Theories, fit and the formation of stereotype content by Brown, Patricia Margaret
Theories, fit and the formation of 
stereotype content
Patricia Margaret Brown 
B. Comm. (University of New South Wales) 
B. Sc. (Hons.) (Australian National University)
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the 
Australian National University.
Division of Psychology, Australian National University. March 1999.
Certificate of Authorship
Aside from the normal intellectual debts inherent in all scientific 
endeavour, the research reported in this thesis was carried out by myself 
without the collaboration of others. This work has not been submitted for a 
higher degree to any other university or institution.
Patricia Margaret Brown
Acknowledgements
I would like to begin by acknowledging the contribution of John Turner in supervising 
this thesis. I thank him for his valuable advice, insight and patience. I would also like to 
thank Craig McGarty, Alex Haslam and Penny Oakes who acted as advisors on this 
thesis. Thanks also go to the administrative and technical staff in the Division of 
Psychology at the Australian National University for their support and assistance.
The support and companionship of fellow PhD students has also been invaluable in 
completing this thesis. I thank my ‘cohort’ of Brenda Morrison, Rina Onorato, Kate 
Reynolds, Angie Khoo, Rachael Eggins and Diana Grace for providing lively 
discussions and coffee breaks.
I would also like to acknowledge the support that my parents have given me over the 
course of my education. They have always encouraged me to learn and to do what 
would make me happy, and I thank them for that. Sadly my mother is not alive to see 
this thesis completed but I know that she would have been proud of it.
Finally, I would like to thank my partner Grahame Legge, not only for his invaluable 
help with formatting, but for his ongoing encouragement, support and patience. I very 
much look forward to spending more time with him after the completion of this thesis.
iv
Abstract
This thesis examines the social psychological processes underlying the formation of 
stereotype content. A review is presented which examines the stereotyping literature 
with respect to the issue of content and its formation. Chapter 2 reviews ‘early’ accounts 
of stereotyping taking us until around the late 1970s. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 review 
‘contemporary’ accounts of stereotyping and stereotype content. We have broadly 
categorized these into three main approaches: the social cognition approach, collective 
approaches (e.g., social representations theory) and interactionist approaches (e.g., self­
categorization theory).
Two key issue are identified from this review: the role of top-down (or theory-driven) 
versus bottom-up (data-driven) processes in determining stereotype content, and the role 
of individual cognitive versus social/collective factors in determining content. These 
issues are discussed in Chapter 6 and an account of the formation of stereotype content 
(derived from self-categorization theory) is presented. This account argues that content 
reflects an interaction between both theory and data, and individual and collective 
factors. The ‘accessibility x fit’ hypothesis, which has previously been applied to 
category salience, is applied to category and content formation. More specifically, it is 
proposed that stereotype content formation reflects the application of background 
knowledge and theories to the representation and interpretation of a stimulus reality 
within a specific comparative context.
The empirical chapters of the thesis (Chapters 7-11) outline a series of seven 
experiments designed to test the above proposal. Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 4 consider the 
role of fit (both comparative and normative) in determining stereotype content. 
Experiment 5 also considers the role of fit in content formation; in addition, it examines 
the effects of generating an explanatory theory upon stereotype content. Experiment 6 
manipulates different types of background theories and examines the impact upon 
content and the interpretation of category-attribute fit. Finally, Experiment 7 seeks to 
link theories to salient self-categorizations and examines the effects of different theories 
on judgements of prototypicality and content.
The findings of these experiments are considered with respect the theoretical account 
proposed and discussed in relation to their implications concerning the nature of 
content, the categorization process, category-attribute fit, and the nature of shared 
theories and knowledge.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction and Overview
This thesis aims to investigate the processes by which stereotype content forms. For the 
purposes of this thesis, stereotyping is defined as “the process of ascribing 
characteristics to people on the basis of their group memberships” (Oakes, Haslam & 
Turner, 1994, p. 1). The content of a stereotype is defined in relation to both the extent 
to which, and the way in which, we see a group of people as similar to each other. 
Content goes beyond saying that a group of people are alike — it tells us how they are 
alike (and how they are different from other groups of people). As such, content can be 
thought of as the meaning or substance of a stereotype. However any group of people 
can be, in principle, described many different ways and by many different attributes. For 
example, we might just as easily describe Australians, at different times, as laconic or 
loud, apathetic or passionate. Of the almost infinite number of possible descriptions for 
a group why do only some of these form part of the group’s stereotype? At any time 
what factors determine how we describe the members of a social group? Are these 
descriptions based on our observations of that group’s behaviour, our expectations about 
how that group should behave, or some combination of the two? These are the general 
questions that this thesis seeks to address.
The literature on stereotyping in social psychology is vast; however, references to 
stereotype content, especially over the last few decades, are somewhat more scant. 
While this thesis focuses upon stereotype content specifically rather than the more 
general issues concerning stereotyping, the latter necessarily inform our understanding 
of the former. It is therefore useful to contextualise issues concerning content within 
more general trends in stereotyping research. To that end, in this opening chapter we 
begin by providing a broad historical overview of social psychological research into 
stereotyping drawing out the implications for content. While such a review does not aim 
to be exhaustive (for recent reviews see Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Leyens, Yzerbyt & 
Schadron, 1994; Oakes et al., 1994; see also the recent edited books of Macrae, Stangor
2& Hewstone, 1996; Spears, Oakes, Ellemers & Haslam, 1997), it aims to draw out the 
key theoretical and empirical issues that have relevance to the topic of stereotype 
content. Following this review we look in more detail at the issue of stereotype content, 
why it is an important topic for further investigation, and possible ways in which this 
issue can be addressed. We conclude this chapter by providing an overview of the aims 
and structure of this thesis.
Overview of stereotyping research
The introduction of the term ‘stereotype’ as a social scientific concept is generally 
credited to Walter Lippmann (1922). In a book concerned more with political and 
sociological than psychological issues, Lippmann outlined the first theoretical account 
of stereotypes and stereotyping. Lippmann used the term ‘stereotype’ to refer to a fixed 
or preconceived view about any public object including, but not restricted to, social 
groups. He considered the world to be “altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting 
for direct acquaintance” and, because of this, we have to “reconstruct it on a simpler 
model before we can manage with it” (p. 16). Lippmann argued that the way we see or 
perceive things is modified by our stereotypes with the result being that we do not 
always see the world in an accurate way. He conceptualised stereotypes as cognitive 
structures or “pictures in our heads” and commented that “the pictures inside people’s 
heads do not automatically correspond with the world outside”(p. 31).
While Lippmann considered stereotypes to be cognitive structures whose chief function 
was to make the world more simple to deal with, he did not see them as neutral or 
asocial. Indeed, he considered that they were shaped by our culture and our “moral 
codes”. Likewise, he considered that they served to defend our position in society and to 
justify and rationalise certain views and behaviours. While Lippmann considered 
stereotypes to be generally inaccurate, overgeneralised, “loaded with preference” and 
difficult to change, he was not completely damning of them and commented that “the 
abandonment of all stereotypes for a wholly innocent approach to experience would 
impoverish human life” (p. 90). Like many researchers who were to follow, Lippmann 
had difficulty reconciling what appeared to be the inevitability and usefulness of
3stereotyping with what he considered to be an undesirable outcome — namely invalid 
content. Ultimately, “what matters is the character of the stereotypes” (p. 90) and 
Lippmann considered that the character was generally wrong.
While Lippmann provided the first theoretical account of stereotyping, the first 
empirical study of stereotype content did not appear until a decade later. Katz and 
Braly’s (1933) investigation into the racial stereotypes held by Princeton students was 
chiefly concerned with understanding and documenting prejudice. They found a high 
degree of consensus in terms of the traits their subjects used to characterise their own 
and other national groups. Given that many subjects had no contact with the groups they 
were stereotyping Katz and Braly concluded that the stereotypes reflected shared 
“public attitudes” about racial groups.
Following on from Katz and Braly, a number of studies investigated the content of 
stereotypes, mainly of racial or national groups (for reviews see Haslam, 1990; Oakes et 
al., 1994). The Katz-Braly checklist method became the main experimental paradigm 
used in such studies. These studies tended to focus on cataloguing the content of various 
stereotypes and considering properties such as their sharedness and stability over time. 
Theoretically, it was assumed that stereotype content arose from some broad socio­
cultural influences which were not clearly articulated. Likewise, it was generally 
assumed that the content of stereotypes was inaccurate, rigid and difficult to change. 
However, while some studies demonstrated stability in stereotype content, others 
revealed the sensitivity and flexibility of stereotype content. For example, a number of 
studies showed that stereotype content could change with changes in social context and 
intergroup relations (e.g., Buchanan, 1951; Meenes, 1943; Seago, 1947) and with 
changes in comparative context (e.g., Diab, 1963a, 1963b).
Such studies suggested that stereotypes could have some basis in fact, and a strand of 
research emerged which sought to test the validity of stereotype content by attempting 
to establish objective measures against which stereotypic beliefs could be assessed. For 
example, a number of studies found some correspondence between stereotypes of a
4group and that group’s own stereotype of itself (e.g., Bogardus, 1950; Campbell, 1967; 
Triandis & Vassiliou, 1967; Vinacke, 1949). The results of these studies led a number 
of researchers to conclude that the content of stereotypes may contain a ‘kernel of truth’. 
This position implied that stereotype content may be based, to some degree, on the 
direct and accurate observation of the behaviours of social groups (this idea is discussed 
further in Chapter 2).
While this research was focussed on both describing the content of stereotypes and 
assessing its validity, it had little to say about the psychological processes underlying 
stereotyping. However, accounts of prejudice with their basis in psychodynamic theory 
provided explanations for stereotyping in terms of factors located within the individual 
(e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson & Sanford, 1950; Dollard, Doob, Miller, 
Mowrer & Sears, 1939). Overall, these accounts viewed prejudice as the result of an 
abnormal and pathological process located within the individual. A person’s view of 
outgroups was argued to reflect their individual needs and desires, and to derive from 
psychodynamic processes such as projection and justification. Needless to say, the 
outcome of these processes (content) was considered to be an inaccurate reflection of 
reality.
In 1952 Asch commented that the earlier, content-based investigations “establish the 
sociological fact that there is substantial agreement in the characterisation of ethnic and 
national groups. But the failure to use psychological analysis leaves the problem at an 
unsatisfactory point” (p. 234). The 1950s saw the emergence of theoretical accounts of 
stereotyping which challenged the content-based approaches, the personality-based 
approaches and the assumption that stereotyping was an irrational and faulty process. 
These accounts emphasised the importance of group memberships and intergroup 
relations in the development of stereotypes (e.g., Asch, 1952; Fishman, 1956; Sherif & 
Sherif, 1953; Sherif, 1967; Vinacke, 1957). Allport (1954) put forward a more cognitive 
argument which related stereotyping to the process of categorization. He suggested that 
categorization was a rational and necessary process which serves to simplify the 
perception of the world, and emphasised the importance of in- and outgroup
5memberships in the formation of categories and the values associated with those 
categories.
It can be seen that a view of stereotyping was emerging which was dissatisfied with the 
content-based studies which merely described stereotypes without attempting to explain 
how their content came about (in practice, however, most empirical work continued to 
focus on content). Likewise, accounts based on individual factors were considered 
inadequate. A number of researchers were questioning whether the stereotyping process 
was an irrational or pathological one based in the individual. Instead, group-based 
processes were beginning to be considered important, especially the role of values 
derived from one’s membership of certain social groups. Finally, stereotyping was 
beginning to be conceptualised as a normal cognitive process which was linked to 
categorization.
This link between stereotyping and categorization was brought to the forefront of 
stereotyping research by Henri Tajfel. His work was heavily influenced by the ‘New 
Look’ tradition which emphasised the role of values in categorization and perception. 
He sought to provide an account of stereotyping that incorporated both cognitive and 
group-based factors. A 1963 study by Tajfel and Wilkes showed that when stimuli are 
divided into categories that correlate with their characteristics (such as line length), the 
difference between stimuli in different categories in terms of their characteristics is 
perceptually accentuated. The fact that this accentuation was observed for non-social 
categories suggested that it was part of ‘normal’ cognitive functioning. Tajfel spelled 
out the implications of these effects for stereotyping in a 1969 paper entitled “Cognitive 
Aspects of Prejudice”. In this he stressed that the cause of prejudice could be found in 
adaptive cognitive functioning, common to all. In addition to the finding that the 
categorization of stimuli into different groups led to accentuation effects, Tajfel also 
found that social categorization alone, under certain conditions, could lead to ingroup 
bias. This extended the Sherifs’ account which argued that such discrimination arose 
from intergroup conflict. Tajfel produced evidence (Tajfel, Flament, Billig & Bundy, 
1971) that a minimal categorization of subjects into groups was sufficient to produce
6discrimination in favour of ingroup members and against outgroup members under 
certain conditions. This finding suggested that stereotype content is to some extent 
determined by the ingroup-outgroup distinction (see Doise, Csepeli, Dann, Gouge, 
Larsen & Ostell, 1972).
Tajfel’s findings with respect to categorization implied that stereotyping was produced 
by a normal cognitive process. This led ultimately to a surge in stereotyping research 
which had a very cognitive emphasis. Generally, from the 1970s onwards, mainstream 
stereotyping research moved away from studying content and towards examining 
process, and criticisms were made of the dominant experimental paradigm, namely the 
Katz-Braly checklist (e.g., Brigham, 1971). Likewise, many researchers were shying 
away from trying to establish the validity or otherwise of stereotype content, assuming 
rather that it is biased.
The 1970s saw the beginnings of what has been termed the social cognitive approach to 
stereotyping. This approach has emphasised the role of cognitive processes in 
stereotyping and has largely ‘borrowed’ paradigms from the cognitive domain and 
applied them to the social. The social cognitive approach attempts to understand the role 
of cognitive structures and processes in the perception of groups and group members 
(Hamilton, Stroessner & Driscoll, 1994). Cognitive processes are assumed to operate in 
a universal fashion regardless of the contents of cognition. In this sense, stereotype 
content became a less important object of study. Like Lippmann, more than fifty years 
previously, this position has proposed that the perceptual world is too complex for 
perceivers to make sense of fully; thus, we need to take cognitive shortcuts in order to 
conserve scarce information processing capacity. These shortcuts lead to biases in 
perception — the result of these is stereotyping. Also echoing Lippmann, stereotypes 
are conceptualised as “pictures in our heads”. Hamilton and Trolier (1986), in a review 
of social cognition and stereotyping, defined a stereotype as:
a cognitive structure that contains the perceiver’s knowledge, beliefs, and
expectancies about some human group, (p. 133)
7Thus, a perceiver’s knowledge, beliefs, and expectancies about social groups (or the 
content of the stereotype) are assumed to be stored within some cognitive structure (e.g., 
in the form of a prototype or schema) and to be activated by appropriate cues. Such 
content initially becomes associated with a stereotype via direct individual observations 
of social group members, filtered by cognitive biases, or via social learning, although 
these processes are not well articulated within this approach. Content is applied to a 
social judgement when there is an appropriate match or fit (in terms of similarity) 
between the stimulus object and the stored stereotype. The emphasis in this approach 
has been on individual cognitive processes and biases, and the product of stereotyping 
(content) has generally been considered to be also biased and overgeneralised.
While in the 1970s and ‘80s the mainstream research focus had moved to examining 
individual cognitive processes, other approaches, mainly from a European perspective, 
have been concerned with the more collective aspects of stereotyping and its content. 
For example, work from a social representations perspective has focussed on the content 
of shared beliefs about social groups (e.g., Augoustinos, 1991; Augoustinos & Walker, 
1995; Hewstone, Jaspars & Lalljee, 1982). Based upon Moscovici’s (1984) social 
representation concept, this view is critical of individualistic and cognitive-based 
approaches, and argues that stereotype content derives from societal influences, such as 
the media, social roles and social structure, rather individual direct contact. Related 
research is emerging which emphasises the importance of stereotype content and its 
consensuality, and the social functions served by stereotyping (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 
1994; Yzerbyt, Rocher & Schadron, 1997). Discursive approaches (e.g., Billig, Condor, 
Edwards, Gane, Middleton & Radley, 1988; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; see also Reicher, 
Hopkins & Condor, 1997), which emphasise the role of language in categorization and 
stereotyping, are also critical of a purely cognitive analysis. These approaches 
emphasise both the variability of content and that it reflects the context and functions of 
communication. Likewise, researchers from within the social cognition approach itself 
have recently moved towards emphasising the pragmatic and social-functional aspects
8of stereotyping beyond cognitive simplification (Fiske, 1992, 1993; Fiske & Leyens, 
1997; Leyens et al., 1994; Operario & Fiske, 1999).
Around the same time as the development of the social cognition perspective and the 
collective perspectives outlined above was the emergence of an interactionist approach 
to stereotyping, typified by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) and 
subsequently self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 
1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994). This theoretical perspective has built 
upon Tajfel’s earlier work and has also been critical of the cognitive perspective for 
ignoring the role of social and group-based factors in stereotyping. Work grounded in 
this approach has gone some way towards addressing the social aspects of stereotyping 
and moving towards a theoretical analysis of stereotype content. Indeed, Linssen and 
Hagendoorn (1994) comment that:
Of all process-oriented theories of stereotyping, self-categorization theory is most
prone to predicting stereotype content, (p. 165)
This approach combines some aspects of both the cognitive approach and the more 
collective approaches, and has attempted to present an integrated, interactionist theory 
that includes an analysis of cognitive, motivational and social factors (and the 
interaction between these factors) in stereotyping. Importantly, this approach considers 
stereotyping to be a ‘psychologically’ valid reflection of social reality (see Oakes et al., 
1994; Oakes & Turner, 1990) and moves research towards considering content as 
meaningfully produced.
Very briefly, this perspective argues that stereotyping has its basis in the categorization 
of social groups. The dimensions on which groups are categorized (and stereotyped) 
depend both on comparative differences between the group being stereotyped and other 
relevant comparison groups (this idea has been termed comparative fit), and the types of 
differences we would expect to find between these groups in terms of our expectations, 
broad background knowledge and theories (normative fit). The other important variable 
is perceiver readiness which refers to how ‘ready’ we are to use a given category and 
depends on factors such as the perceiver’s motivations, values and goals. Importantly,
9normative fit is not considered to be a fixed set of prior expectations associated with a 
category that are ‘matched’ with the comparative differences we perceive between 
categories. Rather, normative fit is argued to be flexible and is determined by context, 
and by background theories and knowledge. Thus, fit is not argued to be between a 
fixed stored category and aspects of the perceived data but rather between the data and a 
category that is actively constructed to match both the comparative and normative 
aspects of that data in interaction with perceiver readiness. In this perspective, then, the 
content of social categories (including self-categories) is an “interactive product of 
motives and expectations, knowledge and reality” (Turner & Onorato, 1999, p. 31).
It can be seen from the above review that while the content issue has sunk from 
prominence in mainstream research it has always been ‘waiting in the wings’ to make a 
reappearance on centre stage, and has been implicitly (if not explicitly) dealt with. 
Indeed, recently there has been somewhat of a revival of interest in the content of 
stereotypes from the social cognitive perspective, and an acknowledgment that previous 
accounts have focussed too exclusively on process. In the next section we consider 
some of the reasons for this revived interest and discuss the importance of stereotype 
content as an area of research.
Revival of the content issue
The renewed interest in stereotype content is illustrated by the following comments 
from some recent influential writings on stereotyping from different perspectives which 
indicate a recognition that the content issue has been overlooked:
[the question of] the determinants of the specific content of a group stereotype ... 
is one that has been relatively neglected by social cognitive research. (Hamilton, 
Stroessner & Driscoll, 1994, p. 20)
... issues of process have recently tended to outweigh issues of content in the areas 
of stereotypes and stereotyping, and as a result less is known than we would like 
about the exact content of social-group representations. (Stangor & Lange, 1994, 
p. 393)
... as the cognitive analysis has progressed, important issues of actual stereotype 
content ... have slipped from the social psychologists’ agenda. (Oakes, Haslam & 
Turner, 1994, p. 7, emphasis in original)
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Another aspect of stereotyping that, surprisingly, has been neglected is the specific 
content of group stereotypes. (Zebrowitz, 1996, p. 79)
Likewise, there has been an increasing recognition that stereotype content matters. This 
is perhaps not surprising given that many stereotyping researchers are originally 
motivated to study stereotyping by what they see as unfair and inaccurate stereotype 
content being applied. Most obviously stereotype content is important because it is 
linked to prejudice — there are important social, moral and ethical differences between, 
for example, viewing Australian Aborigines as under-privileged versus lazy. From the 
social cognition perspective content has often been ignored because stereotyping 
processes are assumed to operate in a universal way regardless of content. However, 
there is an increasing acknowledgment that even if content does not influence process it 
does influence subsequent behaviour towards social group members and may contribute 
to the self-fulfilling nature of many stereotypes (e.g., Snyder, 1981).
Why does it matter if people in a group are seen as nurturant or lazy? The most 
obvious reason is that social interactions are likely to be affected. Regardless of 
whether “lazy” or “nurturant” have the same effects on processing information 
about people, we are likely to behave differently to a nurturant person than a lazy 
person, or perhaps seeks more interactions with one than the other. Thus, 
stereotype content is important in the social worlds we all inhabit .... (Schneider, 
1996, p. 428)
Thus, according to this argument, the content of stereotypes influences our behaviour 
towards social groups which can ultimately feed back into the content of the original 
stereotype.
Other commentators are arguing that content matters because of the consensual nature 
of many of our stereotypes (e.g., social representations theory) and because content 
reflects the social and ideological functions served by stereotyping (e.g., Hoffman & 
Hurst, 1990; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Yzerbyt et al., 1997: see also Tajfel, 1981). 
Understanding the origins and nature of stereotype content can help us to understand the 
social functions served by stereotypes and the social structure which they reflect. This 
position is also beginning to be acknowledged by researchers from the social cognitive 
perspective:
1 1
It matters that stereotypes of Blacks include “lazy”, “athletic” and “musical” 
rather than some other set of traits, both because these beliefs are involved in 
determining the social status of Blacks within a society and because these beliefs 
are determined by the social position of Blacks. (Stangor & Schaller, 1996, p. 17, 
emphasis in original)
While those coming from both an individual-cognitive and more collective perspective 
have recently argued for the importance of including stereotype content in their 
analyses, others have suggested that the two perspectives need to be integrated to 
achieve a more complete understanding of stereotyping and stereotype content (e.g., 
Haslam, 1997; Stangor & Schaller, 1996). Oakes, Haslam and Turner end their 1994 
book on stereotyping by calling for further progress on an integrative theory of 
stereotyping that takes into account stereotype content:
We believe that a social psychological metatheory of cognition will do much to 
advance the prospects for a productive integration of theories of the cognitive 
form and the social content of stereotypes and it is this integration that is surely 
the next major task for stereotyping researchers, (p. 213, emphasis in original)
They argue that stereotyping is not a biased process based on information-processing 
factors that inaccurately reflect stimulus reality. Rather, they consider stereotyping to be 
a psychologically valid and rational process that allows perceivers to make sense of the 
stimulus world. Stereotype content is argued to be the product of a meaningful and valid 
process that reflects an interaction between cognitive factors and socially shared 
knowledge. From this perspective content matters not only because it is valid, 
meaningful, collectively shared, and functional, but also because understanding content 
can further inform us about process.
The time appears ripe to reconsider stereotype content as an important topic in 
stereotyping research. The point is not to throw away the cognitive analysis (because it 
has tended to neglect content) but rather to add to it by introducing the importance of 
social variables. The challenge is to produce an account of stereotype content that 
includes both cognitive and social factors in an interactive and integrative fashion. 
Indeed, as early as 1981 Tajfel summed up the current challenge as follows:
The traditions of social psychological research on stereotypes originate primarily 
from two sources: the descriptive one, consisting of a detailed analysis of the
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contents of stereotypes; and the cognitive one which emphasises ... the individual 
cognitive processes. These two traditions have not, however, come together to 
work towards the construction of a theory of contents of stereotypes as shared by 
social groups. (1981, pp. 159-160, emphasis in original)
Aims and outline of thesis
In this thesis we hope to go some way towards meeting the above challenge and 
producing an account of stereotype content that takes into account both cognitive 
factors, and broader social factors such as group memberships, values, motivations, 
background knowledge and theories, and ideologies. Within such a model, we will 
argue that stereotypes are not merely cognitive devices which filter the stimulus world 
and reduce information-processing demands, but rather they are motivated and 
purposeful social tools which serve personal, social and ideological functions (cf. Fiske, 
1992, 1993; Operario & Fiske, 1999). This thesis aims to advance our understanding of 
stereotype content and how it forms.
There have been very few (if any) attempts to consider extensively and systematically 
the issue of stereotype content formation via a review of the stereotyping literature. 
Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis aim to provide a thorough review of this literature 
focussing on what it can tell us about stereotype content. This message is, at times, 
implicit rather than explicit and needs to be drawn out. Chapter 2 covers ‘early’ 
approaches to stereotype content taking us up until around the late 1970s. This review 
includes the checklist studies, the ‘kernel of truth’ debate, early personality approaches 
to prejudice, early theoretical accounts of stereotyping, and Tajfel’s work on values, 
identity and categorization. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 consider ‘modern’ or ‘contemporary’ 
approaches to stereotype content from the late 1970s onwards. Broadly speaking there 
have been three dominant approaches to stereotyping and stereotype content: 
individualistic approaches that have focussed on individual cognitive processes in 
stereotyping largely to the exclusion of content issues (e.g., the social cognition 
approach); collective approaches that have emphasised content and its shared nature and 
have been critical of individualistic cognitive accounts (e.g., social representations 
theory, discursive approaches); and interactionist accounts that have emphasised the role 
of both cognitive and social factors in producing stereotype content and have attempted
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to integrate the two levels of analysis (e.g., self-categorization theory). Chapter 3 covers 
research from the social cognition perspective which has been the dominant approach to 
stereotyping in the last two decades. Chapter 4 covers collective approaches and 
Chapter 5 interactionist approaches, which have both offered criticisms of, and 
alternatives to, the dominant social cognition paradigm.
While Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 attempt to identify from the literature the themes and 
issues important in understanding stereotype content, Chapter 6 considers these issues 
in more detail. Broadly speaking, most theorists agree that both ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top- 
down’ processes have important influences on stereotype content. Another way of 
putting this is that stereotype content reflects both aspects of stimulus reality which are 
perceived and the stored knowledge and motivations, needs etc. which the perceiver 
brings with them to any judgement. Despite this apparent consensus there is 
considerable and fundamental divergence concerning the detail of these processes, and 
in Chapter 6 we examine in more detail the different accounts of the formation of 
stereotype content with respect to this issue. Likewise, we discuss the dichotomy in 
much of the literature between the role of individual versus collective or group-based 
factors in the formation of stereotype content. It is concluded that an interactionist 
approach to the formation of stereotype content will prove the most useful and complete 
account. Such an approach is interactionist in two senses: it considers the interaction of 
theory and data, and the interaction of individual cognitive processes and broader social 
factors. We outline our account of the formation of stereotype content derived from self­
categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) with particular emphasis on its account of 
category salience (see Oakes, 1987; Oakes et ah, 1994). This account seeks to explain 
stereotype content as reflecting an interaction between stimulus data, motives and 
background theories and knowledge. It is argued that stereotype content is the motivated 
application of higher-order knowledge to represent and make sense of a given stimulus 
reality in a certain comparative social context (see Turner & Onorato, 1999). We 
articulate in more detail the role of fit in providing the link between data and 
background knowledge which determines (in part) the content produced to describe a
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group in any given context. It is argued that the stereotype content associated with any 
given group is not fixed or stored in our heads waiting to be activated but actively 
constructed ‘on-the-spot’ to reflect both category fit and perceiver readiness. While 
theoretically both fit and perceiver readiness are important, the empirical work of this 
thesis takes the role of fit as its main focus. We also consider the socially-shared nature 
of background knowledge and theories, and how these are tied to salient self­
categorizations. We conclude the chapter by outlining the aims of the thesis, the major 
hypotheses to be tested and the empirical strategy adopted in testing these.
Chapters 7 to 11 are the empirical chapters of the thesis and outline a series of seven 
experiments aimed at clarifying the role of contextual factors, normative fit, and 
background theories and knowledge, in determining stereotype content. The concluding 
chapter (Chapter 12) discusses the major empirical findings of the thesis and considers 
the extent to which our account of the formation of stereotype content extends our 
understanding of this issue. We consider how these findings relate to the arguments put 
forward by the thesis, the significance of these findings and their broader implications. 
These relate to the nature of the categorization process, category-attribute fit, the 
construction of theories, the nature of shared knowledge and stereotype change.
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Chapter 2
Early Approaches to Stereotype Content
This chapter reviews early approaches to stereotype content taking us to approximately 
the end of the 1970s. Initially the chapter covers the early content-based studies based 
on the checklist methodology and the debate about stereotype content containing a 
‘kernel of truth’, personality-based approaches to content, and early group-based 
theoretical approaches. The chapter then provides an overview of Tajfel’s work on 
cognitive processes in stereotyping, and the role of values and of social identity 
processes. We consider the implications of this work for the formation of stereotype 
content. In terms of the overall aims of the thesis (as outlined in the previous chapter) 
the review seeks to identify and elucidate early approaches to, and understanding of, 
stereotype content which more contemporary accounts build upon and often echo. In 
particular, Tajfel’s analysis of the role of categorization and cognitive processes in 
stereotyping has provided the starting point for the major contemporary approaches to 
stereotyping (e.g., the social cognitive approach and self-categorization theory) and as 
such this chapter provides a background for the chapters to follow.
Checklist studies and the ‘kernel of truth’ debate
As discussed in the previous chapter, many of the early empirical studies into 
stereotyping had content as their primary focus. One of the earliest and most frequently 
cited empirical studies was that of Katz and Braly (1933) which sought to catalogue the 
racial stereotypes of 100 Princeton students. They were interested in investigating 
prejudice as a “public attitude”. Students were asked to select, from a previously 
prepared list of 84 adjectives, the traits they thought were most characteristic of 10 
national groups. The groups were: Germans, Italians, Negroes, Irish, English, Jews, 
Americans, Chinese, Japanese and Turks. Subjects were then instructed to go back over 
the lists of words they had chosen and mark five words which seemed to them most 
typical of each group. The results showed a high degree of consensus among subjects in
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terms of the traits assigned to each group. For example, Negroes were characterised as 
superstitious (84% of subjects), lazy (75%) and happy-go-lucky (38%). For Katz and 
Braly, the most interesting finding was that subjects held quite consensual stereotypes 
of groups with which they had had little or no contact:
The degree of agreement among students in assigning characteristics from a list of 
84 adjectives to different races seems too great to be the sole result of the 
students’ contacts with members of these races, (p. 288)
However they argued that the individual experience of students may influence 
stereotypic judgements “but it probably does so to confirm the original stereotype which 
he [sic] has learned” (p. 288). Thus, the authors suggested that “the knowledge upon 
which students’ assigned characteristics to various races has both a private and personal 
basis and a public or cultural basis” (p. 289). Stereotype content was argued to derive 
partly from direct contact with other groups but this contact was influenced by “public 
attitudes” already held about these groups.
Subsequently, a number of studies investigated the content of stereotypes using Katz 
and Braly’s checklist paradigm. Many of these studies looked at stereotype content in 
the context of changing intergroup relations and intergroup conflict (such as World War 
II). For example, Meenes (1943) considered stereotypes of the 10 groups used in the 
original Katz and Braly study both before (December, 1935) and after Pearl Harbour 
(February, 1942). Meenes suggested that there was considerable consistency in the traits 
across this period pointing to the rigidity of stereotype content:
There is more resemblance than differences in the 1935 and 1942 stereotypes: 
even those that have changed most, show about half the adjectives common to 
both years, (p. 332)
However there were changes in content especially of the stereotypes of those groups 
involved in the War. For example, in 1942 Germans were characterised as more 
nationalistic, aggressive, revengeful, cruel and treacherous, and less intelligent and 
industrious compared to 1935. Likewise, for the Japanese the top three traits chosen 
went from intelligent, industrious and tradition-loving in 1935, to sly, treacherous and 
extremely nationalistic in 1942 (see also Buchanan, 1951; Seago, 1947). In a similar
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vein Sinha and Upadhyaya (1960) investigated the change and persistence in the 
stereotypes of Indian university students towards Indians and eight other ethnic groups 
in the context of a current Chinese-Indian border dispute. Using a Katz-Braly type 
checklist, stereotypes were assessed both before and during the dispute. Generally the 
stereotypes were stable across that period with the exception of the Chinese, whose 
stereotype changed dramatically. Their characterisation went from friendly, progressive, 
honest, nationalistic, brave, cultured and active before the dispute, to aggressive, cheats, 
selfish, war-mongers, cruel, shrewd and stupid during the dispute.
Replications of the original Katz and Braly study in 1951 (Gilbert) and again in 1969 
(Karlins, Coffman & Walters) pointed to both stability and change in the stereotypes 
held by three generations of Princeton students. Many of the changes observed were 
explainable in terms of changes in intergroup relations brought about by World War II 
and the Cold War. For example, Gilbert found that characterisations of Germans as 
scientifically-minded, stolid and industrious decreased, and as extremely nationalistic, 
aggressive and arrogant increased, reflecting the events of World War II and the rise of 
Nazism. Gilbert suggests that the students’ stereotypes appear to be “based more on 
cultural and historical realities and less on fictitious caricatures or the prejudices of their 
parents” (p. 252). Karlins, Coffman and Walters (1969) found further changes in 
stereotype content with, for example, the stereotype of the Japanese becoming more 
positive again after being relatively negative following World War II.
Therefore, much evidence emerged from the early checklist studies that stereotype 
content could change to reflect changes in intergroup relations and large scale social 
events. Diab (1963a, 1963b) found that content could also change to reflect changes in 
frame of reference. Using the Katz-Braly method he found significant changes in the 
content of stereotypes held by Arab students in Beirut. For example, Americans were 
characterised more positively when judged in the context of 6 rather than 12 other 
groups, and when judged immediately after Russians rather than Germans (1963a). In a 
second study (1963b) subjects assigned traits to either 13 groups or 5 groups, 4 of which 
were unpopular (‘low anchor’) groups. The stereotype of the French was much more
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positive in the context of the 4 other unpopular groups compared to when it was judged 
among 13 groups. These results suggested that stereotype content is not only sensitive 
to changes in social events and intergroup relations but also to the overall comparative 
context in which groups are judged (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty & Hayes, 1992; 
Oakes et al., 1994).
The emerging evidence that stereotype content could reflect intergroup relations and 
real social changes suggested to some researchers that stereotype content may to some 
extent accurately reflect reality (e.g., Gilbert, 1951). Traditionally, stereotype content 
had been assumed to be, at best, a distorted reflection of reality. As Katz and Braly 
(1935) commented:
A stereotype is a fixed impression, which conforms very little to the facts it
pretends to represent, and results from our defining first and observing second, (p.
181)
Many early studies sought to demonstrate the factual basis or otherwise of stereotypes 
and generally concluded that most stereotypes were inaccurate or overgeneralised (e.g., 
Klineberg, 1951; LaPiere, 1936; Shrieke, 1936). One solution to this problem was seen 
as ascertaining the ‘objective’ truth about the various groups that were subjected to 
stereotyping. Borgadus (1950) called for the collection of ‘sociotypes’ which, unlike 
stereotypes, would be based on objective, scientific method. A number of studies 
attempted to establish the validity of stereotype content by judging it against ‘objective’ 
data and, surprisingly, found that many stereotypes did indeed have some apparent 
validity (eg. consistency between hetero-stereotypes and auto-stereotypes of groups, 
Abate & Berrien, 1967; Borgadus, 1950; Triandis & Vassiliou, 1967; Vinacke, 1949). It 
was concluded by some that stereotypes may be valid in content to some extent and 
contain a ‘kernel of truth’ (see Oakes et al., 1994; Oakes & Reynolds, 1997, for more 
extensive reviews of the ‘kernel of truth’ debate).
At the heart of this argument was the idea that if people came into direct contact with 
other groups, and observed what they were really like, they would form more accurate 
stereotypes reflecting actual differences between groups. Triandis and Vassiliou (1967)
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suggested that as contact between groups increased, correspondence between own and 
other stereotypes would also increase. Prothro and Melikian (1955) considered the 
extent to which stereotype content changes with increased familiarity with the 
stereotyped group. Employing the Katz-Braly technique they investigated the 
stereotypes of Americans (and four other groups — Jews, English, Germans, and 
Japanese) held by Arab students at the University of Beirut. They compared stereotypes 
obtained in May 1951 with those obtained in December 1952 following a large influx of 
Americans as residents and visitors. While the stereotypes of the four other groups were 
largely unchanged across this period the stereotype of the Americans was expanded to 
include the traits sociable, superficial, jolly and simple. The authors conclude that 
“increased familiarity apparently produced the change” (p. 10) implying that stereotype 
content changed in response to direct observation of the Americans’ behaviour.
Campbell (1967) argued that “the greater the real differences between groups ... the 
more likely it is that that feature will appear in the stereotyped imagery each group has 
of the other” (p. 821). He suggested that both anthropological and sociological evidence 
points to the fact that groups do differ in terms of their culture, customs, appearance, 
roles and status. Therefore, we would expect a “grain of truth” in stereotypes that reflect 
these real differences. However, Campbell stressed that the differences perceived 
between groups reflected “social reality” (e.g., intergroup relations) rather than intrinsic, 
unchanging differences between group members (see Oakes & Reynolds, 1997). 
Likewise, while real differences may exist between groups these may be exaggerated in 
some stereotypes (LeVine & Campbell, 1972).
In summary, the early approaches to stereotyping focussed on cataloguing the content of 
stereotypes and on investigating the validity of that content. These approaches have 
been criticised by later researchers on a number of grounds. For example, Brigham 
(1971) has argued that the Katz and Braly checklist paradigm forces subjects into 
thinking in terms of generalisations and categories, and encourages them to choose 
more adjectives and produce more prejudicial responses. Also he believed that it was 
impossible to distinguish between subjects who actually endorse the stereotype and
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those who are just reporting on their knowledge of the traits that persons in a culture 
commonly attribute to an ethnic group. The methodology has also been criticised for 
being highly reactive and susceptible to impression management and social desirability 
effects (Brigham, 1971). In addition, the early cataloguing studies have been criticised 
for focussing on content to the exclusion of psychological process (Asch, 1952; 
Brigham, 1971). Likewise, criticisms have been aimed at those studies attempting to 
find a factual basis for stereotype content or to establish a ‘kernel of truth’ (Brigham, 
1971; Sherif, 1967). It has been questioned how it is possible to have ‘objective’ 
measures of stereotype content and whether scientific or sociological methods are really 
any more value free than the impressions of lay persons. Finally it has been argued that 
the correspondence between stereotypes of a group and that group’s own stereotype 
does not necessarily reflect validity of the stereotype but rather the fact that both groups 
share a common belief and value system from which they derive their stereotypes (e.g., 
Bay ton, 1941;Tajfel, 1972).
Despite these criticisms, and the fact that the early studies were descriptive rather than 
theoretical, they nevertheless contribute to our understanding of stereotype content. 
Firstly, a paradigm (Katz and Braly checklist) was established which is still being 
employed to ascertain the content of stereotypes (e.g., Haslam, Oakes, McGarty, Turner, 
Reynolds & Eggins, 1996; Haslam, Oakes, Turner & McGarty, 1995; Haslam et al., 
1992). Secondly, a number of these studies suggested that stereotype content was 
sensitive to, and reflected, changes in context and intergroup relations. These studies 
also established that stereotype content was shared within groups of people, was 
consensual to a large degree, and that members of a group could hold stereotypic beliefs 
about another group with which they had no direct contact. Finally, the ‘kernel of truth’ 
debate raised the issue of the extent to which stereotype content reflects direct and 
accurate observation as opposed to culturally held attitudes and biases, a debate that 
continues in modern approaches to stereotyping.
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Personality-based approaches
While the checklist studies were mainly descriptive, early theoretical accounts that did 
emerge were largely from within a psychodynamic tradition and located the cause of 
prejudice and the content of prejudicial beliefs within the individual’s personality (e.g., 
Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson & Sanford, 1950; Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer 
& Sears, 1939). The classic account of prejudice arising from personality was the 
authoritarian personality (Adorno et al., 1950). This theory linked prejudice to a certain 
type of personality, named authoritarian, and set about uncovering the factors 
contributing to this personality type. Questionnaires were administered to subjects 
followed by extensive interviews and projective tests with selected subjects. The 
questionnaires included an anti-Semitism scale (A-S), an ethnocentrism scale (E), a 
political and economic conservatism scale (PEC) and a fascism (F) scale. As R. Brown 
(1965) notes, the A-S, E and PEC scales are all concerned with explicit ideology while 
the F-scale is concerned with personality, namely the personality of an authoritarian. 
The researchers argued that an authoritarian personality would coincide with a certain 
set of ideological beliefs. They found positive correlations between scores on the F- 
scale, and those on the A-S scale, the E-scale and the PEC scale, concluding that people 
with potentially fascist personalities were more likely to be prejudiced, both against 
Jews and generally, and to hold conservative political and economic views. From the 
interview data, they found that prejudiced subjects were more likely to engage in rigid 
kinds of thinking, have a high opinion of themselves, and be concerned with status, 
dominance and power. They tended to idolise their parents who in turn were described 
as strict, disciplinarian and punitive.
Therefore, Adorno and colleagues claimed that potential fascists had a particular 
framework of beliefs which were not logically related. However, there was a 
psychological relationship binding these individual beliefs together into a ‘structural 
unit’ in which the elements are interconnected in terms of underlying psychological 
dynamics. It was postulated, based on psychodynamic theory, that the potential fascist 
was repressing underlying ambivalences and projecting negative aspects of the self onto
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outgroups. Thus, as children, the prejudiced are ‘frustrated’ by their authoritarian 
parents. Since they idolise their parents, and because their parents are often physically 
punitive, they must take out their frustration on someone else; consequently, their 
aggression is displaced onto a minority group.
In this account of prejudice, therefore, the content of prejudiced beliefs has its basis in a 
certain type of personality, while this personality in turn has a developmental basis. It 
implies that content is invalid (prejudiced) and does not reflect stimulus reality. While 
this account links prejudice, and the content of prejudiced beliefs, to ideology it 
provides a very individualistic account of ideology — certain personality factors, 
formed in childhood, give rise to certain patterns of beliefs.
While the work on the authoritarian personality has been highly influential, it has also 
been widely criticised on both methodological and theoretical grounds (Altemeyer, 
1988; Billig, 1976; R. Brown, 1965; Christie & Jahoda, 1954; Duckitt, 1992; Pettigrew, 
1958). Perhaps one of the most damaging criticisms of the authoritarian personality is 
that the account fails to adequately explain widespread prejudice such as, for example, 
that experienced during apartheid in South Africa — it is difficult to accept that such 
large numbers of persons had fascist personalities (Duckitt, 1992). This is at odds with 
the findings of many of the checklist studies reviewed above which showed 
considerable consensus in stereotypical beliefs. It also cannot account for the changes in 
stereotype content such as that demonstrated by many of the checklist studies.
R. Brown (1965) has argued that while there is evidence that attitudes of anti-Semitism, 
ethnocentrism and authoritarianism are correlated, this does not show that an 
authoritarian personality causes prejudice. He suggests that the traits of the authoritarian 
may cohere because they are the norms of people with little education and of low 
socioeconomic status (SES). Negative correlations between IQ and education, and 
authoritarianism have been found (Adorno et al., 1950; Hyman & Sheatsley, 1954, cited 
in R. Brown, 1965). Therefore it has been argued that authoritarianism may reflect, and 
be explained in terms of, the norms of a certain group of people (namely uneducated,
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low SES) rather than being a personality syndrome. However, regardless of whether one 
accepts the personality-based account or not, the data from Adorno and colleagues does 
appear to point to a important link between the expression of a certain sets of attitudes 
(or a certain stereotype content) and an ideological standpoint. People are prejudiced 
because this somehow ‘fits in’ with a wider constellation of beliefs.
Early group-based approaches
Around the same time as the publication of “The Authoritarian Personality”, other 
theoretical accounts of stereotyping and prejudice were emerging which were group- 
based rather than individualistic explanations (e.g., Asch, 1952; Fishman, 1956; 
LaViolette & Silvert, 1951; Vinacke, 1956, 1957). Some of these accounts questioned 
whether personality alone could adequately explain stereotyping. Likewise, they 
questioned the assumed link between stereotyping and prejudice, and the assumed 
invalidity of stereotyping and stereotype content. For example, Fishman (1956) argued 
that the process of stereotyping and the contents of stereotypes need to be separated. 
While the process of stereotyping may be rigid, the contents of stereotypes are not 
necessarily. He was critical of the ‘authoritarian personality’ approach to stereotyping, 
in part because it represented the content of stereotyping as ‘culture-free’:
The ‘authoritarian’ type, it must be remembered, not only exists in a certain milieu 
but to some extent because of a certain milieu. (Fishman, 1956, p. 41)
Therefore, Fishman argued that stereotype content reflects culture, and also people’s 
goals, motives, and the patterns of social interaction. As such, it is only as rigid as these 
factors. Likewise, stereotyping reflects the customs and values of not only the 
stereotyped group but also the stereotyping group. Certain stereotype content becomes 
important because it reflects the concerns of one’s own group. Therefore content reflects 
both the groups involved and the relationship between them. However, Fishman hung 
onto the idea that stereotyping is basically an “inferior judgemental process” — which 
may nevertheless produce valid content.
Asch (1952) also objected to the idea that stereotypes are necessarily invalid and 
irrational, or more specifically, to the assumption that every view of groups is
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“subjective and wrong”. He argued rather that groups are real and have real 
psychological properties. In the 1952 text “Social Psychology” he provides detailed 
critiques of both the individualistic and the group mind theses, and presents an elegant 
argument in favour of an interactionist approach. Asch also makes some interesting 
points with respect to attitudes and social beliefs which can be linked to our 
understanding of stereotype content. He argues that “needs and interests are crucial in 
the elaboration of belief and become responsible for similarities and differences 
between groups” (p. 566). Using the example of racial attitudes, Asch argues that these 
do not merely reflect knowledge but other needs and interests, which may “organise 
knowledge in a more inflexible way than the available data warrant, thus protecting it 
from disturbing contradictory observations” (p. 568). Social attitudes reflect our place in 
society. Using the example of racial tensions between white and black Americans in the 
southern USA, he argues that “the racial sentiment of Southerners is only in part 
directed to Negroes: it is also a function of their most significant ties to family, 
neighbourhood and group” (p. 577). To change these views would require both a 
“drastic intellectual reorientation” and “a serious snapping of social bonds”: to reject 
such views would amount to rejecting one’s own ingroup. Likewise, Asch argues that 
while we may reject the southerners’ views as prejudiced, from their point of view they 
make some sense:
Information that alone or in a different context would point to racial equality has a
different meaning in the context of the Southerner’s social field. (Asch, 1952, p.
578)
Therefore, such racial attitudes serve the function of rationalising and defending an 
existing social system, or view of the world.
Like Asch and Fishman, Vinacke (1956, 1957) also rejected the idea that stereotyping is 
necessarily ‘bad’ and made the point that stereotyping is a two-way process reflecting 
both groups involved. While stereotypes had commonly been regarded as a type of 
attitude related to prejudice or authoritarianism, he argued that they should be more 
properly regarded as concept systems that serve to organise experiences as do other 
concepts. Therefore, stereotypes can be regarded neutrally as a special kind of concept,
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a means by which objects (or persons) can be classified on the basis of perceived 
properties facilitating meaningful responses to those objects. This implies there is 
nothing inherently bad in stereotyping any more than in forming concepts of any kind 
(Vinacke, 1957). Vinacke defines concepts as “cognitive organising systems which 
serve to bring pertinent features of past experience to bear upon a present stimulus 
object” (p. 233). Therefore concepts, and by implication stereotypes, determine the 
meaning of objects (and people).
Sherif (Sherif & Sherif, 1953, summarised in Sherif, 1967) also rejected the personality- 
based approaches to stereotyping and prejudice. He saw stereotypes not as “a problem 
of the idiosyncratic hates and unfounded beliefs of a few separated individuals” but as 
“images shared ... by large numbers of persons belonging to the same human grouping” 
(1967, p. 234). In his theory of realistic group conflict, Sherif formulated an account of 
prejudice and intergroup relations in which prejudice was seen as a ‘normal’ and 
widespread phenomenon given the right intergroup conditions. His major argument was 
that intergroup attitudes (such as stereotypes) depend crucially upon the relationship 
between groups. He rejected the idea that stereotypes are ‘false’ or ‘wrong’ as he 
believed this “evades the issue of stereotype formation by definition” (p. 23).
In a series of now famous studies Sherif attempted to demonstrate that stereotypes 
depend upon relationships between groups. More specifically, he hypothesised that 
conflict between groups would lead to negative attitudes or prejudice. His studies 
involved groups of 11 to 12 year old schoolboys who were attending summer camps. 
All boys were carefully screened so that they came from similar racial, religious and 
class backgrounds. One study involved three stages: group formation, intergroup 
conflict and conflict reduction. In the first stage the boys were split into two groups that 
were kept separate from each other. Within these groups, norms of behaviour and ‘mini­
cultures’ quickly evolved. In the second stage the two groups were brought into contact 
with each other in the context of competitive activities defined by goals that both groups 
desired but which only one group could obtain. The two groups quickly formed negative 
attitudes towards the other group. Sherif concludes that these attitudes formed in the
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absence of “cultural, physical or economic differences” and in the absence of 
“maladjusted, neurotic or unstable tendencies” (p. 85). He argues that the sufficient 
condition for the formation of negative stereotypes is the “existence of two groups 
competing for goals that only one group could attain” (p. 85). In the third stage of the 
study the groups were brought together to achieve superordinate goals that required the 
co-operation of both groups, and which both groups desired but could not achieve alone. 
Over time negative attitudes and ingroup bias decreased and the boys began to form 
friendships that cut across group lines.
Sherif’s studies are important for a number of reasons. Firstly, they went against the 
psychodynamic view that prejudice was located within the pathological individual. By 
showing that negative and hostile attitudes could arise in ordinary schoolboys from 
similar backgrounds they showed that prejudice was a normal process arising from 
conflict between groups. In addition, they showed that prejudice was a group 
phenomenon, that stereotypes were shared within groups and arose out of group 
membership. That is, stereotypes are both consensual and collectively produced. The 
summer camp studies showed that stereotypes (and their content) were not fixed and 
resistant to change but flexible and could change with changes in intergroup relations.
Sherif recognised the importance of both history and future goals in the formation of 
stereotypic images. For him the formation of stereotypes about other people was part of 
the process of forming a conception of oneself. The way we define ourselves and our 
group membership will influence the formation of images of other groups that “are 
invariably formulated from the point of view of the in-group’s interests and goals” (p. 
27). We tend to judge other groups using the values of our own group as the standard. 
The categories we place others in are not always neutral and reflect not just similarities 
and differences but the “place of those people relative to us” (p. 30). Thus Sherif viewed 
the content of category descriptions as being evaluative and relative to one’s (and one’s 
group’s) values. The formation of a given content for a person “presupposes that he [sic] 
accepts the content as defining or elaborating his concept of himself and ‘his kind’ in 
relation to other categories of people” (p. 37). Therefore stereotype content involves not
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only defining who other people are but also defining who one’s self is. Given that he 
argued that stereotypes arise from the perspective of one group in relation to another 
group in a specific historical context, Sherif did not see it as fruitful to assess the “truth” 
of stereotype content.
Allport (1954) put forward a more functional and cognitive argument for the use of 
stereotypes. He argued that we need to use categories to help us make sense of the world 
and that categories serve to “engender meaning upon the world”. He related prejudice to 
categorization by suggesting that it arose from an association between categorization 
and differences in value and that the “most important categories a man [sic] has are his 
own personal values” (p. 24). Allport, like Sherif, saw the primary source of these 
values as one’s membership of various ingroups. Things associated with one’s ingroup 
are typically liked and vice versa for those associated with an outgroup. Thus prejudice 
is determined by categorizing a person as belonging to one’s ingroup or to an outgroup. 
Allport noted that ingroups and outgroups may change and in this sense categorization 
was a flexible process. However, he also thought that “in most instances categories are 
stubborn and resist change” and that we are more likely to admit evidence that confirms 
rather than contradicts our beliefs (p. 23). The principle of “least effort” means that 
categories assimilate as much information as they can:
When evidence conflicts with categories it may be distorted (through selection,
accentuation, interpretation) so as to seem to confirm the category, (p. 176)
While Allport argued that “prejudgement” was normal, ultimately he believed that the 
cognitive processes of prejudiced people were different from those of tolerant people. 
Therefore he rejected theories, such as Sherif s, as “too collectivistic” and argued that 
“prejudice is ultimately a problem of personality and development” (p. 41).
While Allport hung on to the notion that prejudice was essentially a personality 
disorder, generally theories were developing the idea that stereotyping was a ‘normal’ 
process and one that served some function. For Allport, that function was to simplify 
and structure the environment. Likewise, Vinacke argued that stereotypes are like 
concepts that “facilitate meaningful responses” to people. A number of researchers were
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arguing that stereotype content reflects the values and position of one’s own group 
(Fishman, Asch, Sherif, Allport), and may therefore serve rationalising, justifying and 
explanatory functions. A major step forward in stereotyping research was the 
recognition that stereotyping and its effects are intimately linked to the cognitive 
process of categorization. While Allport recognised the importance of categorization in 
stereotyping, it is generally acknowledged that it was Henri Tajfel’s research on the 
cognitive aspects of prejudice that provided the impetus for a surge of theoretical work 
which switched the focus of stereotyping research towards cognitive processes and 
away from studying content. Tajfel’s work led to the common view that “the basic 
cognitive process in stereotyping is categorization” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 148). Importantly, 
this work showed that cognitive processes alone (under certain conditions) could be 
responsible for the biases observed in stereotyping and prejudice, and it moved the view 
decidedly away from stereotyping as an abnormal and pathological phenomenon to a 
conception of it as a normal cognitive process. We now turn to a review of that work.
Categorization processes in stereotyping
While Tajfel was influenced by the work of both Allport and Sherif, his work was 
unique in that it was also heavily influenced by Bruner and research from the ‘New 
Look’ tradition (Oakes, 1996; Tajfel, 1980; Turner, 1996). This work was largely 
concerned with investigating the role of values and needs in perception and the 
phenomenon of perceptual overestimation. The ‘New Look’ took a functional view of 
perception, and in particular considered how values and needs of perceivers could 
influence their perceptions, especially estimates of physical magnitudes of stimuli. 
Perhaps one of the most influential and most cited studies from this research movement 
was that of Bruner and Goodman (1947). In this study subjects (10 year olds) were 
asked to make judgements of the size of both coins and of neutral grey cardboard discs. 
Although the coins and discs were exactly the same size, the results showed that 
subjects generally judged the coins to be larger, and this overestimation was greater for 
more valuable coins. In addition, it was found that children from poor backgrounds 
tended to overestimate coin size more than those from more well-off backgrounds.
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The results of this study (although much debated) inspired a flurry of experimental work 
dealing with perceptual overestimation. Tajfel (1957) considered this phenomenon and 
reviewed evidence that ‘motivational’ or ‘value’ variables can have an effect on 
subjects’ perceptual judgements of magnitude. He concluded that where stimuli in a 
series vary concurrently on both a physical dimension and a value dimension, then the 
physical magnitude of the stimuli will be overestimated. Tajfel suggested that this 
‘overestimation’ can be better understood as an accentuation of differences in 
magnitude between objects that differ in value. Accentuating differences in magnitude 
in turn accentuates differences in value. Importantly, these effects were linked to social 
perception:
Many social objects and events are sharply classified in terms of their value or 
relevance. When judgements concerning some quantifiable or rateable aspects of 
stimuli which fall into distinct categories are called for, differences in value or 
relevance cannot fail to influence the quantitative judgements in the direction of 
sharpening the objectively existing differences between the stimuli. (Tajfel, 1957,
p. 202)
These ideas were later elaborated into specific predictions concerning the relationship 
between a ‘value differential’, a ‘classification’ and a ‘physical dimension’ and their 
influence upon absolute judgements (Tajfel, 1959b). In general terms, three points were 
made with respect to when differences on a physical dimension were predicted to be 
accentuated: (a) when variation in a physical dimension of a series of stimuli is 
correlated with a variation in value; (b) when a series of stimuli are classified in such a 
way that they fall into distinct classes; and (c) when a series of stimuli are classified in 
such a way that they fall into distinct classes and the classification is of inherent value 
or emotional significance to the perceiver (Tajfel, 1959b, pp. 20-21).
Tajfel (1959b) suggested that these principles, which apply to judgements of physical 
aspects of stimuli, should also apply to judgements of abstract attributes. A certain 
amount of evidence already existed for these predictions. For example, the Bruner and 
Goodman (1947) study demonstrated perceptual accentuation on a physical dimension 
that was correlated with a value dimension (point a above). A study by Secord, Bevan 
and Katz (1956) showed accentuation on a physical dimension when stimuli are divided
30
into categories that have inherent value for the perceiver (point c above). They had 
subjects judge 15 photographs, 10 of black Americans and 5 of white Americans on 
both physical and personality traits. Subjects were comprised of three groups. Two 
came from 47 students from high schools in Atlanta, who were identified as either 
prejudiced against blacks or neutral. A third presumably pro-black group of subjects 
comprised 11 members of a Jewish organisation, B’nai B’rith, which stood for 
‘tolerance and brotherhood’. Results showed that the prejudiced subjects accentuated 
physical characteristics compared to the neutral group. (While the neutral group 
accentuated physical characteristics more than members of B’nai B’rith this difference 
did not reach significance). The authors comment that: “Negroidness is a negative 
value, and as such is accentuated or made more pronounced by our prejudiced judges” 
(Secord et al., 1956, p. 82).
Likewise, a study, by Lambert, Hodgson, Gardner and Fillenbaum (1960) showed 
accentuation on dimensions that correlate with values. Their study concerned English- 
and French-speaking Canadian subjects making judgements about English and French 
speakers. The targets consisted of four bilingual speakers who read both English and 
French versions of a short passage. Subjects had to rate targets on a number of 
personality traits. The results showed, somewhat surprisingly, that both the English and 
the French subjects evaluated the English subjects more favourably, with the French 
subjects showing even more favouritism than the English subjects. Tajfel (1959a) 
argues that the classification into French and English, in the Canadian context, is 
correlated with socio-economic status. For the French, being the less dominant group, 
this division is likely to be more important or valued. Therefore, “the prediction could 
be made that the classification into French and English would determine larger shifts in 
both directions for the French group on those dimensions which are correlated with the 
‘value’ or relevant aspect of this classification — the socio-economic status” (Tajfel, 
1959a, p. 89). The results showed that the French subjects accentuated the differences 
between the two groups on those traits that are relevant to socio-economic status more
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than the English subjects. French subjects did not show this tendency on traits not 
related to socio-economic status — that is non-valued traits (see also Cheyne, 1970).
Thus, evidence existed regarding the link between accentuation of differences in 
physical dimensions when these were correlated with differences in value. The much 
cited study of Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) demonstrated that these accentuation effects 
could occur in the absence of value differentials. The study set out to test the prediction 
encompassed in point (b) above. It considered how the manner in which a series is 
classified influences quantitative judgements. Subjects in three conditions were 
presented with a series of lines that differed from each other in length. In a ‘classified’ 
condition the four shorter lines were labelled ‘A’ and the four longer lines were labelled 
‘B \ In an ‘unclassified’ condition the lines were unlabelled, and in a ‘random’ 
condition there was no relationship between the lines and the label attached to them. 
Although the differences in length were a constant ratio across all three conditions, 
subjects in the ‘classified’ condition exaggerated the differences in line length between 
the two groups of lines compared to the other conditions. Subjects in this condition also 
appeared to minimise the differences in line length within each group, although this 
finding was not statistically significant.
This study demonstrated that when objects are divided into groups or categories that 
correlate with their characteristics (such as line length), the difference between the 
objects in terms of these characteristics is perceptually accentuated, whereas when there 
is no correlation between categories and characteristics this accentuation does not occur. 
The authors argue that the findings can be considered a “simplified exercise in 
stereotyping”:
An essential feature of stereotyping is that of exaggerating some differences 
between groups classified in a certain way, and of minimising the same 
differences within groups. It may be important to note that these effects were 
shown to exist in the present experiment despite the relative ease and simplicity of 
judgements. ... There is therefore the possibility that the phenomenon of 
stereotyping, occurring in situations where judgements are usually neither easy or 
simple and where classifications have been built through long and continuously 
repeated past experience, is no more than an exaggeration of the effects found in 
the present experiments. (Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963, p. 113, emphasis in original)
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The fact that this accentuation of the similarities within groups and differences between 
groups was observed for non-social categories suggested that such biases were part of 
normal cognitive functioning and that stereotyping could be “considered as an 
inescapable adjunct to the human activity of categorizing. As such, it is neither ‘bad’ or 
‘good’; it is there, and presumably it serves some purpose in our continuous efforts to 
simplify the world around us” (Tajfel, 1963, p. 8).
The significance of these findings and the link between cognitive processes and 
prejudice was spelt out in more detail by Tajfel in 1969. Three cognitive processes in 
prejudice were discussed: categorization, assimilation (i.e., how we come to learn the 
content associated with social groups including our own) and the search for coherence 
(i.e., explaining intergroup differences). The categorization process was argued to be 
especially important, with its major function being to introduce simplicity and order: 
“the process of categorization provides the mold which gives shape to intergroup 
attitudes” (Tajfel, 1969, p. 91).
With respect to the link between categorization and stereotyping, Tajfel (1969), building 
on the Tajfel and Wilkes finding, argued that judgements of personality characteristics 
(as in stereotyping) are comparative judgements. Through personal and cultural 
experience, personality dimensions become associated with classifications of people 
into groups. When a classification (such as into social groups) is correlated with a 
continuous dimension (which personality traits can be treated as) there is a tendency to 
exaggerate differences on that dimension between classes and to minimise these 
difference within classes. It is those attributes (or personality characteristics) that are 
correlated with the division into distinct categories that become accentuated when we 
form impressions of groups (Tajfel, 1969). In the case of social stereotypes there will be 
“the subjective accentuation of differences in relevant dimensions between classes of 
stimuli and their subjective reduction within each class” (Tajfel, 1969, pp. 84-5, 
emphasis in original).
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The results of the Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) study implied that the perception of 
differences between groups and similarities within groups (or stereotype content) 
reflects a correlation or association between attributes and the division into categories. 
Importantly, it was argued that accentuation should only occur on relevant dimensions, 
that is, those dimensions that are already somehow associated with the division into 
categories. For example, a study by Tajfel, Sheikh and Gardner (1964) demonstrated 
that members of an ethnic group would be perceived as more similar with respect to 
traits which form a part of the stereotype of that group compared to traits which are not 
part of the group’s stereotype. Subjects listened to four interviews, a Canadian male and 
an Indian male discussing films, and a Canadian male and an Indian male discussing 
their favourite books. There were two groups of subjects. The initial group listened to 
the interviews and then rated each interviewee on 25 semantic differential scales. A 
week later, the same group of subjects rated ‘People from India’ and ‘Canadians’ on the 
same scales. The second group of subjects were presented with 25 adjectives taken from 
the scales used previously and determined by the ratings previously given, and asked to 
select those which they thought described most Canadians and most people from India. 
It was predicted that the judged differences between the ‘interviewees’ from the same 
national group should be smaller on traits judged to be typical of these groups compared 
to traits judged to be less typical. The results showed that individuals (interviewees) 
belonging to the same ethnic group were judged more similar to each other on traits that 
had been judged to be stereotypical of their groups than traits that were judged to be less 
typical of their group. Therefore, the traits which were minimised between members of 
the same group were those which characterise that group.
Thus, one outcome of the categorization of persons into different groups was shown to 
be the accentuation of differences between those groups (and the accentuation of 
similarities within groups) on relevant dimensions. These accentuation effects have 
been shown to be a robust finding in a number of subsequent studies (e.g., Doise, 1978; 
Eiser & Stroebe, 1972; McGarty & Penny, 1988; McGarty & Turner, 1992; Wilder, 
1981, 1986) The other theoretically important effect that was found to result from the
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categorization of persons into groups was discrimination in favour of ingroup members 
and against outgroup members. Tajfel and colleagues produced evidence that, under 
certain circumstances, categorization alone could produce ingroup bias. Tajfel, Flament, 
Billig and Bundy (1971) initially set out to discover the minimal conditions under 
which intergroup discrimination would occur. Schoolboys were led to believe that they 
were assigned to two groups on the basis of their preference for the painters Klee and 
Kandinsky (assignment was actually random). Subjects in each group had no interaction 
with either members of their own group or of the other group. They were asked to 
allocate rewards (in the form of points signifying amounts of money) to individuals who 
were identified only by a code number and their group membership. They did not 
allocate points to themselves and thus there was no self-interest operating. The idea was 
to establish a ‘minimal’ group baseline condition where no discrimination would occur. 
However, the results showed that even these minimal conditions were sufficient to 
produce ingroup bias. In a second study reward matrices were designed to reveal 
strategies that subjects might use in allocating points. The possible strategies were: (a) 
maximum joint profit, (b) maximum ingroup profit, (c) maximum difference in favour 
of an ingroup member, and (d) fairness. It was found that subjects sacrificed maximum 
ingroup gain in favour of maximum difference between groups when forced to chose 
between them. Thus their aim appeared to be gain relative to the outgroup rather than 
absolute gain.
The effects of minimal categorization have also been shown to hold for group 
representations in addition to reward allocations. Subsequent work by Doise et al. 
(1972) demonstrated that intergroup discrimination extended to ratings of evaluative 
traits. They found that subjects in minimal groups evaluated ingroup members more 
favourably than outgroup members. Allen and Wilder (1979) assessed the judged 
similarity in beliefs of ingroup and outgroup members ostensibly split on the basis of 
their preference for Klee and Kandinsky paintings (as per Tajfel et al., 1971). Before 
allocation to minimal groups subjects answered questionnaires concerning their 
opinions on categorization-relevant (e.g., preferred colour combinations) and -irrelevant
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(e.g., social and political issues) items. After being allocated to groups they had to 
predict responses of an anonymous ingroup and outgroup member on the same items. 
Results showed that ingroup members’ opinions were judged to be more similar than 
outgroup members to the subjects’ own opinions. In addition this was found for both 
types of items (although slightly stronger for relevant items).
Tajfel (1972) argued that the minimal group experiments provided subjects with a 
virtually meaningless situation regarding which strategies they should adopt. The only 
guide available was the arbitrary categories provided by the experimenter. Tajfel argued 
that individuals use the minimal social categorizations to help them to make sense of the 
situation and to guide action. One effect of categorization is the tendency for objects (or 
persons) to be perceived as more similar within categories and more different between 
categories. In terms of discrimination, perceived within-group similarity becomes 
important when the self is included as one of these objects or persons. The knowledge 
that one’s self belongs to a category or group is called ‘social identity’. It is defined as 
individuals’ knowledge that they belong to certain social groups in combination with 
the emotional and value significance to them of this group membership (Tajfel, 1972, 
1978a). These ideas eventually evolved into social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979, 1986) which formalised the link between self and group to offer an explanation 
for the discrimination observed in the minimal group experiments. Briefly, social 
identity theory assumes that people are motivated to evaluate themselves positively. To 
the extent that group membership becomes part of their self-concept or identity they 
will also be motivated to evaluate their group positively; that is, they are motivated to 
seek a positive social identity. Social identity is defined and evaluated via social 
comparison. In comparing their group to an outgroup people are motivated to make their 
group positively distinct from the outgroup. We consider the importance of the social 
identity concept further in the next section.
The work of Tajfel and colleagues was crucial in demonstrating that the categorization 
process could result in the outcomes commonly observed in stereotyping: namely the 
perception of, and accentuation of, similarities and differences based on group
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membership, and prejudice against outgroup members. This work implied that such 
phenomena could be explained with reference to cognitive processes, most importantly 
categorization. Thus prejudice and stereotyping could be explained without reference to 
pathological personality factors and could occur in the absence of conflict between 
groups (cf. Sherif’s realistic conflict theory). Crucially, the importance of cognitive 
variables in the study of stereotyping was articulated and emphasised. The work implied 
that stereotype content is in part determined by the operation of cognitive processes and 
biases, and reflects correlations between attributes and categories, and the division into 
ingroups and outgroups. Ultimately, the influence of these findings provided the basis 
for later work (e.g., social cognition perspective) which shifted the focus of stereotyping 
research away from content and toward process, and emphasised the role of cognitive 
functioning in stereotyping.
Functions of stereotyping and influences on the selectivity of content
Despite the cognitive focus of much of Tajfel’s work, he emphasised that stereotype 
content could not be understood with reference to cognitive processes alone. Tajfel 
(1981) criticised recent formulations of the cognitive approach to stereotyping and 
accounts of accentuation which had their basis in his own earlier work. He argued that 
these represent a theoretical retreat for two reasons: (a) they ignore the crucial role 
played in stereotypes by value differentials by placing too much emphasis on ‘pure’ 
cognitive processes in the functioning of stereotypes, and (b) they lack specification of 
the nature of the dimensions on which differences between social groups, or similarities 
within such groups would or would not be accentuated:
... clear specifications of this kind were amongst the principal aims of the earlier 
hypotheses. The understanding of the use of categorizations in simplifying and 
ordering the environment clearly depends upon these specifications. They help us 
to predict when and how various aspects of these categorizations fit or do not fit 
requirements posed by the need to systematise the information which individuals 
receive or select from their environment. What is equally important, they provide 
predictions as to when and how the various social differentiations or accentuations 
will or will not occur. (Tajfel, 1981, p. 152)
It is argued that we selectively accentuate similarities and differences between groups 
and this selectivity is determined by both individual cognitive factors and by social
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context, values, group affiliations and so on. Tajfel argued that accounts of stereotyping 
which only emphasised individual cognitive processes could not give a complete 
account of the social aspects of stereotyping. He saw a need for a theory that considers 
the contents of stereotypes as shared by social groups. To understand the content of 
stereotypes (and the selectivity of dimensions of accentuation) we need to take into 
account the functions served by stereotyping.
Tajfel (1981) suggests five possible functions of stereotyping, two individual and three 
social. Broadly speaking, for the individual, stereotypes serve the cognitive function of 
systematising and simplifying the environment, and they serve to maintain an 
individual’s system of social values. With respect to simplification, Tajfel (1972, 
1978b) argues that the information we receive from the environment can only be dealt 
with if it is made to fit the background of cognitive structures which are already in 
existence. Tajfel (1978b), drawing on work by Piaget (1952), argues that cognitive 
functioning achieves a balance between accommodation and assimilation. 
Accommodation refers to changes in the way we organise our past experience when 
new information is obtained. Assimilation is the extent to which each new piece of 
information we receive from the environment is made to fit with the background of 
experience we already possess: “if this new information could not be related in one way 
or another to our past experience, it would remain completely meaningless” (Tajfel, 
1978b, p. 304). Categorization reflects both accommodation and assimilation:
Just as the system of categories which is used by an individual must be made to fit 
the environment, so the information received from the environment must be made 
to fit the existing system of categories. (Tajfel, 1978b, p. 306)
These two processes involve selecting and modifying information (see Allport, 1954). 
We select information that confirms our categories and modify information that does 
not, as these processes require ‘least effort’.
New information is selected and reinterpreted so as to confirm and support the structure 
of value-loaded categories. Values are argued to be important in determining on what 
dimension similarities and differences are accentuated. The accentuation of differences
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between categories serves to clearly discriminate between these categories. This is 
especially important when division into categories is associated with value differentials. 
The desire to preserve categories associated with values can lead to ‘errors’ of under­
and over-inclusion (e.g., Pettigrew, Allport & Barnett, 1958; Scodel & Austrin, 1957). 
Tied up with committing errors of under-inclusion and over-inclusion, is the desire to 
maintain maximum ‘separateness and clarity’ of categories that are associated with 
values. As already discussed, the act of categorization alone can result in accentuation 
of differences in terms of dimensions correlated with that categorization. However, 
when the classification is of inherent value the accentuation effects will be more 
pronounced (see Lambert et al., 1960; Secord et al., 1956; Tajfel, 1959a, 1959b).
While the individual functions of simplification and value maintenance are important in 
stereotyping, Tajfel (1981) argues that we also need to take social functions into account 
to properly understand social stereotyping and the content of stereotypes. Three social 
functions for stereotypes are suggested in addition to the two individual ones discussed 
above. These functions are social causality, justification and differentiation. The first 
two of these are concerned with the “ideologising of social actions” and involve the role 
of stereotypes in explaining and justifying group actions. Social causality relates to the 
“search for the understanding of complex, and usually distressful, large-scale social 
events” (pp. 160-1). Stereotypes also function to justify actions, often those taken by our 
own group against outgroups. For example, the colonisation of Australia by white 
Europeans was partly justified by stereotyping the indigenous people as ‘primitive’ and 
‘savage’. The third social function, differentiation, refers to the desire to maintain a 
“positive distinctiveness of one’s own group from others which are relevant to the 
group’s self-image” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 162). It concerns creating and maintaining a value 
differential between one’s own group and relevant outgroups.
An analysis of stereotyping which includes these social functions, and takes into 
account not only cognitive processes but also the relations between groups, should 
allow us to “make theoretical sense of the contents of ingroup and outgroup 
stereotypes” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 162). Our search for, and detection of, similarities and
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differences in the social environment is to some extent socially directed. To understand 
the content of stereotypes we need to consider the group that holds that stereotype, the 
functions that the stereotype serves for that group and the relations that exist between 
that group and the group they are stereotyping. Tajfel suggested that the content of our 
stereotypes is intrinsically linked to our social identity as a group member. That identity 
or group affiliation will determine the values, norms, meanings that are important for us 
and determine how we see the world:
As long as individuals share a common social affiliation which is important to 
them (and perceive themselves as sharing it), the selection of the criteria for 
division between ingroups and outgroups and of the kind of characteristics 
attributed to each will be directly determined by those cultural traditions, group 
interests, social upheavals and social differentiations which are perceived as being 
common to the group as a whole. (Tajfel, 1981, p. 163)
This echoes the ideas of Asch, Allport and Sherif who also argued for the role of group 
memberships in determining values, norms etc., which are important for determining the 
dimensions on which we define our own and other groups. However, social identity 
theory allowed for an understanding of the cognitive and social-psychological processes 
operating when we identify with and adopt the values and norms of our ingroup and 
reject those of the outgroup. While the minimal group experiments suggested that 
division into ingroups and outgroups could have important cognitive consequences for 
stereotyping, namely ingroup bias, this is not necessarily an automatic consequence of 
the paradigm. Importantly, the display of ingroup bias also depends on status 
differences between groups and whether these are seen as legitimate and stable, the 
importance of the dimension of comparison for group identity, and the degree to which 
the two groups are comparable. This suggests that ingroup bias and outgroup 
discrimination are not merely a cognitive by-product of categorization but depend 
crucially on real relationships between groups. This point is expressed by Tajfel:
The differentiation principle .... is a dynamic process which can only be 
understood against the background of relations between social groups and the 
social comparisons they make in the context of these relations (1981, p. 162)
Discrimination should only occur on dimensions that are relevant for self-definition. 
The dimensions on which we stereotype an outgroup are not random or based on
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objective similarities and differences but are those which we value. Part of the process 
of obtaining a positive social identity is to establish a relative value differential between 
our ingroup and a comparison outgroup (Tajfel, 1981). In this sense, the content of 
stereotypes is derived from those values that make us distinct from a given outgroup.
In this section we have reviewed Tajfel’s argument that in order to make sense of the 
content of social stereotypes we need to take into account more than individual 
cognitive processes. The functions served by stereotypes, both individual and social, are 
important in determining which dimensions we select when differentiating between 
social groups. It is argued that those dimensions selected and accentuated will be those 
which fit with our background of cognitive structures and value-loaded categories, 
allow us to create clear value differentials between groups, allow us to make sense of 
and justify social relations between groups and allow us to make our group positively 
distinct from relevant outgroups. Thus to understand the content of stereotypes our 
theoretical analysis must take into account the nature of the dimensions on which 
differences between social groups are accentuated.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have charted the early developments in stereotyping research with 
respect to the implications for the formation of stereotype content. Content was the 
primary focus of the earliest research. However, a tension emerged concerning whether 
this content derived from real observed differences between groups (and was therefore 
to some extent valid) or whether it was largely based on overgeneralised, preconceived 
ideas held about groups and derived from cultural influences. The theoretical accounts 
of researchers such as Asch, Sherif and Allport emphasised that stereotyping and 
stereotype content reflect group memberships and relations between groups, thereby 
largely rejecting earlier personality-based accounts of prejudice.
We have reviewed Tajfel’s research concerning both the role of categorization in 
stereotyping and the functional account of stereotype content. This work introduced 
many of the ideas present in contemporary accounts of stereotyping. Importantly, it
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emphasised the role of cognitive processes in stereotyping and contributed to the switch 
in stereotyping research towards process and away from content. It provided the basis 
for the cognitive accounts which were to follow. In the next chapter we review those 
accounts. In addition, we have discussed Tajfel’s criticisms of a purely cognitive 
approach to stereotype content and his arguments in favour of a functional approach to 
stereotyping which considers both individual cognitive and social factors. 
Contemporary accounts building on these ideas are reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5.
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Chapter 3
Contemporary Approaches to Stereotype Content (I): The 
Social Cognition Perspective
The early approaches to stereotyping at different times emphasised both the role of 
individual cognitive processes, and of group- and society-based beliefs and values in 
determining stereotype content. These themes are echoed in contemporary approaches 
(from the late 1970s onwards) to stereotyping and stereotype content. These approaches 
can be broadly categorized into three main areas: those that have emphasised the role of 
individual cognitive processes in stereotyping and tended to focus on process more than 
content, those that have emphasised the role of social and collective factors in 
stereotyping and have focused largely on stereotype content, somewhat to the exclusion 
of process, and those that have sought to explain stereotyping as an interaction between 
individual cognitive and more social factors and have considered both process and 
content to be important. All these approaches to some extent build upon Tajfel’s 
categorization analysis as outlined in the previous chapter and take for granted that 
categorization is important in stereotyping.
In this thesis, we term the first approach the social cognition perspective. We refer to 
research in the second area as collective perspectives and those in the third area as 
interactionist perspectives. Research from the social cognition perspective has arguably 
been the most dominant and influential in the last few decades and in this chapter we 
provide a review of theory and research from this approach relevant to stereotype 
content and its formation. While we are reviewing a range of research under the heading 
of the social cognition approach, it should be noted that this research does not 
necessarily form part of a unified theoretical perspective; however it has in common an 
emphasis on the role of individual cognitive processes and information-processing 
mechanisms in stereotyping, and shares many assumptions concerning the nature of 
categorization and stereotyping (Hamilton, Devine & Ostrom, 1994). The other two 
approaches have been to some extent critical of the social cognition perspective and in
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Chapters 4 and 5 we review their criticisms and alternative views on the formation of 
stereotype content.
Overview and assumptions
The social-cognition approach to stereotyping has its basis in Tajfel’s work which 
demonstrated the importance of cognitive processes, especially categorization, in 
stereotyping and which emphasised the simplifying function played by categorization. 
This perspective has emphasised the role individual cognitive processes and 
information-processing mechanisms in stereotyping:
A social cognition analysis of stereotyping tries to understand the role of cognitive 
structures and processes in the perception of groups and group members. As such, 
it focuses on how an information processing system functions and how that 
system influences our perceptions of groups and group members. (Hamilton, 
Stroessner & Driscoll, 1994, p. 292 )
Many social cognition theorists argue that stereotyping arises, in part, from limited 
information-processing capacity. Ashmore and Del Boca (1981) summarise this 
orientation as follows:
... the human capacity for processing information is limited; that is the basic 
rationality of humans is ‘bounded’ ... cognitive limitations make humans 
susceptible to systematic biases in processing information about people and 
events, and these biases contribute significantly to the formation and maintenance 
of stereotypes regarding social groups, (p. 29)
This position is based on the assumption that the perceptual world is too complex for 
perceivers to fully comprehend because we have limited cognitive capacity. Therefore, 
we are forced to take various cognitive shortcuts to preserve our scarce cognitive 
capacity. These shortcuts result in our oversimplifying the world in terms of 
overgeneralisation and stereotypes. However, more recently some researchers from this 
perspective (e.g., Fiske, 1992, 1993; Fiske & Leyens, 1997; Leyens & Fiske, 1994; 
Operario & Fiske, 1999) have argued that there has been an over-emphasis on errors and 
biases in social cognition research, and that people are ‘good-enough’ perceivers in that 
they strike a balance between accuracy and their practical, pragmatic goals. Thus, in 
social cognition research the metaphor used to describe the social perceiver has changed
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from a ‘cognitive miser’ (Fiske & Taylor, 1984) to a ‘motivated tactician’ (Fiske & 
Taylor, 1991).
The social cognition approach has been marked by a distinct and deliberate shift 
towards studying the processes involved in stereotyping and away from the specific 
content of stereotypes. The cognitive processes involved in stereotyping are assumed to 
be universal and to be uninfluenced by the actual content of stereotypes. This change in 
emphasis is described as follows by Hamilton, Stroessner and Driscoll (1994):
The social cognition approach brought about a shift in emphasis from content to 
process. Given the focus on process, it is assumed that stereotypes, as cognitive 
structures, function in the same way and have similar effects on information 
processing. Consequently, to identify how stereotypes affect information 
processing, the specific content of the stereotypes used in any given study has 
usually been of only secondary concern, (p. 309)
While this approach has explicitly focussed on process more than content, there are still 
important implications to be drawn from it concerning the nature of content and its 
formation. In what follows we will review this very influential approach to stereotyping 
with an eye to what is implied about the contents of stereotypes.
Within this approach there is a distinction made between stereotype formation and 
stereotype application (and by implication stereotype content formation and stereotype 
content application). It is generally assumed that stereotypes are stored “as pictures in 
our heads” (like Lippmann over half a century previously). That is, it is assumed that 
stereotypes are stored in memory as cognitive structures:
From a cognitive perspective ... a stereotype can be defined as a cognitive 
structure that contains the perceiver’s knowledge, beliefs, and expectancies about 
some human group. (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986, p. 133)
Stereotypes as cognitive structures have been conceptualised in a number of ways 
including: as abstract cognitive representations about groups, such as prototypes (e.g., 
Brewer, Dull & Lui, 1981) or schemas (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fiske & Taylor, 1991), 
as containing knowledge of specific group members or exemplars (e.g., Linville, 
Fischer & Salovey, 1989; Smith, 1990; Smith & Zarate, 1992), or as a mixture of 
abstract and exemplar-based information (Judd & Park, 1988; Park & Hastie, 1987;
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Park, Judd & Ryan, 1991). The implication in all these approaches is that these 
cognitive structures or stereotypes contain stereotype content (namely knowledge, 
beliefs and expectancies about social groups). Ascertaining stereotype content depends 
on assessing those beliefs that are most strongly associated with the representation of a 
group in memory (Ford & Stangor, 1992; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Hamilton, 
Stroessner & Driscoll, 1994; Stangor & Lange, 1994). The important questions with 
respect to content, therefore, are (a) how does stereotype content come to be associated 
with these stored categories/representations in the first place (how do stereotypes form?) 
and (b) what factors determine which content is applied to any given judgement of a 
stimulus (how does the stored knowledge interact with stimulus data?). Relevant to 
these questions are issues of the role of bottom-up (data-driven) versus top-down 
(theory-driven) processes in stereotyping.
In what follows we attempt to answer those questions from this perspective by 
considering approaches to stereotype formation, activation, application and change. Our 
focus is necessarily limited to examining these areas with respect to the implications for 
stereotype content.
Stereotype formation
In general, research from this perspective assumes that stereotypes form based on our 
direct individual observation or experience of the world around us. However, there is 
debate concerning how accurate that observation is. Some researchers argue that our 
experience is filtered and biased via cognitive processes which results in stereotypes 
that are oversimplified. Others suggest that our stereotypes have their basis in accurate 
observation and therefore contain a ‘kernel of truth’. Oakes et al. (1994) argue that there 
have been two distinct approaches to stereotype formation from this perspective — one 
based on illusory correlations between behaviours and groups and one on actual 
correlations. We begin by considering accounts that emphasise the role of cognitive 
biases in stereotype formation and then discuss accounts based on actual observed 
correlations between behaviours and groups.
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Even those who emphasise the role of cognitive biases in stereotype formation agree 
that stereotypes are initially based on the perception of differences between groups. 
However, the perception of differences between groups may not reflect actual 
differences between groups:
Stereotype formation rests upon the perception of group differences, as these 
categorical distinctions must exist before different sets of beliefs (stereotypes) can 
become associated with them. By generating the initial perception of group 
differences, these cognitive mechanisms can constitute (or at least contribute to) 
the foundation of stereotype development. (Hamilton, Stroessner & Driscoll, 
1994, p. 305)
As such, the categorization process is argued to play a crucial role in stereotype 
formation (Mackie, Hamilton, Susskind & Rosselli, 1996). However, categorization is 
considered to be a cognitive process that can result in certain biases in our perception of 
group differences. This idea draws upon Tajfel’s work concerning categorization 
effects, such as the accentuation of differences between groups and ingroup bias, 
discussed in the previous chapter. Specifically it is argued that once categorized group 
members are seen as more similar to each other and more different to members of other 
groups than they actually are (e.g., Tajfel, 1969; Wilder, 1981, 1986), perceptions of the 
outgroup come to be more homogenous than perceptions of the ingroup (the outgroup 
homogeneity effect — e.g., Jones, Wood & Quatronne, 1981; Linville, 1982; Park & 
Rothbart, 1982; Quatronne & Jones, 1980) and differentiation between ingroups and 
outgroups results in ingroup bias (e.g., Brewer, 1979; Tajfel et al., 1971). Thus the mere 
act of categorizing can “lay the foundations upon which stereotypes may then be built” 
(Mackie et al., 1996, p. 46). Importantly categorization is not considered to be the same 
thing as stereotyping but it may lead to the development of a stereotype:
... categorization does not always eventuate in the formation of a full-blown 
stereotype. The stereotype itself evolves only when the perceiver acquires 
knowledge and develops a set of beliefs about that group, beliefs that are held to 
characterise the group in general terms. (Mackie et al., 1996)
Thus, the process of categorization may lead to the development of stereotype content 
based on perceived intergroup differences but differences that are somewhat 
overgeneralised and exaggerated. Specifically, such content may be an accentuation of
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actual intergroup differences, and it may be more homogenous and more negative for 
outgroups compared to ingroups.
While categorization may provide the basis for stereotypes in terms of actual (if 
exaggerated) intergroup differences, one of the most influential accounts of stereotype 
formation, distinctiveness-based illusory correlation, argues that stereotypes can form 
even when no actual group differences exist. Illusory correlation refers to the tendency 
to perceive a relationship between two variables where none actually exists (Chapman 
& Chapman, 1967). Hamilton and Gifford (1976) have applied this phenomenon to 
stereotyping and argue that perceivers have a tendency to attend to distinctive or novel 
stimuli and to use these as a basis for categorization (see also Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff & 
Ruderman, 1978; Taylor, 1981). Distinctive stimuli can be either those that are 
numerically uncommon or those that are infrequently observed. When two distinctive 
stimuli co-occur, they attract attention, become more available in memory and, thus, 
become cognitively correlated. For example, when members of a numerically infrequent 
group perform uncommon behaviours, these are more likely to become associated and 
can lead to the development of stereotypes by producing the perception of intergroup 
differences where none actually exist. Once a group becomes associated with a given 
behaviour, this becomes a meaningful category for the perceiver and may guide future 
perceptions of the group.
The initial study demonstrating the operation of illusory correlation in the formation of 
stereotypes was performed by Hamilton and Gifford (1976). They presented subjects 
with 39 statements which described desirable and undesirable behaviours performed by 
members of two groups labelled Group A and Group B (Experiment 1). There were 
twice as many statements about Group A compared to Group B, twice as many 
desirable to undesirable statements, but the ratio of desirable to undesirable behaviours 
was the same for each group. Therefore, both Group B behaviours and undesirable 
behaviours were numerically distinct. However, there was no actual correlation between 
the two. Results showed that subjects overestimated the incidence of undesirable 
behaviours performed by Group B. They also found that this influenced their
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perceptions of Group A as ‘good’ and Group B as ‘bad’. Hamilton and Gifford conclude 
that the co-occurrence of distinctive stimuli produced an illusory correlation between 
the stimuli and that this in turn led to the differential perception of the two groups.
Hamilton and Gifford argue that these results can be extended to real life groups. For 
example, in American society blacks are (relatively) numerically infrequent as is the 
performance of extremely undesirable behaviours. Thus the negative content of 
stereotypes about blacks may arise based on an information-processing bias. The results 
of Hamilton and Gifford’s study have been replicated a number of times (e.g., Acorn, 
Hamilton & Sherman, 1988; Hamilton, Dugan & Trolier, 1985; Jones, Scott, Solemou, 
Noble, Fiala & Miller, 1977; Kim & Baron, 1988; Sanbonmatsu, Sherman & Hamilton, 
1987). Others have found that the effect is weakened when the stimulus groups have 
meaning for the subjects (Stroebe & Insko, 1989). For example, McArthur and 
Friedman (1980) repeated the original Hamilton and Gifford experiment but using real 
groups (e.g., male and females) rather than the labels A and B. Illusory correlation 
effects were only found when groups performed behaviours that were associated with 
pre-existing stereotypic beliefs. Spears, van der Pligt and Eiser (1985, 1986) presented 
participants with stimulus statements which were attitudes towards nuclear power, 
purportedly expressed by people from two towns, a larger and a smaller town. They 
found the perceived covariation between pro- and anti-nuclear statements and town size 
was influenced by participants’ own attitude to nuclear power. Strong illusory 
correlation effects were found when own attitude was congruent with the minority 
position but not when own attitude was congruent with the majority, suggesting that the 
illusory correlation effect can be moderated by own position. Schaller and Maass (1989) 
have demonstrated that ingroup favouritism effects can moderate illusory correlation 
effects. They found that when the minority group was also subjects’ ingroup they no 
longer perceived a correlation between that group and numerically infrequent, negative 
behaviours. Rather they exhibited an ingroup bias. Schaller and Maass suggest that 
motivational as well as cognitive factors are important in stereotype formation.
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Haslam, McGarty, Oakes and Turner (1993) have also demonstrated effects for social 
identity as well as comparative context in the illusory correlation paradigm. An illusory 
correlation experiment was run in which the two stimulus groups were identified as 
coming from different pairs of cities (Canberra, Perth or Detroit in six pairings with 
each city as the majority group and the minority group once per pair). Canberra was the 
city which subjects came from and thus represented a national and urban ingroup. Perth, 
another Australian city, represented a national ingroup and an urban outgroup. Detroit 
represented a national and urban outgroup. They found evidence of the illusory 
correlation effect when the subject’s ingroup (Canberra) was the majority in pairings 
with both Perth and Detroit, and the effect was attenuated when Canberra was the 
minority group in these pairings (consistent with Schaller & Maass, 1989). However, 
they also found the illusory correlation effect when Detroit was the majority group and 
paired with Perth, despite the fact that Perth represented a national ingroup and 
therefore subjects might be expected to display ingroup bias (likewise, the effect was 
attenuated when Detroit was the minority paired with Perth).
This finding is explained in terms of the ‘black-sheep effect’ (see Marques, 1990; 
Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988; Marques, Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988). Drawing on social 
identity theory, the nature of the effect is that under conditions where intragroup and 
intergroup comparisons are made simultaneously, poor exemplars of the ingroup will be 
‘psychologically alienated’ in order to preserve overall ingroup positivity. Haslam et al. 
(1993) argue that in their experiment conditions of simultaneous intragroup and 
intergroup comparisons hold (in the Perth-Detroit pairings, subjects are making explicit 
intergroup comparisons between Australia and the USA and implicit intragroup 
comparisons between Perth and Canberra). Likewise, they argue that at the time the 
experiment was conducted Perth was seen very negatively in Australia (because of 
various government corruption scandals) and thus represented a negative exemplar of 
the ingroup ‘Australian’. Thus, in the Perth-Detroit pairings subjects were motivated to 
see the Detroit group more positively than the Perth group. The authors suggest that 
neither the illusory correlation effect or ingroup bias are inevitable and that both are
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“sensitive to, and critically shaped by, the comparative and normative context of their 
production” (Haslam et al., 1993, p. 4).
Other explanations for illusory correlation effects have also been suggested which 
challenge the role played by distinctiveness and selective attention. Fiedler (1991) 
proposes that the effect may be due to selective information loss that occurs when 
information of varying frequencies is processed. He argues that subjects in the illusory 
correlation paradigm show regression towards the mean in terms of their estimates of 
frequencies. Low frequencies are perceived as higher than they really are and vice versa 
for high frequencies. This effect is especially marked for estimations based on small 
numbers of observations as in case for the minority group and the negative behaviours 
in the usual illusory correlation paradigm. Thus, according to Fiedler, it is the greater 
uncertainty in estimating the frequency of these infrequent events which contributes to 
the illusory correlation effect, rather than their joint distinctiveness. Smith (1991) has 
demonstrated, using computer simulations, that subjects in the illusory correlation 
paradigm are sensitive to the difference between the number of positive and negative 
behaviours recalled rather than the ratio of positive to negative behaviours. Because 
more positive behaviours are recalled about the majority group, they come to be seen as 
more positive than the minority. Thus, he argues that the effect can be explained without 
reference to biased memory processes. Likewise, McGarty and colleagues (Haslam, 
McGarty & P. Brown, 1996; McGarty, Haslam, Turner & Oakes, 1993; McGarty & de 
la Haye, 1997: see also Berndsen, 1997) have offered an alternative explanation for 
illusory correlation effects in terms of the search for a meaningful differentiation 
between groups (to be reviewed in Chapter 5).
Explanations of stereotype formation based on distinctiveness-based illusory 
correlations focus on stereotyping processes. For this model the specific content of a 
stereotype is almost superfluous to the analysis — it seems purely fortuitous that a 
certain distinctive behaviour becomes associated with a certain group. The explanation 
states that infrequent behaviours (which tend to be negative) will be associated with 
minority groups which implies that the content of minority group stereotypes is likely to
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be negative because of the manner in which these stereotypes are formed. However, it 
has little to say about the content of majority group stereotypes. Importantly, the model 
implies that stereotype formation (and the formation of stereotype content) can be the 
result of cognitive processes and biases alone and need not be based on any real 
differences between groups.
Another cognitive bias implicated in the formation of stereotypes is the correspondence 
bias or fundamental attribution error (Mackie et al., 1996). This bias refers to the 
tendency for perceivers to favour dispositional over situational attributions for the 
causes of behaviour (Ross, 1977):
Because the correspondence bias involves the spontaneous process of inferring 
dispositional characteristics, and because stereotyping involves the perception of 
groups in terms of such attributes, the correspondence bias seems likely to be a 
particularly powerful mechanism in stereotype acquisition. (Mackie et al., 1996, p.
48)
This bias may cause perceivers to ignore the role of situational or role constraints in 
determining behaviour and to attribute such behaviour to underlying personality 
dispositions that may be associated with group memberships. Correspondence bias has 
been attributed to the idea that the actor’s behaviour is more salient than the situation 
and therefore more attention is paid to dispositional than situational causes. Another 
explanation is that we have a societal norm for internality such that internal attributions 
are viewed more favourably than external ones (Jellison & Green, 1981). Cross cultural 
research has shown the fundamental attribution error may be partially culture specific 
with the tendency to over-attribute to dispositional causes being more prevalent in 
western versus eastern cultures (Miller, 1984; Morris, Nisbett & Peng, 1995; Morris & 
Peng, 1994).
Pettigrew (1979) has proposed an ‘ultimate attribution error’ whereby attributions tend 
to favour ingroup members over outgroup members because of an ethnocentric bias. It 
is argued to operate such that the tendency to make internal or dispositional attributions 
(as per the fundamental attribution error) is enhanced if an outgroup member is 
performing a negative act. In such cases, Pettigrew argues, internal causes will often be
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seen as ‘innate characteristics’ and external or situational causes for behaviour will be 
overlooked. Hewstone (1990), in a review of the intergroup attribution literature, found 
some support for Pettigrew’s proposal specifically: (a) a tendency to attribute outgroup 
(compared to ingroup) failure more to internal causes and the ‘explaining away’ of 
outgroup success to external factors, and (b) a preference for ingroup- versus outgroup­
serving attributions for group differences. Hewstone notes that “these intergroup 
attributions may help to form and maintain stereotypes ... and even, ultimately, form the 
basis of an ideology that ascribes group differences to genetic characteristics” (1990, p. 
331; see also Allport, 1954).
A position somewhat similar to both correspondence bias and the ultimate attribution 
error is put forward by Yzerbyt, Rocher and Schadron (1997). They propose a 
“syndrome of essentialislic categorization” — that is, categorization based on the notion 
that surface attributes of group members reflect deeper underlying essences (based on 
Medin & Ortony’s idea of psychological essentialism1 2, 1989, and Rothbart & Taylor’s, 
1992, application of it to social categories'). The belief that surface attributes reflect 
deeper attributes, such as underlying dispositions, is argued to encourage categorization 
effects such as the accentuation of differences between groups, and as such may 
contribute to the formation and maintenance of stereotypes. However, being guided by 
essentialistic theories may not result in accurate perception of intergroup differences:
... subjective essentialism induces the belief that social categories differ from one 
another ... a stronger hypothesis also entails the possibility that differences in 
perception arise despite the absence of a factual basis or that actual differences 
remain unnoticed simply because they do not fall under the umbrella of a unifying 
theory. (Yzerbyt et al., 1997, p. 42)
1 Medin and Ortony (1989) define psychological essentialism as “the idea that... surface features are 
frequently constrained by, and sometimes generated by, the deeper, more central parts of concepts” (p. 
180). They argue that people act as if things have essences and that they tend to adopt an essentialist 
heuristic such that they believe that things which look alike will share deeper properties.
2 Rothbart and Taylor (1992) suggest that we tend to view social categories as natural kinds; that is 
categories that have underlying essences, like a biological or genetic basis, that are fundamental to 
category membership. Treating social categories as natural kinds means that surface attributes are seen to 
imply underlying attributes and that categories are seen as being mutually exclusive such that inter­
category differences are exaggerated.
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Likewise, reliance on an essentialistic theory may result in an overreliance on 
dispositional factors at the expense of situational factors. Underlying essences are likely 
to be linked to dispositions or personalities. Thus when we observe that two groups 
differ from each other in terms of some surface attribute, such as skin colour, we may 
infer that they also differ in terms of deeper dispositions and therefore form stronger 
stereotypes about them. Thus, stereotype content may form to reflect underlying 
dispositions that do not actually exist but that are linked to surface features.
Work by Dweck and colleagues (Chiu, Hong & Dweck, 1997; Dweck, Hong & Chiu, 
1993; Dweck, Chiu & Hong, 1995a, 1995b; Levy & Dweck, 1998; Levy, Stroessner & 
Dweck, 1998) suggests that the tendency to use dispositional versus situational 
explanations may be influenced by our implicit theories of personality. For example, 
Dweck et al. (1995a) distinguish between what they call “entity theorists” and 
“incremental theorists”. Entity theorists believe that traits are fixed dispositions and 
they tend to show an overreliance on dispositional information when making 
judgements and decisions. In contrast, incremental theorists believe traits are malleable, 
that is, they “can be changed and developed” (Dweck et al., 1995a, p. 267). The 
different theories represent different models about how personality works and “entity 
and incremental theorists may encode and organise incoming social information in 
different ways” (p. 281). Levy et al. (1998) carried out a set of studies which 
demonstrated differences in social stereotyping between persons holding entity versus 
incremental theories. They argue that “entity theorists appear particularly prone to 
engage in processes similar to those involved in stereotyping” (p. 1421). In Experiment 
1 they found that although entity and incremental theorists (as determined by a 
questionnaire) had the same knowledge of ethnic stereotypes, entity theorists endorsed 
the stereotypes more strongly than did incremental theorists. In Experiment 3, 
participants were presented with novel groups described by either predominantly 
positive or predominantly negative statements. Entity theorists drew more extreme trait 
judgments from the limited information and also perceived the groups to be more 
homogenous than did incremental theorists. In Experiment 4 Levy et al. sought to
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establish a causal relationship between types of theories and level of stereotyping by 
manipulating people’s theories. They found that those participants ‘induced’ with an 
entity theory showed more endorsement of ethnic and occupational stereotypes 
compared to those ‘induced’ with an incremental theory. The authors conclude that 
those people who hold entity theories are more likely to exhibit stereotyping. Thus 
according to Dweck and colleagues, implicit theories of personality have a crucial role 
to play in the development of stereotypes:
Although stereotyping and prejudice may serve a variety of goals (self-esteem 
goals, need for a scapegoat), our work suggests that individuals may not even need 
these special goals to display these tendencies ... Instead, our findings suggest that 
these tendencies may arise spontaneously, because they are so clearly related to 
how entity theorists understand and react to the social world. (Dweck et al, 1995b, 
p. 330)
Thus stereotypes may form to reflect a certain theory of personality. While the type of 
theory endorsed appears to be conceptualised as an individual differences variable (see 
Levy & Dweck, 1998) it is also acknowledged that “people’s implicit theories are not 
rigidly fixed but are themselves malleable” (Levy et al., 1998, p. 1431).
The accounts of stereotype formation discussed so far have been largely been based on 
the role of cognitive biases in stereotype formation and the idea that we may accentuate 
or misperceive differences between groups and form stereotypes based on these 
exaggerated or illusory differences. Likewise, others argue that we may (often 
mistakenly) attribute group differences dispositionally and thus form stronger 
associations between social categories and certain behaviours. Therefore, stereotype 
content forms to reflect perceived differences between groups; however, these perceived 
differences may exaggerate or misrepresent real differences. The formation of 
stereotype content is implied to be strongly determined by the operation of individual, 
biased cognitive processes. Other accounts of stereotype formation argue that, rather 
than resulting from cognitive biases, stereotypes may form to reflect actual observed 
differences between groups. In this sense, these accounts have much in common with 
the ‘kernel of truth’ position discussed in the previous chapter. We now turn our 
attention to these accounts.
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One theory of stereotype formation which argues that stereotypes are based upon real 
observed correlations between groups and behaviours, rather than illusory ones is 
Eagly’s (1987; Eagly & Steffen, 1984, 1986) social role theory of gender stereotypes. 
This theory states that such stereotypes arise from the observed distribution of men and 
women into different social roles. Gender stereotypes reflect the observed social role- 
gender correlation in our society where women have traditionally been homemakers/ 
childraisers and men have traditionally been breadwinners. These roles have certain 
traits associated with them — homemakers are seen to be communal and breadwinners 
are seen to be agentic (Bakan, 1966). Eagly argues that because people have observed 
women to be predominantly homemakers and men to be predominantly breadwinners, 
the traits associated with these roles have come to be associated with women and men 
respectively. Thus, stereotypes about gender stem from and reflect actual socio- 
structural relationships. However, in common with the correspondence bias, these 
stereotypes may reflect an overattribution to personality factors rather than situational 
factors (namely the roles women and men are in).
A 1984 study by Eagly and Steffen demonstrated that social role information had an 
overriding influence in impression formation. Subjects read a brief description of a 
target person which varied according to the target’s gender and social role (full-time 
employee, homemaker or no occupational description). Subjects rated a single target on 
a series of agentic and communal traits. The results showed that ‘average’ men and 
women (i.e., no occupational description) were rated stereotypically — women high in 
communion and low in agency and men vice versa. However, once social role was 
specified, women and men occupying the same role were rated equivalently. This 
suggests that stereotypes were based upon gender-social role correlation rather than 
upon gender per se. It also suggests that the content of gender stereotypes derives from 
and reflects social role structure.
Alternative views regarding these results have been proposed. Schaller (1992) suggests 
that the Eagly and Steffen (1984) study shows that stereotypes may result from the 
failure of people to engage in an “intuitive analysis of covariance”. The powerful
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correlations that exist between gender and social role, and between social role and 
observed behaviour, leads to a spurious correlation between gender and behaviour. 
Schaller, however, argues that people can use more complicated inference strategies if 
they are motivated to do so. One of these motivations can be a desire to see the ingroup 
positively. Schaller presents evidence that people do use more complex inference 
strategies when these will lead to a positive impression of their ingroup. He 
demonstrates this for both ‘pre-existing’ groups (e.g., gender) and for ‘novel’ groups. 
The results are taken as evidence that group membership and group-enhancement 
motives may influence the inference strategies used in stereotype formation.
Likewise, Hoffman and Hurst (1990) present an alternative view of gender stereotype 
formation in direct response to the work of Eagly and colleagues. They argue that 
gender stereotypes do not just reflect the current social structure but rather are attempts 
to rationalise it (see Tajfel, 1981). Given this, gender stereotypes extend beyond the 
persons who occupy the appropriate social roles to all persons of that gender. They had 
subjects read descriptions of persons from two fictional categories (Ackmians and 
Orinthians) that were constructed to reflect the traditional social roles of men and 
women. One category (an analogue of the male gender) was described as comprising of 
80% city workers and 20% childraisers, and another category (an analogue of the female 
gender) had the percentages reversed. However, the persons in the categories did not 
actually differ in terms of their personality with each person being described by one 
agentic, one communal and one neutral trait. Each subject then rated four target persons 
on communal and agentic traits: a ‘cityworker’ and a ‘childraiser’ from each of the two 
constructed categories. They found that subjects formed stereotypes of the two groups 
based upon the social role-category correlation despite the fact that there were no 
personality differences between the groups, and that these stereotypes persisted even 
when social role information was specified. Thus, they argue, the content of gender 
stereotypes forms not just to describe the existing social role distribution but rather to 
rationalise it. Hoffman and Hurst also argue that their analysis may apply to social 
categorizations besides gender.
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The work of both Eagly, and Hoffman and Hurst, in contrast to the illusory correlation 
research, argues that stereotype content is based on beliefs about social roles that are 
shared within society, and that these beliefs reflect aspects of society. Hoffman and 
Hurst suggest that stereotype formation “is not purely an information processing 
phenomenon” (p. 206). Eagly and Steffen (1984) argue that while illusory correlation 
research has shown a relationship between minorities and distinctive behaviours, in their 
research men and women are allocated the attributes that correspond to the roles that 
they actually occupy: that is, the correlation is real rather than illusory. Eagly implies 
that stereotype content reflects the structure of society and thus contains a ‘kernel of 
truth’. Hoffman and Hurst imply that content rationalises and maintains the social 
structure even if it no longer exists. They are inclined to suggest that rather than 
containing a kernel of truth, stereotype content is largely a biased representation of 
reality.
Jussim (1990; 1991; see also Lee, Jussim & McCauley, 1995) also argues that 
stereotypes may to some extent be based in accuracy. His ‘reflection-construction’ 
model considers the relation between perceivers’ beliefs and expectancies about targets’ 
attributes and behaviours, and those targets’ actual attributes and behaviours. The model 
starts with background information “which refers to anything on which perceivers might 
base their beliefs (e.g., targets’ past behaviour or targets’ social group membership, 
achievement or personality test scores, rumour and hearsay etc.)” (Jussim, 1990, p. 56). 
Jussim argues that to the extent that background information accurately predicts targets’ 
behaviour and attributes independently of the perceiver, then expectations based on that 
background information may also result in judgements that accurately reflect actual 
behaviour and attributes.
In a more extreme version of the ‘kernel of truth’ hypothesis Zebrowitz (1996), drawing 
on McArthur and Baron’s (1983) ecological theory of social perception, argues that 
physical appearance may determine the content of some stereotypes. She suggests there 
are actual correlations between some physical features and personality traits, such as 
between attractiveness and social competence, and therefore “accuracy may be one basis
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for stereotypes about groups that differ in appearance” (p. 88). However, while 
stereotype content may reflect real differences between groups in some instances it may 
also reflect “the overgeneralisation of accurate beliefs about the behavioural 
propensities of individuals who physically resemble the group members” (p. 89).
Another outlook on stereotype formation that considers the actual correlation between 
attributes and groups to be the basis of stereotype formation is outlined by Ford and 
Stangor (1992; cf. Campbell, 1958; Campbell, 1967; Tajfel, 1969; Turner, 1985). They 
propose that in forming stereotypes about social groups:
... people abstract the central tendency and variability of different attribute 
dimensions to determine which ones best differentiate the groups and .... the more 
differentiating dimensions are more likely to become stereotypical in the sense of 
becoming strongly associated with the groups in memory, (p. 356)
They report a series of studies aimed at testing this proposal. In a first study they had 
subjects form impressions of two groups that differed in terms of both intelligence and 
friendliness. In one condition, the differences in group means were larger for 
intelligence than friendliness while in the other condition this was reversed. Stereotype 
content was measured in two ways: (a) in terms of trait ratings, which Ford and Stangor 
argue is one of the traditional ways of doing so, and (b) by asking subjects to write 
down four thoughts associated with the group and from these finding an index of 
strength of association between attribute dimensions and group labels. In terms of trait 
ratings subjects differentiated the groups in terms of both intelligence and friendliness 
but more so in terms of intelligence in the first condition and more so in terms of 
friendliness in the second condition. The associative strength measure showed that 
subjects generated more thoughts about the groups in terms of the attribute dimension 
that represented the larger differences in means between the two groups. The authors 
argue that although both attributes were available to subjects to represent the groups, 
subjects spontaneously characterised the groups in terms of the attributes that most 
differentiated between the groups.
A third study was performed similar to the first one except that groups differed in their 
variability regarding intelligence- and friendliness-related behaviour but were the same
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in terms of their means. Results, although not conclusive, suggested that group 
stereotypes were likely to be formed on attribute dimensions for which there was low 
within-group variability. The authors conclude that in forming stereotypes we focus on 
dimensions that are most diagnostic for differentiating groups. Stereotype content forms 
to reflect correlations between categories and attributes (see work by Tajfel as covered 
in the previous chapter; Campbell, 1967; Turner, 1985). Ford and Stangor comment 
that, unlike the illusory correlation paradigm, their research does not assume that 
stereotypes are based on the faulty perception of intergroup differences but rather that 
they may contain a ‘kernel of truth’; that is, real differences exist between social groups 
and these drive stereotype formation. They state that a basic assumption for their 
research is that stereotypes are formed via direct observation of behaviours performed 
by members of social groups (p. 365). In this sense, this idea is similar to that proposed 
by Eagly (1987; Eagly & Steffen, 1984, 1986). However, while intergroup contact may 
be the fundamental determinant of stereotype content formation, they acknowledge that 
other factors may also be important. The perceiver’s motivation or processing goals 
when forming impressions of social groups may come into play. Attribute dimensions 
that come to form the stereotype may be those that positively distinguish the ingroup 
from the outgroup rather than those that maximally differentiate the groups (Ford & 
Tonander, 1995).
All the accounts of stereotype formation reviewed suggest, to some extent, that 
stereotype content is based on direct observation and experience with group members, 
whether that observation and experience is accurately represented or filtered by 
cognitive biases. Stangor and Schaller (1996) suggest that there has been a focus on the 
‘bottom-up’ determinants of stereotypes and stereotype content. Stereotype content is 
assumed to be learned via direct contact with members of other social groups. The 
emphasis is very much on the influence of individual cognitive processes in stereotype 
formation. While the role of cultural and social mechanisms in the formation of 
stereotype content have been acknowledged by researchers from the social cognitive 
perspective (e.g., Mackie et al., 1996) the treatment of these factors has often been
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somewhat cursory and vague. For example, it is suggested that stereotype content may 
be culturally transmitted via the media and family, via processes of social learning, or 
that stereotypes may reflect conformity to social norms, but these processes themselves 
are not clearly articulated (Mackie et al., 1996 — although the accounts of Eagly, and 
Hoffman and Hurst acknowledge the influence of socially-shared knowledge about 
social roles). In general, from this perspective stereotype content is argued to become 
initially associated with a given social group via the individual perception of group 
differences — whether these differences be real, derived from social roles and social 
structure, accentuated via the categorization process, based on illusory correlations or 
real correlations, or reflecting theories about underlying dispositions. In the next section 
we consider how this content, once associated with a given social group, comes to be 
applied to social judgement.
The activation and application of stereotype content
The social cognition approach to stereotyping assumes that stereotypes, once formed, 
are represented cognitively in a relatively fixed form waiting to be activated (Stangor & 
Lange, 1994; Stangor & Schaller, 1996). Likewise, these stereotypes are assumed to 
contain, or be cognitively associated with, content — beliefs and expectations about 
social groups. These stereotypes (and associated content) may or may not be used as the 
basis for subsequent judgements. In simple terms, the activation and application of 
stored stereotype content to a judgement is argued to depend largely upon how a given 
stimulus is categorized which in turn is determined by the perceived similarity or fit 
between features of the stimulus and the specifications or features of the stored 
category. However, seeing a stimulus object in categorical terms is argued to be the 
most cognitively economical option for perceivers and so stereotypes tend to act in 
favour of their own confirmation. That is, there are biases in the encoding and recall of 
stimulus information that tend to favour a match with an activated category. Once a fit 
or match between a stimulus and a stored category is deemed to exist, the content 
applied to judgements of that stimulus is derived from the stored category. Thus, ‘top-
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down’ processes are argued to dominate in stereotype application. We now look at these 
processes in more detail.
Before stored stereotype content is activated the stimulus person must be categorized. 
Categorization is argued to be prior to stereotyping (e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).
Any group judgement process must be preceded by an initial act of social 
categorization. That is, before a group stereotype can be activated and used in 
one’s perceptions of another person, that target person must be categorized as a 
member of the group. (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994, p. 16)
As discussed earlier, stereotypes are argued to be represented in memory in the form of 
either abstract representations such as prototypes or schemas, as exemplars, or as some 
combination of both. Stangor and Lange (1994) argue that the majority of researchers 
(at least from the social cognition tradition) now agree that stereotypes are mental 
representations and that there is “basic agreement that stereotypical characteristics are 
associated with group labels in semantic memory through mental associations” (p. 362). 
They argue for an associational model of social-group representation in which such a 
representation consists of a category label and a number of mentally associated 
stereotypes. These stereotypes become activated in memory by exposure to category 
labels (see ‘spreading activation’ model, Collins & Loftus, 1975).
The impression formation models of Fiske and Neuberg (1990) and Brewer (1988) 
assume that categories are abstract representations such as schemas or prototypes. A 
schema is “a cognitive structure that represents organized knowledge about a given 
concept...” (Fiske & Taylor, 1984, p. 140). Schemas exist at the individual level and are 
argued to act so as to guide perceivers toward relevant information and encourage them 
to resolve inconsistencies with the schema (Leyens & Fiske, 1994). In these models 
categorization of a stimulus object depends on its level of similarity to the category 
prototype or schema:
Before people can apply their schemas, they have to know what category fits the 
specific stimulus they encounter. Categorization processes describe how we 
classify and identify individual instances as members of larger familiar groupings 
... category members are related by family resemblance. (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p. 
139)
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Smith and Zarate (1992) in their exemplar-based model of social judgement argue that 
abstract, group-level knowledge is only minimally important and that information about 
persons is stored as a number of exemplars. Again categorization is explained in terms 
of the perceived similarity between the stored exemplar and features of the stimulus. 
However, this similarity is not seen as a fixed, context-independent feature of the 
stimulus but depends on how the perceiver processes and interprets the stimuli and this, 
in turn, depends on the theories they hold about the stimuli and their relationships with 
other stimuli. Exemplars are not considered to be ‘copies’ of the stimulus that was 
present but rather they are memory traces of the stimulus as interpreted by the perceiver.
The initial categorization of a target stimulus depends upon a number of factors and is 
argued by some to be a relatively automatic process. For example, Brewer (1988) in her 
dual process model of impression formation argues that the first stage of impression 
formation involves the automatic identification of the stimulus in terms of some well 
established dimension such as sex, race or age. Devine (1989) has also argued for the 
automaticity of some stereotypes. She showed that the non-conscious priming of 
category labels, such as Black, and terms related to the stereotype of blacks activated 
the stereotype and influenced the subsequent ratings of a race-unspecified target. 
Likewise, Fiske and Neuberg (1990), in their continuum model of impression 
formation, argue that the first stage of impression formation involves initial 
categorization based upon categories that are chronically accessible (such as sex, race or 
age), or those that are cued by a category label or by novelty or physical appearance. 
Distinctive cues are argued to allow a perceiver to make a judgement with least 
cognitive effort. Taylor (1981; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff & Ruderman, 1978) has proposed a 
distinctiveness or novelty principle: that relatively novel stimuli will automatically 
attract attention and serve as a cue for categorization. For example, Taylor et al. (1978 
— Experiment 3) varied the sex composition of a six person target group from all 
females (or males) to a solo female and five males (or a solo male and five females). 
They found that subjects attributed more sex-typed roles to males and females the fewer 
there were in the group; that is, stereotyping on the basis of sex was more likely to occur
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when sex was distinctive (however, see Oakes & Turner, 1986, for an alternative view 
of these results; see also studies by Abrams, Thomas & Hogg, 1990; Nesdale, 
Dharmalingam & Kerr, 1987).
The relative accessibility of categories is argued to be important at the initial 
categorization stage. The idea of accessibility was first introduced by Bruner (1957) 
who proposed that the readiness to use a given category was determined by the 
perceiver’s past experience and present goals and motives. Work by Higgins and King 
(1981) has suggested that categories that are either used frequently or have been used 
recently tend to be more accessible. It is suggested that certain categories which we use 
very often, such as sex, race and age, may become chronically accessible (Brewer, 
1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). More recently, Higgins (1996) has made a distinction 
between the availability, accessibility and applicability of a category. Availability refers 
to whether the category is actually available in memory, whereas accessibility refers to 
the potential for that category to be activated. Applicability is more closely related to fit 
and refers to the relation between the stored category and features of the stimulus. 
Stangor and Lange (1994) argue that the activation of a social category depends upon 
both contextual and perceiver characteristics. Contextual characteristics include aspects 
of the stimulus such as distinctiveness or whether it belongs to a chronically accessible 
category. Perceiver factors include individual differences in chronically accessible 
categories. They argue that more informative representations are more readily activated 
and that stereotypes are more likely to be activated when information processing 
capacity is limited. Once a category label is primed, the associated stereotype should be 
activated via spreading activation.
Thus the initial activation of a social category is argued to be determined by salient cues 
(such as novelty), priming of categories via labels, and relative accessibility of 
categories which may be influenced by the recency and frequency of previous 
activation, individual differences in category accessibility and by the perceiver’s goals 
(Brewer, 1988; Bruner, 1957) and mood (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). It is not entirely 
clear what role fit plays in initial categorization although it would seem that there must
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be some rudimentary match between features of the stimulus and the activated category 
at this stage, even if categorization is automatic. Hamilton and Sherman (1994) suggest 
that when categorization is relatively automatic “the ‘similarity matching’ process ... 
relies on a single salient cue rather than on resemblance to the group stereotype” (p. 18). 
Spears and Haslam (1997), discussing Fiske and Neuberg’s (1990) continuum model, 
argue that categorization in this model is separate from and prior to perceived fit, “but 
may be undone by it” (p. 206).
While initial categorization of a stimulus may be based on highly distinctive cues, 
priming or accessible categories, the confirmation of this initial category is argued to 
depend upon the match or fit between this category and attributes of the stimulus. The 
initial categorization guides subsequent perception and is confirmed whenever possible 
(Leyens & Fiske, 1994). Fiske and Neuberg (1990) posit a continuum of impression 
formation from categorical, top-down processes to individuated, data-driven processes. 
They argue that movement along a continuum from category-based impressions to more 
individuated impressions is determined by the interpretation of category-attribute fit. 
Confirmation of an initial category is likely to occur when: (a) the category is 
accompanied by traits interpreted as consistent, (b) the category label is accompanied by 
attributes interpreted as mixed, or (c) a well-established category label is accompanied 
by attributes interpreted as irrelevant to the category label and the judgement at hand (p. 
27). If the characteristics of the stimulus do not fit the initial categorization — that is, if 
they are not consistent with that category or not interpreted as similar to features of that 
category — the perceiver moves on to recategorization. Recategorization will occur 
when: (a) target attributes are irrelevant to the category and the judgement at hand and 
the category is not a strongly established one, or (b) target attributes are clearly 
inconsistent with the category. Piecemeal integration is argued to occur when the target 
attributes are present in the absence of any clear-cut category and they do not easily cue 
one (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie and Milberg (1987) report 
evidence to suggest that category-based impressions are more likely to occur when there 
is a consistent match between category labels and attributes. Subjects were presented
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with stimulus individuals described in terms of an occupational category label and a 
number of attributes either consistent or inconsistent with that label. Subjects formed 
more category-based impressions in the consistent conditions and more attribute-based 
impressions in the inconsistent conditions.
In Brewer’s (1988) dual process model of impression formation, after initial 
categorization, processing may take two alternative paths: either person-based and data 
driven, or category-based making use of a prior category structure. Which path is taken 
will depend on the level of personal self-involvement. If the perceiver feels somehow 
involved with the stimulus object subsequent processing will be person-based and data 
driven. Otherwise, further processing will be category-based and top-down. With 
category-based processing, “impressions are based on an active categorization process 
in which available ‘person types’ are matched to the information given about the new 
person” (Brewer, 1988, p. 17). The search begins at the most inclusive level of 
categorization and continues through increasingly specific subtypes until an adequate fit 
is achieved. The search is constrained by the initial classification (e.g., sex) which once 
activated increases the likelihood for a match between incoming stimulus information 
and the category prototype (Brewer, 1988). Once a satisfactory categorization of a 
stimulus person has been achieved, this categorization will influence subsequent 
processing.
If category-based processes are employed, then both models argue that the subsequent 
content associated with a judgement comes from that prior category:
In many situations ... perceivers relate the target individual to preexisting
categories and they utilise the contents of these categories to form their beliefs ....
(Fiske & Neuberg, 1990, p. 15)
Importantly, categorization is considered to be the default option and the most 
cognitively economical path to take. It is easier to use the stored category and contents 
if possible rather than paying attention to an individual’s attributes. However, reliance 
on categorization is argued to come at a cost of decreased accuracy in stereotype
content:
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Categorization by definition generalises beyond the individual case and thus 
introduces error, to the likely extent that the individual is not the prototype of the 
category. (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990, p. 62)
Thus individuation is argued to be more accurate than categorization and therefore 
preferable (see Oakes & Reynolds, 1997, for an alternative viewpoint). Brewer’s model 
also assumes that category-based impressions are less accurate than personalised 
impressions:
Category-based encoding is problematic to the extent that relevant information 
about an individual is either lost or misrepresented in the categorization process. 
(Brewer, 1988, p. 28)
While the activation and use of stored stereotype content is argued to be based on the 
similarity between the stimulus and the category, there is considerable evidence that 
stereotypes tend to bias perception in favour of their own confirmation. A large amount 
of literature considers how these cognitive categories or schemas, once activated, can 
bias the encoding and recall of information, so that data is remembered and interpreted 
so that it fits the pre-existing structure. Therefore, top-down processes tend to dominate. 
This is argued to be especially true for passive processing, which tends to occur 
unconsciously and leads to the assimilation of new information into existing stereotypes 
(Stangor & Lange, 1994). However, it is argued that active processing, where the 
perceiver becomes aware of the activation of the stereotype, may lead to either the 
assimilation of new information or to the accommodation of the stereotype to fit the 
new information. Under active processing conditions, individuals may focus more on 
stereotype-inconsistent information. Much research looks at how we deal with 
information that is clearly inconsistent with or disconfirms our expectancies (i.e., does 
not fit). Stereotypes are considered to be highly resistant to change and to persist even in 
the face of contradictory information. Evidence to support this view is of the kind 
showing that social categories can bias attention to, encoding of, memory for and recall 
of information so as to confirm the original social categorization.
Numerous studies have shown that subjects are more likely to interpret ambiguous 
information in line with their expectancies and can interpret the same behavioural act 
differently when performed by members of different social categories. For example, in a
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classic study by Duncan (1976) white subjects observed one person giving another an 
ambiguous shove. This act was interpreted as being violent when there was a black 
person shoving a white person but was more likely to be seen as ‘playing around’ when 
a white person was shoving a black person. Likewise, subjects were more likely to make 
personal attributions for the act when the perpetrator was black, and to make situational 
attributions when the perpetrator was white. In a similar study Sagar and Schofield 
(1980) found that school children interpreted the same ambiguous behavioural act 
differently when the race of the actor was varied, with the act being interpreted as more 
mean and threatening if the actor was black as opposed to white (see also Bodenhausen 
& Wyer, 1985; Darley & Gross, 1983). It appears that ambiguous information is often 
interpreted so that it fits our expectancies or schemas. Thus it appears that our 
stereotypes (in these cases racial stereotypes) can influence and bias how we interpret 
what we observe.
Our expectancies about social categories can also impact on the behaviour of those we 
are interacting with and bias their behaviour in an expectancy-confirming way. This was 
demonstrated in a study by Snyder and Swann (1978). Subjects were led to believe that 
the person they were about to interview was either an introvert or an extrovert. The 
subjects’ task was to assess the target person’s personality and to this end they could 
select questions to ask them from a possible range. Subjects who thought they were 
interviewing an extrovert were more likely to select questions that would produce 
extroverted responses whereas those expecting introverts chose questions more likely to 
elicit introverted responses. Furthermore the targets, constrained by the questioning 
strategies of the interviewers, tended to present themselves in ways consistent with the 
interviewers’ expectations. Thus expectancies tend to become ‘self-fulfilling 
prophecies’ which influence the behaviours of others in expectancy-confirming ways.
As well as interpreting ambiguous information in a stereotype-consistent fashion, and 
influencing the behaviours of others in an expectancy-confirming way, there is also 
evidence to suggest that in recall we make preferential use of information that is 
consistent with our stereotypes as opposed to inconsistent. A number of studies (e.g.,
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Cohen, 1981; Hamilton & Rose, 1980; Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978; Taylor & Crocker, 
1981; Zadny & Gerard, 1974) have found that subjects given social categorical 
information about targets are more likely to recall information consistent with that 
social category compared to inconsistent information. For example, Cohen (1981) found 
subjects recalled different information about a target woman in a video depending on 
whether she was identified as a librarian or a waitress. Those thinking she was a 
librarian were more likely to recall information consistent with that occupation, such 
that she wore glasses, while those thinking she was a waitress recalled information 
consistent with that role, such that she had been drinking beer. This recall preference 
has been demonstrated for ‘novel’ groups as well as pre-existing stereotypes. Rothbart, 
Evans and Fulero (1979) gave subjects the expectancy that a group of targets were 
either friendly or intelligent, and then presented them with behaviours performed by the 
targets that were either positively or negatively related to friendliness or intelligence, or 
unrelated to friendliness or intelligence. When the expectancy preceded the behavioural 
information subjects recalled more behaviours consistent with the expectancy and 
estimated that these behaviours were more frequent than inconsistent behaviours.
However, there is some debate over whether stereotype-consistent (and confirming) or 
stereotype-inconsistent information is more likely to be recalled, and under what 
conditions. Some researchers have argued that expectancy confirming processes do not 
always operate and have attempted to identify the conditions under which they will or 
will not be important. For example, Hastie and Kumar (1979) presented subjects with 
statements describing behaviours performed by target individuals who had previously 
been described by a series of adjectives. Behaviours were either consistent, inconsistent 
or neutral with respect to the individual’s personality. Subjects showed stronger recall 
for behaviours that were inconsistent with expectancies about the target’s personalities. 
Two recent meta-analytic reviews of research on memory for expectancy-consistent 
versus inconsistent information indicate that generally there is a recall advantage for 
inconsistent information (Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor & McMillan, 1992). It is 
argued that inconsistent information is more likely to be remembered because it is more
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surprising and attention grabbing (see distinctiveness hypothesis). Likewise we devote 
more resources to trying to explain and resolve the inconsistency, and thus it receives 
more attention and is better recalled.
However, a number of factors mediate the memory advantage for inconsistent 
information. Firstly, it appears that preferential recall of inconsistent information holds 
under individual impression formation conditions but not under group impression 
formation conditions (Stern, Marrs, Millar & Cole, 1984). This is argued to happen 
because in individual impression formation, subjects give additional processing to 
unexpected, irreconcilable information, and because subjects expect consistent 
behaviour from individuals (and so inconsistent information is surprising and attended 
to) whereas they do not expect it from a loosely knit group. Stern and colleagues 
presented subjects with a list of personality traits followed by 20 behaviours that were 
either attributed to a single individual or to different members of a group. As expected, 
it was found that inconsistent behaviours were recalled better than consistent behaviours 
in the individual condition but not in the group condition. A number of other have 
supported this hypothesis that individual conditions produce superior recall of 
inconsistent behaviours while group conditions produce better recall of consistent 
information studies (e.g., Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Bodenhausen & Wyer, 
1985). Secondly, studies using pre-existing stereotypes and expectancies (as opposed to 
laboratory created expectancies) have tended to find better recall for consistent 
information (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994). Thirdly, the recall advantage for inconsistent 
information seems to be attenuated by limited cognitive capacity (Macrae, Hewstone & 
Griffiths, 1993). Stereotype consistent information seems to be easier to process and it 
does not required the increased attention that inconsistent information needs to be 
reconciled with initial expectancies.
Even if inconsistent information has a recall advantage, this may ultimately make little 
difference to judgements. Inconsistent information is often attributed situationally and 
thus has little impact. Likewise a strong response bias has been found for consistent 
information (see Fyock & Stangor, 1993; Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor &
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McMillan, 1992). Perceivers often guess that they have seen consistent information 
when they have not, and this tendency may increase as the time between seeing 
information and making judgements increases (Slusher & Anderson, 1987).
Therefore, generally it appears that ‘top-down’ processes have an advantage in the 
application of stereotypes and stereotype content. Categories (and associated 
stereotypes) once activated tend to act in favour of their own confirmation. The 
impression formation models of Fiske and Neuberg (1990) and Brewer (1988) both 
argue that category-based processes have priority in information processing and initial 
categories will be confirmed if at all possible. The content applied to stereotypic 
judgements tends to be based on stored representations rather than the immediate data.
Summary
In the above section we have considered how stereotype content is activated and applied 
to social judgements and the role played by top-down versus bottom-up or data-driven 
processes. Models within the social cognition approach emphasise the role of top-down 
processes in stereotyping. Category-based judgements are assumed to be the most 
cognitively economical and therefore will be employed when possible. The initial 
activation of a category is determined by salient stimulus cues, priming and 
accessibility. Once a stimulus has been initially categorised perceivers then confirm its 
fit with this category. This fit appears to be based on the assessment of the similarity 
between the features of the stimulus and the stored representation of the category. If an 
adequate match or fit is obtained then the process goes no further and judgements about 
the stimulus (and the stereotype content applied) will reflect the contents of the stored 
category. Categories will tend to act in favour of their own confirmation and therefore 
information that is consistent with the activated category is more likely to be encoded, 
remembered and recalled. In this sense top-down processes dominate with judgements 
likely to be biased in favour of stored knowledge. If an adequate fit cannot be achieved 
between the stimulus and a category, recategorization occurs until one is found. If this is 
impossible then the stimulus will be judged in terms of its own features at an 
individuated level. At this point bottom-up processes dominate although this is not
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considered to be stereotyping but rather individuated perception. Thus stereotype 
content, in this view, largely derives from stored categories to some extent in interaction 
with the stimulus data. However, more reliance on data and less on ‘top-down’ 
processes implies a less categorical judgement and less stereotyping.
Stereotype change
In this chapter so far we have considered the formation and application of stereotype 
content from the social cognition perspective. Finally, we want to consider models of 
how stereotypes and stereotype content change. Stereotypes once formed, are assumed 
to be fairly stable cognitive structures that are resistant to change. We have reviewed 
evidence that suggests they tend to bias perception in favour of their own confirmation 
and maintenance. The key to changing stereotypes from this perspective appears to be 
based on providing perceivers with disconfirming examples: that is, with information 
that does not fit the stereotype. Most models of stereotype change have investigated 
under what conditions and in what fashion disconfirming information can change 
stereotypes or, more specifically, stereotype content.
The models of stereotype change seem to have much in common with models of 
stereotype formation: that is, stereotype content is changed via individual direct contact 
with or observation of the behaviour of group members. Indeed, one of the earliest 
models of stereotype change was the ‘contact hypothesis’ (see Allport, 1954; Amir, 
1969; Cook, 1962; Pettigrew, 1969). According to this model stereotype change could 
come about by exposing people to members of the groups they were stereotyping. By 
meeting people and seeing what they were ‘really like’, prejudice should decrease and 
people should hold more accurate views of other groups. However, evidence in support 
of the contact hypothesis has been mixed (for reviews see Hewstone & R. J. Brown, 
1986; Hewstone, 1996) and it has been suggested that contact works most effectively if 
an individual is seen as otherwise typical or representative of a group. Otherwise, the 
person who disconfirms our stereotypic expectancies tends to be discounted as an 
exception (R. J. Brown & Turner, 1981; Hewstone & R. J. Brown, 1986).
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Three more recent models of stereotype change have considered how disconfirming 
information can influence stereotypical views: that is, how stereotype content can be 
altered by exposure to stimuli that do not match (or fit) our expectancies about the 
group. The first of these is referred to as the “bookkeeping model” (Rothbart, 1981). 
According to this model stereotype change depends on the amount of disconfirming 
information received. The greater the amount of disconfirming information, the greater 
will be the change in the stereotype. The second model is referred to as the “conversion 
model” (Rothbart, 1981). In this model stereotype change or conversion is predicted to 
come about when we are presented with one dramatic or highly salient disconfirming 
example. The third model is the “subtyping model” (Brewer, Dull & Lui, 1981; Taylor, 
1981). In line with the view of stereotypes as prototypes within a hierarchical structure, 
this model predicts that information inconsistent with the original category will be 
represented at the level of a subtype or subordinate category. This way, the original 
category is left intact and uninfluenced by the disconfirming information.
Weber and Crocker (1983) have tested the validity of these three models by 
manipulating both the amount of disconfirming information given to subjects and the 
distribution of that information across group members. They found most support for the 
subtyping model. When disconfirming information was concentrated in only a few 
group members, they were seen as unrepresentative of the group as a whole and were 
subtyped. There was little overall change to the original stereotype. Conversely, when 
disconfirming information was dispersed across a large sample the most stereotype 
change occurred.
Research by Hewstone and colleagues has further investigated the influence of 
concentrated versus dispersed information and extended the subtyping model. They 
have found support for the subtyping model of stereotype change in a series of studies 
(Hewstone, Hopkins & Routh, 1992; Hewstone, Johnston & Aird, 1992; Hewstone, 
Macrae, Griffiths & Milne, 1994; Hopkins, Hewstone & Hantzi, 1992; Johnston & 
Hewstone, 1992; Johnston, Hewstone, Pendry & Frankish, 1994). An initial study 
(Hewstone, Hopkins & Routh, 1992) sought to test the conversion model of stereotype
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change and investigated students’ stereotypes of the police in Britain in response to a 
police-schools liaison program. They found that while students rated the police liaison 
officers more positively than police in general, this view did not extend to police in 
general, and that they actually categorized the liaison officers separately from police in 
general. This finding provided support for the subtyping model of stereotype change. 
Hewstone and colleagues argue that disconfirming information will be more influential 
in changing stereotypes if it occurs in individuals otherwise seen as representative of the 
group. A study by Johnston and Hewstone (1992) found more stereotype change when 
disconfirming information was dispersed across group members as opposed to 
concentrated in a few. In addition, they found that the perceived typicality of the 
disconfirming group members mediated stereotype change. Johnston et al. (1994) 
investigated the influence of potential attenuating cognitive and motivational factors, 
such as anticipating interaction with a member of the group being judged, or having 
weaker expectancies about the group, on stereotype change in response to stereotype- 
inconsistent information. These factors should encourage subjects to pay more attention 
to potentially disconfirming information about targets. Evidence for the subtyping 
model was found even in the presence of motivational and cognitive factors.
Other studies suggest the impact of inconsistent or disconfirming information on 
stereotype change may depend upon how well we are able to account for inconsistencies 
in terms of the current stereotype or to discount them. Kunda and Oleson (1995) suggest 
that an inconsistent behaviour by a group member will not be generalised to the rest of 
the group if the perceiver can somehow account for the inconsistency. In their study 
subjects were presented with a group of lawyers, who are considered to be 
stereotypically extroverted. In one condition, subjects were presented with a brilliant 
introverted lawyer and tended to generalise this to the whole group judging them to be 
less extroverted compared to a control group. In two other conditions, subjects also 
learnt that the introverted lawyer either worked for a large or a small firm. In these 
conditions subjects did not generalise from the introverted lawyer to the whole group. 
Kunda and Oleson argue that subjects are able to use this additional piece of
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information (size of firm) to account for the introverted lawyer and so maintain their 
stereotype of lawyers on the whole as being extroverted. These results suggest that 
stereotype maintenance in the face of inconsistent information depends on how well that 
inconsistency can be ‘explained’ away.
Yzerbyt et al. (1997) have suggested that we require cognitive resources to maintain 
stereotypes because reconciling inconsistent information is resource consuming. A 
study by Yzerbyt, Coull and Rocher (1995, cited in Yzerbyt et al., 1997) tested this idea. 
Subjects were presented with a computer engineer (stereotypically introverted) who was 
attributed a number of consistent, inconsistent and neutral traits. Importantly, target 
persons were presented as being extroverted which was inconsistent with the stereotype 
of computer engineers. Information about the target person was presented via a two 
minute interview on an audio tape. While listening to the tape, half the subjects were 
distracted by playing a simple video game, while the other half were not distracted and 
simply listened to the interview. After listening to the tape subjects either rated the 
group ‘computer engineers’ on the a number of traits including extroversion- 
introversion, or simply rated the target person on the same set of traits. Results showed 
subjects who rated the sole target person were more sensitive to the inconsistent 
information compared to those who rated the group. However, of those subjects rating 
the group, the non-distracted subjects rated the category as a whole as more introverted 
(i.e., stereotype-consistently) compared to distracted subjects. They suggest that 
stereotype maintenance is resource consuming and that the distracted subjects did not 
have the resources to explain the inconsistent information away and thus maintain their 
stereotype.
In summary, the above models suggest it is quite difficult to change stereotype content 
with disconfirming information and that this will generally only happen when such 
information is dispersed across group members who are otherwise seen as typical of the 
category. In common with the impression formation models outlined earlier, most of 
these models assume a relatively fixed notion of what is typical or atypical of a given 
group, thus assuming stereotypes to be relatively fixed cognitive structures To change
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stereotypes disconfirming exemplars must be otherwise a ‘good fit’ for the category. 
This ‘goodness-of-fit’ is seen as a match to a fixed category prototype (Rothbart & 
John, 1985). The idea is that we, as perceivers, will discount or subtype disconfirming 
information if at all possible (or explain it away) and only take into account when 
absolutely necessary.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have examined the issue of stereotype content from the social 
cognition perspective. Specifically, we have reviewed accounts of stereotype formation, 
stereotype activation and application, and stereotype change. Because stereotype content 
is conceptualised as being stored in a relatively fixed, cognitive form, a distinction is 
drawn between the initial formation of content (its initial association with a stored 
category) and the application of that stored content to any given social judgement. At 
the formation stage, content is derived chiefly from the perception of differences 
between groups. However, this perception is often filtered by cognitive biases and 
therefore may not reflect ‘true’ differences between groups. Content may be based on 
distinctive, attention-grabbing features of the stimulus.
At the activation stage, top-down processes are argued to dominate. The application of 
content to a stimulus depends on how that stimulus is categorized. This in turn depends 
on the match or fit between the stimulus and aspects of the stored category. Adequate fit 
ensures the stored content associated with that category is applied to the stimulus. A 
large amount of evidence, including that from research on stereotype change, suggests 
that stereotypes tend to act in favour of their own confirmation — thus processes are 
biased towards achieving a match between categories and stimuli. This is argued to 
serve the interests of cognitive economy. Therefore, stereotype content tends to be 
congruent with our expectations about groups (or our schemas). Content is linked to 
category labels which organise our beliefs about social groups and which may serve to 
cue stereotypes. The stereotype content applied to our social judgements is implied to be 
of variable accuracy and often simplified and overgeneralised.
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Thus, while this perspective has deliberately shifted its focus away from studying 
stereotype content, a close examination reveals its implicit emphasis on the role of 
individual cognitive processes in determining stereotype content. Criticisms of this 
perspective are often aimed at the inadequacy of individual cognitive processes alone to 
fully explain stereotype content (e.g., Tajfel, 1981). We consider some of these 
criticisms and some alternative perspectives in the next two chapters.
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Chapter 4
Contemporary Approaches to Stereotype Content (II):
Collective Approaches
In the next two chapters we review two other influential contemporary approaches to 
stereotyping and stereotype content which provide both contrasts and alternatives to the 
social cognition perspective reviewed in the previous chapter. We term these two 
perspectives collective approaches (to be reviewed in this chapter) and interactionist 
approaches (to be reviewed in Chapter 5). The term collective approaches broadly refers 
to approaches that have focussed on the collective and social rather than the individual 
cognitive determinants of stereotyping and stereotype content, and that have emphasised 
the role of groups, society, culture and language in the formation of stereotype content. 
In our review we especially focus on research from social representations theory, and 
from discursive and rhetorical social psychology.
Both collective and interactionist approaches have been critical of the social cognition 
perspective for focussing too much on individual cognitive processes in stereotyping, 
for ignoring the role of social factors and social context, and for ignoring the contents of 
cognition. In the next two chapters we examine the criticisms these approaches have 
made of the social cognition perspective and review their alternative accounts of the 
determinants of stereotype content. We begin in this chapter with a review of collective 
approaches. In the following chapter we review interactionist approaches.
Overview
Stangor and Schaller (1996) make the following distinction between individual, social 
cognitive approaches to stereotyping and more collective approaches:
From one perspective stereotypes are represented within the mind of the 
individual person. From the other perspective, stereotypes are represented as part 
of the social fabric of a society, shared by the people within that culture, (p. 4)
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That is not to say that collective approaches are advocating a ‘group mind’; rather these 
approaches tend to emphasise the importance of shared social beliefs over and above 
individual beliefs (Stangor & Schaller, 1996). This more social approach has been 
accompanied by a more explicit focus on the contents of stereotypes and less focus on 
stereotyping processes (Stangor & Schaller, 1996).
While the research we are including within this approach does not represent a unified 
theoretical perspective, broadly speaking it encompasses the idea that stereotype content 
is derived from culture and society. This approach has been critical of social cognition 
perspectives for ignoring the role of culture in stereotyping. For example, theorists 
within a social constructionist tradition argue that all social reality, including cognitive 
processes themselves, are socially and culturally constructed and vary across cultures 
(Gergen, 1985; Pepitone, 1986). Pepitone (1986) criticises accounts of stereotype 
formation such as illusory correlation, for assuming cognitive processes that are 
independent of culture and independent of the content of stereotypes. He argues, to the 
contrary, that the content of cognitive categories critically affects cognitive processes. 
The same stimulus material will be judged and interpreted according to the cultural 
meanings invested in it.
Crucial to this perspective is the consensual nature of stereotype content. As individuals 
are socialised into a culture, or a society, they acquire the stereotypes of that 
culture/society. Society (rather than the individual) is assumed to be the basis of stored 
knowledge about social groups (Stangor & Schaller, 1996). Cultural stereotypes are 
transferred to individuals via education, family and the media, via social roles and social 
norms, via processes of social learning and conformity. The role of language in 
constructing and transmitting stereotype content is argued to be especially important. Its 
importance lies in the fact that “it transcends the individual and offers a means of 
storing stereotypic beliefs at a collective, consensual level” (Stangor & Schaller, 1996,
p. 11).
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Collective approaches have been criticised for being non-unified and vague, and at 
times more sociological than psychological. However, some recent approaches to 
stereotyping have considered the role of ‘social’ and ‘collective’ knowledge, and the 
role of language, in the formation of stereotype content in a more rigorous and unified 
fashion, and have presented themselves as viable alternatives to the mainstream 
orthodoxy. We now turn to two of these in particular: social representations theory, and 
discursive and rhetorical social psychology.
Social representations theory
The term ‘social representations’ has its origins in Durkheim’s (1898) concept of 
collective representations, which he described as including science, religion and myth. 
Moscovici (1976) coined the term social representations emphasising that this 
knowledge was social in the sense that it is both represented in society and shared by the 
members of society. Social (as opposed to collective representations) are tied up with 
understanding and communicating, and contribute to the creation of ‘reality’ and 
‘common sense’ (Moscovici, 1984). While definitions of the social representations 
concept vary, the following definition of social representations emphasises the 
explanatory nature of this phenomenon:
Social representations ... concern the contents of everyday thinking and the stock 
of ideas that gives coherence to our religious beliefs, political ideas and the 
[mental] connections we create ... They make it possible for us to classify persons 
and objects, to compare and explain behaviours and to objectify them as parts of 
our social setting. (Moscovici, 1988, p. 214, cited in Hewstone, 1989)
The purpose of these representations is to make the unfamiliar familiar. Social 
representations are argued to be created by individuals and groups via communication 
(Moscovici, 1984). Two processes generate social representations — anchoring and 
objectifying (Moscovici, 1984). The first process “strives to anchor strange ideas, to 
reduce them to ordinary categories and images, to set them in a familiar context” 
(Moscovici, 1984, p. 29, emphasis in original). Anchoring involves classifying and 
naming objects so that we are able to understand and represent them. It involves 
comparing unfamiliar objects to our system of categories: “Insofar as a given object is
80
compared to the paradigm of a category it acquires characteristics of that category and is 
re-adjusted to fit within it” (Moscovici, 1984, p. 30). The second process in social 
representations, objectifying, acts to turn ‘abstract’ objects into ‘concrete’ ones 
(Moscovici, 1984). For example, scientific concepts, such as psychoanalysis, become 
transformed so that they become part of everyday commonsense (Moscovici, 1961). The 
specific content of representations is of vital importance and the processes involved in 
creating representations are argued to be important insofar as they help us to understand 
the content. As Moscovici (1984) argues : “... how we think is not distinct from what we 
think” (p. 67).
In many respects, social representations have much in common with schemas as 
discussed by social cognition theorists. For example, they are both conceptualised as 
knowledge structures which guide and facilitate the processing of information 
(Augoustinos & Innes, 1990). Likewise, both are thought to bias the processing of 
information in favour of their own confirmation. Moscovici (1984) argues that: “we are 
never provided with any information which has not been distorted by representations 
‘superimposed’ on objects and on persons ...” (p. 6). The process of anchoring appears 
similar to the processes described previously (Chapter 3) whereby stimulus information 
is matched to a category on the basis of similarity, and then defined and described in 
terms of the contents of that category (or associated stereotype) (Augoustinos & Innes, 
1990). However, while social cognitive theories view the categorization of stimuli as an 
individual cognitive process, social representations theory sees anchoring as a social 
process (Augoustinos & Innes, 1990; Billig, 1991). This highlights the crucial 
difference between the two approaches — while social representations are viewed as 
collectively shared and collectively shaped, schema theory does not clearly articulate 
where schemas and their contents come from (Augoustinos & Innes, 1990; Jaspars & 
Hewstone, 1990). The social representations approach is interested in the content and 
origins of our cognitions not just the process. Likewise, unlike schemas, social 
representations are linked to intergroup processes (Echebarria-Echabe, Guede, Sanjuan- 
Guillen & Valencia-Garate, 1992). It is emphasised that they and their contents are
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created through social communication (see Augoustinos, 1991; Augoustinos & Walker, 
1995).
Social representations are assumed to be consensual, to be shared within groups and 
within society more broadly, and to vary in content across groups. It is these factors that 
are important in terms of an understanding of stereotype content. One of the central 
features of social representations is that their content is shared within social groups. 
This consensus is created via social communication and the interaction of group 
members (Augoustinos, 1991). Thus, consensus is expected within groups, either 
narrowly or broadly defined, and likewise differences in the content of representations 
would be expected between groups.
A number of studies have investigated the consensual nature of social representations 
and their connection to different social groups. For example, Augoustinos (1991) 
investigated the development of consensual representations of Australian society. She 
found that older groups of subjects had more consensual representations than younger 
groups suggesting that with increased socialisation, interaction and communication 
representations (and their content) become shared. A study by Hewstone, Jaspars and 
Lalljee (1982) looked at the social representations held by English public and 
comprehensive schoolboys concerning similarities and differences between the two 
types of boys. They found that the schoolboys possessed quite distinct social 
representations of themselves and each other. At the same time, within each group there 
was considerable agreement in terms of the representations produced. In addition, while 
the two sets of schoolboys did have some overlap in their representations, often they 
invested the same traits with different meanings. For example, the public schoolboys 
saw themselves as hardworking whereas the comprehensive schoolboys saw them as 
‘swots’. Hewstone et al.’s study shows how the content of both representations of own 
and other groups can vary with social group membership.
Echebarria-Echabe et al. (1992) looked at the social representations of drugs held by 
people with different levels of contact with drug users. They found that different
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representations of drugs were anchored in different social categories. Likewise, different 
social categories had different explanations for drug addiction. Because social 
representations are anchored in different social groups, they argue that the contents of 
stereotypes can differ with different groups. Hraba, Hagendoorn and Hagendoorn (1989) 
investigated the link between social distance in an ethnic hierarchy and social 
representations. They found that their subjects held consensual representations of the 
hierarchy of ethnic groups in the Netherlands. However, this social representation was 
not shared to the same degree by all subjects and degree of consensus was influenced by 
“the ideological and social characteristics of the respondents” (p. 67). These researchers 
emphasise that social representations are best understood as dynamic processes rather 
than static structures.
These studies highlight that the contents of social representations, including stereotypes, 
are consensual within groups and may vary between groups. It is suggested that content 
derives from processes of social communication within groups, although these 
processes are not fully outlined. Augoustinos and Walker (1995) go somewhat further 
by proposing that the content of stereotypes is derived from the social and economic 
positions of groups, and not determined by any properties intrinsic to the individual 
members of those groups. They propose that stereotypes are “ideological representations 
which are used to justify and legitimise existing social and power relations within a 
society” (pp. 301-2). Likewise, lost and Banaji (1994), while not employing a social 
representations framework, argue that stereotypes serve ideological functions, namely 
system-justifying ones of maintaining the social structure and the dominance of some 
groups over others. Their “system-justification view assumes that the specific contents 
of stereotypes may be predicted on the basis of objective, material factors such as status 
or position in society” (p.16). Thus, the contents of stereotypes may be “derived from 
prevailing systems of social arrangements” and “changes in the existing system of 
arrangements may produce changes in the contents of stereotypes” (p. 16). Likewise, 
Stangor and Jost (1997) argue that stereotyping should not only be examined at an 
individual and group level, but also at a systems level. They suggest that while most
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models of stereotype formation (see previous chapter) focus on the ‘bottom-up’ 
determinants of stereotypes, ‘top-down’ collectivistic beliefs about groups are also 
crucial.
A number of critiques have been made of social representations theory. Chief among 
these has been the theory’s vagueness and reluctance to define concepts (Potter & 
Litton, 1985). Another important criticism concerns the ambiguity concerning the level 
of consensus necessary before a representation can be considered to be ‘social’ (Potter 
& Litton, 1985). It is argued that the perspective often takes consensus for granted 
without clearly explaining how this consensus comes about or what constitutes a group 
for the purposes of consensus (Harre', 1984; Potter & Litton, 1985). The social 
representations approach implies that the content of stereotypes derives from 
representations that are shared by groups within society rather than simply from 
individual cognitive biases. However, it is somewhat unclear in terms of how these 
representations come to be shared and associated with given groups. While some 
processes have been articulated (e.g., anchoring and objectification) research has tended 
to focus on uncovering the content of different representations. There are also concerns 
that because of their cognitive element, social representations will eventually become 
reduced to cognitive structures or become a ‘social’ variable tacked on to cognitive 
accounts (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995; Billig, 1991; Potter & Billig, 1992). We add 
some of our own criticisms of this approach at the end of this chapter.
With its focus on consensus, the approach has been criticised for ignoring the diversity 
which exists within a group’s shared representations (Potter & Litton, 1985; Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987). We now want to consider approaches from discursive and rhetorical 
social psychology that have emphasised the diversity and contradictions that may exist 
within ‘shared’ representations and stereotype content.
Discursive and rhetorical social psychology
These somewhat overlapping approaches are characterised by an emphasis on the 
inconsistent and contradictory nature of social knowledge including stereotypes.
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Likewise, they focus on social discourse to understand social knowledge. Potter and 
Wetherell (1987) define discourse as “all forms of spoken interaction, formal and 
informal, and written texts of all kinds” (p. 7). Discourse analysis refers to the analysis 
of these forms of discourse. Taking a rhetorical approach to social psychology means 
that “whenever [we] consider a psychological process, [we] should also look for the 
counter-process” (Billig, 1991, p. 59). A number of researchers from this perspective 
have challenged the extent to which social beliefs may be homogenous within groups or 
within society. They are also characterised by their anti-cognitivist approach to the 
study of social psychology, both theoretically and methodologically. Billig (1997) 
argues that while most mainstream psychology takes internal mental states or processes 
as their subject matter:
Discursive and rhetorical psychology does not take these hidden essences as its 
object of study. Instead, discursive psychologists claim that the phenomena of 
social psychology are constituted through social interaction especially discursive 
interaction, (p. 38)
Researchers in this tradition have been particularly critical of the social cognitive 
accounts of stereotyping discussed in the previous chapter. Potter and Wetherell (1987) 
question three assumptions of the social cognition perspective: (a) the inevitability of 
biased categorization, (b) the assumption that categories are preformed and enduring 
and (c) the assumption that categories have fixed structure. In response to the first 
assumption they cite the arguments of Billig (1985) who discusses the counter­
processes of categorization and particularisation. He suggests that it is an equally 
‘normal’ process to look for the unique features of individuals through particularisation 
as it is to group them together via categorization. In response to the second and third 
points, Potter and Wetherell (1987) argue that the idea of categories as preformed, fixed 
and enduring is difficult to maintain in light of evidence demonstrating the widespread 
variability in category content. They propose that categories and their content vary and 
are actively reconstructed to serve functional purposes. A study by Wetherell, 
McFayden, Potter and Roth well (1986, cited in Potter & Wetherell, 1987) looked at the 
discourse of white New Zealanders concerning Maoris. They argue that:
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... if white New Zealanders do use stable prototypes of the category Maori there 
ought to be a high degree of consistency in the depiction of Maoris across 
different topics, (p. 123)
However, this consistency was not found; rather there was a great degree of variability 
in the descriptions of Maoris even across the same persons and many descriptions 
contained contradictory elements. Therefore, they argue that categories, instead of 
having a fixed structure, may be a cluster of inconsistent features and expectations. 
They suggest that rather than categories (and stereotypes) being identical to prior 
expectations, that these expectations may be drawn upon as a category is manufactured. 
In this perspective, the content of categories is often inconsistent, variable across 
occasions and constructed through discourse to serve certain goals.
Discourse analysts have argued that as well as accounting for differences in content and 
representations between groups (as per social representations theory, for example) we 
also need to be able to account for diversity within groups. For example, Condor (1990) 
argues that it may be too simple to propose that dominated groups simply accept the 
ideology and beliefs of the dominant group (as per Augoustinos & Walker, 1995; lost & 
Barvaji, 1994; Stangor & Jost, 1997). She points to the existence of distinct working- 
class cultures and other counter-cultures. While the content of, for example, women’s 
gender stereotypes may be measured as similar to men’s, to see this as reflecting a 
dominant ideology assumes that stereotypes are unitary and consistent. Women may 
possess a dual consciousness with the ability to switch between female views of the 
world and dominant male ideology (Spender, 1980). Condor argues that people may not 
simply accept or reject the dominant ideology but may actually possess multiple 
consciousnesses. For example, working-class people may, while at one level accepting 
the dominant ideology, also develop strong working-class cultures with a different set of 
understandings. Thus, Condor (1990) argues that people do not hold a single consistent 
image of a particular social category.
Likewise, Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton and Radley (1988) have examined 
the dilemmatic nature of thought and ideology, and argue that people often hold 
contradictory beliefs regarding the differences between groups, such as gender
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differences. Such contradictory beliefs are argued to produce variable content associated 
with stereotypes of groups such as women and men. They argue that most social 
psychologists “presuppose consistency in the use and in the meaning of gender 
categories” (p. 124). Other perspectives trace different notions of (or beliefs about) 
gender to discrete belief systems such as ‘gender’, ‘individual difference’ and ‘common 
human nature’. Sociologists have distinguished differentiating and non-differentiating 
ideologies of gender — that is, perspectives that emphasise differences based on gender 
versus those that emphasis either common human nature or individual differences. It 
makes sense that those who ascribe to different belief systems about gender would have 
different subsequent gender stereotypes. However, Billig and colleagues go further by 
arguing that these belief systems are not necessarily distinct:
The tendency to regard notions of ‘gender’, ‘individuality’ and ‘common human 
nature’ as distinct positions, which may be used as a reliable means by which to 
classify ‘different’ belief systems, necessarily minimises the coincidence of these 
different themes within accounts. (1988, p. 125, emphasis in original)
They suggest that accepting the reality of gender may co-exist with an acceptance 
concerning ideas about individual differences or common human nature. In our society 
individualism is valued, thus it is seen as unfair to differentiate on the basis of sex. At 
the same time, common-sense suggests that people are either male or female implying 
some difference between the two categories. Thus, these two seemingly contradictory 
beliefs may co-exist. At times we may be forced to opt for a single answer and to 
choose between these two themes. However, Billig et al. (1988) argue that we do not 
reach a final stable position, rather “the distinction between assertions of human 
similarity, absolute variety and (gender) difference may be regarded as inherently 
unstable” (p. 131, emphasis in original). This is reflected in the instability of gender 
stereotype content.
A recent paper by Reicher, Hopkins and Condor (1997)1 *3 also concerns itself with the 
variability of stereotype content within groups. They suggest that it is too simplistic to
11t should be noted that Reicher et al. (1997) claim to take a position that lies somewhere between
discourse analysis and self-categorization theory. They do not deny the existence of psychological,
cognitive constructs for self and other.
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argue (as does social representations theory) that all members of a group share common 
understandings by virtue of being members of the same group. They argue that 
stereotypes vary within groups and that they are contested by group members. They 
point out that people within the same group may vary in what they say in the same 
context (see also Billig et ah, 1988). Using a discursive methodology they investigated 
how various political parties in Scotland sought to define ‘Scottishness’ during the 
British general election of 1992. They found not only did different members of the same 
national group express contradictory ideas about what defines ‘Scottishness’ but that 
variability also existed within the same political party. Their discussion focuses on how 
category definitions are arrived at within groups via argumentation. Thus they suggest 
that stereotypic content is not given within a social group but rather it is contested and 
argued for in ways that serve strategic ends.
Discursive approaches to stereotyping and stereotype content have been criticised for 
emphasising the variability in what people say and denying the coherence (Augoustinos 
& Walker, 1995). Likewise, the approach is criticised for ignoring the role of cognitive 
processes — for example, what is going on inside people’s heads when they engage in 
discourse? (Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Augoustinos & Walker, 1995; Hogg & McGarty, 
1990; Parker, 1992). Evidence that points to inconsistency in people’s discourse about 
groups does not necessarily imply that there is no underlying cognitive system that 
produces these stereotypes:
The very existence of different sets of repertoires which can be deployed flexibly 
points to the existence of a cognitive substrate which permits the social actor to 
select between them. (Hogg & McGarty, 1990, p. 25)
By discounting the importance of cognitive processes, it is argued that this approach 
does not offer a properly psychological explanation of stereotyping (Hogg & McGarty, 
1990). In addition, the approach has been criticised for being prone to relativism 
(Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Hogg & McGarty, 1990).
Conclusion
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In this chapter we have reviewed collective approaches to stereotype content, especially 
social representations theory, and discursive and rhetorical social psychology. 
Collective approaches emphasise the role of shared social knowledge, such as social 
representations and language, in understanding content. In summary, collective 
approaches to stereotyping, such as social representations theory or discursive social 
psychology, consider the nature of social knowledge, how it is constructed and its 
effects on social behaviour and judgements. This is where the relevance to stereotype 
content is apparent. Likewise, both approaches emphasise the role played by language 
and communication in the transmission of content. Social representations theory stresses 
the consensual nature of content within groups or within society, and argues that content 
becomes created and shared via processes of social communication and interaction. In 
addition, this approach suggests that social representations may act to bias our 
perceptions in favour of their own confirmation and thus stereotype content may not 
accurately reflect real features of individuals. In contrast, discursive approaches stress 
the inherent variability of stereotype content not just between groups but also within 
groups and, indeed, within persons. They emphasise that stereotype content is not given 
but that it is produced via processes of communication, discussion and argumentation 
within groups to serve functional purposes for the group and its members. This 
approach suggests that stereotype content is valid from the perspective of the perceiver, 
although not necessarily a veridical representation of social reality. Thus, while social 
representations theory argues that content may be ‘stored’ in social rather than 
individual representations, discursive approaches eschew the idea of fixed cognitive 
structures which ‘contain’ content. Alternatively they argue that content is actively 
constructed via functional discursive practices such as argumentation. Both approaches 
play down the role of individual cognitive processes in producing stereotype content 
and argue that stereotyping cannot be understood in terms of these processes alone.
We have reviewed above some of the criticisms made of both approaches. With regards 
to the purposes of this thesis, namely the formation of stereotype content, we add a
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further criticism. Despite the fact that content appears to be very important in both 
approaches, explanations regarding the origins of this content appear to be very oblique. 
For social representations theory content arises via processes of communication and 
interaction within society. How exactly these processes operate to produce a given 
content as opposed to other possible contents does not appear to be clearly articulated. 
This often leaves the theory at the level of describing content rather than predicting it. In 
discursive approaches it is also argued that content is produced via discussion, 
communication and argumentation within groups but once again outcomes produced 
seem to be descriptions of content and its variability rather than any predictions of what 
content will be produced when. As discussed previously, we argue that adequate 
accounts of content need to go beyond description and provide a theoretical analysis of 
the processes operating in content formation, an analysis that allows for the prediction 
of content.
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Chapter 5
Contemporary Approaches to Stereotype Content (III): 
Interactionist Approaches
In this chapter we turn our attention to interactionist approaches to stereotyping and 
stereotype content. Interactionist approaches are those that have considered both 
individual cognitive and collective, group-based determinants of stereotyping and 
stereotype content (and the interaction of these factors). In this chapter we focus 
especially on self-categorization theory as the research from this perspective is highly 
representative of the interactionist stance. We also consider recent work from cognitive 
psychology concerning categorization, which self-categorization theory draws upon, 
along with other recent social-psychological developments relevant to this approach 
(e.g., social judgeability theory, Leyens, et al., 1994).
Overview
An interactionist approach to stereotyping draws upon both the role of individual 
cognitive processes and more collective influences in explaining stereotyping and 
stereotype content. It can be thought of as interactionist in two senses — it considers the 
interaction between individual cognitive and collective, group-based factors in 
stereotyping, and it considers the interaction between ‘top-down’ (or theory-driven) and 
‘bottom-up’ (or data-driven) processes in determining stereotype content. In this section 
we begin by examining some of the underlying assumptions of this perspective 
especially in contrast to the social cognition perspective. We then provide a brief 
overview of self-categorization theory. This approach argues that the categorization 
process is fundamental to stereotyping and we articulate (from this perspective) the role 
of categorization in stereotyping, evidence to support this view, and the implications 
that can be drawn regarding the formation of stereotype content.
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In line with its interactionist roots (e.g., Asch, 1952) self-categorization theory argues 
strongly against an individualistic and reductionist social psychology (e.g., Oakes et ah, 
1994; Oakes & Turner, 1990; Turner & Oakes, 1986; Turner & Oakes, 1997):
... one distinctive aspect of self-categorization theory is its explicit aim to develop 
an interactionist, anti-individualistic analysis of these issues, that is, one that takes 
seriously the functional interaction of social and psychological processes, and the 
consequent validity and importance of collective as well as personal definitions of 
the self. (Oakes et ah, 1994, p. 94)
It is argued that reductionism denies the ‘psychological reality’ of the group and reduces 
the activities and existence of a group to the sum of its individual members. Self­
categorization theory argues that a group represents a ‘psychological reality’ and that it 
has emergent properties that are more than the sum of its parts. Given this, 
representations of groups (i.e., stereotypes) are equally as valid as representations of 
individuals and, importantly, representations of groups tell us more about the group than 
would the sum of representations of individuals who make up the group.
This position rejects the idea that the underlying cause of social stereotyping is limited 
information-processing capacity (see Oakes & Turner, 1990; Oakes et al., 1994; Oakes 
& Reynolds, 1997; Spears & Haslam, 1997). Likewise it rejects the idea that 
stereotyping is necessarily biased and that individual-based perception is different from, 
and more accurate than, group-based perception (Oakes et al., 1994; Oakes & Reynolds, 
1997). Thus stereotyping is argued to occur not because of limited cognitive capacity 
but because it is a meaningful representation of group realities. It is argued that even 
with unlimited cognitive capacity we would still stereotype because it is often 
meaningful to perceive people in terms of their group memberships. Such a position 
implies that stereotype content is not necessarily invalid, biased or distorted because 
content derives from meaningful processes rather than individual cognitive biases. We 
will examine some of these assumptions in further detail as we consider this position’s 
account of stereotyping.
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Self-categorization theory
Self-categorization theory’s relevance to stereotyping “derives from the fact that it 
attempts to explain the nature of the relationship between cognitive processes 
(especially categorization) and group life” (Oakes et ah, 1994, p. 94). In simple terms, 
the theory assumes that the categorizations we make of the world include the self. That 
is, in the same way that we categorize external stimuli, we also categorize ourselves as 
similar to some class of stimuli in contrast to some other class of stimuli. This 
categorization reflects our self-conception. It is argued that people can categorize 
themselves (and others) at a number of different levels of abstraction which may be 
more or less inclusive. Theoretically, three general levels of abstraction for self­
categorization are identified: (a) personal identity where one’s self is perceived as a 
unique individual in comparison to other ingroup members (interpersonal), (b) social 
identity where self is perceived as an ingroup member as opposed to an outgroup 
member (intergroup), and (c) the superordinate level of humanity where one is defined 
as a human as opposed to a non-human (interspecies) (Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 
1987). However, these three levels are only examples of an infinite number of possible 
levels; personal and social identity are the most important levels for understanding 
group behaviour but self-categorizations can be both more or less inclusive (Turner & 
Onorato, 1999).
The level at which one categorizes oneself (and others) depends crucially upon 
comparative relations within a given context. Thus, categorization depends on the 
perception of relative differences. These in turn depend on the comparative context or 
frame of reference in which the stimuli are perceived. Therefore categorization depends 
on comparison. However, comparison also depends on categorization (Oakes et al., 
1994). Stimuli must share a category identity at some level to be meaningfully 
compared to each other. This higher-order identity constrains categories that can be 
meaningfully formed on the basis of comparisons. The idea that categorization is 
context-dependent implies that categorization is a variable and fluid process. Likewise, 
the outcome of categorization, the perception of similarity and difference, is also
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variable and context-dependent (Oakes et al., 1994; see also Medin, Goldstone & 
Gentner, 1993). It is this outcome of categorization, namely the perception of similarity 
and difference within and between groups, that is stereotype content. Thus, content is 
flexible and context-dependent.
The theory predicts that categorization at a social level becomes more likely as 
intragroup differences decrease and intergroup differences increase, while categorization 
at a personal level becomes more likely as intergroup differences decrease and 
intragroup differences increase. There is a conflicting inverse relationship between 
personal and social identity. The more we move away from perception of ourselves (or 
others) as unique individuals the more we move towards perception of ourselves (or 
others) as group members. Turner (1985, 1987) talks about a “functional antagonism” 
between the different levels of self-categorization, such that salience at one level 
produces the perception of intra-class similarities and inter-class differences which 
inhibits the perception of these similarities and differences at other levels of 
categorization. Self-categorization tends to vary along a continuum from personal 
identity (where one is perceived as an unique individual maximally different from other 
ingroup members) to social identity (where one is perceived as an ingroup member 
maximally similar to other ingroup members and different from outgroup members) 
(Turner, 1987). It is argued that most of the time people operate somewhere in the 
middle of the continuum but that people may move towards either end at any time given 
the appropriate context.
Movement from personal to social identity produces a depersonalisation of self­
perception and behaviour (Oakes et al., 1994). Depersonalisation involves the 
perception of increased similarity between self and ingroup members and increased 
differences from outgroup members, or self-stereotyping. Individuals come to see 
themselves as interchangeable members of some shared social group or category 
(Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994). It is this depersonalisation that makes 
group-based perception (such as stereotyping) and group-based behaviour possible. 
Group-level behaviour, when one’s social identity is salient, is characterised by “higher-
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order, emergent properties and products” that are argued to represent more than the sum 
of the behaviours of the individuals within the group (Turner et al., 1994, p. 455). 
Likewise, depersonalisation makes shared social beliefs and knowledge possible 
(Turner, 1991). One expects to agree with others categorized as similar to self and is 
therefore influenced by their beliefs, values etc..
Self-categorization theorists argue that people are “both individuals and social group 
members” (Oakes & Turner, 1990, p. 123) and the extent to which they are perceived as 
one or the other varies with comparative context. As we move from an intragroup 
context to an intergroup context, we move from personal identity to social identity. As 
social identity becomes salient, we self-stereotype; that is we perceive ourselves to be 
similar to other ingroup members on dimensions relevant for ingroup definition. 
Likewise, when we stereotype others it is because a social categorization which they 
belong to is salient for us and we perceive them to be similar to other members of their 
group on relevant dimensions (and different from members of other groups). In this 
sense, stereotyping is argued to be simply categorical perception at the intergroup level 
of abstraction. Stereotypes are argued to represent group realities. They represent the 
emergent properties of groups not just personal characteristics of individual members 
(Oakes et al., 1994). Also, stereotypes represent groups-in-context. They are not 
considered representations of fixed, absolute group properties. Importantly, stereotypes 
are categorizations of individuals as social group members; hence self-categorization 
theory has spent considerable effort understanding and articulating the categorization 
process.
Categorization, category formation and category salience
In common with the social cognition perspective, and drawing on the same basis of 
work from Tajfel, self-categorization theory considers the categorization process to be 
fundamental to stereotyping. However, it takes a somewhat different view of the 
categorization process than the social cognition perspective. Importantly, categorization 
is considered to be a comparative and context-dependent process. The comparative 
nature of categorization is embodied in the theory’s principle of meta-contrast. Turner
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(1987) argues that category formation follows the principle of meta-contrast. The 
principle states that:
... within any given frame of reference ..., any collection of stimuli is more likely 
to be categorized as an entity ... to the degree that the differences between those 
stimuli on relevant dimensions of comparison (intra-class differences) are 
perceived to be less than the differences between that collection and other stimuli 
(inter-class differences). (Turner, 1987, pp. 46-7)
That is, categories form so as to maximise relative inter-class differences and minimise 
intra-class differences. The meta-contrast principle describes the comparative relations 
that must exist between stimuli for them to be treated as a category and implies that 
categorization is always relative to a frame of reference (Oakes, 1996).
This contrasts with the major account of stereotype formation from social cognition 
research — namely distinctiveness-based illusory correlation. According to self­
categorization theory, correlations between attributes and the division into categories 
must be real rather than illusory (see also Ford & Stangor, 1992; Tajfel, 1969, 1972; 
Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). Re-interpretations of the illusory correlation effect from a self­
categorization perspective point to the role of meta-contrast and categorization in 
stereotype formation. It is argued that the illusory correlation effect can be understood 
as the result of a search for differentiated meaning (Haslam, McGarty & P. Brown, 
1996; McGarty, Haslam, Turner & Oakes, 1993; Oakes et al., 1994; McGarty & de la 
Haye, 1997) whereby concepts are made ‘separate and clear’. McGarty et al. (1993) 
suggest that subjects in the standard illusory correlation experiment are faced with a 
potentially confusing situation which they expect can be resolved by categorical 
differentiation in terms of the only dimension made available for judgements (i.e., 
positivity/negativity). Subjects can make sense of the task by interpreting the stimuli as 
showing real differences between the two groups (McGarty & de la Haye, 1997).
McGarty et al. (1993) found evidence of the illusory correlation effect without exposing 
subjects to the standard illusory correlation (IC) stimuli. In Experiment 1, subjects were 
merely given the standard instructions and the response sheets for the three standard 
tasks. In addition, some subjects were told that nearly half the stimuli were positive
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Statements about Group A while others were told that there were twice as many 
statements about Group A as Group B. Other subjects were given both pieces of 
information. Subjects given no additional information showed no illusory correlation 
whereas those given both additional pieces of information displayed illusory correlation 
on all three tasks. In a second study, subjects were presented with the standard IC task 
except that stimulus statements were not identified by group. Again strong illusory 
correlation effects were found on all three measures. The argument is made that:
It is clear that subjects differentiated between the groups when they were given (a) 
a task where it was reasonable to differentiate between the social groups and (b) a 
dimension (evaluation) on which to do so. It also appears that they did so in such a 
way as to favour the larger group because there was implicit fit between the 
number of positive statements and the number of statements about the larger 
group. (McGarty & de la Haye, 1997, p. 159)
Berndsen (1997, Study 3.4) presented subjects with an illusory correlation task where 
they were required to ‘think aloud’ while viewing the stimulus statements. She found a 
relationship between the size of perceived illusory correlation and subjects’ tendency to 
reinterpret the behaviours they were presented with. A larger illusory correlation effect 
was associated with a tendency to reinterpret negative Group A behaviours as more 
positive and positive Group B behaviours as more negative. Thus, subjects appeared to 
differentiate between Group A and Group B by accentuating positive behaviours for 
Group A and negative behaviours for Group B. The ‘think-aloud’ procedure 
demonstrated that subjects developed a hypothesis that Group A is better than Group B 
and then reinterpreted subsequent disconfirming behaviours in line with their 
hypothesis; that is, they accentuated differences between groups. Thus, it appears that 
once subjects feel they are able to meaningfully make a categorization they will 
accentuate similarities and differences according to that categorization (Tajfel & 
Wilkes, 1963). The research cited above suggests that in the standard illusory 
correlation task there are actual comparative differences between groups (e.g., in terms 
of the number of positive and negative behaviours about each group, see Smith, 1991) 
and that subjects are motivated to look for meaningful differences between groups. 
Thus, differentiation between groups is crucial for category formation but it reflects the
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perception of real comparative differences between groups according to the principle of 
meta-contrast.
While the meta-contrast principle is crucial in category formation it provides only part 
of the explanation for categorization. A full account must also consider the accessibility 
and the normative content of categories. Self-categorization theory views the salience of 
social categories as being determined by an interactional process involving the relative 
accessibility of the category and the fit between stimulus input and the category (Oakes 
et al., 1994). This idea builds on the work of Bruner (1957) who outlined an 
‘accessibility x fit’ hypothesis with respect to perception. Accessibility refers to how 
perceptually ‘ready’ a person is to perceive a given stimulus. A category that is readily 
accessible will require less input for categorization of stimuli in terms of that category 
to occur; likewise, there will be a wider range of stimuli that will be accepted as fitting 
that category (Bruner, 1957). According to Bruner, accessibility depends upon the 
“current tasks, goals and purposes of the perceiver” and upon the “likelihood of 
particular types of objects or events occurring in the perceiver’s present environment” 
(Oakes, 1987, p. 128). The other half of the equation, fit, refers to the match between 
actual stimulus characteristics and the category. Given two equally accessible 
categories, the one that best fits the stimulus information will be activated, and given 
equal fit the most accessible category is used.
Self-categorization theory has made use of Bruner’s (1957) ‘accessibility x fit’ 
hypothesis to explain the salience of social categories (Oakes, 1987). In terms of 
accessibility, Bruner’s determinants of current goals and circumstances are argued to 
apply equally to the social environment. Turner et al. (1994) refer to accessibility as 
‘perceiver readiness’ and suggest it reflects the perceiver’s past experience, present 
expectations and current motives, values, goals and needs. All perception is argued to be 
motivated perception in the sense that we are ‘primed’ to see what is important to us and 
to ignore what is unimportant (Oakes et al., 1994). Four basic effects of perceiver 
readiness in perception are outlined:
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1. Through the influence of perceiver readiness stimuli are elaborated in terms of 
categories provided by one’s own past experience and the body of ideas, theories 
and knowledge acquired from one’s culture.
2. Perceiver readiness leads to the selective categorization of the world in a way 
that is meaningful, relevant and useful in terms of the needs, goals and purposes of 
the perceiver.
3. It ensures that the categories used by the perceiver evaluate reality from the 
perspective of his or her own standards, norms and values.
4. It represents and judges reality from the vantage point of one’s own place in it, 
from the perspective provided by one’s own position. (Oakes et al., 1994, p. 201, 
emphasis in original)
Perceiver readiness reflects the fact that all perception takes place from a human 
perspective and that our perception is always relative to ourselves, and thus reflects our 
goals, motives and values.
While acknowledging the importance of social category accessibility (or perceiver 
readiness4), and pointing to the need for further research in this area (see Oakes et ah, 
1994) self-categorization researchers have concentrated their efforts on specifying the 
determinants of fit for social categories. Social categorizations describe the invariances 
in human behaviour, at any one time, across individuals. The principle of meta-contrast, 
described above, can be used to predict when a social category will be salient or when a 
given stimulus, in context, will fit a given social categorization. A category likely to 
become salient is one with a contextually high ratio of inter- to intra-category 
differences; this ratio is called the meta-contrast ratio. In terms of social categorization 
this aspect of fit has been termed ‘comparative’ or ‘structural’ fit (Oakes, 1987).
Another aspect of fit has been identified which is referred to as ‘normative’ fit. Oakes 
(1996) defines normative fit as “the match between category and the content properties 
of stimuli” (p. 103). Normative fit takes into account the social meaning of the 
comparative differences between persons; that is, such differences must make sense in 
terms of the broader expectations, background knowledge and theories that we hold 
about groups. Studies by Oakes, Turner and Haslam (1991) demonstrate more clearly
4 From Oakes et al. (1994), and Turner et al. (1994) onwards accessibility is referred to as perceiver 
readiness in order to make clear that the reference is not to stored representations waiting to be activated.
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the role of comparative and normative fit in determining category salience. In 
Experiment 1 they investigated the effect of comparative fit on the salience of sex 
category membership while holding normative fit constant. Subjects viewed a tape-slide 
presentation of a six-person discussion group that varied in its sex composition, 
containing either one man and five women (‘solo’ condition) or three men and three 
women (‘collective’ condition). In addition, the pattern of agreement and disagreement 
between group members on a sex-relevant issue was varied such that either one person 
disagreed with five others who agreed among themselves (‘deviance’ condition) or three 
members disagreed with three others (‘conflict’ condition). The pattern of agreement 
was varied such that there was high concurrence between sex categorization and 
attitudes in the solo/deviance condition (one man disagreed with five women) and the 
collective/conflict condition (three men disagree with three women) but not in the other 
two conditions (solo/conflict — one man and two women disagreed with three women, 
and collective/deviance — one man disagreed with two men and three women). 
Subjects rated a constant target (a man) on a number of masculine and feminine traits, 
and made attributions for his behaviour.
Oakes et al. argue that according to the distinctiveness hypothesis of Taylor and 
colleagues (Taylor, 1981; Taylor et al., 1978, as discussed in Chapter 3) the sex 
categorization should be most salient in the ‘solo’ condition because this is where its 
distinctiveness is greatest. Alternatively they predicted that high fit would lead to 
greater salience of sex categorization as expressed by greater attributions of the target’s 
behaviour to sex category membership and ratings of the target as more stereotypically 
male. Results showed that salience was highest in the collective/conflict condition 
where comparative fit was high.
In Experiment 2, Oakes et al. sought to vary both comparative and normative fit 
independently. Subjects viewed videos of six-person discussion groups that consisted of 
three arts students and three science students. The target persons discussed attitudes 
towards university life which had been shown to differ stereotypically for arts as 
opposed to science students. A target stimulus individual (an arts student) expressed a
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view that was either consistent with, or inconsistent with, the stereotypical arts view 
(consistent vs. inconsistent conditions). In addition the groups were varied so that either 
one arts student disagreed with the other five students, who agreed with each other 
(deviance condition), or three arts students disagreed with three science students but 
both subgroups agreed among themselves (conflict condition), or all six group members 
agreed (consensus condition). On the basis of the principles of comparative and 
normative fit, Oakes et al. predicted that the arts/science categorization “was expected 
to be most salient where both faculty groups conform to the relevant stereotype and 
display correlated intragroup similarities and intergroup differences” (Oakes, et al., 
1991, p. 133). That is, it was predicted to be most salient in the consistent/conflict 
condition where comparative fit was ‘maximised’ in terms of maximum differentiation 
in attitudes, and normative fit was ‘maximised’ in terms of attitudes correlating in a 
stereotypical fashion with group membership. These predictions were supported by 
measures of both stereotyping of group members and attributions of attitudes to group 
membership.
Further support for this account of category salience comes from a study by van 
Knippenberg, van Twuyver and Pepels (1994). They presented subjects with stimulus 
persons in a discussion who were male and female students and teachers (there was no 
correlation between gender and occupation of stimulus persons). Discussion topics were 
varied such that they were either gender relevant (positive discrimination favouring 
women), relevant to academic status (consequences of course evaluations) or neutral. 
Likewise they manipulated the ‘fit’ between categorizations (male-female or student- 
teacher) and positions taken in the discussions (pro versus con). The salience of 
categorizations was measured by considering the within- and between-category errors 
that were made in allocating discussion statements to stimulus persons. More within- 
than between-category errors were taken to indicate greater use of that categorization. 
They found that when there was greater fit between a given categorization and stance on 
a discussion topic (e.g., males were against positive discrimination for women and
101
females were for it) there were stronger categorizations in terms of that category (see 
also Brewer, Weber & Carini, 1995).
Thus, self-categorization theory explains categorization in terms of perceiver readiness, 
comparative and normative fit. Importantly, these factors are argued to be always 
operating in interaction with each other to produce categorization. In contrast to the 
social cognition perspective self-categorization theory argues that:
... to predict categorization ... the entire range of stimuli under consideration,
rather than isolated stimulus characteristics, must be taken into account. (Oakes, 
1996, pp. 101-102)
Therefore, it rejects the idea of salience and categorization based on distinctive cues and 
views categorization as reflecting real comparative aspects of the stimulus array in 
interaction with the perceiver’s background knowledge about stimuli and relations 
between them. In the next section we consider the implications of this account of 
categorization for the formation of stereotype content.
Implications for the formation of stereotype content
The process of categorization is argued to be highly context-dependent and therefore 
variable. This implies that categories are not fixed, waiting to be activated cognitive 
structures but are actively constructed to reflect comparative relations among a set of 
stimuli. Likewise, the comparative nature of categorization implies that the outcome of 
categorization, the perception of similarities and differences between groups (or 
stereotype content) is context-dependent and variable. Thus, the content of categories is 
implied to derive from the context-dependent perception of relative similarities and 
differences between groups in a given frame of reference. This implies that content 
derives from ‘bottom-up’ or data-driven processes (i.e., stimulus characteristics in 
context). However, the role of ‘top-down’ or theory-driven processes is also argued to 
be important in determining content. The perceived relative similarities and differences 
between groups must fit our background knowledge and theories about these groups and 
the relations between them (normative fit). Our expectations, theories, knowledge etc. 
also influence the formation of stereotype content. There must be a fit between this
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stored background knowledge and relevant comparative aspects of the stimuli. Thus, 
stereotype content should reflect an interaction between data and theory. The role of 
both is argued to be equally important.
In addition, our perception of the world is argued to be socially shaped. In categorizing 
the world, we also categorize ourselves and perceive ourselves as similar to ingroup 
members and different from outgroup members. This in turn shapes our social 
behaviour and our perception of the world. The content of stereotypes (of our own and 
other groups) is argued to be shared within the ingroup (Haslam, 1997; Haslam, Turner, 
Oakes, McGarty & Reynolds, 1998). We look to our ingroup, to validate our beliefs. By 
processes of social influence (see Turner, 1991) we bring our beliefs (including the 
content of our stereotypes) into line with those of the ingroup. In this manner, the 
content of our stereotypes becomes consensual and is influenced by collective factors.
We now want to look at some of these implications in more detail and review some of 
the empirical evidence in support of these arguments. We begin by considering the role 
of context in categorization. We examine the structure of categories and role of 
perceived similarity in the categorization process, and the context-dependence of 
perceived similarity and stereotype content. We then review the influence of 
expectations, background knowledge and theories in categorization and in determining 
stereotype content. Finally we expand on the role of collective factors in the formation 
of stereotype content and look specifically at the role of self-categorization in 
explaining consensus in stereotype content.
The role of context
We discussed in Chapter 3 social-psychological models of impression formation, 
categorization and stereotyping based on assumptions that stereotypes are relatively 
fixed cognitive structures such as prototypes, schemas or exemplars, and that 
categorization is determined by matching stimulus attributes to some fixed category 
representation on the basis of their perceived similarity. Recent work from cognitive
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psychology has been critical of views of categories as represented by fixed structures 
such as prototypes or exemplars. For example, Barsalou (1987) argues that:
Invariant representations of categories do not exist in human cognitive systems. 
Instead, invariant representations of categories are analytic fictions created by 
those who study them. (p. 114)
Likewise, Medin and colleagues (Medin & Smith, 1984; Medin, 1989; Murphy & 
Medin, 1985) argue that prototype and exemplar views of categories suffer from having 
a view of similarity that is too unconstrained. Any two objects may be similar and 
dissimilar in an infinite number of arbitrary ways — we need to be able to decide 
which of these ways matter. They claim that categorization is much more flexible than 
presented in these accounts and that accounts of categorization in terms of simple 
similarity-matching are inadequate. The perception of similarities is argued to be 
constrained by both the context of perception (Medin, Goldstone & Gentner, 1993) and 
by the operation of background theories (Murphy & Medin, 1985).
Likewise, self-categorization theory rejects the idea of social categories as fixed 
cognitive structures that contain a relatively fixed content (Oakes et al., 1994; Turner et 
al., 1994; see also Ellemers & van Knippenberg, 1997; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). 
Importantly, self-categorization theory argues that the structure and meaning of a 
category varies with the context within which it is defined (Turner et al., 1994). Thus, a 
social category such as say ‘feminist’, varies in its meaning depending on the context. 
For example, it may mean different things depending on whether the comparative frame 
of reference includes radical feminists, traditional women or misogynists (David & 
Turner, 1992). Likewise, the prototype of this category varies with the context:
Categories are not defined by a fixed prototype (or a fixed set of exemplars); they 
vary in the relative prototypicality of their members as a function of context. 
(Turner et al., 1994, pp. 457-8)
Prototypicality is argued to be determined by meta-contrast. The prototypical member 
of a social category will be that person who differs most from outgroup members and 
least from ingroup members on the relevant dimension of comparison (Oakes, Haslam 
& Turner, 1998). Therefore, a person seen as highly typical of a category in one context
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may be judged to be less typical in another context. For example, an extreme ingroup 
member would not be seen as highly prototypical because they differ from the average 
views of the group. However, if the intergroup context changes to include an extreme 
(and opposite) outgroup, the extreme member becomes increasingly prototypical 
because their position maximises the ratio of intragroup differences to intergroup 
differences. Variability in prototypicality has been demonstrated extensively in research 
done on group polarisation effects (Hogg, Turner & David(son), 1990; McGarty, 
Turner, Hogg, David & Wetherell, 1992; Wetherell, 1987) and group cohesiveness 
(Hogg, 1992; Hogg, Cooper-Shaw & Holzworth, 1993).
A study by Haslam, McGarty, Oakes, Turner and Onorato (1995) demonstrated how 
judgements of prototypicality can vary with the salience of a categorization. In 
Experiment 2, subjects were presented with a video in which four people (confederates) 
discussed two issues: (1) ‘all criminals should be helped rather than punished’ and (2) 
‘the best way to solve the drug problem is for the present laws to be made much 
stricter’. The group reached a consensus which was to disagree strongly with the first 
statement and agree strongly with the second. The group contained both an extremist 
(who exemplified the group’s pro-authority position) and a moderate. Subjects viewed 
the video discussion in one of three conditions: high salience, medium salience and low 
salience. These were designed to vary the context in which subsequent judgements of 
prototypicality would take place by manipulating the salience of the subjects’ own anti- 
authority position. All subjects judged the prototypicality (representativeness) of the 
extreme and moderate group members. Results indicated that with increased salience 
the extreme group member was seen as increasingly more representative of the group 
than the moderate member. This suggests that the same person can be seen as more or 
less prototypical of the same category depending on the context (Haslam, McGarty et 
al., 1995).
Work from the self-categorization theory perspective investigating stereotype change 
also demonstrates the importance of comparative context in determining perceived 
prototypicality and similarity. As discussed in Chapter 3 researchers such as Hewstone
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and colleagues (e.g., Johnston & Hewstone, 1992) have presented evidence that 
stereotype change is mediated by the prototypicality of disconfirming group members. 
That is, disconfirming information is more likely to be incorporated into a groups’ 
stereotype if the group members who display disconfirming behaviour are in other ways 
prototypical. This accords with a view of prototypicality as relatively fixed and being 
determined by similarity between the stimulus attributes and a category representation. 
In line with the arguments presented above, Oakes and colleagues (Oakes & Dempster, 
1996; Oakes, Haslam & Reynolds, 1999) argue that perceived prototypicality is context- 
dependent.
Oakes and Dempster (1996) report a study where they presented subjects with either 
dispersed, concentrated or no information about students from the Australian Catholic 
University (ACU). These students were generally judged to be conservative (as per a 
pretest). The comparative context in which these students were presented was 
manipulated. In one condition subjects read about ACU students in no explicit context 
— however there was the implicit context of comparison to themselves, Australian 
National University students, who are a comparatively less conservative group 
(Restricted Context). In the other condition subjects read about ACU students in the 
context of members of the Call to Australia party', a more conservative comparison 
group (Extended Context). The results indicated that in the restricted context the 
dispersed disconfirmers had more impact on stereotype change than the concentrated 
disconfirmers (as found previously by Hewstone and colleagues). In the extended 
context condition, however, the dispersed disconfirmers had less impact than the 
concentrated ones. The authors argue that in this extended context the prototype of an 
ACU student, in comparison to a more extreme group, had ‘shifted’ towards a less 
conservative position, therefore the disconfirmers in the concentrated condition had 
become more prototypical and therefore had more impact. In fact, the largest shift away 
from the ‘conservative’ stereotype was found in the concentrated/extended context 
condition. These results were replicated in a second study using the stereotype of
5The Call to Australia party was an extremely conservative Australian political party opposed to such 
things as pornography and gay rights (now renamed Christian Democratic Party).
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bushfire fighters (altruistic) and comparing them in the extended context to World 
Vision Volunteers (more extremely altruistic) (Oakes et al., 1999). Oakes et al. conclude 
that “comparative context can alter the category-attribute relationship” (p. 71) and 
therefore that the contents of categories are not fixed but context-specific. Thus, the fit 
between categories and content varies with context. Likewise what we judge to be 
confirming or disconfirming of a category is also not fixed but changes with changes in 
the prototype (which in turn varies with comparative context).
The view that categories are not represented by fixed structures such as prototypes has 
important implications for the content of categories and views on similarity-matching. 
Variability in prototypicality implies that the meaning of categories can change with 
context. If no fixed cognitive structure exists then accounts of categorization based on 
the similarity between stimulus attributes and stored features of the category (such as a 
prototype or schema) would appear to be inadequate. Simple similarity-based accounts 
seem insufficient to account for results such as the ones discussed above. The 
perception of similarity also appears to be context-dependent. It is argued that the 
structure, meaning and content of the same category can change with changes in 
comparative context. This suggests that for any given category there is not an enduring 
fixed representation of that category and its contents. Likewise, it suggests that the 
perception of similarity is constrained by context — things that appear similar in one 
context may appear dissimilar in another.
The above views of categorization imply that the similarities and differences we 
perceive between persons and groups depend on comparative frame of reference. This is 
argued and demonstrated by both researchers from cognitive psychology and self­
categorization theorists. From cognitive psychology, Medin, Goldstone and Gentner 
(1993) argue that context influences our judgements of similarity such that:
... context tends to activate or make salient context-related properties, and, to the 
extent that examples being judged share values of these activated properties, their 
similarity is increased, (p. 257)
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They argue that similarity should be understood as a process rather than a fixed quality 
of a stimulus or object.
Medin et al. (1993) present evidence from a number of studies to support their position. 
In Experiment 1, 20 picture triplets were constructed, consisting each of pictures A, B 
and C. Subjects were presented with 21 pairs of pictures, each containing either picture 
A and picture B, or picture B and picture C. For each pair, subjects were instructed to 
list the features the pairs shared and the features they differed on. Results indicated that 
the perceived properties of picture B depended on whether it was being compared to 
stimulus A or C. For example, in one triplet, A was a picture with three peaks, C was a 
picture with four peaks, and B was an ambiguous shape that could be interpreted as 
having three or four peaks. When comparing B with A subjects indicated that they 
shared the property of having three peaks whereas when B was compared to C subjects 
indicated that they shared the property of having four peaks. Thus subjects came up 
with mutually exclusive properties for B (3 versus 4 peaks) depending on the 
comparison context. This suggests that rather than a stimulus (such as B) having a set of 
fixed properties, the properties of a stimulus can vary depending on what it is being 
compared with.
In Experiment 3, subjects were presented with phrases (usually single words) that were 
either presented in pairs or in a combined context of three words. Subjects had to rate 
the similarity between pairs of words. Results indicated that similarity judgements 
depended on ‘respects’ highlighted by different contrast sets. For example, ‘black’ and 
‘white’ were rated as quite different when presented in a pair, but seen as more similar 
when rated in a context that included ‘red’. The authors argue that in the paired context 
people use a different standard of similarity and focus on different respects. When the 
antonyms ‘black’ and ‘white’ are compared on their own the difference between them is 
highly salient. The features they have in common become more important in the
extended context.
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The context-dependence of perceptions of similarity and difference has also been 
demonstrated in stereotyping studies using social stimuli. The research cited above 
demonstrated how judgements of prototypicality can vary with context. Other studies 
have demonstrated changes in stereotype content to reflect context. For example, 
Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty and Hayes (1992) aimed to show that stereotype 
content varied with both changes in context and with social change. The study involved 
Australian students stereotyping Americans, and was conducted during the time of the 
1990-91 Gulf War which followed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. There were two phases 
of the study — one at the start of the war and one at the end. It investigated how the 
allocation of stereotypical traits to Americans changed with: (a) social change and 
changes in intergroup relations brought about by the war, and (b) with changes in the 
frame of reference provided by relevant comparison groups. In other words, the study 
sought to show how the content of stereotypes of Americans (as held by Australian 
students) changed with changes in context and intergroup relations.
Initially (phase 1) subjects were asked to characterise persons from the USA using a 
Katz and Braly (1933, 1935) type checklist. To manipulate frame of reference, the 
United States was presented to subjects either with two other comparison countries, 
Australia and Britain (Restricted Range), three comparison countries, Australia, Britain 
and the Soviet Union (Medium Range) or four comparison countries, Australia, Britain, 
the Soviet Union and Iraq (Extended Range) (see Diab, 1963a, 1963b). After the 
conflict (phase 2) subjects’ stereotypes of Americans were again assessed in the three 
frames of reference. Results showed that the content of stereotypes applied to 
Americans (the traits checked in the checklist) varied with both frame of reference and 
social change. Given that the majority of subjects were against the war, Americans were 
perceived more negatively after the war (phase 2) than prior to the war (phase 1) in the 
restricted frame of reference. They were also seen more negatively in the first phase of 
the conflict when the frame of reference was extended to include Iraq as a comparison 
group. The authors conclude that “stereotype content varied across experimental
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conditions as an interactive function of both large-scale social change and the intergroup 
relations associated with specific frames of reference” (Haslam et al., 1992, p. 14).
Other studies which are pertinent to the context-dependence of stereotype content are 
those dealing with the outgroup homogeneity effect. As discussed in Chapter 3, this 
effect states that there is an asymmetry between the perception of outgroup and ingroup 
members such that outgroups are seen to be more homogenous than ingroups. 
According to self-categorization theory there is no necessary asymmetry in the 
perception of outgroups and ingroups, and the existence of this effect is context- 
dependent. In an intergroup context, where social identity is salient, both outgroups and 
ingroups should be perceived to be homogenous because perceivers accentuate 
differences between and similarities within both groups. However, in an intragroup 
context, where one’s personal identity becomes salient, perceivers are more likely to try 
to differentiate themselves from other ingroup members and thus the ingroup is 
perceived as relatively heterogenous. Self-categorization theorists suggest that the 
reason for numerous experimental findings of the outgroup homogeneity effect reflect 
the fact that judgements of the outgroup have been in an intergroup context (because 
when perceiving an outgroup there is always an implicit ingroup i.e., self) whereas 
judgements of the ingroup have been carried out in an intragroup context.
An emerging body of research has aimed to demonstrate that the perception of group 
homogeneity is context-dependent (e.g., Haslam, Oakes, Turner & McGarty, 1995; 
1996; Kelly, 1989; Oakes et al., 1994; Simon, 1992; Simon & R. J. Brown, 1987). For 
example, a study by Haslam, Oakes et al. (1995) looked at how the variability of traits 
assigned to Americans and Australians, by Australian students, changed depending on 
the context (intergroup vs. intragroup). They found that in an intergroup context the 
traits assigned to both groups were perceived to be equally variable (i.e., both groups 
were seen as equally homogenous) whereas in an intragroup context, the variability of 
traits assigned to ingroup members were seen as more variable than in the intergroup 
context. The researchers also suggest that the valence of the traits assigned may be 
important. That is, there are motivational reasons (see social identity theory, Chapter 2)
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why we may wish to assign more positive traits to the ingroup than the outgroup. This 
may result in positive traits being seen as less variable for the ingroup but more variable 
for the outgroup, and vice versa for negative traits. This implies that groups are not seen 
as homogenous in “a general, content-free manner” (Oakes et al., 1994, p. 170).
The content of self-stereotypes has also been shown to vary with context. For example, 
a series of experiments by Haslam and Turner (1992, 1995) demonstrated variability in 
perceived similarity of others to self with changes in context. In one study (1992, 
Experiment 1), subjects were all told that they were “slightly pragmatic” and were then 
asked to judge a target who was predominantly pragmatic. They found that even though 
the ‘absolute’ difference between target’s position and subject’s position did not change, 
subjects judged that target to be more similar to themselves as the extent of the frame of 
reference increased and as number of comparison points increased. Therefore, even 
though the ‘distance’ between the subject and the target had not changed in ‘objective’ 
terms, judgements of similarity and difference did change with relative changes in the 
positions of subject, target and the frame of reference in which these were perceived. 
Likewise, Onorato and Turner (1996, 1997; Turner & Onorato, 1999) have 
demonstrated that the content of self-stereotypes can vary depending on whether an 
intragroup or intergroup context is made salient.
The role of expectations, theories and background knowledge
The research discussed above considers the comparative aspects of category fit and how 
the perception of similarity, difference and category content varies with changes in 
context or frame of reference. Likewise much of the research demonstrates how what is 
considered consistent with a category, or normative, can also change with changes in the 
comparative context. We judge certain traits to be typical of, or consistent with, 
firefighters or Americans in one comparative context and not in another. While 
comparative context has been demonstrated to be extremely important, the formation of 
categories and category content also depends crucially on normative fit and perceiver 
readiness. Comparative and normative fit are inseparable and interactive (Oakes et al., 
1994; Turner et al., 1994). It is not enough that there are differences between groups for
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categorization to occur in terms of those differences. These differences must also be in 
the right direction; that is, in a direction that makes sense in terms of our expectations, 
background knowledge and theories about these groups. We now want to elaborate on 
the role normative fit plays in the categorization process and in determining stereotype 
content.
There is much evidence pointing to the importance of normative factors and 
expectations in stereotyping. For example, we reviewed considerable evidence in 
Chapter 3 which suggests that our expectations about groups influence how we process 
information about those groups and how we stereotype them. Earlier in this chapter we 
discussed studies by Oakes et al. (1991) and van Knippenberg et al. (1994) which 
demonstrated the role of normative fit in category salience. However, in these studies 
normative fit was operationalised in terms of consistency between attitudes and 
categories defined by labels (e.g., arts/science students) which suggests that perceivers 
may have a set of relatively fixed expectations about a category cued by a label (e.g., 
Fiske et al., 1987). However, Oakes et al. (1994) make it clear that they are not arguing 
that normative fit is simply connected with a fixed set of expectations and knowledge 
about groups; rather the expectations and knowledge we draw upon are much broader 
and more flexible. In articulating the role of these factors in categorization, self­
categorization theory has drawn on work from cognitive psychology that has 
demonstrated that categorization is influenced and constrained by our background 
knowledge and theories (Oakes et al., 1994; Turner et al., 1994; Turner & Onorato, 
1999). We now briefly outline some of that work.
Neisser (1987) distinguishes between the operation of ‘ecological’ and ‘intellectual’ 
factors in categorization. Ecological factors are those represented in the stimulus 
environment and relate to the concept of ‘comparative fit’. Intellectual factors include 
our theories and knowledge about the way the world is and should be. Medin and 
colleagues argue that it is people’s background theories that guide and constrain which 
stimulus attributes provide a relevant basis for meaningful categorization. They argue
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that our perception of similarities and differences, as well as being constrained by 
comparative context, is guided and constrained by our theories.
Murphy and Medin define a theory as “any host of mental ‘explanations’ rather than a 
complete, organised scientific account ... the term connotes a complex set of relations 
between concepts usually with a causal basis” (1985, p. 290). They argue that concepts 
are best thought of as theoretical knowledge rather than lists of attributes. Importantly, 
the lists of attributes that may be chosen to represent any concept are constrained by the 
theories and knowledge underlying that concept. Thus, on any given occasion in 
describing a category we would not list every possible attribute associated with that 
category — rather, we would list those relevant and diagnostic of our theory and 
background knowledge. For example, even though the attribute ‘flammable’ may be 
applicable to both wood and money, it is likely to be more important in our 
representation of wood because of the knowledge and theories we have about the role of 
money and wood in our society (Murphy & Medin, 1985).
Theories and knowledge drive the selection of attributes and the perception of 
similarity. For example a study by Rips and Handle (1984, cited in Medin & 
Wattenmaker, 1987) has shown subjects’ perception of similarity and subsequent 
categorization of objects was driven by their knowledge about potential variability in 
the size of pizzas and coins. They asked subjects whether an object 5 inches 
(approximately 12.5 cm) in diameter was more likely to be a coin or a pizza. The 
object’s size was actually roughly halfway between large coins and small pizzas. 
However, although the object was equally similar to coins and pizzas in terms of size, 
subjects were more likely to categorize it as a pizza. The explanation offered for this is 
that coins do not vary in size (because their size is fixed by law) whereas pizzas may 
vary. Medin and Shoben (1988, cited in Medin, 1989) found that subjects judged the 
terms white hair and grey hair to be more similar than grey hair and black hair, but 
judged grey clouds and black clouds to be more similar than grey clouds and white 
clouds. White and grey hair are linked by our knowledge of aging whereas grey clouds 
and black clouds are linked by our knowledge about potential stormy weather.
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It is argued that any two entities can be alike and different in a potentially infinite 
number of ways. Our theories and knowledge guide us to look for certain similarities 
and differences. This point is illustrated by the results from rule induction studies 
discussed by Medin and Wattenmaker (1987). In one study subjects were presented with 
pictures of two sets of trains which were labelled either ‘trains run by smugglers’ versus 
‘legal trains’, or ‘trains constructed by creative children’ versus ‘trains constructed by 
uncreative children’, or ‘trains that travel in mountainous terrain’ versus ‘trains that 
travel in flat terrain’. Subjects had to come up with rules for what features separated the 
two sets of trains. They found that although the actual trains across conditions were 
identical, the labels produced different Riles. For example a feature differentiating the 
mountainous versus flat trains was the loads they were carrying, whereas for the 
smuggler train category subjects mentioned the ‘diamond-shaped’ load. It appears that 
the labels acted like (or made accessible) certain theories and that these in turn made 
certain properties more salient. In another study subjects were presented with children’s 
drawings and told that they were drawn by ‘mentally healthy’ versus ‘disturbed’ 
children, or ‘creative’ versus ‘non-creative’ children, or ‘farm’ versus ‘city’ children. 
Subjects appeared to take notice of and mention features or attributes that were 
meaningful in terms of their knowledge about these different groups. For example, 
when drawings were labelled as done by farm children subjects noticed that the 
drawings had some animal parts in them, whereas when the same drawings were 
labelled as done by creative children no subjects mentioned the presence of animal 
parts. Medin and Wattenmaker (1987) argue that “these observations suggest that the 
drawings do not manifest some fixed set of properties that vary in salience so much as 
they ‘support’ a limitless set of properties that derive from the interaction of the 
drawings with the particular observers” (pp. 49-50). The point is that our theories can 
lead us to ‘see’ or interpret the same attribute differently and also guide us to ‘seeing’ 
different bases for similarity and difference.
Similar findings emerged from a recent study reported by Wittenbrink, Hilton and Gist 
(1998). They presented participants with a set of drawings of persons ostensibly done by
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aliens (called Gnolkanians) of Earthlings. In one condition participants were told that 
the Gnolkanians’ body surface was entirely covered with a vinyl-like substance and 
therefore they were surprised by Earthlings’ skin (‘appearance’ explanation). In the 
other condition they were told that for Gnolkanians it was a virtue to hide all emotions 
in public and therefore they were surprised by Earthlings’ display of feelings (‘inner 
state’ explanation). All participants received the same set of 20 drawings and were 
instructed to sort them into groups of similar drawings as they saw appropriate. Results 
indicated that participants’ background knowledge about the stimuli influenced how 
they sorted the drawings with different clusters of similarity formed across the two 
conditions.
Medin and colleagues argue that it is theories that make our concepts coherent and 
meaningful. Thus categories are not based on any set of similarities, or even a certain set 
of similarities, but rather similarities that make sense in terms of our theories and 
knowledge. Categorizing depends on these theories which both guide the search for 
similarity and constrain it. Thus:
the relationship between a concept and an example is analogous to the relation 
between theory and data. That is classification is not simply based on a direct 
matching of the concept with those in the example, but rather requires that the 
example have the right ‘explanatory relationship’ to the theory organising the 
concept. (Medin, 1989, p. 1474)
These ideas are very similar to self-categorization theory’s notion of normative fit. 
While comparative fit and meta-contrast play an important role in the categorization 
process, relative similarities and differences must be in a normative direction for a given 
categorization to occur. The important point is that normative fit is not argued to 
represent a fixed expectation or category to which stimulus data is matched. Normative 
fit involves taking into account the social meaning of observed differences between 
groups. Our long-term knowledge about the world is not conceptualised as containing 
set categories but rather as containing information that can be flexibly applied to the 
categorization process. As Oakes et al. (1994) argue:
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there is no one-to-one correspondence between the long-term knowledge we have 
about what different kinds of groups are like and the actual social category that is 
constructed to represent them in any given setting, (p. 122)
Other work from social psychology is supportive of the idea that cognitive knowledge 
structures (or theories), that are broader than fixed representations of groups or schemas, 
influence the categorization process. For example, the social judgeability theory of 
Leyens, Yzerbyt and Schadron (1994) argues for the importance of theories in 
interpreting data. This theory argues that “people do not just rely on data and theories 
about data but also upon theories about judgements” (p. 7). Leyens et al. suggest that 
criteria other than at the level of objective reality need to be considered when examining 
a social judgement. These include the cultural, integrity and theoretical levels. At the 
level of reality the problem is to adequately integrate categorical and individuating 
information so as to match reality as well as possible. With the other levels the aim is to 
find a useful fit rather than an exact match with reality (see also Fiske & Leyens, 1997; 
Leyens & Fiske, 1994). Thus the aim of social judgement is not to reflect reality but to 
find a solution that allows people to function socially as well as possible. The reality 
level focuses on data and theories about data; the other levels deal with theories that 
judges hold about their judgements.
At the reality level theories about data are assumed to be the same as schematic 
knowledge (as proposed by the social cognition perspective — see Chapter 3). Leyens 
et al. argue that “theories attract data” (p. 149), and so, in common with the social 
cognition perspective, they argue that perception is biased to favour theories or 
category-based judgements. At the level of integrity, motivational factors operate and 
perceivers are motivated to retain the social integrity of self and group (see social 
identity theory, Chapter 2). At the cultural level people respect cultural rules such as 
those against stereotyping. At the theoretical level a judgement of others incorporates an 
explanation and constitutes an ‘enlightening gestalt’. They argue that when trying to 
find the best match between data and theories about data people are influenced by 
personal and social integrities and also affected by social rules about the appropriateness
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of the judgement. For example, it may be considered inappropriate to stereotype unless 
one has sufficient information to make such a judgement.
Experiments by Yzerbyt, Schadron, Leyens and Rocher (1994, Experiments 1 and 2; see 
also Yzerbyt, Leyens & Corneille, 1998) sought to address this idea. The first part of 
Experiment 1 involved subjects receiving minimal category information about a 
person’s profession. They were told a target person was either a comedian or an 
archivist, professions thought to be diagnostic of extroversion and introversion 
respectively. In the second part of the experiment subjects performed a vigilance task 
where they were asked to ‘shadow’ a text during a dichotic listening task. In the third 
part of the experiment half the subjects learned that they had been given information 
about the target in their non-listening ear during the vigilance task (although all subjects 
were actually given no information). Subsequently subjects rated the target as more 
introverted or extroverted (depending on profession) when they believed they had 
received the additional individuating information compared to those who did not receive 
this information. It appears subjects were more willing to make a judgement when they 
believed that they had more information available to make a judgement, and because the 
only information actually available was categorical information their judgements 
corresponded to stereotypes. In a second experiment, some subjects were told they had 
received information about the category in general (e.g., comedians) rather than the 
particular target. They were less willing to make a categorical judgement. Thus, Leyens 
et al. argue that stereotyping is not only influenced by theories about data (like schemas) 
but also by ‘theories about theories’ such as the appropriateness of making stereotypical 
judgements.
Yzerbyt et al. (1997), building on the social judgeability perspective and drawing on the 
work of Medin and colleagues, argue that people may “quite heavily rely on their naive 
theories to organise incoming information” about target persons or groups (p. 27). As 
discussed in Chapter 3, they suggest that people may hold ‘essentialist’ theories such 
that surface attributes of individuals are believed to reflect deeper underlying 
dispositions (see also Medin & Ortony, 1989; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). Employing
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such a theory is argued to result in the accentuation of observed differences between 
groups. A study by Hoffman and Hurst (1990; see Chapter 3) found that subjects who 
produced an explanation for observed category-role correlations stereotyped more than 
those who did not. Likewise, we have reviewed in Chapter 3 work by Dweck and 
colleagues (Chiu et al., 1997; Dweck et al., 1993; Dweck et ah, 1995a, 1995b; Levy & 
Dweck, 1998; Levy, Stroessner & Dweck, 1998) which demonstrates that people who 
hold ‘entity’ versus ‘incremental’ theories show differences in the ways they encode and 
organise incoming social information, with entity theorists more likely to demonstrate 
stereotyping. Chiu et ah argue that while these implicit theories are rarely articulated 
“they may set up an interpretative frame within which information is processed” (p. 19).
Recent work by Wittenbrink and colleagues (Wittenbrink, Gist & Hilton, 1997; 
Wittenbrink, Park & Judd, 1998) has also considered “the role that higher order 
structural properties of stereotypic knowledge play in the processing of social 
information” (Wittenbrink et ah, 1997, p. 526). They argue that our stereotypic 
knowledge does not just include the attributes of groups but also a causal structure 
concerning the links between those attributes and to the perceiver’s wider knowledge 
about the world. Thus stereotypes serve as ‘explanatory frameworks’ which allow us to 
construe cause and effect relations:
Stereotypic construal, then, is not only a consequence of the perceiver’s 
stereotypic assumptions regarding additional, potentially unobserved, or so far 
unnoticed, trait characteristics but also a result of the constraints stereotypic 
knowledge places on the potential causal connections among the various pieces of 
information. (Wittenbrink et ah, 1997, p. 528)
In a series of experiments Wittenbrink et ah (1997) sought to examine how stereotypic 
causal assumptions influence the encoding of stereotype-relevant information. In 
Experiment 1 they considered causal stereotypic assumptions regarding African 
Americans. They propose that there are two opposing causal models concerning white 
Americans’ beliefs about African Americans — a ‘perpetrator’ model which holds that 
African Americans are “individually responsible for economic failure and low social 
status” and a ‘victim’ model which holds that “the lower social status and economic
118
failure of African Americans is due to structural disadvantages” (p. 527). They screened 
white college students for their belief models concerning African Americans using the 
Modern Racism Scale (MRS: McConahay, Hardee & Batts, 1981). Students identified 
as holding either a ‘victim’ model (low score on the MRS) or a ‘perpetrator’ model 
(high score on the MRS) participated in the next phase of the experiment. They read a 
trial summary which described a male basketball player (either African American or 
white) who was accused of assaulting one of his teammates (of the opposite race). 
Subjects’ explanations for the events described were analysed for their explanatory 
structure. Subjects with different MRS scores tended to construct different causal 
explanations for the events with high MRS subjects more likely to blame an African 
American versus a white player for initiating the incident, a vice versa for the low MRS 
subjects.
In Experiment 2, Wittenbrink et al. sought to rule out the possibility that subjects in 
Experiment 1 may have been motivated to develop post hoc explanations that were 
consistent with their initial stereotypes of the two groups. Subjects’ victim or 
perpetrator models were ‘primed’ by having them read and respond to one of the trial 
summaries from Experiment 1, which described an African American basketball player 
assaulting a white player, where the majority of the basketball team was white. In a 
supposedly unrelated experiment, subjects then viewed animated films of fish which 
either: (a) showed a lone fish (the target) and a group of fish in an antagonistic situation 
where the cause of the antagonism remained ambiguous (e.g., a lone fish approaching a 
group of fish who then moved away from the lone fish), or, (b) showed a group of fish 
including the target moving together (non-antagonistic). Wittenbrink et al. predicted that 
the primed explanatory models concerning African Americans (either victim or 
perpetrator) would be used to explain the interactions between the fish in the ambiguous 
situations (where the models were applicable) but not in the non-antagonistic situation 
(where the models were not applicable). Results showed that subjects interpreted the 
target fish’s behaviour in the antagonistic situations in a way that was consistent with 
their model, with differences between high MRS and low MRS subjects. This suggests
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that construal effects may occur even when subjects are not motivated to maintain 
stereotype consistency. In addition, no differences between high and low MRS subjects’ 
ratings of the target fish were found for the non-antagonistic situation. Thus, while there 
was a transfer of the original stereotypic construal to stimuli unrelated to the stereotype 
these construal effects “emerged only when the target episodes provided a potential 
match with the activated stereotype” (Wittenbrink et al., 1997, p. 539). That is, the 
‘models’ were only applied to the stimuli when they provided a fit with the stimuli.
The research discussed above suggests that theories and knowledge can influence both 
the interpretation and categorization of stimuli. These theories, knowledge and 
expectations that influence the categorization and stereotyping process are conceived of 
as broader and more complex than, for example, simple category schemas. Importantly, 
such theories do not simply contain content about specific social groups but may reflect 
broad systems of beliefs about the world and how it operates (e.g., Just World 
Hypothesis: Lerner, 1980) or expectations about the appropriate way to process social 
information (see Leyens et al., 1994). This last point has been demonstrated by work on 
the illusory correlation effect by self-categorization theorists. As has been argued above, 
subjects faced with the standard illusory correlation task expect the two groups to differ 
in some way. Therefore, removing this expectation should attenuate the effect. This was 
tested in a study by Haslam, McGarty and P. Brown (1996). The task was identical to 
standard illusory correlation studies except in one condition subjects were given an 
expectation that there were less grounds to meaningfully differentiate between the two 
groups on the evaluative dimension. This was done by telling subjects in one condition 
that handedness was the reason for labelling the two groups and that the larger group 
were right-handers whereas the smaller group were left-handers (as occurs naturally). 
They found that subjects given this expectation demonstrated less illusory correlation 
compared to those in a control group. Similarly a study by Berndsen (1997, Study 2.2) 
demonstrated that data-based illusory correlation can be eliminated when there are no 
expectations of differences between groups. Subjects were either given the standard 
group labels A and B, or told that one group were students from the year 1993 and the
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others from 1994. Manipulation checks showed that subjects expected groups A and B 
to be more different than students from 1993 versus 1994. Higher illusory correlation 
was found in the A versus B condition compared to the condition where expectancies of 
intergroup differences were lower.
The evidence discussed above has important implications for the content of categories. 
It suggests that the content of categories is not fixed but varies both with comparative 
context (as discussed above) and with changes in the theories and knowledge being 
made use of in that context. Category or stereotype content is deployed in flexible ways 
according to the principles outlined above:
The content of categories is selectively varied to match what is being represented 
in terms of our background theories and knowledge. It is therefore not a fixed 
category content being applied: the stereotype content is selectively constructed to 
describe, make sense of and rationalise the context-specific differences observed, 
to differentiate groups meaningfully in terms of the interplay between background 
knowledge and immediate data. (Oakes et al., 1994, p. 122)
This also implies that there is no fixed consistency between a given category and a 
given content but that “a given attribute could, in principle, match any number of 
categories” (Oakes et al., 1994, p. 122). Likewise, a given category could be 
meaningfully represented by any number of different attributes. The consistency or 
similarity between an attribute and a category varies with both comparative context, and 
with background theories. We discuss these ideas in more detail in the next chapter.
The role of collective factors
Thus far, we have largely focussed on individual determinants of stereotype content; 
that is, the role of context and the role of individuals’ expectations, knowledge and 
theories. However, as discussed earlier, self-categorization theory argues for an 
interactionist approach which involves both the role of common cognitive processes and 
of shared social knowledge. We have already discussed evidence that suggests that 
whether one perceives others as ingroup or outgroup members can influence how they 
are stereotyped. In this section we consider briefly how categorizing self as an ingroup 
member can influence the categorization process and the formation of content. Haslam
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(1997; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty & Reynolds, 1998) argues that one of the 
consequences of self-categorization in terms of a social category is that one expects to 
agree with others one categorizes as similar to one’s self (see Turner, 1991). One looks 
to common ingroup members to validate one’s beliefs. Thus we engage in ‘social reality 
testing’ to check the correctness of our subjective beliefs (Turner, 1991). Through a 
process of ‘referent informational influence’ our beliefs form and become shared 
(Turner, 1991). McGarty and Turner (1992) argue that social categories are implicit 
social norms. Categorizing is a ‘social normative’ activity that is anchored in our 
reference groups. They demonstrated that social influence impacts upon both the 
strength of categorization effects and judgemental confidence, and thus mediates 
cognitive processes.
Social influence from the groups we identify with, as well as affecting the 
categorization process, can also influence the content of our categorizations. Recent 
studies by Haslam and colleagues (Haslam, 1997; Haslam, Oakes, McGarty, Turner, 
Reynolds & Eggins, 1996; Haslam et al., 1998) explicitly address the foundations of 
stereotype consensus and the role of social influence in consensus regarding stereotype 
content. Specifically, a series of studies aimed to explore the impact of shared ingroup 
norms on the stereotyping process (Haslam et al., 1996). In Experiment 1, Australian 
students (attending the Australian National University or ANU) were asked to make 
judgements about an ingroup (Australians) and an outgroup (Americans). Before 
completing the task, subjects were given information about the traits other people had 
previously used to characterise Australians and Americans. These traits where either 
consistent or inconsistent with the stereotype of the two groups. In addition, the source 
of the traits was either an ingroup (ANU students), an outgroup (prejudiced people) or 
an ingroup-not-outgroup (unprejudiced ANU students). Subjects were then presented 
with three traits that either described Australians or Americans and had to decide on the 
percentage of people from Australia and the percentage of people from the United States 
that each trait applied to. The results showed that the relative applicability of stereotype-
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consistent traits was enhanced when an ingroup source validated these beliefs or an 
outgroup source contradicted these beliefs.
In a second experiment, Australian students had to assign traits from a checklist to 
either Americans or Australians. Again they were informed which traits (five in total) 
had been previously endorsed by either unprejudiced ANU students (ingroup) or 
prejudiced people (outgroup). These traits were either stereotype consistent or 
stereotype inconsistent. Subjects had to choose from the checklist the five traits they 
thought were most typical of either Australians or Americans. Results showed that 
stereotype consensus varied as a function of both the source and consistency of the 
traits. Overall, there was more stereotype consensus when the source was ingroup 
compared to outgroup. In addition, for an ingroup source there was more consensus 
when traits were consistent versus inconsistent, whereas the opposite pattern was found 
for an outgroup source. It is argued that these results indicate that stereotype content “is 
shaped by (and comes to represent) shared ingroup norms” (Haslam, 1997, p. 137).
Thus the way we categorize others, in terms of both process and content, is influenced 
by our self-categorizations. Because in categorizing others we always also implicitly 
categorize ourselves, all our stereotypes of others will be from the perspective of our 
ingroup, and will be influenced by the norms of our ingroup. Presumably they are also 
influenced by knowledge, theories and ideologies shared within our ingroup. We 
expand on these ideas in the next chapter.
It should be noted that while we have discussed individual and collective determinants 
of stereotype content to some extent as if they are separate factors, self-categorization 
theory argues that stereotyping is determined by an interaction between these two 
factors. Thus, it is not the case that the collective factors are merely ‘tacked on’ to the 
individual cognitive analysis. Content is not only socially determined because it derives 
from socially-shared beliefs but also because social factors impact upon the 
categorization process which determines content. Social categorization reflects the 
perceiver’s goals, motive, expectations, knowledge and theories which are all socially
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mediated and derived (Turner & Onorato, 1999). Social categories represent people in 
terms of social comparative properties and thus reflect social context (Turner & 
Onorato, 1999). Via the categorization process, via self-stereotyping or 
depersonalisation, individual perception is transformed into collective perception and 
perceivers draw upon the shared values, norms and knowledge of the collective in 
stereotyping. The cognitive functioning of the individual mind is always mediated by 
social factors, by the interaction between individual and society. Thus while we may 
talk about individual cognitive processes (and the empirical focus of this thesis is 
largely on those processes - see Chapter 6) it is important to keep in mind that these 
processes always operate in interaction with social context and social processes (Turner 
& Oakes, 1997).
Conclusion
In this chapter we have reviewed interactionist approaches to stereotype content. Like 
collective approaches (reviewed in the previous chapter) this perspective provides an 
alternative to social cognitive accounts which emphasise the role of individual cognitive 
processes. Like discursive social psychology, interactionist approaches, such as self­
categorization theory, argue against the idea of stereotypes and their content as ‘pictures 
in our heads’ waiting to be activated. Rather, content is produced via an interaction 
between perceiver readiness, contextual factors, and theories, expectations and 
background knowledge. We have reviewed considerable evidence supportive of the idea 
that stereotype content is both context- and theory-dependent. In contrast to discursive 
approaches, self-categorization theorists argue for the role of both individual cognitive 
processes and collective processes in determining stereotype content. The role of both 
‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ processes, and of individual and group-based processes, are 
argued to be crucial to give a complete account of the formation of stereotype content. 
The link between data and theory is argued to be in the form of fit (both comparative 
and normative).
In the next chapter we consider further the interaction between theory and data, and 
between the individual and the collective, in determining stereotype content.
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Chapter 6
Issues and Processes in the Formation of Stereotype
Content
In the previous four chapters we have reviewed both early and contemporary approaches 
to stereotyping with respect to their implications for the formation of stereotype content. 
In this chapter we take a closer look at the important issues that have emerged from that 
review with the aim of arriving at an account of the formation of stereotype content. We 
conclude this chapter with a statement of the aims and hypotheses of this thesis, derived 
from this account, and by briefly outlining the empirical strategy to be adopted.
Issues in the formation of stereotype content
A number of crucial similarities and differences have emerged from our review of the 
literature. For example, the nature of stereotype content has been conceptualised in a 
number of contradictory ways: as relatively fixed and difficult to change versus flexible 
and context-dependent, as a biased and overgeneralised representation of the features of 
individuals versus a psychologically valid representation of group realities, and as 
individually based and idiosyncratic versus consensual and collectively derived. 
Likewise, content itself has been variously treated as both central to our understanding 
of stereotyping and as unimportant and peripheral. Related to these different 
conceptions of the nature of content are two key themes or ‘tensions’ that emerge from 
our review of the stereotyping literature. The first of these is the role of bottom-up 
versus top-down processes in determining stereotype content. Another way of stating 
this is: to what extent is stereotype content based on the stimulus data perceived and to 
what extent is it derived from the abstract ideas, processes and knowledge of the 
perceiver and dependent on their motivations, needs, goals etc.? Most accounts we have 
reviewed agree, to a greater or lesser extent, that both data and theory have a role to play 
in determining content. Likewise, most attempt to find a link between data and theory 
by considering the impact they have upon each other. However, important differences
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exist across accounts in terms of the priority given to either theory or data, and likewise 
how the link between the two has been conceptualised.
A second, and related, tension that emerges from our review is the distinction between 
individual versus collective factors in determining stereotype content. While 
personality-based and social cognitive accounts have emphasised the role of the 
individual determinants of stereotyping, others have emphasised the role of collective 
factors (e.g., social representations theory) or considered an interaction between 
individual and social factors (e.g., self-categorization theory). In addition, within those 
accounts that emphasise the importance of group memberships, shared knowledge and 
beliefs, and the consensual nature of stereotype content (e.g., social representations 
theory, discourse analysis, self-categorization theory) differences are apparent in terms 
of the role of the group, how the group is conceptualised and explanations of how 
consensus is arrived at within collectives.
As previously noted, most contemporary perspectives have been influenced by, and 
build upon, Tajfel’s analysis of the role of categorization in stereotyping. This is 
especially true of the social cognitive approach and of self-categorization theory. 
However, understandings of the nature and outcomes of categorization differ 
significantly between these two accounts. Connected with these different treatments are 
divergent understandings of the role of data versus theory, and of individual versus 
collective factors in the formation of stereotype content. All these variables have 
important roles to play in the categorization process. Therefore, in considering the two 
key themes outlined above it is important to examine concurrently assumptions 
concerning the nature of categorization.
To arrive at an account of the processes involved in the formation of stereotype content, 
it is vital to consider the issues articulated above in further detail, and in doing so to 
resolve or account for the apparent differences. Specifically, we want to examine the 
nature of categorization, the role of theory versus data (and their interaction) and the 
role of individual versus collective variables. In the following section we briefly recap
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what the different perspectives have argued with respect to these issues and compare 
and contrast the differences across accounts.
A closer examination of the issues
Our intention, in this examination, is not to go back over all the literature reviewed to 
date but rather to draw upon that which is most pertinent to the issues raised. Thus, in 
our examination of these issues we concentrate on contemporary accounts of 
stereotyping, drawing on earlier literature where appropriate. In considering the first 
issue, that is the role of theory versus data (and the nature of the categorization process), 
we focus on contrasting the social cognition perspective with self-categorization theory. 
This is because it is these two accounts that have been most explicit with respect to the 
cognitive processes operating in stereotyping. When considering the role of individual 
versus collective factors, we contrast social cognitive with both collective and 
interactionist accounts. Likewise, we examine differences between collective and 
interactionist accounts in terms of how the influence of ‘social’ factors has been 
explained.
Data versus theory
Within the social cognition perspective a distinction is made between the formation and 
application of categories and stereotypes (and by implication the formation and 
application of stereotype content). Generally stereotypes are argued to form on the basis 
of perceived differences between groups. Categorization plays a role at this stage in that 
it acts to accentuate actual differences between groups. Indeed, stereotypes may form 
when no real differences exist between groups because of the operation of cognitive 
biases such as the perception of illusory correlations (e.g., Hamilton & Gifford, 1976). 
While the perception of differences between groups is necessary for the formation of a 
stereotype, it is not sufficient and it is argued by some that categorization does not 
always lead to the development of a stereotype (e.g., Mackie et al., 1996). This only 
occurs when a set of generalised beliefs become associated with a group or category 
label in memory (Stangor & Lange, 1994). Stangor and Schaller (1996) argue that
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researchers from the social cognitive tradition have tended to focus on the ‘bottom-up’ 
determinants of stereotypes in that stereotypes form on the basis of direct observation 
of, and contact with, group members. This is also apparent in the stereotype change 
literature, where change in content is brought about by contact with individual group 
members. However, it should be noted that the direct observation of data is not argued 
to be accurately represented in memory; rather its perception is filtered by various 
cognitive processes such as illusory correlation, correspondence bias and indeed the 
categorization process itself. This implies that the content that forms is an inaccurate 
representation of reality. While some researchers are more inclined to argue that 
stereotype content forms to reflect actual differences between groups (e.g., Eagly & 
Steffen, 1984, 1986; Ford & Stangor, 1992; Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Jussim, 1990, 
1991; Zebrowitz, 1996), they tend to agree that once formed, stereotypes are stored in 
memory waiting to be activated.
The application of a stereotype and its content to the judgement of a person depends on 
the categorization of that person. Categorization must occur before a stereotype is 
applied. Such categorization may occur relatively automatically based on highly 
accessible categories triggered by distinctive cues (Brewer, 1988; Devine, 1989; Fiske 
& Neuberg, 1990). The confirmation of an initial categorization depends on the 
perceived similarity or fit between salient features of the stimulus person and the stored 
category, which may be structured as a prototype, a schema or a set of exemplars 
(Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Smith & Zarate, 1992). If an appropriate fit is 
achieved, the subsequent impression of the stimulus person is based on the activated 
stereotype. While stereotyping appears to be based on an interaction between data and 
theory (linked by fit), stereotypes are argued to bias the perception and processing of 
data in favour of their own confirmation/’ In the service of cognitive economy, if a fit 
can be achieved between an activated stereotype and the stimulus it will be. This occurs 
through processes that tend to favour the attention to, encoding of and recall for
h The process of anchoring, as articulated in social representations theory, appears to have much in 
common with this approach to categorization in that unfamiliar objects are compared to the ‘paradigm’ of 
a category, adjusted to fit the category, and acquire the characteristics of that category
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stereotype-consistent (or fitting) versus stereotype-inconsistent information. We have 
reviewed considerable evidence in Chapter 3 which supports the notion of a bias 
towards stereotype-consistent information in impression formation. Likewise, evidence 
from stereotype change studies indicates that stereotype-inconsistent information tends 
to be ‘subtyped’ leaving the original stereotype intact unless it is associated with 
otherwise stereotype-consistent information (e.g., Johnston & Hewstone, 1992). 
Therefore, in the application of stereotype content ‘top-down’ processes tend to 
dominate. Data plays a role in so far as it must be sufficient to trigger a category and 
provide adequate fit with it. However, the subsequent judgement of the stimulus person 
is based upon the stored representation of the category they are deemed to belong to; 
thus the content of the stereotype applied derives from abstract knowledge about that 
category. Indeed, categorization and stereotyping are defined in impression formation 
models as ‘top-down’ processes (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). While more 
data-based or bottom-up processing is argued to be possible, it is distinguished from 
stereotyping. Thus impressions based solely on data are individuated impressions and 
not categorical.
Many of the differences from the above view apparent in alternative accounts of 
stereotyping, such as self-categorization theory, arise from a very different 
understanding of the categorization process. According to self-categorization theory, all 
perception involves categorization (see Bruner, 1957). Therefore, no distinction is made 
between categorical impressions (which above are argued to be dominated by top-down 
processes) and individuated impressions (bottom-up). All impressions, even those of 
individuals, are argued to be categorical (see Reynolds, 1996, for a discussion). 
Therefore, stereotyping is simply categorization at a given level of abstraction, namely 
intergroup (Oakes, 1996). Stereotyping is the categorical perception of groups. Thus it 
is not argued that stereotyping involves top-down processing and individuation involves 
bottom-up processing. Rather, all impressions (all categorizations) reflect both top- 
down and bottom-up processes; that is all categorizations (including stereotypes) are
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based upon an interaction between stimulus data and stored background knowledge, 
plus the motives, goals and needs of the perceiver.
Crucially, for self-categorization theory, categorization is “a dynamic, context- 
dependent process, determined by comparative relations within a given context” 
(Oakes, Haslam & Reynolds, 1999, p. 58, emphasis in original). Therefore, in contrast 
to social cognitive accounts, it always involves an entire stimulus array rather than a 
single stimulus (Oakes, 1996). Categories form to reflect and maximise meta-contrast; 
that is, the ratio of inter- to intragroup differences (see also Ford & Stangor, 1992). 
Therefore, categorization is always relative to a frame of reference or context. 
Categorizations form to reflect actual but relative similarities and differences between 
groups (but not objectively fixed ones as per the ‘kernel of truth’ idea). Thus, this 
perspective disagrees with accounts of stereotype formation such as illusory correlation. 
Indeed, as reviewed in Chapter 5, the illusory correlation effect has been reinterpreted 
by self-categorization theory researchers as an outcome of the categorization process 
and as reflecting a search for comparative differences between groups (e.g., Haslam, 
McGarty & P. Brown, 1996; McGarty & de la Haye, 1997; McGarty et al., 1993). The 
comparative nature of categorization means that categories are not conceptualised as 
stored cognitive representations. Thus, this perspective rejects the idea of stereotypes as 
fixed prototypes or schemas waiting to be activated (see also discursive approaches, 
e.g., Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Categories and their content are constructed ‘on the 
spot’ to reflect an interaction between theory and data. Considerable evidence 
supporting the context-dependence of category prototypicality comes from studies 
reviewed in Chapter 5 (e.g., Haslam, McGarty et al., 1995; Hogg, 1992; Hogg et al., 
1993; Hogg et al., 1990; McGarty et al., 1992; Oakes et al., 1999; Oakes et al., 1998). 
Given that categories are constructed ‘on the spot’, in this account no distinction is 
made between the formation and the application of content; rather both are part of the 
same process.
Self-categorization theory, in common with the social cognitive perspective, considers 
fit to be crucial in linking theory and data. Again, however, it is understood quite
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differently. As outlined previously, two aspects of fit are considered to be important, 
comparative fit and normative fit. Comparative fit concerns the comparative relations 
between stimuli as articulated by the principle of meta-contrast. Categories (and 
content) that form must fit with the comparative differences between groups. Therefore, 
the role of data is crucial in content formation; content reflects real comparative and 
contextual aspects of stimulus reality. However, the role of the perceiver is also 
important: because categorization and the search for similarity and difference is driven 
and guided by the perceiver’s needs, motives and goals (perceiver readiness) and 
because the perception and interpretation of similarity and difference depends on the 
perceiver’s background knowledge and theories. Normative fit links background 
knowledge and theories to immediate data. Comparative differences between groups 
must make sense in terms of our knowledge and theories for us to make use of them in 
stereotyping. However, this is not considered to be a matching procedure based on 
objective, fixed similarity as fit is conceived of in social cognitive accounts. Normative 
fit does not represent a fixed expectation or category to which stimulus data is matched, 
nor does it represent a fixed consistency or similarity between data and stored category 
representations. Importantly, it always acts in interaction with comparative fit such that 
relative differences between groups must fit with our knowledge and theories about 
those groups, and the perception of differences between groups, and their meaning, is 
determined and constrained by both the comparative context and the theories and 
knowledge applied.
Thus, this perspective, in line with recent work from cognitive psychology, rejects 
similarity based accounts of categorization such as those employed by the social 
cognitive perspective. Medin and colleagues (e.g., Murphy & Medin, 1985) argue that 
similarity is not a fixed feature of the stimulus. Alternatively they argue that perceptions 
of similarity are guided and constrained by both context (Medin et al., 1993) and by 
theories (Murphy & Medin, 1985). In self-categorization theory context and theories are 
broadly represented by comparative and normative fit. Thus the perception of stereotype 
content, of similarities within groups (and differences between groups) is driven by both
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the comparative frame of reference (meta-contrast) and by the perceiver’s expectations 
and theories. The perception of similarity and difference is context- and theory- 
dependent. This is consistent with Tajfel’s work (see Chapter 2) which suggested that 
the dimensions selected for accentuation between groups are not merely those which 
correlate with a division into categories but which fit our background of knowledge 
about these categories.
Considerable evidence for the context-dependence of content and perceived similarity 
has been reviewed in Chapter 5. For example, it has been demonstrated that what is 
judged to be typical of a category (e.g., American; Haslam et al., 1992) and perceived 
similarity of others to self (Haslam & Turner, 1992, 1995) both vary with changes in 
frame of reference. Likewise, other studies have shown that the content associated with 
a group (Haslam et al., 1993) and the content of self-stereotypes (Onorato & Turner, 
1996, 1997; Reynolds, 1996; Turner & Onorato, 1999) both vary with intra- versus 
intergroup contexts. Stereotype change studies (Oakes & Dempster, 1996; Oakes et al., 
1999) also demonstrate that what we judge to be confirming or disconfirming of a 
category varies with comparative context. Thus, perceived consistency or typicality of 
content with a category varies with comparative context. There is also evidence that it is 
influenced by expectations, theories and knowledge. The role of expectations in the 
categorization process is highlighted by studies on the illusory correlation effect (e.g., 
Berndsen, 1997; Haslam et al., 1996; McGarty et al., 1993). Likewise, there is evidence 
that broad theories held by perceivers influence how they categorize and stereotype 
individuals (e.g., Chiu et al., 1997; Dweck et al., 1993; Dweck et al., 1995a, 1995b; 
Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Levy & Dweck, 1998; Levy et al., 1998; Wittenbrink et al., 
1997; Yzerbyt et al., 1997). In addition, we have reviewed studies from the cognitive 
literature that demonstrate how perceptions of similarity are influenced by theories and 
background knowledge (e.g., Medin & Wattenmaker, 1987; Rips & Handle, 1984, cited 
in Medin & Wattenmaker, 1987). Indeed, the evidence from the social cognition 
literature demonstrating that information consistent with categories and category labels 
takes priority when making group-based decisions can also be interpreted as supportive
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of this position. Presumably, category labels tend to be associated with theories and 
knowledge in memory and data interpreted as consistent or normatively ‘fitting’ with 
these will be used in subsequent stereotyping. Wisniewski and Medin (1994) argue that 
meaningful category labels are used to ‘activate’ theories, that labels activate prior 
knowledge or expectations about categories that are subsequently used in judgements.
How are the ‘theories’ and background knowledge discussed above different and 
distinct from, for example, cognitive schemas as discussed by the social cognition 
perspective? Are they simply more abstract fixed categories? The answer is no for two 
reasons. Firstly, self-categorization theory would agree with Barsalou (1987) that 
knowledge in long term memory may be stable but rarely is the same information 
retrieved from this knowledge to represent a category. Therefore, we can consider long 
term memory as containing continuous knowledge used to construct concepts rather 
than being divided into invariant concepts (Barsalou, 1987). In a somewhat similar vein, 
Potter and Wetherell (1987) suggest that rather than fixed mental categories we have an 
“inconsistent cluster of expectations and associations” that we may draw upon in an 
“occasioned manner”. Thus, while the store of knowledge, expectations and theories in 
memory is obviously fixed and stable at any one time, different ‘parts’ of that 
knowledge may be brought to bear upon any given categorical judgement. What 
determines which ‘part’ of knowledge and theories is employed? Barsalou argues that 
people construct concepts using knowledge from long-term memory in a process that is 
sensitive to context, recent experience and perceiver’s goals (see also Medin and 
colleagues). Self-categorization theory would agree with this but also add the influence 
of the perceiver’s salient social identity or self-categorization. Perceivers draw upon that 
theoretical knowledge which is associated with their current social grouping. This leads 
us to the second point of distinction between ‘theories’ and schemas; theories, while 
residing in individuals’ heads, are socially shared and socially determined forms of 
knowledge. We elaborate on this point below in considering the second theme for 
discussion, the role of individual versus collective factors in content formation.
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Individual versus collective factors
Social cognitive accounts have focused on individual cognitive processes in 
stereotyping and largely ignored social determinants (Haslam, 1997; Stangor & 
Schaller, 1996). This focus can be understood in light of their account of the 
stereotyping process. Stereotypes form based on individual direct observations of group 
members filtered by individual cognitive processes. Such processes are assumed to be 
universal. Haslam (1997) argues that from this perspective the collective nature of many 
stereotypes, the fact that they (and their content) are often widely shared within groups 
and within society, is explained by what he terms “common informational input”. That 
is, we observe the same objective world, we share universal cognitive processes that act 
upon our observations and thus produce the same stereotypes. He suggests, however, 
that it is questionable whether two different people exposed to the same objective 
information will indeed process it in the same way. Alternatively, it is argued, 
consensus may have more to do with shared group memberships than common 
experience.
Indeed a number of the early approaches to stereotyping, such as those of Asch, Sherif 
and Allport, argued for the importance of group memberships in determining intergroup 
images based on shared ingroup values and norms. Likewise, Tajfel argued that 
common social affiliations are crucial in determining the characteristics chosen for 
accentuation between groups and that these would be determined by the group’s 
interests, traditions, values and norms (e.g., Tajfel, 1981). A number of more recent 
approaches have also emphasised the group-based and collective nature of stereotypes 
and their content. For example, it has been argued that content derives from processes of 
social learning and conformity that are influence by language, culture and the media. 
Social representations theory argues that content derives from images and beliefs that 
are shared within groups and within societies. These representations can vary with 
group membership (e.g., Hewstone et al., 1982; Hraba et al., 1989) as can stereotype 
content. Importantly, how we interpret objective data is influenced by our social 
representations; thus data is only interpreted the same way within groups which share
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representations (Haslam, 1997). Consensus within groups concerning the content of 
representations is argued to come about via everyday communication and interaction. 
However, these perspectives suffer from being rather vague in terms of how exactly 
beliefs come to be shared within groups or within society, and how these shared beliefs 
come to impact upon stereotyping and content.
Self-categorization theory also argues for the influence of the group and of social factors 
in stereotyping. Importantly, this approach considers individual cognitive factors and 
social, group-based factors in interaction. Content is not only social in the sense that it is 
derived from shared beliefs; in addition, social processes influence the cognitive 
processes that determine content:
... it is not simply that the contents of the mind are assimilated from society. It is
also that psychological functioning, the way the mind works, presupposes an
interaction with social context and social processes. (Turner & Oakes, 1997, p.
356, emphasis in original)
Cognitive processes also impact on social ones in that the principles of categorization 
(as outlined above) determine category salience and thus when we will see ourselves as 
ingroup members and others as outgroup members. The group’s influence on cognition 
is explained in terms of social identities or self-categorizations. When we self- 
categorize, we see ourselves as identical to, and interchangeable with, other ingroup 
members, we expect to agree with those ingroup members and we are influenced by 
those ingroup members. Studies by Haslam and colleagues concerning stereotype 
consensus (e.g., Haslam, 1997; Haslam et al., 1996; Haslam et al., 1998, outlined in 
Chapter 5) have demonstrated how content is shaped by shared ingroup norms. 
Likewise, content is influenced by ingroup theories, knowledge and ideologies; it is 
these ingroup theories, knowledge and ideologies that are employed in the 
categorization process in the manner outlined above.
Other approaches have criticised self-categorization theory’s account of both stereotype 
consensus and the impact of social factors upon content. These argue for the role of 
ideology and social structure in determining common beliefs and stereotypes (e.g., 
Augoustinos & Walker, 1995; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Stangor & Jost, 1997). Jost and
135
Banaji (1994) argue that social identity theory’s (and self-categorization theory’s) 
ability to explain the consensuality of stereotypes is limited. They propose that a 
complete theory needs to address the concept of ideological domination and evidence of 
false consciousness. They claim that an identity-based approach to stereotyping cannot 
explain why minority groups show outgroup favouritism and self-stereotype negatively 
in a fashion which is system- rather than group-serving. Thus, they argue that 
consensual content derives not only from beliefs and representations shared within 
groups but also those shared across groups, and that consensus derives from ideological 
domination and ‘system-justifying’ influences. Stangor and lost (1997) propose that 
society and system beliefs are ‘beyond’ social groups and social identities; therefore to 
fully understand stereotyping and content we need to take into account three levels of 
analysis — the individual, the group and the system.
While this perspective emphasises that content is shared across group boundaries, 
discursive and rhetorical approaches focus on the variability of content both between 
and within groups. For example, Condor (1990) argues that social identity/self­
categorization theory tends to assume consensus a priori without fully explaining it. She 
argues that social identity theory is not always clear about the boundaries of a group 
within which a stereotype is shared and does not adequately account for the 
considerable intragroup as well as intergroup variability in stereotype content. Likewise, 
Reicher et al. (1997) criticise both self-categorization and social representations theories 
for assuming that all members of a group share common understandings by virtue of 
being members of the same group. They argue that consensus is not given within groups 
but comes about via processes of argumentation to achieve strategic ends (Reicher et al., 
1997). That is, group members debate the ‘meaning’ of their group before consensus is 
reached. Thus, content has a social dimension in that it is arrived at via rhetorical means 
within groups and in that it reflects group-based functions such as justification and 
social causality (Reicheret al., 1997; see Tajfel, 1981).
The accounts discussed above all agree on the influence of shared beliefs or social 
knowledge on stereotype content; however, they differ in terms of how this influence is
136
explained. Some of the differences appear to arise from different understandings 
concerning the nature of the group and of self-categorization. According to self­
categorization theory, self-categorizations (like any other categorizations) are not fixed 
but can vary with context. Self-categorization, like other categorization, is a dynamic, 
fluid process that depends on comparative context and for which there is no basic level. 
Thus, while in some contexts we may define ourselves as, for example, ‘women’ there 
is also a sense in which we are members of a patriarchal society. Therefore, in some 
contexts we are influenced by the norms, theories, ideologies associated with belonging 
to the category ‘woman’ whereas in other contexts we are influenced by broader societal 
beliefs. Given that we can move between levels of self-categorization, it is possible for 
us to be seen to both accept the norms and theories of society in some circumstances 
and the contradictory ones of our subgroup in others. Therefore, when dominated 
groups appear to self-stereotype negatively they may actually be identifying with the 
dominant group. Conceptualising social identity/self-categorization as something that is 
flexible and that can change with context also helps us to understand why stereotype 
content can appear to vary within groups. Belonging to a group ‘psychologically’ is not 
an all or nothing thing and one may identify with a certain social category in one 
context and not in another. Stereotype content within groups may appear to vary 
because group boundaries and definitions themselves are varying, and because context 
is changing from intragroup (where we are inclined to differentiate ourselves from other 
ingroup members) to intergroup (where we emphasise ingroup similarities). Thus, the 
process of self-categorization can produce both homogenous and heterogenous views, 
both within and between groups and persons. Turner and Oakes (1997) argue that 
perception varies:
... not only with the perceiver but also with the salient self-category for a given 
perceiver — different people see the same thing differently, and the “same” 
perceiver sees the same thing differently as the varying self changes, (p. 367)
The beliefs and theories we hold are shared within groups and these will vary for 
individuals as their group memberships and identifications vary. Therefore, the same 
individual may express different beliefs and stereotypes in different contexts. For
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example, Turner and Onorato (1999) discuss a study (see Onorato & Turner, 1996) 
which demonstrated that women who previously defined themselves as ‘independent’ 
came to see themselves as ‘dependent’ when their self-categorization as a ‘woman’ 
(compared to men) was made salient. Likewise, previously ‘dependent’ men came to 
define themselves as ‘independent’ when categorizing themselves as ‘men’ (compared 
to women). Turner and Onorato (1999) argue that:
as a function of variation in the level of self-categorization from personal to social 
identity, apparently people’s general ideas about “independence/dependence” can 
be used to generate self-concepts which are exactly opposite in content, (p. 36)
The above argument suggests that the background knowledge and theories held by any 
one individual may be quite broad and may contain inherent inconsistencies and 
contradictions (see also Billig et al., 1988). On any given occasion when we categorize 
or stereotype we draw upon only part of that knowledge and thus our stereotype will 
appear consistent with a given theory. However, this does not imply that we have an 
ongoing, unchanging set of beliefs or theories. The important point is that we conceive 
of background knowledge as being much more broad and fluid than any fixed set of 
categories or beliefs, and that salient background knowledge can vary with variations in 
salient self-categorization.
An account of the formation of stereotype content: Aims of thesis and 
statement of hypotheses
We believe that a full account of the formation of stereotype content needs to 
incorporate into its explanation both the role of theory and data, and of individual and 
collective factors. From the arguments presented above, we conclude that for our 
purposes an interactionist account such as self-categorization theory best lends itself to 
adequately predicting stereotype content. It appears to be the only account that 
sufficiently examines the interaction between both theory and data, and between 
cognitive and social processes, in social categorization. Likewise, it appears able to 
account for evidence found in support of alternative theories of stereotyping. 
Importantly, self-categorization theory explicitly acknowledges the importance of
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content, not just in a descriptive capacity but in furthering our understanding of 
stereotyping processes.
This thesis aims to apply self-categorization theory to the problem of content formation 
and to provide an interactionist account of stereotype content formation. With respect to 
this issue, it needs to be made clear how our conceptualisation of content formation may 
differ from previous accounts. We are arguing that the formation of stereotype content 
is not distinct from the application of stereotype content. That is, we do not believe that 
content forms and is then stored waiting to be applied at a later date. Rather, we are 
suggesting that content forms to reflect the interaction between theory and data in a 
given context and at a given moment. In this sense, we are considering the content that 
forms to represent a group, and is used to describe a group, as the product of a specific 
interaction between stimulus data and background knowledge. Thus, the content that 
forms to represent a group on one occasion may be different from the content that forms 
to represent that group on a different occasion (and in a different context). Therefore, 
when we consider content formation we are not considering the formation of a 
permanent set of traits that come to be associated with a given social group (e.g., all 
men are stereotyped as aggressive and ambitious). Rather, we are looking at the content 
that is used on any occasion to describe a group, and at the factors that determine that 
content.
Theoretically and empirically the thesis has three main aims. Firstly we aim to elaborate 
on the interaction between aspects of the stimulus environment and the influence of 
broader social knowledge in determining the content associated with a social category in 
any given instance. For self-categorization theory the categorization process is crucial to 
understanding how content is produced. The outcome of categorization is the perception 
of similarities within, and differences between, groups. Given that content is simply 
those attributes or dimensions on which we judge group members to be alike, it follows 
that the outcome of categorization is stereotype content. By understanding the formation 
of categories we can understand the formation of category content as these are argued to 
be aspects of the same process. Therefore, in this thesis we account for the formation of
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stereotype content by applying the ‘accessibility x fit’ hypothesis, which has previously 
been successfully applied to category salience (e.g., Oakes, 1987; Oakes & Turner, 
1986; Oakes, Turner & Haslam, 1991), to the formation of stereotype content. The 
details of this hypothesis have been outlined in Chapter 5 and need not be repeated here. 
Thus, the first hypothesis of the thesis is:
HI: Stereotype content will form to reflect an interaction between comparative 
and normative fit. More specifically, given appropriate ‘readiness’, stereotype 
content will form so as to reflect attributes that maximise relative differences 
between groups and minimise relative differences within groups in a direction that 
is meaningful in terms of our background knowledge and theories about these 
groups and the dimension of comparison.
When we talk about an interaction between comparative and normative fit in 
determining content we mean that influence of normative fit will depend on the level of 
comparative fit and vice versa. More specifically, given good normative fit stereotyping 
in terms of a relevant attribute should only occur if there is also high comparative fit. 
Likewise, given high comparative fit between a category and an attribute, stereotyping 
in terms of that attribute should only occur if there is also good normative fit.
A second aim of this thesis is to elaborate the concept of normative fit in terms of 
background knowledge and theories. It is argued that while the content of our 
stereotypes must be normatively fitting with our background knowledge, expectations 
and theories, it is not argued to be consistent or ‘matched’ with a fixed category; rather 
consistency is more properly with some relevant aspect of background knowledge and 
theories. Likewise the consistency (or perceived similarity, or fit) between attributes and 
categories is not considered to be fixed, but both context- and theory-dependent. 
Previous work has demonstrated that perceived consistency or prototypicality (and 
subsequent stereotype content) can vary with comparative context. We wish to examine 
whether it can also vary with accessible background theories and knowledge. Therefore 
a second hypothesis of the thesis is:
H2: There is no fixed or absolute consistency between a given stimulus attribute 
and a given social category. The perceived consistency between an attribute and a 
category can vary with the background knowledge or theory that is brought to bear
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upon that judgement. Likewise, the prototype of a category can vary with 
background knowledge and theories.
A corollary of the above hypothesis is that the content associated with any given social 
category can also vary with theories and knowledge.
Theoretically (and empirically) the above two hypotheses comprise the backbone of the 
analysis of content presented in this thesis. Our focus is on elaborating the role of the 
categorization process in content formation: to this end, crucial variables are fit (both 
comparative and normative) which provides the link between data and background 
knowledge, and theories which allow us to expand upon and understand more fully the 
normative influences in content formation. Thus, empirically, the major aims of the 
thesis (in testing the above hypotheses) are to demonstrate an interactive effect for 
comparative and normative fit in determining stereotype content, and to demonstrate the 
role of theories in guiding and constraining the perception of similarities and differences 
within and between social groups, and in determining the ‘meaning’ of these social 
groups.
Finally, as outlined above, we conceptualise the background knowledge and theories we 
bring to bear upon categorization as much broader than schemas or fixed cognitive 
categories. In different contexts we make use of theoretical knowledge that may be 
different or even contradictory. Theories should not be conceptualised as simply more 
abstract fixed categories or representations. Likewise, we do not consider theories to be 
types of cognitive biases which filter stimulus information, nor do we consider them to 
represent personality differences in ways of ‘seeing’ and interpreting the world. While 
theories reside in the heads on individuals, they are grounded in the social groups we 
belong to and identify with. Just as social identity or self-categorization can vary so will 
the knowledge or theories that we use in any given context. They will vary with salient 
self-categorizations and across contexts. Thus a third aim of the thesis is to investigate 
the variability in theoretical knowledge, to consider the influence of different types of 
knowledge on stereotype content, and to consider the links between theoretical 
knowledge and salient self-categorizations.
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Empirical strategy
In the next five chapters a program of empirical research is discussed which attempted 
to address the above aims and to test the hypotheses. As outlined above the role of fit 
and theories are the key empirical issues to be investigated in the thesis. In simple 
terms, the strategy was to firstly consider the influence of comparative fit on stereotype 
content on its own. Next normative fit was introduced and the interaction between the 
two examined. Following this we wanted to further consider the relationship between 
normative fit and theories, and to look at the influence of different types of theories on 
stereotype content. The final part of the strategy was to link different theories to self­
categorizations, and again examine the effects on stereotype content and perceived 
prototypicality.
As stated in the introductory chapter, our definition of stereotype content is concerned 
with both the nature in which we see a group of people as similar to each other (and 
different to other groups) and the extent to which we see them as similar within groups 
(and different between groups). Therefore, operationally in this thesis content was 
measured in terms of both the degree to which perceivers differentiated between groups 
on relevant dimensions, and in terms of the types of dimensions or attributes used to 
characterise a group.
In Chapters 7 and 8 we describe Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4. These experiments sought 
to address the first aim of the thesis and to test the first hypothesis concerning the 
interaction between comparative and normative fit in determining stereotype content. 
Experiments 1 and 3 investigate the operation of comparative fit on its own. They look 
at how comparative differences between group are reflected in how those groups are 
stereotyped. It should be noted that in these experiments (as in Experiments 2, 4, 5 & 6) 
stereotyping is operationalised as the degree of differentiation and stereotype content as 
differentiation between groups on relevant dimensions. In Experiments 2 and 4, 
normative fit was introduced in the form of a correlation between group behaviours and 
the normative labels given to groups. Operationalising normative fit in this way is 
consistent with past experiments (e.g., Oakes et al., 1991) and also with Wisniewski and
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Medin’s (1994) idea that labels serve to activate theories. Indeed, one of the arguments 
we are making in this thesis is that category labels can serve to activate theories. 
However, it should be noted that while labels can activate theories, we conceptualise 
theories as being far broader and more complex than what is implied by a label.
Chapter 9 discusses Experiment 5 which also investigates the interaction between 
comparative and normative fit. In this experiment we also expand upon the concept of 
theories and their influence by examining theories ‘generated’ by subjects to explain 
differences between groups and the fit between category labels and group behaviours. 
This experiment addresses the first and second hypotheses of the thesis. Experiment 6 
(Chapter 10) seeks to further investigate the influence of theories. In this experiment, 
comparative fit is held constant (differences between groups are constant across 
conditions) while different types of theories relevant to those differences are 
manipulated. This experiment is concerned with further addressing the second aim of 
the thesis.
Finally, in Experiment 7 (Chapter 11) we seek to link different theories with self­
categorizations, and to consider how different theories can influence the ‘meaning’ of 
the same category. A slightly different empirical strategy is adopted in this final 
experiment. While the previous experiments measure the level of differentiation 
between groups in terms of relevant dimensions, in this experiment we look at the 
influence of different theories on the perceived prototypicality of a target person with a 
specific group and on the specific stereotype content generated. As this experiment 
seeks to look closely at the operation of the ‘theory’ variable, the comparative context in 
this experiment is implicit rather than explicit. This final experiment seeks address the 
second and third aims of the thesis.
143
Chapter 7
Experiments 1 and 2: Comparative Fit, Normative Fit 
and Stereotype Content (I)
As discussed in the previous chapter, one of the major aims of this thesis is to elaborate 
on the interaction between stimulus data and background knowledge in determining 
stereotype content. Specifically, we have proposed that stereotype content will form to 
reflect an interaction between comparative and normative fit. The first major hypothesis 
of the thesis (HI) predicts that:
...stereotype content will form so as to reflect attributes that maximize relative 
differences between groups and minimize relative differences within groups in a 
direction that is meaningful in terms of our background knowledge and theories 
about these groups and the dimension of comparison.
Turning to the first part of that prediction, we have argued that stereotype content will 
form to reflect comparative fit; that is, the ratio of between-group differences to within 
group differences (meta-contrast ratio). The greater the differences between groups 
relative to differences within groups on a given dimension, the more stereotype content 
should reflect differences on that dimension. In Experiment 1 we sought to test that 
prediction by systematically varying the degree of comparative fit between two groups 
and the behaviours describing members of those two groups. We have discussed 
previously that stereotyping and stereotype content formation involve not only 
comparative fit but also normative fit. In Experiment 2 we sought to manipulate 
normative fit in addition to varying comparative fit. Stereotype content should reflect 
differences in a direction that is meaningful in terms of our background knowledge and 
theories. Thus, it is not enough that comparative differences exist between groups; these 
differences must be consistent with our knowledge and expectations about these groups. 
Therefore, given that differences exist between groups (i.e., that there is high 
comparative fit) we would expect those differences that are consistent with our 
knowledge and theories about those groups to be used to a greater extent in stereotyping
144
those groups compared to those differences which are not consistent with our 
knowledge and theories about those groups.
The details of these first two experiments are outlined below.
Overview of Experiment 1
Experiment 1 sought to manipulate the degree of comparative fit between behaviours 
(reflecting attributes) and groups, and to measure the subsequent stereotyping of those 
groups in terms of those attributes. The experimental paradigm used in this study was 
largely based upon that used by Ford and Stangor (1992: Experiments 1 and 3 — 
reviewed in Chapter 3). Their experiments investigated the role of diagnosticity in 
stereotype formation and proposed that those attributes that maximally distinguish 
between groups will be more likely to become stereotypically associated with those 
groups compared to less diagnostic attributes. They suggest that perceivers are sensitive 
to both group means and to group variances in forming stereotypes and acknowledge 
the similarity between their proposal and the principle of meta-contrast proposing that 
the meta-contrast ratio can be “interpreted as an index of diagnosticity for 
categorization” (p. 357). Put another way, they propose that those attributes for which 
there is higher comparative fit (or a higher meta-contrast ratio) for groups will be more 
important in the groups’ stereotypes than those for which there is lower comparative fit.
To briefly recap, in their first experiment, Ford and Stangor varied the extent of 
differences between two groups and kept the variability within groups constant in terms 
of two attribute dimensions (intelligence and friendliness). In Experiment 3, they varied 
the extent of variability in terms of the two dimensions and kept the extent of 
differences between the two groups constant. Their results showed that in Experiment 1 
participants characterised the groups more in terms of the attribute dimension that 
differentiated more between the groups (was more diagnostic) compared to the less 
differentiating dimension. Likewise, in Experiment 3 they found that participants tended 
to characterise groups more in terms of those dimensions which indicated relatively 
lower within-group variability.
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In their experiments stereotype content was measured in two ways: ratings of each 
group in terms of intelligence and friendliness using Likert-type scales (which they 
suggest is one of the traditional ways of measuring stereotypes), and using an index of 
associative strength between the attributes and the groups. This second measure was 
operationalised by asking participants to write down thoughts associated with each 
group and then calculating the number of thoughts connected with each attribute 
(intelligence or friendliness) for each group. Ford and Stangor conceptualise stereotypes 
in terms of those attributes that are relatively strongly associated with social groups or 
group labels in memory (see also Stangor & Lange, 1994). While a number of attributes 
may be descriptive of a group, “attributes that have strong associative links to a given 
group in memory will be more likely to be activated or ‘come to mind’ when one thinks 
about the group or encounters an individual who is a member of that group” (p. 356). 
While we employed a variation of Ford and Stangor’s paradigm as a convenient way of 
manipulating the degree of comparative fit in this experiment, it should be pointed out 
that there are some theoretical differences between their position and our own. We agree 
that stereotype formation reflects attributes that maximally differentiate a group from 
other comparable groups; however, we do not conceive of stereotypes as mentally 
stored representations waiting to be activated (see Chapters 5 and 6).
The method and dependent measures employed in this experiment were very similar to 
those used by Ford and Stangor (1992, Experiments 1 and 3). Participants were 
presented with behaviours performed by members of two groups (Group A and Group 
B) and asked to form impressions of each group. Each group performed behaviours 
related to both intelligence and friendliness. Behaviours were selected (on the basis of 
pretesting) so that the groups differed from each other in terms of both attribute 
dimensions (i.e., Group A performed behaviours that were both more intelligent and 
less friendly than Group B). There was always comparative fit between the two 
dimensions (intelligence and friendliness) and the two groups. That is, both dimensions 
correlated with group membership and differentiated between the groups. What was 
varied was the degree of comparative fit between groups and dimensions, whether it
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was high or low. In one condition there was higher comparative fit in terms of 
friendliness and lower comparative fit in terms of intelligence (high comparative fit for 
friendliness condition) whereas in the other condition there was higher comparative fit 
in terms of intelligence and lower comparative fit in terms of friendliness (high 
comparative fit for intelligence condition).
Comparative fit is tied to the meta-contrast ratio; that is, the ratio of average differences 
between groups to the average differences within groups. Comparative fit will be higher 
when meta-contrast is higher and lower when meta-contrast is lower. Thus, higher 
comparative fit should coincide with larger differences between groups and smaller 
variability within groups. In this experiment we sought to manipulate the level of 
comparative fit by varying the degree of differences between groups and the degree of 
variability within groups. In Ford and Stangor’s first experiment they were concerned 
with varying mean differences between groups while keeping variability on each 
dimension within groups constant. In their third experiment they kept mean differences 
between groups on each dimension constant while varying the variability along each 
dimension within groups. In this experiment our concern was to vary comparative fit 
between groups such that it was higher for the friendliness dimension in one condition 
and higher for intelligence in the other. In an attempt to make this manipulation as 
strong as possible we varied both differences between groups and variability within 
groups. We chose behaviours such that average differences between groups were higher 
for the friendliness dimension (compared to the intelligence dimension) in the high 
comparative fit for friendliness condition and higher for intelligence (compared to 
friendliness) in the high comparative fit for intelligence condition. In terms of 
variability, we sought to ensure that variability within groups was smallest for 
friendliness for the high comparative fit for friendliness condition, and smallest for 
intelligence for the high comparative fit for intelligence condition. It should be noted 
that while the degree of comparative fit for each dimension was varied across 
conditions, for both dimensions (friendliness and intelligence) there was always
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relatively high comparative fit in all conditions. Put another way, for both dimensions 
the differences between groups was greater than the variability within groups.
While the aim of this experiment was to examine the effect of comparative fit on 
stereotype content (before introducing the normative fit variable in the next 
experiment), we have discussed previously that comparative fit and normative fit are 
inseparable and that they are always working together (along with perceiver readiness). 
Thus, while there was no explicit normative fit in this study it is likely that there was 
implicit normative fit engendered by the type of experimental task and by the types of 
behaviours describing the two groups. Firstly, given that the experimental task involved 
forming impressions of two groups participants may have expected to find differences 
between the two groups and therefore may have been looking for meaningful 
differences7. Secondly, the type of attributes describing the groups (friendliness and 
intelligence) plus their combination (e.g., unfriendly and intelligent, friendly and 
unintelligent) may have acted to create certain expectations about the two groups. Thus, 
while the experiment sought to establish clear differences between the two groups in 
terms of intelligence and friendliness, it is possible that participants might form their 
own expectations concerning the differences between groups and that these might 
influence their interpretation of presented differences.
Predictions
It was predicted that participants would stereotype groups more in terms of those traits 
that were highly comparatively fitting compared to traits that were less comparatively 
fitting. Therefore:
1. For the high comparative fit for friendliness condition, it was predicted that 
participants would differentiate between groups A and B more in terms of the 
friendliness dimension compared to the intelligence dimension. Likewise, for the 
high comparative fit for intelligence condition, it was predicted that participants 
would differentiate between groups A and B more in terms of the intelligence 
dimension than the friendliness dimension.
7 For example, some interpretations of the illusory correlation effect, as discussed in Chapter 5, suggest 
that when participants are presented with two groups they expect to find differences between those 
groups and so look for a meaningful basis for differentiation (Berndsen, 1997; Haslam et al., 1996; 
McGarty et al., 1993).
148
In addition, it was predicted that there would be differences in differentiation in terms of 
friendliness and intelligence across the comparative variable, such that:
2. Participants would differentiate more in terms of the friendliness dimension in 
the high comparative fit for friendliness condition (compared to the high 
comparative fit for intelligence condition) and more in terms of the intelligence 
dimension in the high comparative fit for intelligence condition (compared to the 
high comparative fit for friendliness condition).
Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 64 first year psychology students at the Australian National University 
in Canberra. All students participated in the study on a voluntary basis, as part of a 
normal laboratory class. Approximately 58% of the sample were female and the average 
age was 22 years. Participants were randomly assigned to experimental conditions. One 
independent variable was manipulated — degree of comparative fit — which had two 
levels, high for friendliness versus high for intelligence.
Stimulus materials
Behavioural descriptions, similar to those used by Ford and Stangor (1992; see also 
Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Srull, Lichtenstein & Rothbart, 1985; Stangor & Duan, 1991) 
were prepared. Each description referred to a member of one of the target groups 
performing a behaviour that was related to either intelligence, friendliness or was 
neutral. For example, a description of a behaviour relating to intelligence (negative) 
performed by a member of Group B was: “A member of Group B made the same 
mistake three times”. A description of a behaviour relating to friendliness (positive) 
performed by a member of Group B was: “A member of Group B belongs to a number 
of social clubs”. A description of a neutral behaviour performed by a member of Group 
A was : “A member of Group A eats three meals a day”.
Each target group (Group A and Group B) was described by 18 different behaviours: 6 
related to intelligence, 6 related to friendliness and 6 that were not related to either
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intelligence or friendliness (neutral)*. In all conditions, each group was described 
favourably in terms of one dimension and negatively in terms of the other. Group A was 
always described (on average) by behaviours that were more intelligent and less friendly 
than Group B. The reverse pattern held for descriptions of Group B. The statements 
were selected on the basis of pretest ratings of behaviours in terms of intelligence and 
friendliness given by 14 independent participants. These participants rated 64 
behavioural statements in terms of both intelligence and friendliness on 9-point scales 
ranging from 1 (extremely unintelligent/extremely unfriendly) to 9 (extremely 
intelligent/extremely friendly). These participants did not take part in the subsequent 
experiment.
In the high comparative fit for friendliness condition, the behaviours were selected to 
create a larger mean difference between the two group in terms of friendliness (M=3.50 
for Group A and M=7.52 for Group B), t(13)=13.6, pc.001, and a smaller mean 
difference in terms of intelligence (M=6.74 for Group A and M=4.42 for Group B), 
t£ 13)=7.76, pc.001. The difference between the groups was significantly greater for the 
friendliness than the intelligence attribute dimension, tf 13)=7.04, pc.001. In the high 
comparative fit for intelligence condition, the behaviours were selected to create a larger 
mean difference between the groups in terms of intelligence (M=7.46 for Group A and 
M=3.71 for Group B), t(13)=9.61, pc.001, and a smaller mean difference in terms of 
friendliness (M=4.75 for Group A and M=6.71 for Group B), t(13)=7.22, pc.001. The 
difference between the groups was significantly greater for the intelligence than the 
friendliness attribute dimension, t(13)=5.36, pc.001. The mean pretest ratings (in terms 
of intelligence and friendliness) of stimulus statements used in the experiment, along 
with the mean differences between groups on each dimension, are summarised in Table 
7.1 below.
In terms of variability, we sought to ensure that variability within groups was smallest 
for friendliness for the high comparative fit for friendliness condition, and smallest for 
intelligence for the high comparative fit for intelligence condition. Homogeneity of
* Details of the statements used to describe each group appear in Appendix A.
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variance tests showed that in the high comparative fit for friendliness condition 
variability associated with the friendliness dimension was significantly smaller than that 
associated with the intelligence dimension both within Group A (SD’s=.57 vs. 1.52), 
Cochran’s C(5,2)=.88, p<.05, and within Group B (SD’s=.22 vs. 1.07) Cochran’s 
C(5,2)=.96, p<.05. In addition, variability in friendliness was not significantly different 
across groups and variability in intelligence was not significantly different across 
groups. Likewise, in the high comparative fit for intelligence condition homogeneity of 
variance tests showed that variability associated with the intelligence dimension was 
significantly smaller than that associated with the friendliness dimension within both 
Group A (SD’s=.43 vs. 1.40) Cochran’s C(5,2)=.91, p<.05, and within Group B 
(SD’s=.45 vs. 1.62), Cochran’s C(5,2)=.93, p<.05. In addition, variability in friendliness 
was not significantly different across groups and variability in intelligence was not 
significantly different across groups.
Table 7.1
Mean pretest ratings of friendliness and intelligence stimulus statements for Group 
A and Group B, and mean differences between groups on each dimension: 
Experiment 1
Comparative fit: High for Friendliness High for Intelligence
Group: A B Diff A B Diff
Friendliness 3.50 7.52 4.02 4.75 6.71 1.96
Intelligence 6.74 4.42 2.32 7.46 3.71 3.75
Note: Diff = difference between groups A and B.
Thus, in the high comparative fit for friendliness condition, there was a larger mean 
difference between groups and a smaller variability within groups on the friendliness 
dimension compared to the intelligence dimension. Likewise, in the high comparative 
fit for intelligence condition there was a larger mean difference between groups and a 
smaller variability within groups on the intelligence dimension compared to the 
friendliness dimension. Note, however, that while comparative fit was lower for
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intelligence in the high comparative fit for friendliness condition and lower for 
friendliness in the high comparative fit for intelligence condition, there was still 
comparative fit for both these dimensions in both these conditions. Differences were a 
matter of degree rather than a case of high fit versus no fit.
Procedure
All participants were shown instructions concerning the experiment which were also 
read aloud by the experimenter. In all conditions the instructions read:
This study concerns impression formation based upon limited information. I am 
going to give you some information about people from different groups and later 
ask you to make some judgements about them. In a moment I will show you some 
statements describing behaviours performed by different members of two groups.
For convenience these groups have been labelled Group A and Group B.
All participants were instructed to read the statements carefully and to try to form an 
impression of what each group was like. These instructions were very similar to those 
used by Ford and Stangor (1992). The behavioural statements were then presented to 
participants on an overhead projector, one at a time, at a rate of approximately 5 seconds 
per statement. The order of presentation of statements was random.
After viewing the behaviours, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire 
concerning the impressions they had just formed of the two groups. All participants 
completed the dependent measures and recorded their gender and age. After collecting 
questionnaires, all participants were debriefed as to the purpose of the study, thanked 
and dismissed.
Dependent variables
Two dependent variables were employed which were identical to those used by Ford 
and Stangor (1992). The first dependent variable was a trait rating measure. All 
participants were asked to rate both groups on intelligence and friendliness using 9- 
point scales (ranging from 1 = extremely unintelligent/extremely unfriendly, to 9 = 
extremely intelligent/extremely friendly). This measure allowed us to test our 
predictions concerning differentiation between groups by looking at differences in
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ratings of the two groups. As discussed previously, stereotype content can 
conceptualised as the relative differentiation between groups in terms of relevant 
dimensions. The second measure was a thought listing measure. Participants were asked 
to write down four thoughts concerning what they thought Group A was like and four 
thoughts concerning what they thought Group B was like, based on the impressions they 
had just formed. This measure was designed by Ford and Stangor to provide an index of 
the “associative strength between the groups and the descriptive attributes” (Ford & 
Stangor, 1992, p. 359).
In addition, as in Ford and Stangor (1992), a free recall measure was employed. 
Participants were asked to recall as many as possible of the behavioural statements they 
had read for both Group A and Group B. This measure was designed to test whether 
either type of behaviour (intelligence or friendliness) was more memorable when it was 
more extreme (that is, when there was higher comparative fit for that dimension).
Results
Overview of analyses
The main predictions of the experiment were tested using planned contrasts (based on a 
priori predictions). We have also reported the overall ANOVA for completeness. As 
contrasts were planned and directional, all t-values reported below are one-tailed unless 
otherwise specified.
Trait ratings
Mean ratings for intelligence and friendliness for Group A and Group B across both 
levels of the comparative fit variable were calculated. We also calculated the differences 
between groups A and B in terms of each dimension for each condition. This was done 
by subtracting friendliness ratings for Group A from friendliness ratings for Group B 
(given that Group B members were more friendly than Group A members) and by 
subtracting intelligence ratings for Group B from intelligence ratings for Group A 
(given that Group A members were more intelligent than Group B members). These 
means (and associated standard deviations) are presented in Table 7.2 below:
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Table 7.2
Mean ratings of perceived friendliness and intelligence for Group A and Group B. 
and mean difference scores: Experiment 1
Comparative fit: High for Friendliness High for Intelligence
N: 30 34
Group: A B Diff A B Diff
Friendliness ratings 3.93
(1.93)
7.37
(1.56)
3.44
(3.17)
4.68
(1.39)
6.65
(1.20)
1.97
(2.24)
Intelligence ratings 6.43
(1.85)
5.13
(1.55)
1.30
(2.78)
6.97
(1.03)
4.85
(1.31)
2.12
(1.92)
Note: Scores for Group A and Group B can range from 1 to 9; diff=mean difference scores, these can 
range from -8 to +8; a higher score indicates more stereotyping, a negative score would indicate reverse 
stereotyping, a zero score would indicate no stereotyping; standard deviations in brackets.
To check whether the stimulus materials were successful in creating perceived 
differences between groups in terms of intelligence and friendliness, planned contrasts 
were carried out to check if Group A was perceived to be more intelligent and less 
friendly than Group B. As expected, in the high comparative fit for friendliness 
condition, Group A (M=6.43) was judged to be significantly more intelligent than 
Group B (M=5.13), t(29)=2.56, pc.Ol, and Group B (M=7.37) was judged to be 
significantly more friendly than Group A (M=3.93), t(29)=5.93, p<.001. In the high 
comparative fit for intelligence condition, Group A (M=6.97) was judged to be 
significantly more intelligent than Group B (M=4.85), t(33)=6.43, pc.001, and Group B 
(M=6.65) was judged to be significantly more friendly than Group A (M=4.68), 
t(33)=5.14,p<.001. Therefore it appears that the stimulus materials were successful in 
creating differences between the groups on both dimensions in both conditions.
We also expected that the differences perceived between groups A and B in terms of 
intelligence and friendliness may differ somehow from the stimulus input. In one sense, 
it is difficult to compare the mean ratings of groups in terms of intelligence and 
friendliness between pre- and posttest. At pretest (see Table 7.1), means were based on 
individual statements which were rated individually in terms of friendliness and
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intelligence (in no explicit context), whereas at posttest (see Table 7.2) participants 
rated groups (based on descriptive statements about them) in an explicit comparative 
context. One might expect an accentuation of differences between groups at posttest 
because statements (and corresponding attributes) are correlated with group 
memberships (Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963) However, there is no evidence that participants 
accentuated differences between groups on either dimension. Indeed, they appear to 
have moderated differences between groups compared to the stimulus input. One 
striking difference between pre- and posttest is the rating of Group B in'terms of 
intelligence in the high comparative fit for intelligence condition which appears to be 
much higher at post- compared to pretest (i.e., they are seen as less unintelligent).
Predictions 1 and 2
Predictions 1 and 2 concerned the amount of differentiation between groups on relevant 
dimensions. Therefore these were tested using the differences scores calculated above 
(see Table 7.2). The mean differences scores were analysed in a 2 (comparative fit: high 
for friendliness/high for intelligence) X 2 (dimension: friendliness/intelligence) 
ANOVA with a repeated measure on the last factor. This revealed a significant main 
effect for dimension, F( 1,62)= 12.75, pc.OOl, which was qualified by a significant 
dimension by comparative fit interaction, F( 1,62)= 16.81, pc.OOl. The nature of this 
interaction is represented in Figure 7.1 below.
To test predictions 1 and 2, four planned pairwise contrasts were carried out applying 
Sidak’s multiplicative inequality to control for the experiment-wise error rate9. Contrasts 
revealed that when there was high comparative fit for friendliness, participants 
differentiated between Group A and B more in terms of friendliness (M=3.43) than 
intelligence (M=1.30), t(62)=5.19, pc.05. When there was high comparative fit for 
intelligence participants differentiated between Group A and B slightly more in terms of 
intelligence (M=2.12) than friendliness (M= l.97), although this difference failed to 
reach significance, t(62)=.58, p>.05. Looking at comparisons across dimensions,
'With four contrasts, 62 degrees of freedom and a  = .05 (one-tailed) the critical t-value based on Sidak’s 
multiplicative inequality is 2.28 (Rohlf & Sokal, 1981).
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participants differentiated in terms of friendliness significantly more in the high 
comparative fit for friendliness versus high comparative fit for intelligence condition, 
t(62)=3.74, p<.05. Likewise, participants differentiated in terms of intelligence 
significantly more in the high comparative fit for intelligence versus high comparative 
fit for friendliness condition, t(62)=2.28, p<.05.
4 n
High for Friendliness High for Intelligence
Degree of Comparative Fit
Figure 7.1 Interaction between comparative fit and dimension on mean difference 
scores: Experiment 1
Thoughts generated
The thoughts generated by participants were coded by the experimenter and an 
independent judge (a postgraduate student) who were both blind to condition. Each 
thought was coded as being either associated with intelligence or friendliness, or 
irrelevant to either dimension, and for being either positively or negatively valenced, or 
neutral. Agreement between judges was 87% and disagreements were decided by the 
experimenter.
Initially, in line with the analysis performed by Ford and Stangor (1992), total thought 
listings for Group A were combined with total thought listings for Group B and the 
valence of the thoughts was ignored. The mean number of thoughts relating to
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intelligence or friendliness generated across the two levels of comparative fit are 
presented in Table 7.3 below:
Table 7.3
Mean number of thoughts generated relating to friendliness and intelligence: 
Experiment 1
Comparative fit: High for Friendliness High for Intelligence
N: 30 34
Friendliness thoughts 2.87(1.14) 2.47 (1.08)
Intelligence thoughts 1.53 (1.20) 1.91 (1.00)
Note: Scores can range from 0 to 8; standard deviations in brackets.
A 2 (comparative fit: high for friendliness/high for intelligence) X 2 (dimension: 
friendliness/intelligence) ANOVA with a repeated measure on the last factor was 
carried out on the mean thought listings scores. This yielded a main effect for 
dimension, F(l,62)=21.7, p<.001, such that overall more friendliness-related thoughts 
were generated than intelligence-related thoughts. Planned pairwise contrasts (applying 
Sidak’s multiplicative inequality) were again carried out, identical to those employed 
for the mean difference scores above. These revealed that overall participants generated 
more thoughts related to the friendliness dimension than the intelligence dimension but 
that this difference was only significant in the high comparative fit for friendliness 
condition, t(62)=4.53, p<.05. No other contrasts reached significance.
We were interested in whether participants formed different overall (positive or 
negative) impressions of the two groups across the different conditions. We did a further 
analysis that took into account the valence of the generated thoughts. We calculated the 
total number of positive thoughts (related to either intelligence or friendliness) 
generated about both Group A and Group B, and the total number of negative thoughts 
generated about Group A and Group B. An overall relative positivity score for each 
group was calculated by subtracting total negative thoughts from total positive thoughts.
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Therefore, a score greater than zero means the group was characterised by more positive 
than negative thoughts, and a score less than zero means the group was characterised by 
more negative than positive thoughts. The means for this new variable across 
comparative fit appear in Table 7.4 below:
Table 7.4
Relative positivity of thoughts generated about Group A and Group B: 
Experiment 1
Comparative fit: High for Friendliness High for Intelligence
N: 30 34
Group A -.43 (1.22) .12 (.91)
Group B .90(1.03) .38 (1.35)
Note: Scores can range from -4 to +4; standard deviations in brackets.
A 2 (comparative fit: high for friendliness/high for intelligence) X 2 (group: A/B) 
ANOVA with a repeated measure on the last factor was performed on these means. It 
revealed a significant main effect for group, F( 1,62)= 12.41, pc.001, which was 
qualified by a significant comparative fit by group interaction, F(l,62)=5.55, £<.03. 
Overall, Group A were judged more negatively than Group B. However, pairwise 
contrasts revealed that this difference was only significant in the high comparative fit 
for friendliness condition, t(62)= 3.96, p<.05 (two-tailed)10.
Recalled behaviours
A final analysis looked at the number of recalled behaviours. The mean total number of 
recalled behaviours related to friendliness and to intelligence in each condition were 
calculated. Means appear in Table 7.5 below:
'"Note that a two-tailed t-test was employed here as we had no a priori predictions concerning the 
direction of differences. With four contrasts, 62 degrees of freedom and a  = .05 (two-tailed) the critical t- 
value based on Sidak’s multiplicative inequality is 2.57 (Rohlf & Sokal, 1981).
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Table 7.5
Mean number of recalled behaviours relating to friendliness and intelligence: 
Experiment 1
Comparative fit: High for Friendliness
N: 30
Friendliness behaviours 3.50 (1.72)
Intelligence behaviours 3.70 (1.75)
N ote: Standard deviations in brackets.
A 2 (comparative fit: high for friendliness/high for intelligence) X 2 (dimension: 
friendliness/intelligence) ANOVA with a repeated measure on the last factor revealed a 
main effect for comparative fit, F(l,62)=4.32, p<.05, qualified by a comparative fit by 
dimension interaction, F(1,62)=7.03, pc.01. Participants recalled more behaviours 
relating to friendliness than intelligence in the high comparative fit for intelligence 
condition and slightly more behaviours relating to intelligence than friendliness in the 
high comparative fit for friendliness condition. Therefore, it does not appear that there 
was superior memorability for the more extreme behaviour in each condition; indeed the 
opposite appears to have happened, with superior recall for the less extreme behaviour 
in each condition.
Discussion
Some support was found for our predictions. In terms of prediction 1, we found 
differences in differentiation between groups in terms of friendliness and intelligence 
across comparative fit in the predicted directions. That is, when comparative fit was 
higher for friendliness than intelligence, participants differentiated between groups 
relatively more in terms of friendliness than intelligence. However, while participants 
differentiated between groups slightly more in terms of intelligence than friendliness 
when comparative fit was higher for intelligence than friendliness, this difference did 
not reach significance. In terms of prediction 2 we found, comparing across levels of 
comparative fit, that participants differentiated significantly more in terms of
High for Intelligence
4.94 (2.00) 
3.79(1.67)
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friendliness when comparative fit was higher for this dimension (high comparative fit 
for friendliness condition) compared to when it was lower (high comparative fit for 
intelligence condition). Likewise, participants differentiated significantly more in terms 
of intelligence in the condition with higher comparative fit for intelligence compared to 
the condition with lower comparative fit. Therefore, strong support was found for 
prediction 2. However, prediction 1 was borne out in one condition (high comparative 
fit for friendliness) but not the other (high comparative fit for intelligence).
Similar results were found for the thought listing measures. A significant difference was 
found in the total number of friendly- versus intelligence-related thoughts generated in 
the high comparative fit for friendliness condition, where more friendliness-related 
thoughts were generated compared to intelligence-related thoughts. However, there 
were also more friendliness-related (vs. intelligence-related) thoughts generated in the 
high comparative fit for intelligence condition (although this difference was not 
significant). Therefore, in general it appeared that regardless of degree of comparative 
fit, participants generated more thoughts related to the friendliness dimension than the 
intelligence dimension. Interestingly, we also found that participants tended to generate 
more positive thoughts relating to Group B versus Group A in the high comparative fit 
for friendliness condition. There was no significant difference in the relative amount of 
positive thoughts generated about each group in the high comparative fit for intelligence 
condition. It make sense that Group B were seen more positively than Group A in the 
high comparative for friendliness condition as in this condition Group A are 
characterised as extremely unfriendly (and only moderately intelligent) whereas Group 
B are extremely friendly (and only moderately unintelligent). However, we might 
expect this pattern to be reversed in the high comparative fit for intelligence condition 
where Group A are extremely intelligent (and only moderately unfriendly) and Group B 
are extremely unintelligent (and only moderately friendly). In this condition Group B 
was actually characterised more positively than Group A (although not significantly so). 
Therefore, it appears that friendliness may have been a more important dimension than 
intelligence in shaping impressions of groups.
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In terms of the recall of behavioural statements, participants tended to recall more of the 
less extreme behaviours in each condition. That is, they recalled more of the behaviours 
related to the dimension with lower comparative fit. Therefore, there was no evidence 
that any perception of differences between groups was related to superior memorability 
of more extreme behaviours. Indeed, less extreme behaviours appeared to be more 
memorable. This was especially true for the friendliness-related behaviours in the high 
comparative fit for intelligence condition.
Thus, in the high comparative fit for friendliness condition participants stereotyped 
groups more in terms of the dimension for which there was higher comparative fit. This 
was found both in terms of differentiation between groups and in terms of thoughts 
generated about the groups. However, differences across dimension were not found in 
the high comparative fit for intelligence condition. In general, it appears that 
participants made less extreme judgements in terms of the intelligence dimension 
compared to the friendliness dimension in both conditions, tending to be less inclined to 
judge Group B to be extremely unintelligent. The consequence of this was to make 
differences across dimension greater where there was high fit for friendliness but less 
where there was high fit for intelligence.
There are a couple of possible explanations for the lack of extreme judgements on the 
intelligence dimension. Firstly, it is possible that for first year university students there 
may be norms against judging persons to be highly unintelligent. Participants may have 
felt they were not justified in making assessments about others’ intelligence from the 
information given. This is consistent with the social judgeability perspective of Leyens 
et al. (1994 — see Chapter 5) which argues that people have theories about judgements 
and respect ‘cultural rules’ when forming impressions. For first year university students 
there may be ‘cultural rules’ concerning making judgements about intelligence.
Secondly, it is possible that the combination of the traits friendliness and intelligence 
may have created certain expectations about the groups, and that each dimension may 
have to some extent influenced the interpretation of statements related to the other
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dimension. The lack of accentuation of group differences, compared to the stimulus 
input, for either dimension supports this idea. While there was no ‘explicit’ normative 
fit in this study, there may have been ‘implicit’ normative fit. For example, Group A 
were both unfriendly and intelligent and participants may have had expectations about 
what unfriendly/intelligent people are like (and likewise, about the friendly/unintelligent 
people in Group B). As participants were exposed to behaviours relating to each group 
they may have begun to form hypotheses about what both those groups were like and 
subsequently interpreted further behavioural statements in terms of their expectations. 
This is consistent with work by Berndsen, Spears, McGarty and van der Pligt (1998). 
Their research looked at the illusory correlation paradigm, where participants are 
presented with positive and negative statements about Group A and Group B. They 
found that participants developed a hypothesis that Group A is better that Group B, and 
subsequently reinterpreted negative Group A behaviours as more positive and positive 
Group B behaviours as more negative.
It is possible that in the current study, participants may have developed hypotheses 
about the nature of the two groups and reinterpreted subsequent behaviours to fit their 
hypotheses. The dimension friendliness may have shaped overall impressions with the 
unfriendly/intelligent group being seen as generally negative (and therefore their 
intelligence is downplayed) and the friendly/unintelligent group being seen as generally 
positive (and therefore their ‘unintelligence’ is downplayed). Therefore, friendliness 
may be the more dominant dimension in forming impressions (possibly because being 
friendly is more voluntary whereas intelligence is more innate) and may ‘shape’ 
interpretations of intelligence. The results on the thought listing measure are consistent 
with this possibility with participants generating more friendliness-related thoughts 
regardless of condition, and generating more positive thoughts about Group B the 
friendly/unintelligent group. Likewise, in terms of the recalled behaviours, in the high 
comparative fit for intelligence condition, participants recalled more friendliness-related 
compared to intelligence-related behaviours. This supports the idea that in this condition 
friendliness was the more important dimension in forming impression of the two
162
groups. These possibilities are explored further in subsequent experiments (see next 
chapter).
Overview of Experiment 2
In this experiment we sought to explicitly manipulate the levels of both comparative and 
normative fit. While a great number of the studies discussed in Chapter 5 deal with the 
importance of comparative and normative fit in stereotyping very few have attempted to 
systematically and concurrently vary the level or degree of both variables. One notable 
exception is a study by Oakes, Turner and Haslam (1991 — Experiment 2, see Chapter 
5). They independently varied both comparative and normative fit which were 
manipulated in terms the consistency and direction of attitudes held by groups of arts 
and science students. Results of their study indicated that group salience was highest 
when there was both high comparative fit and good normative fit. In this study we 
aimed to vary the degree of both comparative and normative fit between two groups and 
the behaviours describing those groups, and to examine the effects on stereotype 
content.
Thus, while Experiment 1 was largely a replication of Ford and Stangor’s study, 
Experiment 2 sought to extend that experiment by introducing a normative fit variable. 
Stereotyping should occur in terms of dimensions that best differentiate between groups 
in a normative direction; that is, in a direction that is consistent with our expectations, 
and background knowledge and theories. Oakes et al. (1991) argue that category 
salience depends upon both comparative and normative fit: “A social categorization not 
only becomes salient to the degree that it best fits individuals’ behaviour, but such a fit 
implies a meaningful explanation of their actions” (Oakes et al., 1991, p.127 emphasis 
in original). Likewise, stereotype content should not only reflect differences between 
groups that provide the highest comparative fit, but it should reflect differences that are 
meaningful or provide normative explanations for what is observed.
In Experiment 1 we found some evidence that participants stereotyped groups more in 
terms of those attributes that best differentiate between groups. That is, participants
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stereotyped more in terms of traits or dimensions for which comparative fit was high 
compared to those for which it was lower. In this experiment we sought to demonstrate 
that stereotyping occurs when differences are maximised between groups in a direction 
that is consistent with our normative expectations and theories. Therefore, in this 
experiment we wanted to introduce normative expectations about the types of, and 
direction of, differences between groups. That is, we wanted to introduce a normative fit 
variable. In this experiment normative fit was operationalised in terms of the direction 
of differences between groups. Differences between groups were either consistent with 
normative labels given to those groups or inconsistent. This is in line with the method 
used by Oakes et al. (1991). However, it should be noted that we are not suggesting that 
category labels cue fixed stereotypes that are stored in memory. Rather, in line with 
Wisniewski and Medin (1994) we argue that category labels may serve to activate 
broader theories and background knowledge.
Recall that the groups in Experiment 1 differed in terms of intelligence and friendliness 
such that one group was more intelligent and less friendly than the other group. The two 
group labels chosen to be used in this experiment were ‘tour guides’ and ‘chess players’. 
Most people would expect chess players to be relatively more intelligent than tour 
guides and relatively less friendly, and vice versa. A pretest using an independent 
sample of 19 participants, who rated the intelligence and friendliness of tour guides and 
chess players on 9-point scales, confirmed that in general tour guides were perceived to 
be significantly more friendly than chess players (M’s=7.84, 5.10), t(18)=6.78, p<.001, 
and chess players were perceived to be significantly more intelligent than tour guides 
(M’s=7.42, 5.89), t( 18)=3.14, pc.01.
The design and procedure of this experiment were identical to Experiment 1 except that 
a label-type independent variable was introduced. Thus degree of comparative fit was 
manipulated such that it was either higher for friendliness or higher for intelligence. 
Again it should be noted that there was always comparative fit for both friendliness and 
intelligence in all conditions — it just differenced in degree. In addition, participants 
were either given group labels that were consistent with intergroup differences or that
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were inconsistent. Thus, they were either told that Group A were chess players and 
Group B were tour guides, or vice versa.
Predictions
We expected the highest level of stereotyping in terms of a dimension to occur when 
comparative fit and normative fit were operating together, that is, when there was 
comparative fit for a dimension and normative fit was good (i.e., group labels consistent 
with intergroup differences). We expected less stereotyping when there was 
comparative fit but no normative fit (i.e., group labels were inconsistent). Theoretically, 
we would expect to find zero stereotyping in this condition because differences between 
groups should only produce stereotyping if they are normative or meaningful ones. 
However, in practice we might expect to find some differentiation between groups in 
this condition given there are relatively high levels of comparative fit in all conditions 
and that participants may be motivated to explain the differences between groups. 
Importantly, we expected relatively less stereotyping in the inconsistent labels condition 
compared to the condition with good normative fit.
Thus we predicted a main effect for label-type (or normative fit). We also predicted an 
interaction between comparative and normative fit such that differences in stereotyping 
should be found across the degree of comparative fit, but only when normative fit was 
good (i.e., labels were consistent) and not when there was no normative fit (labels were 
inconsistent). Given good normative fit (consistent labels) we would expect a higher 
degree of comparative fit to result in more stereotyping. Given no normative fit we were 
expecting little stereotyping and therefore differences in the degree of comparative fit 
should have no effect on level of stereotyping (i.e., comparative differences between 
groups should only result in stereotyping when they are also normative).
Specifically, we predicted:
1. For both dimensions more stereotyping should occur when group labels are 
consistent versus inconsistent with intergroup differences.
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2. Given consistent labels, there should be more stereotyping in terms of a 
dimension when the degree of comparative fit for that dimension is high versus 
low.
3. Given inconsistent labels, there should be no differences in the level of 
stereotyping across the degree of comparative fit for either dimension.
Method
Participants and design
Participants were 92 first year psychology students at the Australian National University 
in Canberra. All students participated in the study on a voluntary basis, as part of a 
laboratory class. Approximately 70% of the sample were female and the average age 
was 19.6 years. Participants were randomly assigned to experimental conditions. This 
experiment was performed in laboratory classes in the same week as Experiment 1. Two 
independent variables were manipulated in a 2 (degree of comparative fit: high for 
friendliness/high for intelligence) x 2 (label-type: consistent/inconsistent) between- 
subjects design.
Stimulus materials
The same behavioural statements used in Experiment 1 were employed in this 
experiment.
Procedure
All participants were shown instructions concerning the experiment which were also 
read aloud by the experimenter. In all conditions the instructions were:
This study concerns impression formation based upon limited information. I am 
going to give you some information about people from different groups and later 
ask you to make some judgements about them. In a moment I will show you some 
statements describing behaviours performed by different members of two groups. 
For convenience these groups have been labelled Group A and Group B.
These instructions were identical to those in Experiment 1. In addition, participants in 
the consistent labels conditions were given these instructions:
However, to help you in making judgements about the groups I want you to 
imagine that Group A are CHESS PLAYERS and that Group B are TOUR 
GUIDES.
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while the additional instructions for participants in the inconsistent labels condition 
read:
However, to help you in making judgements about the groups I want you to 
imagine that Group A are TOUR GUIDES and that Group B are CHESS 
PLAYERS.
All participants were instructed to read the statements presented to them carefully and to 
try to form an impression of what each group was like. The behavioural statements were 
then presented to participants on an overhead projector, one at a time, at a rate of 
approximately 5 seconds per statement.
After viewing the behaviours, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire 
concerning the impressions they had just formed of the two groups which was almost 
identical to that used in Experiment 1. One difference was that participants were asked 
to indicate if they had been told which groups of people were represented by Group A 
and Group B and if so to indicate. This served as a manipulation check. All participants 
completed the dependent measures and recorded their gender and age. The dependent 
measures employed were identical to those used in Experiment 1. After collecting 
questionnaires, all participants were debriefed as to the purpose of the study, thanked 
and dismissed.
Results
Manipulation check
Ten participants failed to correctly identify the two groups and were excluded from 
further analyses. This left a total sample of 82 participants. Seventy percent of this 
sample were female and the average age was 19.3 years.
Unlike Experiment 1, we did not check whether participants overall had judged Group 
A to be more intelligent than Group B, and Group B to be more intelligent than Group 
A because we expected these judgements to be influenced by group labels. However, as 
these differences were found in Experiment 1 we can be confident that the stimulus 
materials were successful in creating the desired differences between groups.
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Data screening and overview of analyses
Following elimination of participants who failed the manipulation check, an 
examination revealed that there were quite uneven cell sizes across conditions (see 
Table 7.6 below) and initial analyses revealed that the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance may have been violated for some dependent variables.
To overcome this problem, cases were randomly deleted from the two larger cells to 18 
participants per cell to produce more equal cell sizes. Analysis of variance is robust to 
violations of homogeneity of variance if cell sizes are equal (Kirk, 1982). All analyses 
were run with both the full sample and the reduced sample. There were very few 
changes in the significance of results across the two analyses, with two previously 
significant results becoming marginally significant with the reduced sample. We 
decided to take the most conservative approach and thus all results reported below are 
based on the reduced sample. This sample consisted of approximately 68% females and 
had an average age of 19.4 years. Analyses using the full sample are included in 
Appendix C.
Table 7.6
Original cell sizes: Experiment 2 
Comparative Fit: High for Friendliness
Consistent Labels 16
Inconsistent Labels 17
High for Intelligence
23
26
As in the previous experiment, the main predictions were tested using planned contrasts 
(based on a priori predictions) and all t-values are based on one-tailed tests unless 
otherwise specified.
Predictions 1. 2 and 3
Mean ratings for intelligence and friendliness for Group A and Group B across 
comparative fit and label-type were calculated. Likewise, as in Experiment 1, difference
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scores for friendliness and intelligence were calculated in the manner described above. 
These means (and associated standard deviations) are presented in Table 7.7 below:
Table 7.7
Mean ratings of perceived friendliness and intelligence for Group A and Group B. 
and mean difference scores; Experiment 2
Comparative fit: High for Friendliness High for Intelligence
G roup: A B Diff A B Diff
FRIENDLINESS RATINGS:
Consistent labels 4.13 7.38 3.25 4.89 7.33 2.44
(1.31) (1.46) (1.69) (1.23) (1.14) (2.12)
Inconsistent labels 5.12 6.41 1.29 5.28 6.56 1.28
(1.65) (1.37) (2.57) (1.84) (1.38) (2.88)
INTELLIGENCE RATINGS:
Consistent labels 6.69 5.00 1.69 7.39 4.89 2.50
(1.30) (.97) (1.45) (.85) (1.32) (1.76)
Inconsistent labels 6.47 6.06 .41 6.44 5.67 .78
(.72) (.97) (1.12) (1.25) (1.91) (2.29)
Note: Scores for Group A and Group B can range from 1 to 9; diff = mean difference scores, these can 
range from -8 to +8; a higher score indicates more stereotyping, a negative score would indicate reverse 
stereotyping, a zero score would indicate no stereotyping; standard deviations in brackets.
A 2 (comparative fit: high for friendliness/high for intelligence) x 2 (label-type: 
consistent/inconsistent) x 2 (dimension: friendliness/intelligence) ANOVA with a 
repeated measure on the last factor was carried out on the mean difference scores. This 
yielded a significant main effect for label-type , F( 1,65)= 12.6, p<.001. As predicted 
(prediction 1), participants stereotyped more when labels were consistent versus 
inconsistent regardless of the degree of comparative fit or dimension. Figures 7.2 and 
7.3 below illustrate this effect separately for the friendliness and intelligence
dimensions:
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Figure 7.2 Stereotyping on friendliness dimension across label-type and 
comparative fit: Experiment 2
□  Consistent 
■  Inconsistent
High for IntelligenceHigh for Friendliness
Degree of Comparative Fit
Figure 7.3 Stereotyping on intelligence dimension across label-type and 
comparative fit: Experiment 2
As can be seen in the above figures, for both dimensions the most stereotyping occurred 
in the condition with both consistent labels and higher comparative fit for that 
dimension. It can also be seen that label-type had a powerful influence on stereotyping 
with more stereotyping occurring in the consistent versus inconsistent labels conditions.
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In Figures 7.2 and 7.3 we can see differences in stereotyping across comparative fit for 
the consistent labels condition but not for the inconsistent labels condition (supportive 
of predictions 2 and 3). However, contrary to prediction 2, no significant interaction 
between degree of comparative fit and label-type was found, and planned pairwise 
comparisons revealed no significant differences across comparative fit when labels were 
consistent. In support of prediction 3, there were also no significant differences across 
comparative fit when labels were inconsistent.
The ANOVA also yielded a significant main effect for dimension, F(l,65)=8.1,p<.01, 
which was qualified by a marginally significant comparative fit by dimension 
interaction, F(l,65)=3.87,p<.055. The nature of this interaction (collapsing across label- 
type) is illustrated in Figure 7.4 below:
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Figure 7.4 Stereotyping across comparative fit and dimension: Experiment 2
It appears from the above figure that participants differentiated more between groups in 
terms of the friendliness dimension than the intelligence dimension but only in the 
condition with high comparative fit for friendliness. Likewise, we can see that 
participants tended to differentiate more in terms of friendliness when comparative was 
higher for that dimension and more in terms of intelligence when comparative fit was 
higher for that dimension. However, pairwise contrasts showed only one significant
171
difference. Consistent with Experiment 1, participants differentiated between groups 
more in terms of friendliness than intelligence when comparative fit was higher for 
friendliness, t(65)=3.30, p<.05".
Thoughts generated
As in Experiment 1, the number of thoughts generated by participants were coded by 
the experimenter and an independent judge (a postgraduate student) who were both 
blind to condition. Each thought was coded as being associated with either intelligence 
or friendliness, or irrelevant to either dimension, and for being either positively or 
negatively valenced, or neutral. Agreement between judges was 85% and disagreements 
were decided by the experimenter.
Initially, total thought listings for Group A were combined with total thought listings for 
Group B and the valence of the thoughts was ignored. The mean number of thoughts 
relating to intelligence or friendliness generated across comparative fit and label-type 
are presented in Table 7.8 below:
Table 7.8
Mean number of thoughts generated relating to friendliness and intelligence: 
Experiment 2
Comparative fit: High for Friendliness High for Intelligence
FRIENDLINESS THOUGHTS:
Consistent labels 3.12(1.91) 3.11 (1.08)
Inconsistent labels 2.06(1.48) 1.94 (.87)
INTELLIGENCE THOUGHTS:
Consistent labels 1.75 (1.13) 1.89 (.83)
Inconsistent labels 1.71 (.92) 1.33 (.98)
Note: Scores can range from 0 to 8; standard deviations in brackets.
" With four contrasts, 65 degrees of freedom and a  = .05 (one-tailed) the critical t-value based on 
Sidak’s multiplicative inequality is 2.28 (Rohlf & Sokal, 1981).
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A 2 (comparative fit: high for friendliness/high for intelligence) X 2 (label-type: 
consistent/inconsistent) x 2 (dimension: friendliness/intelligence) ANOVA with a 
repeated measure on the last factor was performed on the mean number of thoughts 
generated. This revealed significant main effects for label-type, F( 1,65)= 18.08 p<.001, 
and dimension, F( 1,65)= 15.35, pc.001. There were no significant effects involving the 
comparative fit variable. Thus, overall participants generated more thoughts in the 
consistent versus inconsistent labels condition. In general more thoughts relating to 
friendliness were generated than thoughts relating to intelligence.
Again, we also did a further analysis that took into account the valence of the generated 
thoughts. We calculated an overall relative positivity score for thoughts generated about 
both Group A and Group B using the method outlined in Experiment 1. Mean scores for 
each group across comparative fit and label-type appear in Table 7.9 below:
Table 7.9
Relative positivity of thoughts generated about Group A and Group B: 
Experiment 2
Comparative fit: High for Friendliness High for Intelligence
GROUP A
Consistent labels -.56 (1.55) -.33 (.84)
Inconsistent labels .59 (1.37) .39 (1.38)
GROUP B
Consistent labels 1.19(1.17) .67 (1.45)
Inconsistent labels .35 (1.50) .11 (1.32)
Note: Scores can range from -4 to +4; standard deviations in brackets.
A 2 (comparative fit: high for friendliness/high for intelligence) X 2 (label-type: 
consistent/inconsistent) x 2 (group: A/B) ANOVA with a repeated measure on the last 
factor was performed on the mean relative number of positive thoughts generated. This 
revealed a significant main effect for group, F(l,65)=4.30 p<.05, and a significant group 
by label interaction, F(1,65)=9.14, pc.Ol. Thus, when labels were consistent, there were
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relatively more positive thoughts generated about Group B compared to Group A, 
consistent with the results of Experiment 1.
Recalled behaviours
A final analysis looked at the number of recalled behaviours. The mean total number of 
correctly recalled behaviours related to friendliness and to intelligence across 
comparative fit and label-type were calculated. Means appear in Table 7.10 below:
Table 7.10
Mean number of recalled behaviours relating to friendliness and intelligence: 
Experiment 2
Comparative fit: High for Friendliness High for Intelligence
FRIENDLINESS BEHAVIOURS:
Consistent labels 2.07 (.96) 3.00(1.65)
Inconsistent labels 2.47 (1.38) 2.67 (1.94)
INTELLIGENCE BEHAVIOURS:
Consistent labels 2.20(1.57) 3.56 (1.54)
Inconsistent labels 2.53 (1.23) 2.56(1.72)
Note: Standard deviations in brackets.
A 2 (comparative fit: high for friendliness/high for intelligence) x 2 (label-type: 
consistent/inconsistent) x 2 (dimension: friendliness/intelligence) ANOVA with a 
repeated measure on the last factor revealed only a marginally significant main effect 
for degree of comparative fit, F(l,65)=3.72, p<.06. Overall participants tended to recall 
more behaviours of either type (intelligent or friendly) when comparative fit was high 
for intelligence versus friendliness. However, there were no differences across the types 
(friendly versus intelligent) of behaviours recalled suggesting there was not superior
recall for either dimension.
Discussion
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As predicted, strong effects were found for the label-type variable such that participants 
stereotyped significantly more when labels were consistent with intergroup differences 
versus inconsistent. Consistent with prediction 1, more stereotyping occurred when 
there was good normative fit versus no (or counter-) normative fit. This difference was 
found on both the trait rating measure and the thought generation measure. However, no 
significant interaction between normative fit and comparative fit was found. While there 
were no significant differences across degree of comparative fit when labels were 
inconsistent (as per prediction 3) there were also no significant differences across degree 
of comparative fit when labels were consistent (contrary to prediction 2).
For both the intelligence and friendliness dimensions the most stereotyping occurred in 
the condition with both high comparative fit and consistent labels. However, because of 
the lack of differences across the comparative fit variable we cannot conclude that most 
stereotyping is occurring when both normative fit is good and comparative fit is highest 
compared to when normative fit is good and comparative fit is lower. From these results 
we can only conclude that, given comparative fit, more stereotyping occurs when 
normative fit is good compared to when it is not.
Once again (consistent with Experiment 1) participants differentiated between groups 
more in terms of friendliness than intelligence in the high comparative fit for 
friendliness condition, but differentiated equally in terms of both dimensions in the high 
comparative fit for intelligence condition. In general, it appeared that differentiation 
between groups was more extreme on the friendliness versus the intelligence dimension; 
even when labels were inconsistent participants differentiated between groups more in 
terms of friendliness than intelligence
Thus, in this experiment, strong effects were found for the normative fit variable with 
more stereotyping occurring where labels were consistent with intergroup differences 
and less stereotyping where labels were inconsistent with intergroup differences. There 
was less differentiation between groups in terms of a dimension when there was
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comparative fit for that dimension but no normative fit, suggesting that it is not enough 
for differences to exist between groups for stereotyping to occur; those difference must 
also be in a meaningful direction. It appeared in this experiment that the most 
stereotyping occurred when comparative and normative fit were operating together. 
However, we found no significant differences across the degree of comparative fit in 
this experiment. That is, stereotyping in terms of a dimension was not significantly 
greater when there was normative fit and high comparative fit for that dimension, 
compared to normative fit and lower comparative fit.
General Discussion
In Experiment 1, we found that participants’ stereotypes of groups reflected the 
dimension for which there was higher comparative fit in the high comparative fit for 
friendliness condition but not in the high comparative fit for intelligence condition. 
Therefore, our experiment only partially replicated the findings of Ford and Stangor 
(1992). In addition, we found that participants stereotyped more in terms of a dimension 
when there was high comparative fit for that dimension versus lower comparative fit. In 
Experiment 2, we found that participants stereotyped groups more in terms of a 
dimension when there was high comparative fit and good normative fit for that 
dimension versus high comparative and counter-normative fit. However, contrary to our 
predictions, we did not find a significant interaction between comparative and 
normative fit.
In considering these results, we need to ask why we failed to completely replicate the 
findings of Ford and Stangor (1992 — Experiment 1). That is, we need to examine why 
participants did not differentiate between groups more in terms of intelligence than 
friendliness in the high comparative fit for intelligence condition. One difference 
between their experiment and ours was that they varied differences between groups 
while holding variability within groups constant, whereas we attempted to vary both of 
these factors. While we reasoned this was a stronger manipulation of comparative fit, it 
may have influenced results especially given that we were measuring perceived 
differences between groups rather than perceived variability within groups. Also, in
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general, the pretest differences between groups were more extreme in Ford and 
Stangor’s experiment compared to the current ones, and this may have influenced 
subsequent perceptions of differences between groups.
In both of our experiments we tended to find less differentiation in terms of the 
intelligence dimension than the friendliness dimension. It appeared that our participants 
may have been less willing to give very low ratings on the intelligence dimension. As 
discussed above, this may be attributable to norms or social rules which sanction against 
judging someone to be extremely ‘dumb’ (see social judgeability theory). Likewise, 
there was some evidence that the two dimensions, intelligence and friendliness, may 
have shaped interpretations of each other. Specifically, it is possible that friendliness 
may have ‘anchored’ impressions of the two groups with the friendly group being 
judged as generally positive regardless of intelligence and the unfriendly group being 
judged as generally negative regardless of intelligence. In the next experiments we 
sought to examine further the types of impressions which were formed of each group.
In addition, there is a difference between the dimensions intelligence and friendliness in 
that intelligence may be considered innate, whereas friendliness can be employed more 
instrumentally (i.e., we can be friendly when we choose to be but we have less choice 
about being intelligent). This relates to why friendliness may shape perceptions more as 
it may be seen as a behaviour that people have more control over. Therefore, choosing 
to be highly friendly may be seen as more positive than being born highly intelligent. 
The group labels employed in this study may have related somewhat differently to the 
innate versus instrumental nature of the dimensions. That is, one assumes chess players 
are inherently intelligent whereas tour guides may only be instrumentally friendly in the 
context of their occupation. Thus, it may be more consistent to employ a category label, 
other than ‘tour guide’, which implies more inherent rather than instrumental 
friendliness.
All the points outlined above were followed up in the next set of experiments. Finally, 
in the current experiments it could be argued that when participants rated Group A as
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unfriendly and intelligent, and Group B as friendly and unintelligent, they were not 
stereotyping but merely ‘reproducing’ the ‘reality’ which the experimenter presented 
them with. While we have argued that stereotyping does reflect reality we also believe 
that social categorization and stereotyping allow perceivers to ‘go beyond’ the 
information given (Bruner, 1957). To demonstrate this point, we included measures 
other than direct ratings of intelligence and friendliness in the next set of experiments.
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Chapter 8
Experiments 3 and 4: Comparative Fit, Normative Fit 
and Stereotype Content (II)
Experiments 3 and 4, in common with Experiments 1 and 2, sought to manipulate 
comparative and normative fit, and to examine the effects on stereotype content. These 
experiments were conceptually very similar to Experiments 1 and 2, and also sought to 
test the first hypothesis (HI) of the thesis. However, these experiments also sought to 
address a number of the issues raised by Experiments 1 and 2 as discussed in the 
previous chapter.
Experiment 3 manipulated degree of comparative fit only (as per Experiment 1). Once 
again, this was manipulated via the presentation of behavioural statements relevant to 
the intelligence and friendliness of two groups. Experiment 4 manipulated both 
comparative and normative fit (as per Experiment 2). Once again, normative fit was 
manipulated via the direction of differences between groups. The changes implemented 
in the current experiments related to the issues raised with respect to Experiments 1 and 
2 in the previous chapter. These changes and the rationale for them are outlined below:
(a) in manipulating degree of comparative fit in the previous experiments we varied 
both mean differences between groups and variability within groups whereas Ford 
and Stangor (1992) only manipulated one or the other of these variables. In the 
current experiments we only varied the level of mean differences between groups 
(while keeping variability within groups constant) to be more consistent with Ford 
and Stangor’s original experiment.
(b) some changes were made to the behavioural statements presented to participants in 
these experiments with the aim of creating larger mean between-group differences 
than in the previous experiments.
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(c) in Experiment 4, the group labels were changed from ‘chess players’ and ‘tour 
guides’ to ‘chess players’ and ‘charity workers’. The reason for this is that 
friendliness of charity workers may be judged to be more inherent rather than 
instrumental. Therefore this label is more consistent with the ‘chess player’ label. 
Given this, the friendliness dimension may be interpreted as innate and therefore be 
more consistent with the intelligence dimension.
(d) in the previous experiments it appeared that the two dimensions, intelligence and 
friendliness, may have shaped interpretations of each other. In particular we 
surmised that the combination of dimensions may have resulted in one group being 
seen on the whole as more positive than the other group. Likewise, it is possible that 
participants may have been reluctant to make negative judgements about 
intelligence. We included some measures in these experiments to further explore 
these possibilities. Firstly, the ‘thought listing’ measure employed in the previous 
experiments was replaced by a measure designed to uncover participants’ 
explanations for the behaviour of members of the two groups and to investigate 
whether the two dimensions (intelligence and friendliness) influenced the 
interpretation of each other. Secondly, to assess whether one group was seen in 
generally more positive terms than the other group, participants completed a Katz- 
Braly type checklist measure of traits descriptive of each group. This measure also 
allowed us to consider how participants were ‘going beyond’ the data they were 
presented with in forming impressions of the two groups. Further details of these 
measures appear in the methods sections below.
Overview of Experiment 3
Experiment 3 was very similar to Experiment 1. Participants were presented with 
behaviours performed by members of two groups (Group A and Group B) and asked to 
form impressions of each group. Once again, Group A were always described as being 
more intelligent and less friendly than Group B. The degree of comparative fit was 
manipulated such that it was higher for friendliness in one condition and higher for 
intelligence in the other condition.
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In manipulating comparative fit in this experiment, unlike Experiment 1, we only varied 
differences between groups and kept variability within groups constant (this is 
consistent with Ford & Stangor, 1992, Experiment 1). We chose behaviours such that 
average differences between groups were higher for the friendliness dimension in the 
high comparative fit for friendliness condition and higher for intelligence in the high 
comparative fit for intelligence condition. In terms of variability, we sought to ensure 
that variability within groups did not differ across conditions.
Predictions
The predictions were identical to those of Experiment 1.
1. For the high comparative fit for friendliness condition, it was predicted that 
participants would differentiate between groups A and B more in terms of the 
friendliness dimension compared to the intelligence dimension. Likewise, for the 
high comparative fit for intelligence condition, it was predicted that participants 
would differentiate between groups A and B more in terms of the intelligence 
dimension than the friendliness dimension.
2. Participants would differentiate more in terms of the friendliness dimension in 
the high comparative fit for friendliness condition (compared to the high 
comparative fit for intelligence condition) and more in terms of the intelligence 
dimension in the high comparative fit for intelligence condition (compared to the 
high comparative fit for friendliness condition).
Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 20 first year psychology students at the Australian National University 
in Canberra. All students who participated in the study received course credit. Seventy- 
five percent of the sample were female. Participants were randomly assigned to 
experimental conditions. One independent variable was manipulated, degree of 
comparative fit, which had two levels, high for friendliness versus high for intelligence.
Stimulus materials
Behavioural descriptions, drawn from those used in Experiment 1 and those used by 
Ford and Stangor (1992), were used. Each description referred to a member of one of 
the target groups performing a behaviour that was related to either intelligence,
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friendliness or was neutral. For example, a description of a behaviour relating to 
intelligence (negative) performed by a member of Group B was: “A member of Group 
B failed his written driver’s test for the fourth time”. A description of a behaviour 
relating to friendliness (positive) performed by a member of Group B was: “A member 
of Group B regularly hosts dinner parties”. A description of a neutral behaviour 
performed by a member of Group A was : “A member of Group A took out the day’s 
garbage before going to bed”.
Each target group (Group A and Group B) was described by 15 different behaviours: 5 
related to intelligence, 5 related to friendliness and 5 that were not related to either 
intelligence or friendliness (neutral)12. This was changed from Experiment 1 (where 18 
statements/group were used) to make the task less arduous for participants (and because 
of time constraints). In all conditions, each group was described favourably in terms of 
one dimension and negatively in terms of the other. Group A was always described (on 
average) by behaviours that were more intelligent and less friendly than Group B. The 
reverse pattern held for descriptions of Group B. The statements were selected on the 
basis of pretest ratings of behaviours in terms of intelligence and friendliness given by 
20 independent participants from the same population. These participants rated 80 
behavioural statements in terms of both intelligence and friendliness on 9-point scales 
ranging from 1 (extremely unintelligent/extremely unfriendly) to 9 (extremely 
intelligent/extremely friendly). These participants did not take part in the subsequent 
experiment.
In the high comparative fit for friendliness condition, the behaviours were selected to 
create a larger mean difference between the two group in terms of friendliness (M=2.98 
for Group A and M=7.29 for Group B), t[ 19)= 14.8, p<.001, and a smaller mean 
difference in terms of intelligence (M=6.00 for Group A and M=4.01 for Group B), 
t(19)=7.41, pc.OOl. The difference between the groups was significantly greater for the 
friendliness than the intelligence attribute dimension, t( 19)= 10.65, p<.001. In the high 
comparative fit for intelligence condition, the behaviours were selected to create a larger
12 Details of the statements used to describe each group appear in Appendix A.
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mean difference between the groups in terms of intelligence (M=7.66 for Group A and 
M=2.85 for Group B), t( 19)= 12.51, p<.001, and a smaller mean difference in terms of 
friendliness (M=3.96 for Group A and M=6.62 for Group B), t( 19)= 10.9, pc.001. The 
difference between the groups was significantly greater for the intelligence than the 
friendliness dimension, t(19)=7.08, pc.001.
The mean pretest ratings (in terms of both intelligence and friendliness) of stimulus 
statements describing both groups in both conditions are summarised in Table 8.1 
below. Differences created between groups on each dimension are also reported. The 
‘difference between differences’ was larger for both conditions compared to 
Experiments 1 and 2, creating a stronger manipulation of the degree of comparative fit.
Table 8.1
Mean pretest ratings of friendliness and intelligence stimulus statements for Group 
A and Group B, and mean differences between groups for each dimension: 
Experiment 3
Comparative fit: High for Friendliness High for Intelligence
Group: A B Diff A B Diff
Friendliness 2.98 7.29 4.31 3.96 6.62 2.66
Intelligence 6.00 4.01 1.99 7.66 2.85 4.81
Note: Diff = difference between groups A and B.
In terms of variability, we sought to ensure that variability within groups did not differ 
across conditions (as per Ford & Stangor, 1992, Experiment 1). Homogeneity of 
variance tests showed that in the high comparative fit for friendliness condition that 
variability associated with the friendliness dimension was not significantly different 
from that associated with the intelligence dimension within both Group A (SD’s=.38 vs. 
.16), Cochran’s C(4,2)=.85, p>.05, and Group B (SD’s=.15 vs. .12), Cochran’s 
C(4,2)=.60, p>.05. In addition, variability in friendliness was not significantly different 
across groups, Cochran’s C(4,2)=.87, p>.05 and variability in intelligence was not
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significantly different across groups, C(4,2)=.64, p>.05. Likewise, in the high 
comparative fit for intelligence condition homogeneity of variance tests showed that 
variability associated with the intelligence dimension was not significantly different 
from that associated with the friendliness dimension within both Group A (SD’s=.47 vs. 
.22), Cochran’s C(4,2)=.82, p>.05, and Group B (SD’s=.28 vs. .33), Cochran’s 
C(4,2)=.59, p>.05. In addition, variability in friendliness was not significantly different 
across groups, Cochran’s C(4,2)=.74, p>.05, and variability in intelligence was not 
significantly different across groups, Cochran’s C(4,2)=.70, £>.05.
Thus, in the high comparative fit for friendliness condition, there was a larger mean 
differences between groups on the friendliness dimension compared to the intelligence 
dimension. Likewise, in the high comparative fit for intelligence condition there was a 
larger mean difference between groups on the intelligence dimension compared to the 
friendliness dimension. However, as in the previous experiments, there was always 
comparative fit for both dimensions in both conditions.
Procedure
All participants were shown instructions concerning the experiment which were also 
read aloud by the experimenter. In all conditions the instructions read:
This study concerns social judgement based upon limited information. I am going 
to give you some information about people from different groups and later ask 
you to make some judgements about them. In a moment I will show you some 
statements describing behaviours performed by different members of two groups.
For convenience these groups have been labelled Group A and Group B.
All participants were instructed to read the statements carefully and to try to form an 
impression of what each group was like. The behavioural statements were then 
presented to participants on a video one at a time, at a rate of approximately 5 seconds 
per statement. The order of statements was random.
After viewing the behaviours, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire 
concerning the impressions they had just formed of the two groups. Before completing 
the dependent variables (outlined below) participants were asked to “think about what
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the people in Group A and Group B are like” and then to write a brief description of 
their impressions of the people in Group A and the people in Group B. Next, 
participants were asked to “think about the reasons why the people in Group A and 
Group B are the way that they are” and to then write a short description to account for 
the behaviours of the people in Group A and Group B. These tasks were designed to 
elicit participants’ explanations for the behaviours of the two groups. All participants 
then completed the dependent measures and recorded their gender. After collecting 
questionnaires, all participants were debriefed as to the purpose of the study, thanked 
and dismissed.
Dependent variables
There were some changes to the dependent variables compared to those used in 
Experiment 1. The first dependent variable was a trait rating measure as employed in 
Experiment 1. All participants were asked to rate both groups on intelligence and 
friendliness using 9-point scales (ranging from 1 = extremely unintelligent/extremely 
unfriendly, to 9 = extremely intelligent extremely friendly).
In addition, all participants completed a Katz-Braly type checklist (1933, 1935 — see 
Haslam et al., 1996; Haslam et ah, 1995; Haslam et ah, 1992). This measure was 
employed to determine the overall impression formed of each group and to see if one 
group was characterised in more positive terms than the other group. A list of 57 
adjectives were used. These were taken largely from the original Katz-Braly (1933) list. 
However, a number of adjectives from the original list that seemed irrelevant to the 
judgement at hand were excluded (e.g., physically dirty) and some adjectives were 
added that seemed particularly relevant (e.g., unfriendly)13. Participants were instructed 
to read through the list of words, and to underline those that seemed typical of Group A 
while circling those typical of Group B. They were then instructed to go back over the 
list and mark with an X the five words that seemed most typical of Group A and to tick 
the five words that seemed most typical of Group B.
n See Appendix B for a full list of the adjectives used.
Results
Overview of analyses
As in Experiment 1, the main predictions of the experiment were tested using planned 
contrasts. Because these were planned and directional all t-values reported are one-tailed 
unless otherwise stated. Results of overall ANOVA’s have also been reported for 
completeness.
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Trait ratings
Mean ratings for intelligence and friendliness for Group A and Group B across 
comparative fit were calculated. Likewise, differences scores were calculated in the 
same manner as in Experiment 1. These means (and associated standard deviations) are 
presented in Table 8.2 below:
Table 8.2
Mean ratings of perceived friendliness and intelligence for Group A and Group B, 
and mean difference scores: Experiment 3
Comparative fit: High for Friendliness High for Intelligence
N: 10 10
Group: A B Diff A B Diff
Friendliness 3.10 7.90 4.80 4.80 7.70 2.90
(.74) (-74) (1.40) (1.31) (.68) (1.29)
Intelligence 7.10 4.80 2.30 7.90 4.70 3.20
(-88) (1.69) (2.31) (.57) (1.16) (1.62)
Note: Scores for groups A and B can range from 1 to 9; standard deviations in brackets; diff = mean 
difference score, these can range from -8 to +8; a positive score indicates stereotyping..
Initially planned contrasts were carried out to check if Group A were perceived to be 
more intelligent and less friendly than Group B. As expected, in the high comparative fit 
for friendliness condition, Group A (M=7.10) were judged to be significantly more 
intelligent than Group B (M=4.80), t(9)=3.15, p<.01, and Group B (M=7.90) were 
judged to be significantly more friendly than Group A (M=3.10), t(9)= 10.85, pc.001. In
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the high comparative fit for intelligence condition, Group A (M=7.90) were judged to 
be significantly more intelligent than Group B (M=4.70), t(9)=6.25, p<.001, and Group 
B (M=7.70) were judged to be significantly more friendly than Group A (M=4.80), 
t(9)=7.13, p<.001. Therefore it appears that the stimulus materials were successful in 
creating differences between the groups on both dimensions in both conditions.
As in Experiment 1, we also expected that the differences perceived between groups A 
and B may differ somehow from the stimulus input. Overall, participants appeared to 
judge both groups in both conditions more positively compared to the stimulus input 
(see Table 8.1). That is, they judged Group A to be more intelligent and less unfriendly, 
and Group B to be more friendly and less unintelligent. In all cases, the overall 
differences between groups appear to be accentuated with the exception of the 
intelligence dimension in the high comparative fit for intelligence condition. In this 
case, perceived differences between groups are less than the stimulus input, with Group 
A being judged to be slightly more intelligent, but Group B seen as much less 
unintelligent (as in Experiment 1)
Predictions 1 and 2
To test predictions 1 and 2 mean difference scores were analysed in a 2 (comparative fit: 
high for friendliness/high for intelligence) x 2 (dimension: friendliness/intelligence) 
ANOVA with a repeated measure on the last factor. This revealed a main effect for 
dimension, F(l,18)=4.51 ,p<.05, which was qualified by a significant dimension x 
comparative fit interaction, F(l,18)=7.30,p<.02. The nature of this interaction is 
represented in Figure 8.1 below.
It can be seen from that figure that the pattern of results was very similar to that 
observed in Experiment 1. Four planned pairwise contrasts were carried out to test 
specific predictions (applying Sidak’s multiplicative inequality to control for the 
experiment-wise error rate14). Contrasts revealed that when there was high comparative
14 Note that with four contrasts, 18 degrees of freedom and ot=.05 one-tailed the critical t-value based on 
Sidak’s multiplicative inequality is 2.43 (Rohlf & Sokal, 1981).
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fit for friendliness, participants differentiated between groups A and B more in terms of 
friendliness (M=4.80) than intelligence (M=2.30), t(18)=3.42, p<.05. Likewise, when 
there was high comparative fit for intelligence participants differentiated between 
groups A and B slightly more in terms of intelligence (M=3.20) than friendliness 
(M=2.90), although this difference failed to reach significance, t(18)=.41, p>.05. 
Looking at comparisons across dimensions, participants differentiated in terms of 
friendliness significantly more in the high comparative fit for friendliness versus high 
comparative fit for intelligence condition, t(18)=2.60, p<.05. Likewise, participants 
differentiated in terms of intelligence more in the high comparative fit for intelligence 
versus high comparative for friendliness condition, although this difference was not 
significant, t( 18)= 1.23, p>.05.
5  -I
High for Friendliness
□  Friendliness 
■  Intelligence
High for Intelligence
Degree of Comparative Fit
Figure 8.1 Interaction between comparative fit and dimension on mean difference 
scores: Experiment 3
Checklist ratings
The percentage of participants choosing checklist traits to describe groups A and B 
across both levels of comparative fit appear in Table 8.3 below:
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Table 8.3
Percentage of participants choosing each adjective across conditions: Experiment 3
Comparative Fit: High For Friendliness High For Intelligence
Group A
Intelligent 40% 90%
Industrious - 60%
Ambitious 40% 40%
Individualistic 40% -
Conceited 40% -
Reserved - 40%
Shrewd 30% -
Quick-tempered 30% -
Aggressive 30% -
Argumentative 30% -
Sophisticated 30% -
Methodical - 30%
Practical - 30%
Conservative - 30%
Efficient - 30%
Group B
Pleasure Loving - 90%
Friendly 70% 70%
Happy-go-lucky 40% 70%
Courteous 60% -
Kind 50% -
Absent-minded 40% 40%
Vague 30% 40%
Talkative 30% -
Sensitive 30% -
Generous 30% _
Note: Due to the relatively small sample size, only traits chosen by at least 30% of participants are 
included. - = <30%.
It can be seen from above that Group A were characterised more in terms of 
unfriendliness-related traits where there was high comparative fit for friendliness (e.g., 
individualistic, conceited, shrewd, quick-tempered, aggressive, argumentative) but more 
in terms of intelligence-related traits where there was high comparative fit for
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intelligence (e.g., intelligent, industrious, ambitious, methodical, practical, efficient). 
Group B appear to be described positively and in terms of friendliness across both 
conditions. However, in the high comparative fit for intelligence condition the traits 
reflect an impression of a relaxed and sociable group (e.g., pleasure-loving, friendly, 
happy-go-lucky) whereas in the high comparative fit for friendliness condition, the 
impression is more one of altruism (e.g., friendly, courteous, kind).
A more systematic analysis of adjectives chosen to describe each group was carried out 
following a method used by Haslam et al. (1992). Each trait on the checklist was 
characterised as either positive or negative by five independent raters. Where at least 
four of the raters agreed the trait was deemed to be either positive or negative 
accordingly, or otherwise it was deemed to be ambiguous. A ‘trait favourableness’ score 
was calculated for the five traits assigned by each participant. A +1 was scored for a 
positive trait, -1 for a negative trait and 0 for an ambiguous trait. Therefore, for each 
participant there was a positivity score of between +5 and -5 for both Group A and 
Group B. In terms of positivity, in the high comparative fit for friendliness condition we 
would Group B to be judged more positively (because here they are presented as 
extremely friendly and moderately unintelligent) compared to Group A (extremely 
unfriendly and moderately intelligent). In the high comparative fit for intelligence 
condition we would expect Group A to be judged more positively (because here they are 
presented as extremely intelligent and moderately unfriendly) compared to Group B 
(extremely unintelligent and moderately friendly).
The mean positivity scores were analysed in a 2 (comparative fit: high for 
friendliness/high for intelligence) x 2(group: A/B) ANOVA with a repeated measure on 
the last factor. This revealed a significant main effect for group, F( 1,18)= 13.32, £<.01, 
which was qualified by a significant comparative fit x group interaction, F( 1,18)= 16.27, 
p<.001. The nature of that interaction is illustrated in Figure 8.2 below:
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High for Friendliness High for Intelligence
Degree of Comparative Fit
Figure 8.2 Interaction between comparative fit and group on positivity scores: 
Experiment 3
It can be seen from above that in the high comparative fit for friendliness condition 
Group B were perceived much more positively than Group A (M’s = 2.60 and -1.40). 
Pairwise contrasts15 revealed that this difference was significant, t(18)=5.43, p<.05, two- 
tailed. In the high comparative fit for intelligence condition Group A and Group B were 
perceived almost equally positively (M’s = 1.40 and 1.20). This difference was not 
significant, t(18)=.27, p>.05. In addition, Group A were perceived to be more positive 
in the high comparative fit for intelligence versus the high comparative fit for 
friendliness condition, t(18)=3.80, p<.05. The positivity of Group B did not differ 
significantly across degrees of comparative fit, t( 18)= 1.90, p>.05.
Descriptions of Group A and Group B
A qualitative analysis was undertaken of the descriptions written by participants about 
groups A and B, and reasons for each group’s behaviour. In the high comparative fit for 
friendliness condition, participants seemed to emphasise the unfriendly nature of Group 
A members (presented as very unfriendly and moderately intelligent). They were
15 Note that with four contrasts, 18 degrees of freedom and cc=.05 two-tailed the critical t-value based on 
Sidak’s multiplicative inequality is 2.77 (Rohlf & Sokal, 1981). Note that a two-tailed t-test was 
employed here as we had no a priori predictions concerning the direction of differences.
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described as selfish, career-oriented, impatient, success-oriented, arrogant, aggressive 
and ambitious. For example, one participant described Group A as:
People who are calculative, self-centred and selfish. They are also self-sufficient 
and independent.
Participants also appeared to emphasise the ‘friendliness’ dimension when describing 
Group B (presented as highly friendly and moderately unintelligent) and there was less 
mention of intelligence dimension.
In the high comparative fit for intelligence condition, participants tended to describe 
Group A (presented as high on intelligence and moderate on friendliness) as ‘loners’ 
who spent a lot of time on intellectual pursuits and therefore did not have much time to 
develop friendships. For example, one participant commented that Group A:
Spent so much time on studies — didn’t expand interests or circle of friends then. 
Prefer own company. Perhaps pushed by family.
Group B (who were presented as highly unintelligent and moderately friendly) were 
described not so much as ‘dumb’, but rather as people who had missed out on 
opportunities or had other priorities. Rather than being ‘unintelligent’ they were 
described as ‘confused’, ‘forgetful’ and ‘impractical’. For example:
Group B people seem to revolve more around people than careers. It is possible 
that they have more time to spend with people; also they seemed somewhat 
confused, maybe because they are frightened by the rules and success Group A is 
accustomed to.
In general it appeared that participants formed subtly different impressions of the two 
groups across conditions. In the high comparative fit for intelligence condition, Group A 
were seen as highly intelligent and studious and this was reasoned to account for their 
lack of social skills. In comparison, in the high comparative fit for friendliness 
condition, Group A were perceived as selfish and successful — their unfriendliness 
seemed to dominate the impression and the interpretation of their intelligence. Overall, 
the friendliness of Group B seems to offset their unintelligence as participants reason 
that intellectual pursuits are not important to them and that they are confused or vague
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rather than stupid. These impressions seem to be consistent with the checklist data and 
positivity scores discussed above.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 3 were very similar to those obtained in Experiment 1. As in 
Experiment 1 some support was found for our predictions. When comparative fit was 
high for friendliness participants differentiated between groups more in terms of 
friendliness than intelligence; however, when comparative fit was high for intelligence 
there was no significant difference in intergroup differentiation in terms of intelligence 
versus friendliness. In addition, participants differentiated more in terms of friendliness 
when comparative fit was higher for this dimension (high comparative fit for 
friendliness) versus lower (high comparative fit for intelligence). There was no 
significant difference across degrees of comparative fit for the intelligence dimension.
Once again, it appeared that differentiation in terms of the dimension friendliness was 
generally more extreme than differentiation in terms of intelligence. The analysis of 
positivity scores showed that in the condition with higher comparative fit for 
friendliness, Group B were characterised as significantly more positive than Group A. 
This was also reflected in the descriptions of both groups, with Group A in particular 
being described in a very negative fashion which reflected their high level of 
unfriendliness. In the condition with higher comparative fit for intelligence, we 
expected Group A to be seen more positively than Group B because they were presented 
as highly intelligent (and only moderately unfriendly) whereas Group B were highly 
unintelligent (and only moderately friendly). However, there was no difference in terms 
of how positively participants characterised the two groups in this condition. In 
particular, Group B were not characterised negatively, but as moderately positive. This 
was also reflected in the written descriptions where Group B were described as 
‘forgetful’ or ‘impractical’ rather than unintelligent.
The results discussed above may account for the lack of predicted difference between 
intelligence and friendliness in the high comparative fit for intelligence condition. It
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appears that while Group B in this condition were presented as highly unintelligent, the 
fact that they were also moderately friendly may have influenced the interpretation of 
this trait. The result of this appears to be that overall they were seen in a relatively 
positive light and their lack of intelligence was not accentuated. Thus, the differentiation 
between groups in terms of intelligence was minimised in this condition because of the 
relatively high level of intelligence attributed to Group B.
Therefore, it appears that there may be problems associated with the use of the 
‘intelligence’ dimension in this experiment. When combined with information about 
friendliness, impressions of intelligence may be shaped by impressions of friendliness. 
It appears from the positivity scores and the written descriptions in this experiment that 
these two dimensions may not be independent and that friendliness may be the 
dominant dimension in terms of impressions formed. This point is discussed further in 
the General Discussion at the end of this chapter.
Overview of Experiment 4
Experiment 4 sought to add a normative fit variable to the design of the previous 
experiment. In design and procedure it was very similar to Experiment 2. Again, 
normative fit was operationalised via group labels that were either consistent or 
inconsistent with the differences between groups. However, this time the labels ‘chess 
player’ (stereotypically intelligent but less friendly) and ‘charity worker’ 
(stereotypically friendly but less intelligent) were used, with charity worker being 
substituted for tour guide. This was done because it was felt charity workers were more 
of an inherently friendly group, whereas tour guides may be only instrumentally 
friendly. A pretest using an independent sample of 20 participants confirmed that in 
general charity workers were perceived to be significantly more friendly than chess 
players (M’s=7.70 versus 4.85) t(19)=6.43, p<.001, one-tailed, and chess players were 
perceived to be significantly more intelligent than charity workers (M’s=7.15 versus 
6.05), t( 19)= 1.70, p<.05, one-tailed.
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Experiment 4 was identical to Experiment 3 except that a label-type independent 
variable was introduced. Participants were either given group labels that were consistent 
with intergroup differences or that were inconsistent. Thus, they were either told that 
Group A were chess players and Group B were charity workers, or vice versa. Once 
again, as in the previous experiments, there was always comparative fit in all conditions, 
which differed in degree.
Predictions
Predictions were identical to those in Experiment 2. That is:
1. For both dimensions more stereotyping should occur when group labels are 
consistent versus inconsistent with intergroup differences.
2. Given consistent labels, there should be more stereotyping in terms of a 
dimension when the degree of comparative fit for that dimension is high versus 
low.
3. Given inconsistent labels, there should be no differences in the level of 
stereotyping across the degree of comparative fit for either dimension.
Method
Participants and design
Participants were 46 first year psychology students at the Australian National University 
in Canberra. All students participated in the study for course credit. Approximately 65% 
of the sample were female. Participants were randomly assigned to experimental 
conditions. Two independent variables were manipulated in a 2 (degree of comparative 
fit: high for friendliness/high for intelligence) x 2 (label-type: consistent/inconsistent) 
between subjects design.
Stimulus materials
The same behavioural statements used in Experiment 3 were employed in this 
experiment.
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Procedure
All participants were shown instructions concerning the experiment which were also 
read aloud by the experimenter. In all conditions the instructions were:
This study concerns social judgement based upon limited information. I am going 
to give you some information about people from different groups and later ask 
you to make some judgements about them. In a moment I will show you some 
statements describing behaviours performed by different members of two groups. 
For convenience these groups have been labelled Group A and Group B.
These instructions were identical to those in Experiment 3. In addition, participants in 
the consistent labels conditions were given these instructions:
However, it may help you to know that the behavioural statements to be presented 
were gathered in a previous study from groups of CHARITY WORKERS and 
CHESS PLAYERS. The statements to be presented about GROUP A refer to the 
CHESS PLAYERS, while the statements to be presented about GROUP B refer to 
the CHARITY WORKERS.
while the additional instructions for participants in the inconsistent labels condition 
read:
However, it may help you to know that the behavioural statements to be presented 
were gathered in a previous study from groups of CHESS PLAYERS and 
CHARITY WORKERS. The statements to be presented about GROUP A refer to 
the CHARITY WORKERS, while the statements to be presented about GROUP B 
refer to the CHESS PLAYERS.
These instructions were slightly different from those employed in Experiment 2 where 
participants were instructed to ‘imagine’ that groups A and B were the occupational 
groups presented (e.g., imagine that Group A are chess players). It was thought that 
these instructions might be more convincing than the instructions employed in 
Experiment 2.
All participants were instructed to read the statements presented to them carefully and to 
try to form an impression of what each group was like. The behavioural statements were 
then presented to participants on a video, one at a time, at a rate of approximately 5 
seconds per statement.
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After viewing the behaviours, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire 
concerning the impressions they had just formed of the two groups. This questionnaire 
was almost identical to that used in Experiment 3. One difference was that participants 
were asked to indicate if they had been told which groups of people were represented by 
Group A and B and if so to indicate. This served as a manipulation check. All 
participants completed the dependent measures and recorded their gender. The 
dependent measures employed were identical to those used in Experiment 3. After 
collecting questionnaires, all participants were debriefed as to the purpose of the study, 
thanked and dismissed.
Results
Manipulation check and cell sizes
Two participants failed to correctly identify the two groups and were excluded from 
further analyses. This left data from 44 participants for analysis. The distribution of 
these participants across conditions is presented in Table 8.4 below. All analyses are 
based on these cell sizes unless otherwise stated.
Table 8.4
Cell sizes; Experiment 4 
Comparative fit:
Consistent labels 
Inconsistent labels
High for Friendliness High for Intelligence
Trait ratings
Mean ratings for friendliness and intelligence for Group A and Group B across degree 
of comparative fit and label-type were calculated. Likewise, as in Experiment 3, 
difference scores for friendliness and intelligence were calculated in the manner 
described above. These means (and associated standard deviations) are presented in
Table 8.5 below:
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Table 8.5
Mean ratings of perceived friendliness and intelligence for Group A and Group B. 
and mean difference scores: Experiment 4
Comparative fit: High for Friendliness High for Intelligence
Group: A B Diff A B Diff
FRIENDLINESS
Consistent labels 4.09 7.36 3.27 4.20 7.70 3.50
(1.51) (1.29) (2.53) (1.14) (.48) (1.51)
Inconsistent labels 4.15 7.23 3.08 4.40 7.20 2.80
INTELLIGENCE
(1.86) (1.24) (2.93) (1.78) (.79) (2.20)
Consistent labels 7.27 5.09 2.18 7.80 4.80 3.00
(1.01) (1.58) (2.18) (.63) (1.14) (1.14)
Inconsistent labels 6.77 5.62 1.15 7.30 4.60 2.70
(•S3) (1.61) (1.86) (1.70) (1.96) (3.27)
Note: Scores for Group A and Group B can range from 1 to 9; difference scores can range from -8 to +8, 
a higher score indicates more stereotyping, a negative score would indicate reverse stereotyping, a zero 
score would indicate no stereotyping; standard deviations in brackets.
A 2 (comparative fit: high for friendliness/high for intelligence) x 2 (label: 
consistent/inconsistent) x 2 (dimension: friendliness/intelligence) ANOVA with a 
repeated measure on the last factor was carried out on the mean difference scores. The 
only significant result yielded was a main effect for dimension, F(l,40)=6.31, p<.05. As 
in Experiment 3, it appears that participants differentiated between groups more in 
terms of the friendliness dimension than the intelligence dimension. Contrary to 
predictions, no significant effects involving label-type or comparative fit were found.
Checklist ratings
Table 8.6 below presents the percentage of participants who chose traits characterising 
Group A and Group B by condition.
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Table 8.6
Percentage of participants choosing each adjective across conditions: Experiment 4
Comparative Fit: High For Friendliness High For Intelligence
Labels: Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent
Group A 
Intelligent 80% 80% 73% 50%
Ambitious - - 70% 30%
Scientific minded - - 30% 50%
Preoccupied - 42% 40% -
Industrious - - 40% -
Practical - - - 40%
Efficient - - 40% -
Methodical 36% - 30% -
Individualistic 36% - 30% -
Arrogant - 33% - -
Quick-tempered - - - 30%
Brilliant - - - 30%
Quiet - - - 30%
Group B
Friendly 82% 83% 60% 60%
Absent-minded - 33% 40% 70%
Generous 56% 42% 30% -
Vague - - - 50%
Happy-go-lucky 46% 33% - 40%
Pleasure Loving - - 30% 40%
Talkative 36% - 30% -
Courteous - - 30% -
Kind - - 30% -
Passionate - - 30% -
Stupid — — — 30%
N o te : O n ly  traits c h o s e n  b y  at le a s t  30%  o f  p a r tic ip a n ts  in c lu d e d . - = < 3 0 % .
As in Experiment 3, a positivity score was calculated for each subject for both Group A
and Group B. These were then analysed in a 2 (comparative fit: high for
friendliness/high for intelligence) x 2 (label-type: consistent/inconsistent) x 2 (group: 
A/B) ANOVA with a repeated measure on the last factor. This revealed a significant
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main effect for comparative fit, F(l,40)=4.40, p<.05, a significant main effect for group, 
F( 1,40)= 10.22, pc.Ol, and a significant comparative fit x group interaction, 
F( 1,40)=7.11, p<.02. The nature of that interaction (collapsed across label-type) is 
illustrated in Figure 8.3 below:
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Figure 8.3 Interaction between comparative fit and group on positivity scores: 
Experiment 4
As in Experiment 3 it appears that participants perceived Group A and B equally in 
terms of positivity in the high comparative fit for intelligence condition (M’s = .80 vs. 
1.00), t(40)=.36, p>.05, but perceived Group A to be less positive than Group B in the 
high comparative fit for friendliness condition (M’s = .46 vs. 2.67), t(40)=4.36, p><.05. 
In addition, Group B were perceived more positively in the high comparative fit for 
friendliness condition compared to the high comparative fit for intelligence condition, 
t(40)=3.15, p<.05. The positivity of Group A did not differ across degree of 
comparative fit, t(40)=.64, p>.05.16
16 Note that with four contrasts, 40 degrees of freedom and cx=.05 two-tailed the critical t-value based on 
Sidak’s multiplicative inequality is 2.61 (Rohlf & Sokal, 1981). Note that a two-tailed t-test was 
employed here as we had no a priori predictions concerning the direction of differences.
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Descriptions of Group A and Group B
Again, a qualitative analysis was performed of the descriptions written by participants 
of groups A and B and reasons for their behaviour. These are summarised below for 
each condition (with examples).
Consistent labels/high comparative fit for friendliness
In this condition, Group A were described as ‘go-getter types’, introverted and self- 
interested, highly strung, self-centred, and not as easy-going as Group B. The label 
‘chess-player’ was used to make sense of the behaviours performed by this group:
Chess is a game of planning, strategy, thinking, intelligence — people who play 
are generally more intelligent than the average hence income group higher, mind 
logical, able to plan. However due to discrimination of the chess culture as nerds 
socially outcast, negative view of society.
Group B were seen as more experienced and mature, more interactive and caring. It was 
reasoned that charity workers are outgoing and extroverted because they work with 
people and that they tend to be friendly, easy-going, helpful and caring
Consistent labels/high comparative fit for intelligence
Group A was generally described as intelligent loners, intellectual and anti-social. They 
were characterised as academic and cloistered, developed intellectually but not 
emotionally. A number of participants mentioned the fact that they were ‘chess players’ 
in their explanations, for example:
Chess players tend to have an intellectual mind — capable of complex thought 
patterns — a very individual, competitive game — cuts out friendships.
In contrast, Group B was described as vague, caring, and helpful. The emphasis was on 
‘friendliness-related’ dimensions. Once again, the ‘charity workers’ label appeared to 
shape many of the impressions, for example:
Charity work is an extremely social activity - have to have good interpersonal 
skills — ability to look at things on a practical level.
Inconsistent labels/high comparative fit for friendliness
201
In the inconsistent labels condition, a number of participants appeared in their 
explanations to be trying to reconcile and explain what they saw as inconsistencies 
between group labels and group behaviours. For example, one participant reasoned that 
charity workers’ occupation is to help and associate with people all the time — so in 
their leisure period they “pamper and keep to themselves”. Another participant 
commented that:
Perhaps these people are stressed with other people’s problems and avoid people 
due to having a case load of problems. Aggressive because of the demands of their 
job.
Descriptions of Group B often focussed on trying to explain why chess players would 
be unintelligent and friendly. For example, it was reasoned that chess players generally 
have solitude; therefore given the chance they prefer to socialise with others. Likewise, 
it was suggested that their brilliant minds could impact on their forgetfulness due to 
“always thinking about new chess strategies”.
Inconsistent labels/high comparative fit for intelligence
Again attempts were made to ‘explain’ the inconsistent behaviours presented. For 
example, in trying to explain unfriendly charity workers one participant wrote:
People in Group A are nice all day at work — they probably feel the need to 
relieve frustration elsewhere.
Likewise, another participant explained friendly/unintelligent chess players in the 
following fashion:
Seeing they are involved in a sport they are very competent at social interaction 
but tend to lack vast intelligence.
Another participant describing unintelligent chess players commented that “people who 
are good at some things often aren’t good at others”.
Overall, it appeared that to some extent, participants generated explanations or 
‘theories’ that accounted for the differences between groups in terms of the group labels
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they were presented with. In the inconsistent labels condition they appear to have 
attempted to reconcile the apparent inconsistencies to some extent. This may account 
for the lack of effects for label-type observed.
Discussion
In general our predictions were not supported in this experiment. Contrary to 
predictions no significant effect for label-type was found. Likewise there was no 
interaction between degree of comparative fit and normative fit.
One of the most interesting results obtained from this study was the lack of significant 
effects for label-type (i.e., normative fit). This was especially curious in light of the 
strong effects obtained for this variable in Experiment 2. It seems likely that this 
difference was due to a difference in experimental procedure: namely the instructions 
that participants were given in this experiment to “write a short explanation to account 
for the behaviours of the people in Group A and Group B”. It is possible that these 
instructions activated ‘theories’ and other knowledge that made the observed differences 
between groups ‘meaningful’ ones — that is, theories that reconciled the apparent 
inconsistencies between group labels and group behaviours. The written descriptions 
suggest that participants were able make different traits fit with the categories charity 
worker and chess player by subtly changing the meaning of these categories.
Another difference between the current experiment and Experiment 2 was the use of the 
label charity workers rather than tour guides. It is possible that the fit (or lack thereof) 
may not have been as strong for this category and this may have influenced the lack of 
effects for label-type.
The positivity scores largely replicated the results found in Experiment 3. In the high 
comparative fit for friendliness condition, Group B were characterised much more 
positively than Group A. However, in the high comparative fit for intelligence 
condition, there was little difference in the positivity of the two groups.
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General Discussion
Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 4 sought to address the first aim, and to test the first hypothesis, 
of the thesis. Experiments 1 and 3 sought to investigate the role of comparative fit in 
determining stereotype content. Experiments 2 and 4 investigated the role of both 
comparative and normative fit and predicted an interaction between these two variables 
in terms of stereotype content formation. We will first discuss the implications of 
Experiments 1 and 3, and the suggested role of comparative fit. We will then discuss the 
results of Experiments 2 and 4, and the implications regarding the role of normative fit, 
and the interaction between comparative and normative fit.
Experiments 1 and 3
Both these experiments produced a very similar pattern of results and provided partial 
support for our hypotheses. The results of both experiments demonstrated that in the 
condition with higher comparative fit for friendliness, participants differentiated 
between groups more in terms of the more comparatively fitting dimension (i.e., 
friendliness). Thus the stereotype content applied to groups A and B reflected those 
attributes (in this case friendliness) that maximised differences between groups (and in 
the case of Experiment 1 also minimised differences within groups). However, these 
results were not replicated for intelligence in the high comparative fit for intelligence 
condition. This was contrary to predictions and also contrary to results obtained by Ford 
and Stangor (1992). In terms of prediction 2, more stereotyping occurred in terms of a 
dimension when comparative fit was high for that dimension versus lower (however for 
intelligence this difference was only significant in Experiment 1). That is, there was 
more differentiation in terms of each dimension when it was more fitting.
Results with respect to prediction 2 support the idea that stereotype content will reflect 
differences in degree of comparative fit, with more comparatively fitting dimensions 
being more important in subsequent stereotypes. However, we also predicted that given 
two comparatively fitting dimensions, the more fitting one should prove to be more 
important in stereotypes formed. This was shown to be the case when friendliness was 
more fitting than intelligence but not in the reverse case. We have discussed above a
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number of possible reasons for the lack of predicted effects (prediction 1) in the high 
comparative fit for intelligence condition. It appears that information about friendliness 
and intelligence presented together may have changed the interpretations of each 
dimension somewhat. This suggests that while there was no explicit normative fit in 
these studies, there may have been implicit normative fit. The written descriptions and 
checklist data in Experiment 3 suggested that subtly different impressions were formed 
of the groups in different conditions, which may have reflected expectations about what, 
for example, a highly intelligent but unfriendly group of people are like. Friendliness is 
possibly the dominant dimension in forming impressions and it may shape 
interpretations of the meaning of intelligence. In Experiment 3, participants 
characterised the highly friendly group as very positive and the highly unfriendly group 
as very negative. However, there was little difference in the perceived positivity of the 
highly intelligent versus the highly unintelligent group. Thus, it appears that intelligence 
figured less prominently in participants’ impressions, and that even when large 
differences in intelligence were presented, they may not have had a large influence on 
participants’ overall impressions of groups. Thus, for example, when Group B were 
presented as highly unintelligent but moderately friendly, it may have been the positive 
friendliness that shaped the overall impression, and minimised the negativity on the 
intelligence dimension (see Berndsen et al., 1998).
It is also possible that for social desirability reasons, our participants were less willing 
to make judgements of low intelligence, meaning differences in intelligence were 
minimised rather than accentuated. In this sample there may be cultural ‘rules’ against 
judging anyone to be ‘dumb’ (Leyens et ah, 1994). In both experiments, posttest 
judgements of Group B’s intelligence (in the high comparative fit for intelligence 
condition) were higher than what was presented at pretest suggesting that this dimension 
was minimised rather than accentuated. Indeed, differences in results obtained in the 
high comparative fit for intelligence condition between our experiments and those of 
Ford and Stangor (1992) may reflect a cultural difference between our participants (who 
were Australian) and the participants used in Ford and Stangor’s study (who were
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American). Cultural norms in Australia may place more importance on friendliness as a 
trait rather than intelligence. Likewise, friendliness may be seen as more of a volitional 
behaviour whereas intelligence is more innate; thus, friendliness may be perceived to be 
more diagnostic of what a group of people are really like.
Another problem in the current experiments (and in Ford and Stangor’s studies) 
concerns the simultaneous manipulation of friendliness and intelligence in such a way 
that there is an inconsistency between values. That is, a negatively valued trait (e.g., 
unfriendliness) was always paired with a positively valued trait (e.g., intelligence). As 
discussed above, these two oppositely valued traits appear to have influenced the 
interpretation of each other. Likewise, the pairing of the two traits in this fashion meant 
that there was poor fit in these experiments between the division into groups and values. 
It may be preferable to have clear fit in terms of both attributes and values — this could 
be achieved by only manipulating one dimension rather than two.
In summary, Experiments 1 and 3 showed some evidence that a dimension that 
differentiates more between groups will prove to be more important in the stereotypes 
formed of those groups (compared to a less differentiating dimension) (prediction 1). In 
addition, they demonstrated that more stereotyping in terms of a dimension occurs when 
comparative fit is high for that dimension versus lower (prediction 2). Overall, the 
results of Experiments 1 and 3 point to possible problems inherent in the use of the 
intelligence dimension, especially in combination with the friendliness dimension. 
Manipulating comparative fit by considering the differences across the degree of 
comparative fit of these two dimensions may not be the most successful or 
straightforward method to use. Thus, in the following experiments (Experiments 5 and 
6) only one dimension, friendliness, was used. Likewise, in the current studies the levels 
of comparative fit manipulated were medium versus high, meaning that there was 
always comparative fit for both dimensions but that it varied in degree. A stronger 
manipulation of this variable might involve comparing a high comparative fit condition 
with a no comparative fit condition, using only one dimension. In the next experiment, 
Experiment 5, this type of manipulation is employed.
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Experiments 2 and 4
The results obtained in Experiments 2 and 4 were somewhat contradictory. In 
Experiment 2, as predicted, it was found that when group labels were consistent with 
differences between groups participants used those differences more in stereotyping 
those groups compared to when group labels were inconsistent with differences between 
groups. However, these results were not replicated in Experiment 4. In both 
experiments, a predicted interaction between comparative and normative fit was not 
found; however, this is likely to be partly due to the problems encountered in 
manipulating comparative fit which have been discussed above.
We have suggested above that the different results found in these two studies may be 
due to methodological differences. Firstly, different category labels were used in 
Experiment 4 with the label tour guide being replaced with charity worker — there may 
have been differences in the ‘fit’ between these two labels and the dimensions 
intelligence and friendliness. Secondly, participants in Experiment 4 were asked to write 
explanations to account for the behaviours of the two groups before rating the perceived 
intelligence and friendliness of those two groups. One possibility, consistent with the 
arguments of this thesis, is that asking participants to write an explanation for the 
behaviour of the two groups may have activated broader theories and knowledge about 
those groups and their behaviours. These theories, in turn, may have been consistent 
with the intergroup differences presented. For example, when faced with charity 
workers who are unfriendly, participants may have drawn upon knowledge that people 
in caring professions are often under a lot of stress which may result in unfriendly 
behaviour. Thus, in the inconsistent labels condition, participants may have drawn upon 
theories and knowledge that ‘fitted’ with the differences between groups, and therefore 
made use of these differences between groups when stereotyping. This suggests that the 
‘consistency’ between, say, the category charity worker and the dimension friendliness 
is not fixed but ‘theory-dependent’. Theory generation is explored further in the next 
experiment.
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Other explanations for these results should also be considered. For example, the social 
cognition literature (reviewed in Chapter 3) suggests that we are more likely to 
remember stereotype-consistent information when cognitive load is high and stereotype- 
inconsistent information when cognitive load is low (e.g., Macrae et al., 1993; Stangor 
& Duan, 1991; cf Spears & Haslam, 1997). It could be argued that asking participants to 
think and write about the two groups gave them more time to recall information 
inconsistent with category labels. Fiske and Neuberg (1990) argue that as perceivers pay 
more attention they make more use of individuating versus categorical information in 
impression formation, and this could be argued to be happening in Experiment 4 where 
impressions are based more on ‘data’ than ‘theory’. Likewise, asking participants to 
provide an explanation may have made them feel more accountable for the impressions 
they formed and there is evidence to suggest that accountability can lead people to pay 
more attention to inconsistent information (Tetlock, 1985; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989).
Stangor and Lange (1994) make a distinction between active and passive processing in 
social judgement. They argue that passive processing, which involves little conscious 
effort, usually leads to the assimilation of new information into an activated existing 
representation. On the other hand, active processing, which is a more controlled and 
conscious process, has different effects. In particular, active processing may lead 
perceivers to focus on expectancy-inconsistent information. Active processing occurs 
“when the perceiver consciously controls for the influence of activated information” 
(Stangor & Lange, 1994, p. 388). It could be argued that in Experiment 4, asking 
participants to write explanations for the behaviour of the two groups resulted in more 
active processing of the information which may have made participants focus more on 
inconsistent information. These ideas concerning the effects of attention, capacity and 
style of processing (active versus passive) are discussed further in Chapter 10.
In Experiment 4 participants generated explanations in all conditions. Therefore, it is 
difficult to fully assess the effects of these ‘theories’. In the next experiment we 
attempted to manipulate theory generation such that some participants generated
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theories and others did not. In addition, we sought to manipulate comparative fit in a 
stronger fashion based on the arguments outlined above.
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Chapter 9
Experiment 5: The Effects of Comparative Fit, Normative 
Fit and Theory-Generation on Stereotype Content
This experiment considered the role of comparative fit, normative fit and background 
theories in producing stereotype content. It aimed to follow up some of the 
contradictory results found in the previous experiments. This experiment extended those 
previous experiments in a number of ways. We wished to manipulate comparative fit in 
a more straightforward and stronger fashion. This was done by employing high 
comparative fit versus no comparative fit conditions, rather than higher comparative fit 
versus lower comparative fit as in the previous experiments. In addition, we 
operationalised comparative fit in terms of only one attribute dimension, friendliness, 
rather than in terms of both friendliness and intelligence. In the high comparative fit 
condition, not only did the two groups differ from each other in terms of friendliness 
based on mean differences derived from pretest ratings of behaviours (as in the previous 
experiments), they also differed in terms of the number of friendly and unfriendly 
statements presented about each group. Thus, there were more friendly statements about 
one group and more unfriendly statements about the other group. In this sense, there 
was a correlation between groups and the dimension friendliness. Unlike the previous 
experiments, there was also a correlation between groups and ‘value’ with one group 
being described in more positive terms than the other group. In the no comparative fit 
condition there were equal numbers of friendly and unfriendly statements about each 
group and thus no correlation between groups and friendliness-related behaviours (or 
value). In previous studies (e.g., Oakes et al., 1991) comparative fit has been 
operationalised in terms of a correlation between group membership and expressed 
opinions. It was felt that this was a ‘cleaner’ and stronger operationalisation of 
comparative fit.
Normative fit was manipulated once again using group labels that were either consistent 
or inconsistent with the differences between groups. In this experiment we reverted to
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the labels used in Experiment 2, namely ‘chess players’ and ‘tour guides’. These labels 
appear to have good fit with the dimension friendliness. In addition, in this experiment 
we wished to test the idea, raised in Experiment 4, that asking participants to generate 
an explanation about the groups and group behaviours they were judging might activate 
broader knowledge and theories about these groups and therefore influence the 
perceived consistency between group labels and behaviours, and subsequent levels of 
stereotyping. Therefore, we introduced a ‘theory-generation’ variable. Participants in 
some conditions were given the opportunity to generate theories explaining the 
differences they had observed between the two groups (consistent with Experiment 4). 
Participants in other conditions were not given the opportunity to generate theories 
(consistent with Experiment 2). In Experiment 4 there was some evidence that giving 
participants the opportunity to come up with explanations for the behaviours of the two 
groups may have operated to activate their background theories and knowledge and 
allowed them to ‘find’ a fit between the presented behaviours and the category labels. 
By introducing the ‘theory-generation’ variable we hoped to demonstrate that when 
participants were given the opportunity to produce an explanation for the apparent 
inconsistencies between group labels and data they should find it meaningful to 
differentiate between groups in terms of the observed behavioural differences, even 
though group labels were inconsistent with those differences. We hoped to show that the 
act of explaining the relationship between group labels and group behaviours could 
actually alter the perceived ‘consistency’ between labels and behaviours.
As outlined below, there were also some changes to the dependent variables employed 
in this experiment compared to the previous experiments.
This experiment aimed to show that more stereotyping occurs in terms of a given 
dimension (in this case friendliness) when comparative fit is high for that dimension 
compared to when there is no comparative fit for that dimension. However, in addition 
to traits differentiating between groups they must also be traits that are meaningful for 
differentiation between the groups. That is, there must not only be comparative fit 
between groups and the but also normative fit. More stereotyping should occur when
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comparative and normative fit are operating together; that is, comparative differences 
exist between groups and these differences are in a normative direction. Therefore, if 
there are differences between groups but these are not in a normative direction, less 
stereotyping should occur in terms of the differentiating dimensions. Likewise, if there 
are groups with normatively meaningful labels but these groups do not actually differ 
from each other (no comparative fit), there should also be less stereotyping.
An additional aim of the experiment was to illustrate that what is normatively fitting is 
in no sense ‘fixed’. In Experiment 2 we found evidence that more stereotyping occurs 
when groups labels are consistent with intergroup differences and less stereotyping 
occurs when group labels are inconsistent with intergroup differences. It could be 
argued that participants have fixed stereotypes or schemas about certain social groups. 
When they are given a label, such as tour guides, and presented with traits consistent 
with that group, they may merely call upon the representation they have of tour guides 
and apply the content that is associated with that stereotype. Likewise, when a stimulus 
trait does not match the category, that category is not employed (e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 
1990). This experiment aimed to show, instead, that people have broad background 
knowledge about social groups and that they may call upon different parts of that 
knowledge when trying to make sense of stimulus information. The inclusion of the 
theory-generation variable sought to test the second hypothesis (H2) of the thesis 
namely:
There is no fixed or absolute consistency between a given stimulus attribute and a 
given social category. The perceived consistency between an attribute and a 
category can vary with the background knowledge or theory that is brought to bear 
upon that judgement...
Therefore, for example, while people may typically think of tour guides as ‘friendly’, 
they could conceivably find an explanation within their background knowledge for tour 
guides acting in a relatively unfriendly fashion. Therefore, conceivably the trait 
friendliness could be both consistent or inconsistent with the category ‘tour guides’ 
depending on the theory employed to explain the relationship between the category and
that trait.
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Overview of the experiment
The experiment presented participants with behaviours about two groups of people, 
Group A and Group B. These behaviours were presented such that either Group A were 
more friendly than Group B, or Group A and Group B did not differ in terms of 
friendliness. In addition, participants were given labels for the two groups that were 
either consistent with intergroup differences or inconsistent. They were either told that 
Group A were ‘tour guides’ and Group B were ‘chess players’ or vice versa. Finally, 
half the participants were instructed to produce an explanation for the behaviours of the 
people in the two groups and the other half were not given this instruction.
Thus there were two independent variables in the study: fit (high/no normative/no 
comparative), and theory generation (no theory/theory). The three levels of fit were 
comprised as follows: high fit held when there were differences between groups in 
terms of friendliness (i.e., there was high comparative fit) and group labels were 
consistent with the direction of those differences (good normative fit); no normative fit 
held when there were differences between groups in terms of friendliness (comparative 
fit) and group labels were inconsistent with those differences (no normative fit); no 
comparative fit held when there were no differences between groups in terms of 
friendliness (no comparative fit) and the groups were given normative labels.
The levels of fit employed require some explanation. The design did not fully cross 
comparative and normative fit such that there were high and no comparative fit 
conditions, and good and poor normative fit conditions. This is because it makes little 
sense to talk of normative fit when there is no comparative fit. When there are no 
differences between groups we cannot say that group labels are either consistent or 
inconsistent with these differences. Normative fit is always connected with the direction 
and nature of differences that exist between groups. Thus while we have given the 
groups labels in the no comparative fit condition, these labels were not related to 
differences between groups. The labels in the no comparative fit condition are more 
properly referred to as ‘normative labels’ (that is labels with some normative meaning) 
rather than as consistent or inconsistent labels.
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The design of the study is illustrated in Table 9.1 below:
Table 9.1
Design: Experiment 5
NO THEORY THEORY
HIGH FIT • / ✓
(high comparative fit &
consistent labels)
NO NORMATIVE FIT
(high comparative fit &
inconsistent labels)
NO COMPARATIVE FIT V
(no comparative fit & normative 
labels)
Predictions
This experiment sought to test both the first and second hypotheses of the thesis as 
outlined in Chapter 6. Broadly speaking, the first prediction was that stereotyping (in 
terms of differentiation on the dimension friendliness) should occur when both 
comparative and normative fit are operating together. That is, there should be more 
stereotyping, in terms of differentiation between groups, in the high fit (comparative 
fit/consistent labels) condition compared to the other two conditions. More specifically 
it was predicted that:
1. Given no theory generation, there should be more stereotyping in the high fit 
condition versus both the no normative fit and no comparative fit conditions. 
There should be no differences in stereotyping between the no normative fit and 
no comparative fit conditions.
In Chapter 6 we discussed an interaction between comparative and normative fit such 
that the effect of comparative fit should be dependent on the level of normative fit (and 
vice versa). While the design of this experiment does not allow for an interaction 
between these variables to be found statistically, theoretically the prediction is the same. 
That is, given the same level of comparative fit (as in the high fit and no normative fit 
conditions) there should be differences in stereotyping across normative fit (i.e., 
whether group labels are consistent or inconsistent). It is not possible to hold normative
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fit constant in this design (because of the no comparative fit condition). However, we 
are predicting that given the same group labels (as in the high fit and no comparative fit 
conditions) there should be differences in stereotyping across levels of comparative fit.
Other predictions concerned the theory-generation condition. We expected to find 
different effects for fit across theory generation conditions (similar to what was found in 
Experiments 2 and 4 respectively). Given theory-generation, we once again expected 
stereotyping to occur when both comparative and normative fit were operating together. 
This held in the high fit condition. However, given the generation of a theory which 
explains or accounts for the differences between groups, we also expected stereotyping 
(in terms of intergroup differentiation) to occur in the no normative fit condition. This is 
because we expected that those participants who had the opportunity to explain the 
relationship between categories and behaviours may activate theories and knowledge 
that allow them to reconcile the apparent inconsistency and therefore make use of the 
differences between groups when forming impressions of them. Once again, we 
predicted little stereotyping in the no comparative fit condition. As argued previously, 
comparative fit and normative fit operate together. Given no comparative fit there can 
be no normative fit. Specifically, it was predicted that:
2. Given theory generation, there should be more stereotyping in the high fit 
condition and the no normative fit condition versus the no comparative fit 
condition. There should be no differences in stereotyping between the high fit and 
no normative fit conditions.
Method
Participants and design
Participants were 76 students from senior secondary colleges in the Australian Capital 
Territory, with 84% females and an average age of 17.1 years. All students participated 
on a voluntary basis as part of a normal class.
As outlined above the design manipulated two independent variables, fit (high/no 
normative/no comparative) and theory-generation (no theory/theory) in a 3 x 2 between 
subjects design. Participants were randomly allocated to conditions.
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Stimulus materials and procedure
Initially, participants were given some basic information about the study, and were 
asked to sign a consent form if they were willing to participate. The experimenter then 
gave participants the following information as an introduction to the study:
I’m going to show you a video with statements describing behaviours performed 
by members of two groups. First I want to give you a little background 
information concerning where I got this information from. This study is following 
up a previous study that I did. In that study I was investigating the personalities 
and behaviours of people who belong to different types of leisure groups. The two 
groups I looked at were chess players from a local chess club, and volunteer tour 
guides. I got people from these two groups to provide me with, among other 
things, statements that were descriptive of a typical sort of behaviour they might 
perform or a typical behaviour they had performed over the past month. Their 
responses were totally anonymous.
In this present study I’m interested in investigating your perceptions of these two 
leisure groups and of the personalities of the people in these two groups. I’m 
going to show you a video of the statements I obtained from different members of 
these two groups. For convenience, in the video I’ve labelled the two groups with 
the letters A and B. However the statements about Group A members were 
obtained from the tour guides (chess players) while the statements about Group B 
were obtained from the chess players (tour guides). Now I’m going to play the 
video and I want you to simply read each statement carefully — once the video is 
finished there will be a questionnaire for you to complete where I’ll ask you about 
your perceptions of the two groups.
All subject were given identical instructions, except those in the no normative fit 
condition were told that Group A were chess players and Group B were tour guides. In 
addition, participants were shown an overhead while being given instructions, that said:
GROUP A = TOUR GUIDES
GROUP B = CHESS PLAYERS
In the no normative fit condition these labels were reversed.
It should be noted that the ‘cover story’ used in this experiment was much more detailed 
and elaborate than those employed in the previous experiments. It was hoped that these 
instructions would be more believable for participants and would engage them more
with the task.
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Participants then viewed a video which presented a number of behavioural statements 
about the two groups of people, Group A and Group B. There were 18 statements about 
each group: 12 pertaining to friendliness and 6 neutral statements. The statements were 
largely taken from those used previously in Experiment 1, 2, 3 and 4 and those used by 
Ford and Stangor (1992); however some changes were made to make them more 
suitable for the slightly younger participants used in this study. Statements were chosen 
on the basis of pretest ratings of their perceived friendliness performed by 10 
independent raters. These ratings were done on 5-point scales ranging from 1 ‘highly 
unfriendly’ to 5 ‘highly friendly’. There were two videos used. In the first video (high 
comparative fit video), statements were selected so that Group A were described as 
more friendly than Group B. Group A were described in terms of 9 friendly (e.g., A 
member of Group A regularly hosts dinner parties), 3 unfriendly (eg. A member of 
Group A is often abrupt) and 6 neutral statements (e.g., A member of Group A eats 
three meals a day). Group B were described in terms of 9 unfriendly, 3 friendly and 6 
neutral statements17. That is, there was a correlation between the dimension 
‘friendliness’ and group membership, although not a perfect one18. On the basis of 
pretest ratings, the statements describing Group A were significantly more friendly than 
those describing Group B (M’s=3.80 vs. 2.37), t(9)= 14.56, pc.001, two-tailed. The 
variability of the mean ratings for friendliness-related behaviours did not differ across 
groups (SD’s=1.19 versus 1.21), Cochran’s C(11,2)=.51, p>.05. This video was used as 
the stimulus in both the high fit and no normative fit conditions.
In the second video (no comparative fit video), statements were selected so that Group 
A and Group B did not differ in terms of friendliness. There were 6 friendly, 6 
unfriendly and 6 neutral statements describing each group. The 6 friendly statements 
about Group A were randomly selected from the 9 friendly statements used in the first 
video. The 6 unfriendly statements included the 3 unfriendly statements previously used
17 The statements used to describe each group appear in Appendix A.
IK Feedback from pilot studies using a perfect correlation between friendliness and groups (that is Group 
A described by 12 friendly statements and Group B by 12 unfriendly statements) indicated that subjects 
found this situation more transparent and less believable than a mixture of friendly and unfriendly 
statements to describe each group.
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to describe Group A in the first video plus 3 randomly chosen from the unfriendly 
statements used to describe Group B in the previous video. The 6 neutral statements 
were the same as previously used. Likewise, the 6 unfriendly statements about Group B 
were randomly selected from the 9 unfriendly statements previously used. The 6 
friendly statements used included the 3 friendly statements previously used to describe 
Group B plus 3 statements randomly chosen from the friendly statements used to 
describe Group A in the first video. The 6 neutral statements were the same as 
previously used19. Thus, there was no correlation between the dimension ‘friendliness’ 
and group membership. On the basis of pretest ratings, the statements describing Group 
A were not significantly different in terms of friendliness than those describing Group B 
(M’s=3.10 vs. 3.07), t(9)=.56, ns. The variability of the mean ratings for friendliness- 
related behaviours did not differ across groups (SD’s=1.41 versus 1.41), Cochran’s 
C(11,2) = .50, p>.05. Likewise, the difference between Group A and Group B in terms 
of friendliness for the high comparative fit video was significantly greater than the 
difference between Group A and Group B for the no comparative fit video, t[9)=6.72, 
£<•001, two-tailed. This video was used as the stimulus in the no comparative fit 
condition. We did not endeavour to vary the level of variability of friendliness 
behaviours across the two videos as in Experiments 1 and 2 . Instead we sought to keep 
variability within groups fairly constant and vary only differences between groups (as in 
Experiments 3 and 4, and Ford & Stangor, 1992, Experiment 1). Thus the variability of 
behaviours used in the no comparative fit video did not significantly differ for that used 
in the comparative fit video for Group A, Cochran’s C(11,2) = .59, £>.05, or Group B , 
Cochran’s C(11,2)=.58, p>.05.
Statements, on both videos, were presented to participants one at a time for 
approximately 5 seconds each. They were presented in a random order. After viewing 
the video, all participants were given a questionnaire to complete and were initially 
asked to indicate their age and gender. Then all participants were asked to indicate if
iy The statements used to describe each group appear in Appendix A.
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they had been told which groups of people had been represented by groups A and B, and 
if so, to indicate what the two groups were. This served as a manipulation check.
Next, participants in the theory-generation condition had the following instructions read 
aloud to them by the experimenter while they also read through them:
The first task I want you to do is a problem-solving type task. I want you to think 
about the two groups of people you have just read about, and to think about the 
types of groups that they belong to. Your task is to try to produce an explanation 
that will account for the behaviours of the people in the two groups. I want you to 
take into account not only the behaviours you have read about the two groups but 
also the types of people that these statements were obtained from. Why do you 
think these people might behave in this fashion? I want you to write a short 
explanation for the behaviours of the people in these two groups.
Participants in the no theory-generation condition did not receive these instructions.
Following this, participants in all conditions completed a number of measures. Finally, 
the purpose of the study was discussed with participants and they were thanked for their 
participation.
Dependent measures
The main dependent measure was the same as that employed previously. Participants 
completed 9-point trait rating scales for friendliness for groups A and B as described in 
the previous experiments. This measure allowed us to assess perceived differences 
between groups A and B in terms of friendliness. The other side of difference is 
similarity, and so participants were also asked to rate on a 9-point scale how similar 
they thought Group A and Group B were to each other (l=not at all similar, 9=very 
similar). We would expect perceived similarity between the groups to decrease with 
increases in perceived differences between groups.
In addition, participants were asked to mark on a Katz-Braly type checklist those 
words/traits they thought Group A and Group B most differed on by underlining those 
words. Traits included in the checklist were ones which were thought to be especially 
relevant to the dimension friendliness. There were 30 traits in the checklist2".
20 See Appendix B for a full list of the traits used.
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Participants were then asked to mark with a letter ‘A’ the “3 words which you think best 
represent something that Group A has more of than Group B” and to mark with the 
letter ‘B’ the “3 words which you think best represent something that Group B has more 
of than Group A”.
Other measures
To test whether generating a theory influenced the perceived consistency between the 
categories chess player and tour guide, and the dimension friendliness, all participants 
were asked to rate how they thought ‘most people in general’ would rate tour guides and 
chess players in terms of friendliness on a 9-point scale. Finally, all participants were 
asked to rate on a 9-point scale how interested they were in the study (1 to 9 from ‘not 
at all’ to ‘very’). It was thought that if participants were paying more attention or more 
actively processing information in the theory-generation condition this might be 
reflected in this measure.
Results
Manipulation checks and cell sizes
Firstly, all participants who could not correctly identify which groups were represented 
by Group A and Group B were excluded from further analyses (11 in total). Likewise, 
participants in the theory-generation condition who failed to produce a theory were 
excluded (1 in total). Unfortunately, this resulted in small cell sizes in some conditions. 
The cell sizes per condition are presented in Table 9.2 below. These hold for data 
throughout this section unless otherwise stated. The reduced sample consisted of 83% 
females and had an average age of 17.2 years.
Table 9.2
Participants per cell: Experiment 5
Fit: High No Normative No Comparative
Theory: No Theory No Theory No Theory
N: 10 12 8 8 12 14
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Overview of analyses
Planned orthogonal contrasts were used to test our predictions. Details of the overall 
ANOVA have also been included for completeness. Unless stated otherwise, all 
contrasts are one-tailed.
Trait ratings
The first dependent measure was designed to assess the level of stereotyping in terms of 
the trait friendliness. Stereotyping is conceptualised as the extent to which participants 
differentiate between the two groups (A and B) in terms of friendliness. Therefore, 
difference scores were calculated for the difference between ratings of Group A and 
Group B. This was done by subtracting scores for Group B from scores for Group A for 
each participant. Table 9.3 below contains the mean ratings given to both Group A and 
Group B, and the mean differences between groups A and B.
A 3 (fit: high/no normative/no comparative) by 2 (theory-generation: no theory/theory) 
ANOVA performed on the difference scores revealed a significant main effect for fit, 
F(2,58)=3.54, p<.05. This is illustrated in Figure 9.1 below.
It can be seen from that figure that in general more stereotyping occurred in the high fit 
condition compared to the other two levels of fit. Specific predictions were tested in 
terms of planned contrasts. It appeared that the assumption of homogeneity of variance 
may have been violated for the overall ANOVA, Cochran’s C( 10,6)=.39, p<.03. 
Therefore, contrasts were carried out using the separate variance estimate. The first two 
contrasts tested prediction 1. They looked at differences across fit in the no theory- 
generation condition. The first of these compared high fit with no normative and no 
comparative fit. It revealed that participants differentiated between groups in terms of 
friendliness significantly more in the high fit condition compared to when there was no 
normative fit or no comparative fit, t(14)=3.16, p<.005. The second contrast compared 
the no normative fit and no comparative fit conditions and found no significant 
difference between them, t( 15.1)=. 12, p=.45. Therefore, both contrasts supported 
prediction 1.
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The next two contrasts tested prediction 2 and looked at differences across levels of fit 
in the theory-generation condition. The third contrast compared high fit and no 
normative fit conditions with the no comparative fit condition. Contrary to predictions, 
this contrast was not significant, t(29.6)=. 1.22, p=.12. The fourth contrast compared 
high fit with no normative fit in the theory-generation condition. This was not 
significant, t( 19.9)=.97, p=.17. While this supported prediction 2, the previous contrast 
did not.
Table 9.3
Means for Group A and Group B for trait rating and difference scores: 
Experiment 5
Fit: High No Normative No Comparative
Group: A B Diff A B Diff A B Diff
NO THEORY
Trait 7.88 4.13 3.75 6.75 5.67 1.08 6.20 5.00 1.20
ratings (0.99) (1.81) (1.91) (1.60) (1.88) (3.00) (1.23) (0.82) (1.23)
THEORY
Trait 7.88 4.75 3.13 6.79 4.93 1.86 6.83 5.42 1.42
ratings (1.25) (1.28) (2.30) (1.85) (2.59) (3.82) (1.19) (1.51) (2.07)
Note: Scores on the trait rating measure can range between 1 and 9, scores on diff can range between -8  
and +8. Standard deviations appear in brackets.
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□  High Fit 
■  No Normative Fit 
No Comparative Fit
No Theory Theory
Theory Generation
Figure 9.1 Main effect for fit for trait rating difference scores: Experiment 5
Similarity
The second dependent measure, the similarity measure, measured the extent to which 
the two groups were perceived to be similar to each other and can be considered another 
measure of level of stereotyping with higher ratings of similarity indicating less 
stereotyping. Table 9.4 below contains the mean similarity ratings given across 
conditions:
Table 9.4
Means for similarity measure across conditions: Experiment 5
Fit: High No Normative No Comparative
THEORY
No theory 3.63 (1.30) 5.17(2.12) 5.40(1.71)
Theory 5.12(1.46) 4.07 (1.86)* 5.18 (0.89)*
Note: Similarity scores can range from +1 to +9 with a higher similarity score indicating less 
stereotyping. Standard deviations appear in brackets.
* 1 case missing from this cell.
The overall 3 x 2  ANOVA revealed a marginally significant theory x fit interaction, 
F(2,57)=2.59, p<.09. This is illustrated below in Figure 9.2:
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□  High Fit 
■  No Normative Fit 
El No Comparative Fit
No Theory Theory
Theory Generation
Figure 9.2 Interaction between fit and theory-generation for similarity scores: 
Experiment 5
It can be seem from above that in the no theory-generation condition, those in the high 
fit condition stereotyped more (i.e., lower similarity scores) than those in the other two 
conditions. However, in the theory-generation condition, participants in the no 
normative fit condition appeared to stereotype more (i.e., lower similarity) than those in 
the other two conditions. Again predictions were tested in terms of planned contrasts. 
The assumption of homogeneity of variance was not violated for this variable, 
Cochran’s C( 10,6)=.25, p=.74; therefore, contrasts were carried out using the mean 
square error from the overall ANOVA. With no theory-generation, a significant 
difference was found between the high fit (M=3.63) versus the no normative fit and no 
comparative fit conditions (combined M=5.29), t(57)=2.24, p<.02. In addition, there 
was no difference in ratings of similarity between the no normative fit (M=5.17) and no 
comparative fit conditions (M=5.40), t(57)=.30, p=.38. Again these results support 
prediction 1.
For the theory-generation condition, once again no difference was found between the 
high fit and no normative fit (combined M=4.60) conditions compared to the no 
comparative fit condition (M=5.18), t(57)=.87, p=.19. Likewise, there was no
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significant difference between the high fit (M = 5.12) and no normative fit conditions 
(M=4.07), t(57) = 1.32,2=09.
Checklist ratings
Participants were asked to choose from a list of adjectives the three they thought best 
differentiated Group A from Group B and the three they thought best differentiated 
Group B from Group A. Table 9.5 below presents the percentage of participants who 
chose traits characterising Group A and Group B by condition.
Table 9.5
Percentage of participants choosing each adjective across all conditions: 
Experiment 5
Fit: High No Normative No Com parative
Theory: No Theory No Theory No Theory
N:
G roup A
8 7 12 14 8 12
Friendly 63% 71% 42% 50% 50% 50%
Talkative 38% - - 29% 50% 69%
Sensitive 25% - 42% - 25% -
Aggressive - 43% - - - -
Courteous 38% - - 29% - -
Pleasure-loving 38% - - - 25% -
Reserved - - 25% 36% - -
Gregarious
G roup B
— — — — 33%
Quiet 75% - - - 75% 42%
Rude 63% - - 43% - -
Unfriendly 50% 43% - 43% - -
Talkative - - 50% - - -
Sensitive - 43% - - - -
Reserved 38% - - - - 42%
Friendly - - 33% - - -
Note: Because of small cell sizes only those traits marked by at least 30% of participants in at least 
one condition have been included, - = <30%.
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An analysis of this data was carried out using a similar method to Haslam, et al. (1992; 
see also Experiments 3 and 4). Five independent participants rated each word in the 
checklist as either consistent with the trait ‘friendliness’, inconsistent with friendliness 
or irrelevant to this trait. Where at least four of these raters agreed the trait was deemed 
to be either consistent or inconsistent with friendliness, or otherwise it was deemed to 
be ambiguous. A ‘composite friendliness’ score was calculated for the three traits 
assigned by each subject to each group. A +1 was scored for a friendliness-consistent 
trait, -1 for an friendliness-inconsistent trait and 0 for an ambiguous trait (each score had 
a value between -3 and +3). The mean composite friendliness scores for Group A and 
Group B across conditions appear in Table 9.6 below:
Table 9.6
Mear, composite friendliness scores from checklist data: Experiment 5
Fit: High No Normative No Comparative
Theory: No Theory No Theory No Theory
Group A 2.43* .86* .92 1.36 1.44* 1.91*
(.79) (2.19) (1.83) (1.74) (1.33) (1.58)
Group B -1.43* -.71* .75 -.79 -.11* -.36*
(.98) (1.70) (2.09) (2.19) (1.36) (1.12)
Note: a positive score means consistent with friendliness, a negative score means inconsistent with 
friendliness; scores can range from -3  to +3.
* one case missing data in these cells.
Across almost all conditions participants tended to characterise Group A in terms of 
friendliness-consistent traits and Group B in terms of friendliness-inconsistent traits. 
This was reflected in the results of a 3 (fit: high/no normative/no comparative) x 2 
(theory-generation: no theory/theory) by 2 (group: A/B) ANOVA with a repeated 
measure on the last factor which revealed a significant main effect for group, 
F(l,54)=21.53, pc.OOl. No other significant effects were found. It should be noted that 
in the no theory-generation / no normative fit condition, however, groups A and B were 
characterised almost identically (M’s = -92, .75 respectively). The highest friendliness- 
consistent characterisation for Group A occurred in the high fit condition when no
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theory was generated. Likewise, in this condition there was least friendliness-consistent 
characterisation of Group B. This is in line with the results found on the other dependent 
measures
Summary of results for main dependent measures
Overall, support for the predictions was mixed. Prediction 1 was supported across both 
main dependent measures. With no theory generated, participants stereotyped more 
when there was both comparative fit and consistent labels, compared to when either one 
of these conditions held. Results when the theory generation variable was operating 
were more complex. Firstly, the operation of this variable seemed to somewhat reduce 
levels of stereotyping in the high fit condition, which was unexpected. In addition, 
generating a theory did not significantly increase levels of stereotyping in the no 
normative fit condition. No differences across levels of fit were found in the theory- 
generation condition. In order to investigate these results further we performed an 
analysis of the types of theories generated by participants across these two conditions.
Types of theories generated
A content analysis of the types of theories generated in the high fit and no normative fit 
conditions was performed. As we did not expect theory-generation to have an effect in 
the no comparative fit condition, these theories were not analysed. The initial content 
analysis revealed the theories generated could be categorized as ‘group-related’, 
‘individual’ and ‘descriptive’. Coders were given the following definitions for types of 
theories: a ‘group-related’ theory is one that “explains the behaviours in terms of group 
membership”, an ‘individual’ theory is one in which “behaviours are not related to 
group membership, (but) explained in terms of individual personalities, or personality- 
type theories”, a ‘descriptive’ theory is one that “merely describes behaviours 
performed by Group A and Group B without explaining them”. Ratings done by the 
experimenter and an independent coder both blind to condition had an agreement rate of 
86%. Disagreements were decided by the experimenter.
An example of a ‘individual’ theory (produced in the high fit condition) was:
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Obviously the people in the two different groups were all individuals therefore 
behaving in their own individual ways.
An example of a ‘group-related’ theory (produced in the no normative fit condition) 
was:
Tour guides talk to people all day if tour guiding and don’t look for interaction 
with other people out of work. A person who is a volunteer tour guide probably 
doesn’t have much trouble feeling comfortable around other people but he/she 
probably doesn’t care to (sic) much about other people and other people’s 
feelings. A chess club member is likely to be ‘geekish’ and ‘intellectual’ and 
probably won’t fit in well to many other groups, because of this he/she tries to be 
nice to other people to make more friends.
A example of a ‘descriptive’ theory (produced in the high fit condition) was:
Group B were not very social and sort of keep to themselfs (sic) and close friends. 
Group A were friendly and made new friends when they could.
Table 9.7 below shows the number of each type of theory produced in the high fit and 
no normative fit conditions.
Table 9.7
Types of theories generated: Experiment 5
Theory Type: Group Individual Descriptive Total
FIT
High Fit 2 2 4 8
No Normative 6 6 2 14
A comparison of mean ratings of difference scores, similarity scores and composite 
friendliness scores for those participants using a ‘group-related’ theory compared to 
participants using either an ‘individual or descriptive’ theory revealed some differences, 
as presented in Table 9.8 below:
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Table 9.8
Mean trait rating difference scores, similarity scores and composite friendliness
scores by theory type; Experiment 5
Fit: High No Normative
Theory Type: Group Individ. + 
Descriptive
Group Individ. + 
Descriptive
Trait rating diff. 5.50 2.33 4.17 .13
(2.12) (1.86) (3.13) (3.48)
Similarity 5.00 5.17 3.17 4.75
(2.83) (1.17) (1.94) (1.58)
Comp. Friend A -2.00 2.00 2.33 .63
(1.41) (1.00) (1.21) (1.77)
Comp. Friend B 1.00 -1.40 -2.17 .25
(.00) (1.52) (1.17) (2.25)
In the high fit condition, although cell sizes are very small, there is some indication that 
participants who generated a group-based theory tended to stereotype more than those 
who generated either individual or descriptive theories. In the no normative fit 
condition, an inspection of the means suggests that participants who produced ‘group- 
based’ theories were more likely to make use of the comparative differences presented 
when stereotyping the groups. That is, they produced ‘theories’ that explained why 
chess players would be more friendly than tour guides. It can be that seen participants 
who produced individual or descriptive theories differentiated between the groups in 
terms of friendliness much less, and saw the groups as more similar to each other. 
Likewise, they characterised Group A less in terms of friendliness-consistent traits and 
Group B more in terms of friendliness-consistent traits.
Independent two-tailed t-tests showed that within the no normative fit condition, 
participants generating a group-related theory stereotyped more compared to 
participants who generated other types of theories for the trait rating difference measure, 
t(12)=2.24,pc.05. Likewise, they characterised Group A significantly more in terms of 
friendliness-consistent traits, t(12)=2.03, pc.07, and Group B significantly less in terms
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of friendliness-consistent traits, t(12)=2.38, £<.04. Differences across similarity ratings 
were not significant, t( 12)= 1.68, p=. 12.
Other measures
All participants were asked how they thought ‘most people in general’ would rate tour 
guides and chess players in terms of friendliness. This measure was designed to assess 
how consistent participants believed the trait friendliness to be with the two groups. The 
means for this measure across conditions appear in Table 9.9 below:
Table 9.9
Friendliness ratings for tour guides and chess players: Experiment 5
Fit: High No Normative No Comparative
Theory: No Theory No Theory No Theory
Tour Guides 7.25 8.00 5.83 7.43 6.90 7.42
(1.04) (1.31) (2.29) (1.51) (1.29) (1.00)
Chess Players 4.63 4.75 5.08 3.86 4.70 4.42
(2.07) (1.83) (1.78) (1.51) (1.57) (1.68)
N ote: scores can range from 1 to 9. Standard deviations appear in brackets.
Friendliness ratings for tour guides and chess players were analysed in a 3 (fit: high/no 
normative/no comparative) x 2 (theory: no theory/theory) x 2 (group: tour/chess 
ANOVA with a repeated measure on the last factor. This yielded a significant main 
effect for group, F(l,58)=62.07, p<.001, which was qualified by a significant group by 
theory interaction, F(l,58)=4.72, p<.05. Interestingly, participants thoughts ‘others’ 
would differentiate between tour guides and chess players in terms of friendliness more 
in the theory-generation condition compared to the no theory-generation condition.
Mean ratings of interest for all conditions are presented in Table 9.10 below. A 3 (fit: 
high/no normative/no comparative) x 2 (theory: no theory/theory) ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect for fit, F(2,58)=3.24, p<.05, indicating that participants found the 
task most interesting in the no comparative fit condition.
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Table 9.10
Mean ratings of interest scores: Experiment 5
Fit: High No normative No comparative
Theory: No Theory No Theory No Theory
Interest 5.50 4.75 4.75 4.79 5.40 6.39
(2.00) (1.17) (1.87) (1.85) (.97) (1.45)
Note: Scores on these variables can vary from 1 to 9. Standard deviations appear in brackets.
Discussion
This experiment showed strong support for prediction 1 and more mixed support for 
prediction 2. As predicted, the experiment generally showed clear differences in 
stereotyping across different levels of both comparative and normative fit. When no 
theory was generated, participants demonstrated more stereotyping in the condition 
where both comparative fit and normative fit were operating (i.e., high fit) compared to 
when there was comparative fit but no normative fit (no normative fit — as in 
Experiment 2) or normative labels but no comparative fit (no comparative fit). It 
appears that more stereotyping in terms of a trait (in this case friendliness) occurs when 
there is both high comparative and good normative fit between a trait and the relevant 
categories. Less stereotyping occurred when there were comparative differences 
between the groups but these differences were not consistent with normative 
expectations about the groups. Thus, when participants believed the friendly group was 
chess players and unfriendly group was tour guides, the differentiation between the two 
groups in terms of friendliness was minimal. Likewise, when participants were 
presented with two groups that did not differ comparatively in terms of friendliness but 
were given normative labels for these groups (tour guides and chess players) they also 
stereotyped relatively less. While participants in this condition still differentiated 
between Group A and Group B in terms of friendliness, they did so to a significantly 
lesser extent than participants in the high fit condition.
With respect to prediction 2, different effects for fit were found when participants were 
asked to generate a theory. Specifically, there were no significant differences across the
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fit variable in this condition (consistent with the results of Experiment 4). We expected 
that generating a theory would have little effect on the levels of stereotyping in the high 
fit and no comparative fit conditions, but would increase levels of stereotyping in the no 
normative fit condition towards that of the high fit condition. This was because we 
expected the act of generating a theory to activate knowledge that allowed participants 
to reconcile the apparent inconsistencies between group labels and behaviours. While no 
significant differences in level of stereotyping were found between high fit and no 
normative fit conditions given theory-generation, an inspection of the means suggests 
that this was due to both a small increase in level of stereotyping in the no normative fit 
condition and a decrease in stereotyping in the high fit condition. Likewise, neither of 
these conditions demonstrated significantly more stereotyping than the no comparative 
fit condition. The implications of the results with respect to both predictions are 
discussed in more detail below.
Overall there is good evidence that stereotyping occurs when both comparative fit and 
normative fit are operating together. With respect to the first hypothesis of the thesis, 
there is evidence that stereotype content reflects differences between groups that are in a 
direction that is meaningful in terms of our background knowledge about those groups 
and the dimension of comparison. Differences between groups that are not in a 
meaningful direction (as in the no normative fit condition) produce much less 
stereotyping. Thus, it cannot be argued that when presented with inconsistent 
information we accommodate our categories to fit that information (or assimilate that 
information into our existing categories). Likewise, when presented with category labels 
(which presumably cue expectations) but with no differences between groups, 
information is not assimilated to fit with our expectations. Thus, stereotype content does 
not merely reproduce differences between groups, or pre-existing stereotypes based on 
group labels, but rather reflects meaningful differences between groups.
Thus it can be argued that the influence of comparative fit depends on the level of 
normative fit. Given the same level of comparative fit (as in the high and no normative 
fit conditions) stereotyping varied across normative fit (whether labels were consistent
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or inconsistent). Likewise, given the same normative group labels (high fit and no 
comparative fit conditions) levels of stereotyping varied across comparative fit. 
Therefore, it appears that the effects of both comparative fit and normative fit in 
determining stereotype content depend upon the levels of each other.
It should be noted that in the no normative fit and no comparative fit conditions, 
participants still differentiated between groups to a small degree. It is interesting to 
surmise why participants differentiated between groups at all in the no comparative fit 
condition when no real differences were present. This situation may be similar to an 
illusory correlation-type experiment where participants are motivated to differentiate 
between groups and attempt to do so on the basis of the only meaningful information 
available, namely the group labels (see Berndsen, 1997; McGarty & de la Haye, 1997; 
McGarty et al., 1993).
The effects found for fit were somewhat modified by the theory-generation variable. In 
general terms, it appeared that generating a theory produced less stereotyping under 
conditions of high fit. Somewhat surprisingly, it appeared that less stereotyping 
occurred when participants generated a theory in this condition compared to when they 
did not produce a theory. This may be due to uncertainty being introduced into the task 
by asking participants to ‘think’ more about they are doing. Likewise, giving 
participants the opportunity to think may have alerted them to cultural norms against 
stereotyping, and therefore they may have resisted doing so (see Leyens et al., 1994). 
This may also be because when participants think about the task they engage in more 
active processing and this may lead them to not apply an activated category (Stangor & 
Lange, 1994). However, scores on the measure of interest in the task suggested that 
participants found the task no more engaging when they were asked to generate a 
theory. A content analysis of the types of theories produced in the high fit condition 
indicated they were chiefly individualistic or descriptive which may have mitigated 
against differentiating between groups.
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It was expected that where there was no normative fit (i.e., inconsistent labels paired 
with comparative differences between groups), generating a theory that explained the 
observed differences between groups should produce stereotyping in terms of those 
differences. In general, this was not found. The content analysis of types of theories 
produced in this condition suggested that overall a variety of theories were generated. 
Looking at mean levels of stereotyping across theory type in the no normative fit 
condition indicated that participants who generated theories that explained the 
behaviours in terms of group memberships stereotyped more than those who explained 
behaviours in terms of personality or individual differences. While this seems obvious, 
it is important to be aware that people can have a large store of knowledge and theories 
to draw upon when making social judgements, and different types of theories and 
knowledge will, of course, produce different levels of stereotyping. These different 
types of theories may act in opposing directions as was apparent in this study. 
Experimentally, it would be desirable to have more control over the types of theories 
employed by participants so that clearer predictions could be made concerning the 
expected pattern of stereotyping, and the expected content. Ideally, then, different sets 
of predictions could be made depending on the type of theory used. Such theories could 
be based on the types of theories that were spontaneously produced in this study — 
namely group-related theories and individual/personality theories.
Another limitation of the current experiment was that participants generated theories 
after they had viewed information about the two groups (but before they had made 
judgements about the groups). Therefore, it is possible that the theories generated were 
really just justifications of impressions already formed, and did not influence the 
formation of those impressions. To rule out this possibility it would be desirable to 
activate theories before impression formation takes place.
In the next experiment we sought to control theories by providing participants with a 
specific theory before they viewed any stimulus materials and formed impressions of 
groups. We also provided participants with different types of theories which should 
produce different levels of stereotyping. By providing participants with more than one
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type of theory, we also hoped to investigate whether it is activating a theory per se 
which has an effect, or whether it is the type of theory which matters. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, forcing participants to think more about what they are doing may 
make them pay more attention to the task or to more actively process information, 
which may in turn make stereotype-inconsistent information more important in 
subsequent judgements (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Macrae et al., 1993; Stangor & Lange, 
1994).
Finally, an interesting result was found in the current experiment concerning 
judgements of how other people in general would rate tour guides and chess players in 
terms of friendliness. While generally it was found that others would be expected to see 
tour guides as friendly and chess players as unfriendly, the difference between tour 
guides and chess players was larger in the theory-generation condition. In particular, 
participants in the no normative fit/no theory-generation condition (who had been 
exposed to information contrary to their expectations) judged that others would see 
chess players as and tour guides as equally friendly. This suggests that exposure to 
inconsistent information had acted to change their stereotypes of tour guides and chess 
players, such that they no longer saw friendliness as being a trait highly consistent with 
tour guides and highly inconsistent with chess players. Thus, rather than maintaining 
their stereotype in the face of inconsistent information they had revised it. However, 
participants in the no normative fit condition who generated a theory, judged that others 
would perceive tour guides to be highly friendly and chess players highly unfriendly. 
Thus, they appear to have maintained their stereotype in the face of inconsistent 
information. This is consistent with work by Yzerbyt et al. (1996, cited in Yzerbyt et al., 
1997) who argue that reconciling inconsistent information is resource consuming and 
that we need resources to be able to maintain stereotypes. It could be argued that 
participants who had time to generate a theory had more resources available to maintain 
their existing stereotype (even though they did not necessarily use this as the basis of 
their judgements about groups A and B).
235
Chapter 10
Experiment 6: The Effects of Different Theories of 
Human Behaviour on Stereotype Content
The aim of this experiment was to further explore the role of normative fit and theories 
in producing stereotype content, and to expand upon and clarify the findings of 
Experiment 5. As such, it aimed to provide a further and stronger test of the second 
hypothesis of the thesis than the previous experiment. More specifically, it aimed to 
investigate the influence of theories on the interpretation of fit between category labels 
and data. Results from Experiment 5 indicated evidence that different types of theories 
can produce different levels of stereotyping even when stimulus data and category 
labels remain the same. Presumably, participants may have produced theories or drawn 
upon background knowledge that allowed them to make sense of the presented data and 
which were consistent with the intergroup differences they were presented with.
However, a problem in Experiment 5 was the variety of theories generated to explain 
the observed differences between the two target groups. The design of that study meant 
that there was no control over the types of theories which participants employed, 
resulting in theories that appeared to produce opposing effects. The current experiment 
aimed to clarify the results obtained in Experiment 5 by gaining some control over the 
theoretical context operating when participants make judgements about the groups. It 
was hoped that by manipulating theories before impressions were formed of the two 
groups we would be able to predict more accurately stereotyping effects or otherwise in 
different contexts and how different theories would interact with fit to produce 
stereotype content. In this experiment we also wanted to rule out the possibility that 
theories employed were merely justifications of impressions already formed or attempts 
to reconcile inconsistencies with existing stereotypes. Therefore, participants were 
provided with theories before they viewed stimuli about the two groups, or made any 
judgements about them, or indeed received any information about them. Thus, the
236
theories were ‘activated’ before participants began forming impressions of the two 
groups.
Overview of the experiment
The experiment employed a similar methodology to that used in Experiment 5. 
Participants were presented with information about the friendliness of two groups, with 
one group always being presented as relatively more friendly than the other. The 
participants’ task was to make a number of judgements about the two groups. 
Comparative fit was not manipulated in this study. The level of comparative fit was 
high and kept constant across all conditions.
A qualitative analysis of the types of theories produced in Experiment 5 revealed that 
these fell mainly into two categories: individual or personality-type theories, and group- 
based theories. Individual or personality theories were theories that explained 
behaviours in terms of individual personalities and did not attribute behaviours to group 
memberships. The group-based theories attempted to account for the observed 
differences in behaviour in terms of group memberships.
The types of theories chosen for the current experiment were broad theories about 
human behaviour similar to those that had been spontaneously generated by participants 
in Experiment 5. Two types of theories were used: the first was a ‘fixed-personality’ 
theory which explained human behaviour in terms of stable individual personalities, the 
second was a ‘variable-social’ theory which proposed that human behaviour is flexible 
and determined by social and contextual variables such as group membership. A third 
condition was included in the design where participants were not provided with any 
explicit theory. The types of theories manipulated in this study were somewhat similar 
to the types of implicit personality theories that have been proposed by Dweck and 
colleagues (Chiu et al., 1997; Dweck et ah, 1993; Dweck et al, 1995a, 1995b; Levy & 
Dweck, 1998; Levy, Stroessner & Dweck, 1998 — see review in previous chapters). 
They have identified two types of implicit theories that they argue influence the 
processing of social information and which set up an “interpretative frame” within
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which information is processed. Entity theorists believe that personality traits are fixed 
and non-malleable (similar to our fixed-personality theory). Incremental theorists 
believe that a personality attribute is a malleable quality that can be changed (similar to 
our variable-social theory). While they have applied their analysis mainly to 
understanding achievement motivation, they argue that entity and incremental theorists 
are likely to demonstrate differences in stereotyping. Specifically, they cite evidence 
that entity theorists endorse existing stereotypes to a greater degree that incremental 
theorists (Levy & Dweck, 1998) and that entity theorists tend to assign stronger traits to 
novel groups (Levy, et al., 1998). Thus, they are arguing that entity theorists, who 
believe that personality is more of an inherent or innate quality, should demonstrate 
more stereotyping than incremental theorists who subscribe to a more contextual and 
situational view of personality.
While Dweck and colleagues have presented their approach to implicit theories as a 
model of individual differences (Dweck et al., 1995a), they acknowledge that “both 
theories may represent basic modes of thought that are at some level familiar to most 
individuals” (Chiu et al., 1997, p. 26). Thus, they suggest that while one theory may be 
more dominant, the other may still be available and able to be made accessible given the 
right circumstances (Dweck et al., 1995b: see also Anderson, 1995; Harackwiecz & 
Elliot, 1995). In an experiment performed by Chiu et al. (1997, Study 5) participants 
were presented with a short article that presented an argument for either an incremental 
theory or an entity theory, the idea being to make one or the other type of theory 
accessible for participants. They found that those participants presented with an entity 
theory subsequently made stronger trait judgements and showed more of a tendency to 
use traits to make future behavioural predictions, compared to those presented with an 
incremental theory. Likewise, Levy et al. (1998) found that participants induced to 
believe an entity theory endorsed stereotypes more than those induced with an 
incremental theory. Thus, it appeared that these types of theories could be manipulated 
to produce different social judgemental outcomes.
238
We agree with Dweck and colleagues that both types of theories (or knowledge) are 
available to most people and that either type of theory can be made accessible, and 
subsequently influence stereotyping. Therefore, in the current experiment the aim was 
not to split participants into those who agreed with one type of theory as opposed to 
another type. Rather, the theories chosen were ones that it was felt all participants 
probably employed at some time and that would be equally acceptable to a majority of 
participants. The study aimed to make one or the other of these theories more accessible 
to participants, the idea being that participants would be more ‘ready’ to employ a 
theory which had been made accessible and relevant for them (see previous discussions 
of perceiver readiness, Chapter 5).
In addition to varying types of theories, the experiment also varied the labels given to 
groups such that they were either consistent or inconsistent with presented intergroup 
differences. Once again, the labels used were ‘tour guides’ and ‘chess players’, which 
had been shown previously to be generally associated with relatively more friendliness 
and relatively less friendliness respectively.
The aim of the current experiment was to investigate the influence of different theories 
on the interpretation of fit between category labels and data, and to demonstrate that 
there is not a fixed consistency between categories and certain traits. On the face of it, 
when labels are consistent with intergroup differences there is good normative fit and 
therefore stereotyping should occur. Likewise, when labels are inconsistent with 
intergroup differences, normative fit is poor and therefore less stereotyping should occur 
(as per the previous experiment and Experiment 2). The introduction of theories means 
that intergroup differences do not just have to fit category labels, rather they have to fit 
theories or explanatory systems. So, for example, people employing a ‘fixed- 
personality’ type of theory should expect people to behave largely in terms of their 
individual personalities and in a fairly consistent fashion across situations. Therefore, a 
group of friendly tour guides should be seen as consistent because it make sense for 
inherently friendly people to become tour guides. However, a group of unfriendly tour 
guides should be seen as less consistent because this does not make sense in terms of the
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explanatory system. People employing a ‘variable-social’ type of theory should expect 
people to display behaviours which are determined by their group membership and 
variable across situations. They should also see a group of friendly tour guides as quite 
consistent; being a tour guide may make these people friendly. However, their theory 
should also allow them to see a group of unfriendly tour guides as consistent as they 
don’t expect people to behave in a stable fashion. They may deduce that there is 
something about being a tour guide that makes these people unfriendly (e.g., dealing 
with tourists!). Therefore, whether category labels are interpreted as consistent or 
inconsistent with intergroup differences should depend on the theory or explanatory 
system which people employ.
Predictions
The experiment aimed to provide a further test of the second hypothesis of the thesis as 
outlined in Chapter 6. On the basis of the above arguments, a number of predictions 
were made concerning differences in stereotyping between conditions with consistent 
and inconsistent category labels. Specifically, it was predicted that:
1. For participants given no explicit theory, those presented with consistent labels 
should stereotype groups more than those presented with inconsistent labels.
This is consistent with findings in Experiments 2 and 5 which demonstrated that less 
stereotyping occurs when group labels are inconsistent with intergroup differences. 
Likewise, it was predicted that a similar effect for label-type would be found in the 
‘fixed’ theory condition. Thus, the second prediction was:
2. For participants presented with a ‘fixed-personality’ theory, those presented 
with consistent labels should stereotype groups more than those presented with 
inconsistent labels.
A different pattern of stereotyping across the label-type variable was expected in the 
‘variable-social’ theory condition. Specifically, the third prediction was:
3. For those participants presented with a ‘variable-social’ theory, there should be 
no differences in levels of stereotyping for those presented with consistent labels 
compared to those presented with inconsistent labels.
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Thus, overall, we predicted less stereotyping would occur when category labels were 
inconsistent. However, this effect was not expected to hold when a ‘variable/social’ 
theory was employed. The different pattern of stereotyping in the ‘variable’ theory 
condition compared to the ‘fixed’ theory condition was predicted to be driven by 
participants in this condition differentiating between groups (i.e., stereotyping) even 
when labels were inconsistent with intergroup differences. Thus, a fourth prediction 
was:
4. Given inconsistent category labels, participants presented with a ‘variable- 
social’ theory will stereotype more compared to participants given a ‘fixed- 
personality’ theory. However, given consistent category labels, there should be no 
differences in the levels of stereotyping across these two conditions.
Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 117 senior secondary students attending colleges in the Australian 
Capital Territory. Eighty percent of the sample were female and participants had an 
average age of 16.4 years. All students participated on a voluntary basis as part of a 
normal class.
The independent variables of theory type (no/fixed/variable) and category label type 
(consistent/inconsistent) were manipulated in a 3 x 2 between-subjects design. 
Participants were allocated to conditions on a random basis.
Stimulus materials and procedure
Initially, participants were given some preliminary information about the study, and 
asked to sign a consent form. The experiment was introduced as being concerned with 
the relationship between people’s personality and the jobs they do. Then, according to 
condition, a theory about human behaviour was presented. Participants in the ‘fixed- 
personality’ theory condition were told that:
An important theory held by many psychologists is that most people are born with 
certain personality characteristics and behave in a fairly consistent manner 
throughout their lives. For example, if you’re basically an honest person, you’ve 
probably always been like that and its probably unlikely that you would ever
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become dishonest. Consistent with this idea, people tend to take up jobs that 
reflect their personalities. For example, caring, nurturing people often tend to 
become child-care workers. It is unlikely that people who are like this would 
become business executives. We tend to be attracted to jobs that we are suited for 
in terms of our personality. People’s behaviour tends to stay fairly constant across 
their lives.
The above position can be summed up by the psychological principle personality 
determines roles.
These participants were then asked to “think of some aspect of your personality that you 
can’t imagine ever changing very much and which you think has led you into some 
specific role” and to write a couple sentences about this. This was intended to make the 
theory more salient, self-relevant and accessible for participants.
Participants in the ‘variable-social’ theory condition were told that:
An important theory held by many psychologists is that most peoples’ 
personalities are basically flexible and can change over the course of their lives. 
For example, you may think of yourself as a basically relaxed and easygoing 
person, but in some situations, such as an exam, you may become quite tense and 
anxious. Consistent with this idea, the jobs that people do tend to influence their 
personalities and behaviours. For example, people who are looking after children 
tend to become more nurturing and caring. If the same people later on became 
business executives that role may bring out more aggressive and ruthless 
personality characteristics. People’s personalities tend to be influenced by the 
types of jobs or roles they are in. If they change jobs you might find that their 
behaviour or personality can change also.
The above position can be summed up by the psychological principle roles 
determine personality.
These participants were then asked to “think of an aspect of your personality that has 
changed as you have been in different roles or groups” and to write a couple of 
sentences about this. Participants in the ‘no theory’ condition were given no instructions 
at this stage.
Next, all participants were told they were to view a video describing behaviours 
performed by members of two groups. They were told that these groups were chess 
players and tour guides. In the consistent labels condition, participants were told that 
Group A (the friendly group) were the tour guides and that Group B were the chess 
players. In the inconsistent labels condition, these labels were reversed.
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All participants then viewed a video which was identical to the ‘high fit’ video used in 
Experiment 5. There were 18 statements about each group; 12 pertaining to friendliness 
and 6 neutral statements. Group A was described in terms of 9 friendly, 3 unfriendly 
and 6 neutral statements. Group B was described in terms of 9 unfriendly, 3 friendly and 
6 neutral statements21. Statements were presented one at a time in a random order for 
approximately 5 seconds each.
After viewing the video, all participants completed a questionnaire. Initially, all 
participants were asked to indicate if they had been told which groups of people had 
been represented by groups A and B, and if so, to indicate what the two groups were. 
This served as a manipulation check and participants failing to answer this correctly 
were excluded from further analyses. Following this, participants in all conditions 
completed a number of dependent measures. Finally, the purpose of the study was 
discussed with participants and they were thanked for their participation.
Dependent measures
The first two main dependent measures, the ‘trait rating’ measure and the ‘percentage 
estimate’ measure, were designed to assess levels of stereotyping in terms of the 
dimension friendliness. The trait rating measure was identical to that used in the 
previous experiments. The percentage estimate measure asked participants to estimate 
the percentage of people in both Group A and Group B that they thought were friendly.
In the previous experiments we measured stereotyping in terms of a differentiation 
between groups on a specific dimension, namely friendliness or intelligence. We have 
done this by getting participants to rate two groups and then calculated the differences 
between the groups’ ratings. In this experiment we also wanted to measure more 
directly how different participants thought the two groups were, and how similar they 
thought the members within each group were. When stereotyping occurs, differences 
between groups should be maximised and those within groups minimised. Thus, higher 
levels of stereotyping should be reflected by the perception of larger differences
21 The statements used to describe each group appear in Appendix A.
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between groups and larger similarities within groups. The next two measures were 
designed to measure perceived differences between groups and similarities within 
groups. Participants rated on 9-point scales how similar they thought the members of 
Group A were to each other and how similar they thought the members of Group B 
were to each other (l=not at all similar, 9=very similar — ‘intragroup similarity’ 
measure), and how different they thought Group A were from Group B (l=not at all 
different, 9=very different — ‘intergroup difference’ measure).
Because of time constraints in administering materials during class-time the number of 
dependent variables were restricted and a checklist was not administered as in the 
previous experiment.
Additional and post-test measures
In addition to the main dependent measures, there were a number of supplementary and 
post-test measures designed to provide more information about what was going on in 
the experiment and to provide checks on the success of the manipulations. Participants 
were asked rate the likelihood (1 to 9 from ‘definitely not’ to ‘definitely’) of two 
possible attributional replies to the question “Why do you think the people in the video 
behaved the way they did?”: “something to do with their individual personality”, 
“something to do with the group they were in; that is, tour guide or chess player”.
Participants in the ‘fixed’ and ‘variable’ theory conditions were asked how much they 
personally agreed with the theory of human behaviour they were initially presented with 
(rating 1 to 9 from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much’). Finally, participants were asked to rate 
how interested they were in the study (1 to 9 from ‘not at all interested’ to ‘very 
interested’).
Results
Manipulation checks and cell sizes
As mentioned above, all participants who could not correctly recall the labels given to 
the two groups, or who did not answer this question, were excluded from further
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analyses. Thirty participants22 failed this manipulation check, leaving a sample of 87 
comprised of 79% females and with an average age of 16.5 years.
The two theories used in the study were chosen on the basis that neither one would be 
more acceptable to participants than the other. Mean levels of agreement with each type 
of theory appear in Table 10.1 below:
Table 10.1
Mean levels of agreement with each type of theory: Experiment 6
Theory: Fixed Variable
Label: Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent
N: 14 14 14 15
Agreement 6.43 6.50 6.71 5.67
(1.99) (1-74) (1.33) (1-76)
Note: Scores can range from 1 to 9 with a higher score indicating more agreement. Standard deviations 
appear in brackets.
A 2 (theory type: fixed/variable) x 2 (label-type: consistent/inconsistent) between 
subjects ANOVA found no significant differences across this variable. The overall 
average level of agreement was relatively high at 6.32. Therefore, it appears that both 
theories used were seen as equally attractive or plausible, and that both theories were 
generally acceptable to participants.
Overview of analyses
Predictions were tested via a series of five orthogonal planned contrasts. All contrasts 
are one-tailed unless otherwise stated. Details of overall ANOVA’s have also been 
included for completeness.
Main dependent measures
Four main dependent measures were employed: a trait rating measure, a percentage 
estimate measure, an intragroup similarity measure and an intergroup difference
22 This rather large number was due to a large number of participants who failed to answer this question.
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measure. The trait rating and percentage estimate measures produced ratings concerning 
the dimension friendliness separately for groups A and B. As in the previous 
experiments, difference scores were calculated for the difference between ratings of 
Group A and Group B for both the trait rating measure and for the percentage estimate 
measure. The difference scores, are presented in Table 10.2 below21:
Table 10.2
Means for trait rating and percentage estimate difference scores: Experiment 6
Theory: No Fixed Variable
Label: Cons Incons Cons Incons Cons Incons
N: 13 17 14 14 14 15
Trait ratings 3.92
(2.06)
1.53
(2.72)
2.43
(2.56)
.64
(2.27)
2.79
(2.05)
2.47
(2.90)
Percentage estimate 42.2
(24.8)
24.4
(34.5)
33.9
(31.1)
7.9
(29.6)
33.9
(25.2)
30.0
(38.2)
Note: Scores can range from +8 to -8 on the trait rating difference measure and from +100 to -100 on the 
percentage estimate difference measure. On both measures, a positive score indicates that Group A were 
judged to be more friendly than Group B. A zero score would indicate zero stereotyping; that is, 
participants judge there to be no difference between groups A and B. Standard deviations appear in 
brackets.
It can be seen from the above means that across both measures participants tended to 
differentiate between groups most when labels were consistent and least when they were 
inconsistent. However, this difference was most pronounced in the no theory and fixed 
theory conditions, with little difference occurring in the variable theory condition. A 
highly significant positive correlation was found between these two measures, r=.94, 
P<.01, and therefore they were combined into an overall measure of stereotyping in 
terms of friendliness. This was done by recoding the scores on the percentage estimate 
measure onto a 9-point scale and then averaging across both measures. This new 
measure is referred to as ‘friendliness stereotyping’.
2' See Appendix C for details of the mean scores on the trait rating measure and percentage estimate 
measure for each group.
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Initially means on this new measure were subjected to 3 (theory: no/ fixed/variable) x 2 
(label: consistent/inconsistent) between-subjects ANOVA revealing a significant main 
effect for label-type , F(l,81)=6.85, p<.02. A plot of the effects found for this variable 
appears in Figure 10.1 below:
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Figure 10.1 Friendliness stereotyping scores across theory-type and label-type: 
Experiment 6
As can be seen from the above figure, participants appeared to demonstrate more 
stereotyping when labels were consistent versus inconsistent in both the no theory and 
fixed theory conditions. However, in the variable theory condition there was no 
apparent difference in stereotyping across label type. When labels were consistent it 
appeared that participants stereotyped equally in the fixed and variable theory 
conditions (and slightly more in the no theory condition). When labels were inconsistent 
it appears that participants stereotyped less in the no theory and fixed theory conditions 
compared to the variable theory condition.
To test predictions 1, 2 and 3, a set of three planned orthogonal pair-wise contrasts were 
carried out between means in the consistent and inconsistent labels conditions for each 
level of the theory variable. It was found that on this measure, as predicted, participants 
demonstrated more stereotyping when labels were consistent versus inconsistent both
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when there was no theory, t(81)=2.15 £<.02, and a ‘fixed’ theory, t(81)=2.11, £<.02. 
There was no difference in stereoty£ing across label ty£e in the ‘variable’ theory 
condition (M’s=2.96, 2.70), t(81)=.27, £=.40.
Next, we considered £rediction 4. We £redicted that when labels were inconsistent more 
stereoty£ing should occur in the variable theory condition com£ared to the fixed theory 
condition. This £rediction was su££orted, t(81)=2.03, £<.05. Where labels were 
consistent, no differences in stereotypng were found in the fixed theory condition 
com£ared to the variable theory condition as £redicted, t(81 )=. 14, £=.44.
It should also be noted from Figure 10.1, although not £redicted, there a££ears to be 
generally lower levels of stereoty£ing in the fixed theory condition com£ared to the no 
theory condition. Post hoc com£arisons between these two conditions revealed no 
significant differences for either the consistent labels conditions, t(81 )= 1.18, £=.24, 
two-tailed, or the inconsistent labels condition, t(81 )= 1.27, £=.21, two-tailed.
Measures of intragrou£ similarity and intergrou£ difference were also designed to assess 
the level of stereotyping, but more generally rather than in terms of a single trait. 
Although £erceived intragrou£ similarity was measured se£arately for Grou£ A and 
Grou£ B there were no differences between grou£S on this measure and therefore they 
were combined into an overall measure of intragrou£ similarity (an average of 
intragrou£ similarity for Grou£ A and intragrou£ similarity for Grou£ B). Mean 
intragrou£ similarity and intergrou£ difference scores across conditions a££ear in Table 
10.3 below.
The correlation between scores on these two measures was fositive and significant, 
r=.60, £<.01, two-tailed. Therefore, the measures were combined into an overall 
measure of stereotypng by averaging across scores on each measure. Means on this 
overall stereotypng measure were subjected to 3 (theory: no/fixed/variable) x 2 (label: 
consistent/inconsistent) between-subjects ANOVA revealing significant main effects for 
label ty£e, F( 1,81 )=4.41, £<.04, and theory-ty£e, F(2,81)=5.27, £<.01. A pot of the 
effects found for this variable a££ears in Figure 10.2 below:
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Table 10.3
Means for intragroup similarity and intergroup difference measures: Experiment 
6
Theory: No Fixed Variable
Label: Cons Incons Cons Incons Cons Incons
N: 13 17 14 14 14 15
Intragroup similarity 6.12
(.98)
5.29
(1.43)
5.61
(1.20)
4.46
(1.31)
5.46
(1.35)
5.90
(1.31)
Intergroup difference 6.62
(2.14)
5.94
(2.22)
5.71
(2.13)
4.14
(2.35)
6.57
(1.22)
6.47
(1.64)
Note: Scores can range from 1 to 9 on both the intragroup similarity and intergroup difference measures. 
A higher score indicates a judgement of either higher intragroup similarity or intergroup difference. 
Therefore, higher scores on both measures indicate more stereotyping. Standard deviations appear in 
brackets.
7 -I
No Theory
□  Consistent 
■  Inconsistent
Fixed Theory Variable Theory
Theory Type
Figure 10.2 Levels of stereotyping across theory-type and label-type: Experiment 6
It can be seen from above that a similar pattern of results to those obtained for the 
‘friendliness stereotyping’ measure were found for this measure. Again a series of 
planned orthogonal contrasts were carried out as per predictions. It was found that on 
this measure, as predicted, participants demonstrated more stereotyping when labels 
were consistent versus inconsistent when there was a ‘fixed’ theory, t(81)=2.51, p<.008.
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However, where there was no theory this difference was only marginally significant, 
t(81 )= 1.42, £<.08. It can be seen that there was no difference in stereotyping across 
label-type in the ‘variable’ theory condition (M’s=6.02, 6.18), t(81) =.31, p=.38.
Likewise, given inconsistent labels, the level of stereotyping in the fixed theory 
condition was significantly less than that in the variable theory condition, t(81)=3.54, 
£<.001. Where labels were consistent, no differences in stereotyping were found in the 
fixed theory condition compared to the variable theory condition, t(81)=.66, £=.26.
Again, it should also be noted from Figure 10.2, that there appears to be generally lower 
levels of stereotyping in the fixed theory condition compared to the no theory condition. 
Post hoc comparisons between these two conditions revealed no significant difference 
for the consistent labels conditions, t(81 )= 1.28, £=.20, two-tailed, and a significant 
difference in the inconsistent labels condition, t(81)=2.55, £<.02, two-tailed.
In summary, support for the predictions was strong. As predicted, generally more 
stereotyping occurred in the consistent versus inconsistent labels condition but this 
difference did not hold for those participants presented with a ‘variable-social’ theory. It 
appears that this is because when labels were inconsistent, those with a ‘variable-social’ 
theory stereotyped more compared to the ‘fixed’ theory condition.
Additional and post-test measures
Posttest questions included two attributional questions about the behaviour of the 
groups in the video; that is, whether their behaviour was to do with their individual 
personality or the group they were in. Means on all these measures across condition 
appear in Table 10.4 below:
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Table 10.4
Mean ratings for attribution measures: Experiment 6
Theory: No Fixed Variable
Label: Cons Incons Cons Incons Cons Incons
N: 13 17 14 14 14 15
Individual attribution 7.62 6.77 7.43 7.54 6.86 6.87
(1.33) (1.82) (1.95) (1.66) (1.61) (1.89)
Group attribution 4.46 4.00 4.93 3.62 6.71 4.71
(2.96) (2.53) (1.77) (1.81) (1.64) (1.94)
Note: Scores on all variables can range from 1 to 9. Standard deviations appear in brackets.
Scores for individual and group based attributions were analysed via a 3 (theory type: 
no/fixed/variable) x 2 (label type: consistent/inconsistent) x 2 (attribution type: 
individual/group) ANOVA with a repeated measure on the last factor. This yielded a 
significant main effect for label type, F(l,79)=8.17, p<.005, a significant main effect for 
attribution type, F(l,79)=58.85, pc.001, and significant theory by attribution interaction, 
F(2,79)=4.19, p<.02. The significant effect for label type appears to be due to 
participants endorsing group-based attributions more when labels were consistent versus 
inconsistent. Comparing scores on the two attribution measures it appears that in 
general participants were more inclined to make individual-based than group-based 
attributions (M’s=7.13, 4.73 respectively). This difference may be indicative of a 
cultural belief or norm that ‘we are all individuals’ and that it is ‘wrong’ to stereotype. 
Likewise, the attribution of behaviour to an individual’s personality could be seen, at 
one level, to be consistent with both types of theories - the difference being that in one 
case personality is seen as being fixed and in the other it is seen as flexible. Thus, there 
may not have been a one-to-one link between theory-type and type of attribution. The 
interaction between attribution and theory-type is due to the high group-based 
attribution in the variable theory/consistent labels condition compared to other 
conditions. Thus, it appears that the theory activated in this condition lead participants
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to be more inclined to make group-based attributions for the perceived consistency 
between behaviours and groups.
Participants were also asked to indicate posttest how interested they were in the study. 
Means scores for this variable across conditions appear in Table 10.5 below:
Table 10.5
Mean ratings for interest scores: Experiment 6
Theory: No Fixed Variable
Label: Cons Incons Cons Incons Cons Incons
N: 13 17 14 14 14 15
Interest 4.77 4.29 7.00 6.50 6.71 5.80
(2.24) (2.26) (1.66) (1.35) (.91) (1.78)
Note: Scores on all variables can range from 1 to 9. Standard deviations appear in brackets.
A 3 (theory: no/fixed/variable) x 2 (label: consistent/inconsistent) between-subjects 
ANOVA of ‘interest’ ratings found a significant main effect for theory-type, 
F(2,81)= 12.41, p<.001, indicating that those participants who were presented with a 
theory (combined M=6.51) found the study to be more interesting than those who 
received no theory (M=4.53). This may indicate that participants presented with a 
theory, of any type, would be more motivated to pay attention to the stimulus materials 
and to put more thought into subsequent judgements.
Discussion
The results of this experiment provided strong support for our predictions. As predicted, 
different effects for label-type were found depending on what type of theory was made 
accessible. In the condition with no explicit theory, participants tended to differentiate 
between groups more when category labels were consistent with intergroup differences 
versus inconsistent. This result supports the findings of Experiments 2 and 5. Likewise, 
when a ‘fixed-personality’ theory was made accessible for participants, they 
demonstrated more stereotyping when category labels were consistent versus
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inconsistent. It appears that this type of theory allowed good fit between labels and 
behaviours when labels were consistent, but not when labels were inconsistent. Finally, 
as predicted, when a ‘variable-social’ theory was made accessible, there were no effects 
for label-type. Regardless of whether labels were consistent or inconsistent, participants 
demonstrated stereotyping in this condition. Compared to the ‘fixed-personality’ theory 
condition, those in the ‘variable-social’ condition demonstrated more stereotyping when 
labels were inconsistent but the same amount of stereotyping when labels were 
consistent. Thus, it appears that this type of theory allowed for good fit between 
behaviours and labels, regardless of whether those labels might initially be thought of as 
consistent or inconsistent.
Overall, the results of this study provide support for the theoretical argument presented. 
Broadly speaking, this argument is that stereotyping will occur when there is good fit 
between stimulus data and a category. However, the ‘category’ is not conceptualised as 
a fixed cognitive structure that is cued by a category label. Rather, the category and the 
‘fit’ between category labels and data are argued to be generated within a broader 
framework of knowledge and theories which allow both the category itself and the fit 
between categories and data to be flexible.
In general, category labels may provide a low level theory that generates expectations 
about a category. For example, if we are presented with the category label ‘tour guides’, 
we may expect this group of people to be friendly, especially relative to a group of 
‘chess players’. However, while these labels may generate a set of expectations, this is 
not to say that there is a fixed relationship between the category ‘tour guides’ and the 
attribute ‘friendliness’. This relationship is interpreted within a broader theoretical 
context, and depending on what knowledge or ‘explanatory system’ is most accessible, 
may be interpreted as either consistent or inconsistent (or irrelevant).
One of the aims of the current study was to demonstrate that the ‘consistency’ between a 
personality attribute, such as ‘friendliness’, and a category label, such as ‘tour guide’, is 
not fixed and is dependent on the salient theoretical context. Overall, the results of this
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experiment provide support for the notion that theories play an important role in the 
interpretation of ‘fit’ between categories and attributes. The results of this experiment 
demonstrate that a change in theoretical context alone can produce differences in 
stereotyping. We argue that this difference is primarily due to the interpretation of ‘fit’ 
in the inconsistent labels conditions. When there was a ‘fixed’ theory, the labels in this 
condition appear to be interpreted as ‘inconsistent’ with the presented intergroup 
differences. Therefore, there was poor fit between the data and the category, and 
consequently little stereotyping occurred. When there was a ‘variable’ theory, the 
‘inconsistent’ labels appeared to be interpreted as consistent — there was good fit 
between category and data and thus stereotyping occurred, equal to when labels were 
‘consistent’ with data. Importantly, these results suggest that the same category label 
can be interpreted as both ‘consistent’ and ‘inconsistent’ with the same set of intergroup 
differences, depending on the theoretical context. This goes against the idea that there is 
a ‘fixed’ relationship between category labels and attributes. Likewise, it challenges the 
notion that there is a fixed category, such a ‘tour guide’, with fixed contents, such as 
‘friendliness’. In this study, the category ‘tour guide’ was associated with both 
friendliness and unfriendliness when it made sense to do so. Therefore, it would appear 
that categories, such as ‘tour guide’ are not fixed and do not have a fixed content.
An interesting finding in the current experiment was that, given consistent category 
labels, participants stereotyped groups to the same degree regardless of whether they 
were presented with a fixed or variable theory. We noted in the introduction to this 
experiment that researchers such as Dweck and colleagues have suggested that entity 
theorists may be more inclined to stereotype than incremental theorists. Likewise, work 
by Yzerbyt et al. (1997) suggests that those who hold ‘essentialistic’ theories, which are 
somewhat similar to entity theories, are more likely to make categorical judgements. 
The results of this experiment suggest that both entity-type and incremental-type 
theories may result in stereotyping. What matters is not the type of theory per se, but the 
relationship (or fit) between that theory and the data. Thus, either type of theory may 
result in stereotyping when they provide the right explanatory relationship between
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category and data. Results on the attributional measures showed that participants in the 
variable theory/consistent labels conditions were more inclined to endorse a group- 
based attribution suggesting that while stereotyping to the same degree as those in the 
fixed theory condition, their stereotyping was based upon a different underlying 
assumption.
Another interesting result in the current experiment was that participants in the no 
theory condition appeared to generally demonstrate a higher level of stereotyping than 
those in either of the two theory conditions (although this difference only reached 
significance for the stereotyping measure in the inconsistent labels condition). This 
finding could be linked to the distinction between active versus passive processing as 
discussed in previous chapters. It is possible that those presented with a theory were 
engaged in more active processing and thus were generally less inclined to make a 
categorical judgement. The scores on the measure of interest indicated that those 
presented with a theory found the task significantly more interesting than those without 
an explicit theory, suggesting that they may have been more actively engaged in the 
task. If this is true, then it appears that active processing, like different theories, can 
either result in more or less stereotyping, and again this would appear to depend on the 
fit between theories and data. We have also discussed previously how making 
participants think about a theory may make them pay more attention to the task at hand 
and have more cognitive resources available for the task. Generally, these factors are 
argued to result in less stereotyping and more individuated judgements (Fiske & 
Neuberg, 1990; Macrae et al., 1993). In this experiment, theories resulted in both more 
and less stereotyping depending on the fit between theories and data. Thus the 
relationship appears to be more complex than those discussed above. Activating theories 
may result in more cognitive resources being available, and as argued by Spears and 
Haslam (1997), resources are needed to detect fit between theories and data. However, 
whether more resources results in more or less stereotyping depends on whether fit is 
detected and indeed on whether fit is there to be detected. Resources may also be need 
to detect a lack of fit. Indeed, in the inconsistent labels condition, those participants
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presented with a ‘fixed’ theory appeared to stereotype less than those with no theory. 
Thus, it appears that theories may act not only to demonstrate fit between categories and 
data, but also to accentuate a lack of fit.
An important point to note is that the theories used in this study were not directly 
related to group behaviours or labels, or the relationship between the two. That is, the 
theory was not simply a matter of telling participants, for example, that these tour 
guides are unfriendly for whatever reason — the theory served more to give participants 
an outlook, or an explanatory system within which they could then interpret ‘reality’. In 
this respect, theories seem closely related to perceiver readiness; that is, the idea that we 
perceive the world relative to ourselves and our own theories, and that our perception is 
in turn constrained by ourselves and our theories (Oakes et al., 1994). Importantly, 
though, these theories do not operate independent of reality. While we may be ‘primed’ 
to see the world a certain way, we will not do so unless the world is that way in some 
sense. This is where fit comes into the picture: “Fit ties perception firmly to reality; 
however perceptually ‘ready’ we may be to see a given object or event in terms of 
category accessibility, we do not do so until something with at least requisite 
characteristics enters the perceptual field” (Oakes, et al., 1994, p. 116).
While perception is constrained by ourselves and our theories, we have argued earlier in 
this thesis that these in turn are constrained by our self-categorizations. In the next, and 
final, experiment we consider the influence of theories that are explicitly linked to self­
categorizations.
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Chapter 11
Experiment 7: The Effects of Different Background 
Theories on Judgements of Prototypicality and Stereotype
Content
This experiment aimed to expand upon the findings of the previous experiments and to 
address some of the theoretical questions left unanswered by those experiments. The 
results of our previous experiments have shown how comparative and normative fit 
operate together to determine stereotype content, and have demonstrated the role of 
background theories in determining the fit between categories and content. In the 
previous experiments we have conceptualised stereotype content as the amount of 
differentiation between groups in terms of a relevant dimension. For example, in 
Experiment 6 we considered how differentiation between groups in terms of the 
dimension ‘friendliness’ would vary as different background theories were made 
accessible, and argued that with different theories this dimension is seen as more or less 
consistent with the same category.
We have previously argued (see Chapter 6) that the content associated with any given 
category will vary, not only with comparative context, but also with variations in 
background theories and knowledge. In Experiment 6 we demonstrated that judged 
levels of specific content (i.e., friendliness) varied with different background theories. In 
the current experiment, we wanted to consider how different background theories 
determine the content of social categories more broadly, rather than just demonstrating 
variations in use of the same content dimension. Specifically, we aimed to demonstrate 
in this experiment that the meaning of a social category could vary with different 
background theories. We aimed to demonstrate this in two ways. Firstly, we aimed to 
show that the perceived prototypicality of a given person with a given social category 
would vary with different theories. Previous research has demonstrated that the same 
person can be seen as more or less prototypical of the same category depending on the 
comparative context (Haslam, McGarty et al., 1995). The current experiment aimed to
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demonstrate that the same person can be seen as more or less prototypical of the same 
category depending on the type of theory made accessible. Secondly, we aimed to show 
that the content associated with a given social category can vary with different 
background theories. In this experiment, rather than considering a specific content 
dimension relevant to differences between groups, we considered content that was 
related to a specific social category and that should vary with different background 
theories. Thus we were investigating changes in the type of content associated with a 
category rather than in the degree of a specific content dimension associated with a 
category (as in Experiment 6).
In Experiment 6, theories were made accessible to participants in an individualistic 
fashion. That is, we were concerned with making theories accessible to each participant 
personally, and did not consider the extent to which these theories may be shared within 
(or originate within) an individual’s social group. Other research considering the 
influence of different theories on social judgements has also taken an individualistic 
approach (e.g., Chiu et al., 1997; Dweck et al., 1993; Levy et al., 1998; Wittenbrink et 
al., 1997). However, we have argued in Chapter 6 that theories are socially shared and 
socially determined pieces of knowledge that are linked to the way we self-categorize. 
Research by Haslam and colleagues (Haslam, 1997; Haslam et al., 1996; Haslam et al., 
1998) has demonstrated how shared in-group norms can influence stereotype content. In 
this experiment we aimed to show how shared ingroup theories could also influence 
stereotype content (and perceptions of prototypicality). Thus, in this experiment, unlike 
Experiment 6, an attempt was made to link theories to an individual’s ingroup.
Thus, the aims of the current experiment were threefold. Firstly, it aimed to demonstrate 
that the consistency or fit of a stimulus person with a given category varies with the 
broader background theory made accessible for the perceiver. Therefore, whether a 
person is judged to be prototypical of a given category should vary with the broader 
theory or explanation made accessible. That is, it sought to demonstrate that perceived 
prototypicality of a category can vary with background theories as well as with context. 
To show this independently for theories, comparative context was not manipulated in
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this study. Secondly, the study aimed to show that the content of the stereotype 
associated with a given category also varies with the accessible theory. We wished to 
demonstrate more clearly the link between a certain type of theory and certain 
stereotype content. Thirdly, we wished to link theories to social groups. We wanted to 
demonstrate consistency in the theories generated by persons who shared the same 
ingroup compared to a relevant outgroup.
Overview of the experiment
Given the above aims, an experiment was designed so as to manipulate the broad 
theories and background knowledge accessible to participants and then to measure their 
stereotyping of a category whose meaning should change in line with these theories. To 
address the aims of this experiment (as discussed above) a different methodology was 
adopted in this experiment in comparison to the previous experiments. It was decided 
that rather than giving participants theories (as in Experiment 6) it would be more 
effective to present them with statements which it was felt they would disagree with, 
and then encourage them to generate their own theories by focussing on why they 
disagreed with these statements and articulating an alternative position. We attempted to 
make an ingroup identity salient by getting participants to compare themselves and 
other ingroup members who (like them) would disagree with the statement with 
outgroup members who would agree with the statement. Two extreme statements were 
constructed to act as stimulus statements, both of which outlined a ‘theory’ about the 
determinants of success in our society. The details of these statements are provided 
below.
The category chosen for participants to make judgements about was the long-term 
unemployed. This category was chosen because of its link with the stimulus statements. 
That is, the reasons for long-term unemployment are related to the reasons for success 
or otherwise in our society. Likewise, long-term unemployment is a topical issue and 
one that participants should be familiar with and hold opinions about. The study aimed 
to show that the prototypicality of a given stimulus person of the category long-term 
unemployed would vary with the theory made accessible for participants. To this end,
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two stimulus persons were ‘constructed’ designed to be either (at face value) more or 
less typical of the category long-term unemployed. Again these persons are described in 
more detail below. Therefore, at face value, there was more consistency between one 
stimulus person and the category, and less consistency between the other stimulus 
person and the category. The experiment aimed to show that this perceived consistency 
itself would vary with the type of theory made accessible. Thus, the person seen as 
typical or consistent (or fitting) in one theory condition may be seen as less typical or 
consistent (or fitting) in another theory condition (and vice versa).
Broadly speaking the experiment sought to provide a further test of the second 
hypothesis of the thesis. More specifically, it sought to show that the same stimulus 
person would be judged to be more or less prototypical of the same category depending 
on the broad theory that was made accessible, and the stereotype content associated with 
a given category would vary with the broad theory that was made accessible.
We also wanted to address the third aim of the thesis in this study. We sought to make 
participants categorize themselves with others who, like them, disagreed with the 
stimulus statement in comparison to those who agreed with the statement. The theories 
generated by participants should reflect their self-categorization with others who hold a 
similar position. Likewise, the types of theories generated should vary depending on 
which ‘ideological’ group was made salient for participants. Thus, the experiment 
aimed to show that theories generated by those who share a social categorization are 
consistent for those within the social category and different to those generated by 
persons in opposing social categories.
Predictions
Specific predictions were made concerning both judgements of prototypicality and 
stereotype content. The first prediction concerned prototypicality. It was predicted that:
1. The same stimulus person would be judged to be more or less prototypical of
the same category depending on the broad theory that was made accessible.
With respect to stereotype content it was predicted that:
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2. The stereotype content associated with a given category would vary with the 
broad theory that was made accessible.
Method
Pre-test screening
Initially participants from the introductory psychology course at the Australian National 
University were presented with one of two possible statements outlining theories about 
success in our society. Participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed or 
disagreed with the statement presented. This served as a basis for recruiting participants 
for the main experiment.
All participants were told that the study was concerned with “attitudes and opinions 
about our society and some current issues”, and that this was the first phase of the study 
and they would be given the opportunity to participate in a second phase at a later date. 
Participants were then informed that they would be presented with a statement 
“concerning social and economic attitudes, that was recently expressed in the media by 
a certain group in our society. For ail sorts of reasons we can’t tell you the name of this 
group at present. However, we can tell you that they are a group who subscribe to fairly 
extreme politics and are considered by many to be a minority or ‘fringe’ group. Please 
read through the statement carefully.”
Participants were then presented with either Theory A or Theory B which are outlined 
below:
Theory A
In our society individual ability and effort are the only keys to success. We are all 
born equal and if inequality exists it is the result of problems specific to 
individuals not to socio-economic groups. Society is simply a collection of 
discrete individuals, each of whom should seek to further their own private 
interests. If people really want to succeed and get on in life they will. All those 
people we hear referred to as ‘disadvantaged’ or ‘oppressed’ in our society 
wouldn’t be disadvantaged if they just got off their butts and tried a bit harder. If 
they don’t succeed, they only have themselves to blame. We must beware of 
bailing-out people who basically just expect to be helped through life, given hand­
outs, without ever even trying to help themselves. Lets face it, most of the people 
who need hand-outs have never even tried to help themselves!
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Theory B
In our society success is entirely determined by external factors, like the family 
you happen to be born into. Individual effort and ability count for nothing. We 
cannot explain the inequalities that exist in our society in terms of differences 
between individuals — they are entirely due to differences between socio­
economic groups. None of the blame or responsibility for lack of success can lie 
with any of those people who are less well-off in our society. We can only blame 
the rest of society, including ourselves, for their lot — we must take responsibility 
and share the guilt for the inequalities that exist. People who are born into certain 
groups in our society are stuck at the bottom and there is nothing they can do 
through their own efforts to change their situation. We just can’t expect them to 
help themselves and they are entitled to demand help from those who are better- 
off.
At the end of the statement, participants were asked to indicate “how much you agree or 
disagree with this statement.” Participants marked their response on a 9-point scale 
ranging from 1 (agree) to 9 (disagree).
Both theories were designed to be fairly extreme statements which it was felt that the 
majority of introductory psychology students would disagree with. Allocation to 
conditions (i.e., theory type) was random. Participation in this phase of the study was in 
laboratory groups ranging from 13 to 27 students per group.
In this phase, 68 participants were presented with Theory A and 80 participants were 
presented with Theory B. Of those presented with Theory A, the majority (81%) 
disagreed with it, 4% were neutral and 15% agreed. Across all participants the mean 
level of disagreement was 6.96 which is significantly different from the midpoint 
(neutral position) of the scale, t(67)=9.45, pc.001, two-tailed. Of those presented with 
Theory B, the majority (59%) disagreed with it, 12% were neutral and 29% agreed. 
Across all participants the mean level of disagreement was 5.96 which is significantly 
different from the midpoint (neutral position) of the scale, t(79)=9.63, pc.001, two- 
tailed. Therefore, overall the majority of participants disagreed with both theories 
although the level of disagreement was higher for Theory A than for Theory B as might 
be expected for a university sample.
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Only those participants who expressed disagreement (a score of 6 or greater) with either 
of the statements were given the opportunity to participate in the main experiment.
Participants and Design
A total of 50 participants took part in the main experiment. There were 40 females and 
10 males, with an average age of 21.4 years. All participants received course credit for 
their participation. The experiment was run in sessions of between 1 and 3 participants 
per session.
The independent variables of theory type (A/ B) and stimulus interview type (consistent/ 
inconsistent) were manipulated in a 2 x 2 between subjects design. Allocation to 
stimulus interview type was random.
Procedure
At the beginning of the session, all participants were given the following instructions:
This study is concerned with your attitudes and opinions about our society and 
some current issues. There are two phases to this study. This is the second phase. 
You completed the first phase of this study in your laboratory class. You may 
remember that you were presented with a statement, concerning social and 
economic attitudes, that was recently expressed in the media by a certain group in 
our society. You were then asked to indicate whether you agreed or disagreed with 
that statement.
You have been recalled to this phase of the study because you DISAGREED with 
that statement. There are some other participants who AGREED with the 
statement and they are attending other sessions. We are interested in comparing 
your opinions with participants in other sessions who AGREED with the 
statement. Just to remind you of that statement, it appears below. Please read 
through the statement again.
Depending on which statement they were initially presented with (at pretesting), 
participants were then presented with that theory (A or B) again. After reading through 
the statement again, all participants answered two questions concerning the statement. 
The first question was: “You have previously indicated that you disagree with this 
statement. Think about why you disagree with this statement — list as many reasons as 
you can think of below.” The second question was: “This statement represents a certain 
way of looking at the world. You may have your own, alternative way of looking at the
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vorld — please try to express this below in a couple of sentences.” These questions 
vere designed to focus participants on why they disagreed with the initial statement and 
o make their alternative theories accessible. They also allowed us to determine the 
ypes of theories made accessible and how consistent these were within conditions, 
^rticipants were given 2 minutes to write an answer to each question and the 
experimenter instructed them as to when their time was up and when to move onto the 
text question.
following completion of this task, participants listened to two audio-taped interviews 
vith stimulus persons. These interviews were constructed so as to present one stimulus 
jerson in one condition was more consistent with, or prototypical of, the category ‘long- 
Crm unemployed’ compared to the other stimulus person in the other condition. A 
jretest with 26 independent participants indicated that there were significant differences 
h prototypicality of the stimulus person across the two interviews, t(24)=2.12, p<.05, 
tA'o-tailed24. The stimulus person was presented to participants within the context of an 
aidio-taped interview between the stimulus person and the researcher. The interviews 
vere introduced to participants in the following fashion:
As part of this research project I’ve been conducting interviews with a selection of 
ordinary Australians concerning their attitudes about society and some current 
social issues. Given our current time constraints, I’ve chosen at random a selection 
of recordings of those interviews for each group of participants to listen to. In your 
case, you’ll be listening to two interviews — one with CATHY and one with 
DAVE. You’re only going to listen to the beginning of the interviews, where I ask 
people for some general background information about themselves. I’ll be asking 
you to make some judgements about the types of attitudes you think these people 
might hold and about your own attitudes ... please listen to each interview 
carefully.
a11 participants then listened to two stimulus interviews, audio-taped with Cathy, who 
vas an employed person, and Dave (the stimulus person) who was an unemployed (and 
spending on condition was either consistent with, or inconsistent with, the category 
bng-term unemployed). The researcher acted as the interviewer in all cases. The same 
nale confederate played the role of Dave in both conditions and a female confederate
2 The measure of prototypicality used was the same as that employed in the main experiment. Details of 
low this was measured are outlined in the Method and Results sections.
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played the role of Cathy. The interview with Cathy was always played first and was 
always the same. This interview was designed to be as neutral as possible and served the 
purpose of getting participants used to the format of the interview. It also acted as a 
filler to make the true nature of the study less transparent and to lend credibility to the 
cover story. The interviewer asked Cathy a number of questions about her background, 
education, living arrangements, future plans etc. The experimenter stopped the tape after 
a few minutes at a point where it seemed the interviewer was proceeding to ask more 
specific questions concerning the interviewee’s attitudes to society. A full transcript of 
this interview appears in Appendix A. Following this participants listened to an 
interview with Dave which had the same format (questions) as the interview with Cathy. 
Dave was a 27 year old, single male who had been unemployed for a year and a half. 
The content of this interview differed across conditions. In the consistent condition, 
Dave was presented as a ‘dole bludger’25; he was lazy, put little effort into finding a job 
and tended to blame others for his unemployment. In the inconsistent condition, Dave 
was presented as someone who was bright and active, but unable to find a job despite 
his efforts. To highlight the difference between the interviews, in response to the 
question:
Have you had any further education or training since leaving school?
Dave in the consistent condition responded:
... uuh yeah, I started a TAFE26 course when I left school but I dropped out after a 
year, uh, ‘cause I ended up failing most things. I guess I just partied too much. 
Umm, since I’ve been unemployed the CES27 is always trying to send me on those, 
you know, trainin’ courses but I don’t go to any of them. Can’t see the point 
really. They usually sound like they’d be dead boring, (sighs) I can’t see what I’d 
get out of them.
whereas Dave in the inconsistent condition responded:
D: Uh yeah, actually I have, umm, I did a TAFE course when I left school. It got 
pretty hard going at times because, uh, I had to support myself but I still managed 
to finish it. And since I’ve been unemployed the CES has encouraged me to go to
25 ‘Dole blutiger’ is a colloquial Australian term which refers to someone who is unemployed, receiving 
unemployment benefits and not really making any effort to find a job.
2h The initials TAFE stand for Technical and Further Education.
27 The initials CES stand for Commonwealth Employment Service.
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training courses and I’ve been along to a few now and their, oh, pretty interesting.
I figure it, you know, I figure it can’t hurt to be better trained. At least I feel like 
I’m, you know, doing something.
Again the interview with Dave was stopped after a few minutes. Each interview ran for 
approximately 3 minutes. A full transcript of each interview appears in Appendix A.
After listening to the stimulus interviews all participants completed a questionnaire 
about the long-term unemployed and the target stimulus person (Dave). Participants 
were told that they would receive a questionnaire relating to each interview they had 
heard — that is, one relating to the interview with Cathy and one relating to the 
interview with Dave. They were then told that the order of presentation of these 
questionnaires was being randomised across different groups and in their case they 
would receive the questionnaire relating to the interview with Dave first followed by the 
questionnaire relating to the interview with Cathy. In fact all participants only ever 
received the questionnaire relating to the interview with Dave. On all questionnaires, the 
words ‘Dave’ and ‘long-term unemployed’ were handwritten to give the impression that 
this person and occupation were only two of many that participants could have been 
asked about.
After completing the questionnaire, participants were debriefed as to the true nature of 
the study, and were then thanked and dismissed.
Dependent measures
Three questions measured how prototypical participants thought the stimulus person 
(Dave) was of the category long-term unemployed. Firstly, participants were asked to 
indicate how typical they thought Dave was of the long-term unemployed (9-point scale 
ranging from 1, not at all typical, to 9, very typical) and how representative they thought 
Dave was of the long-term unemployed (9-point scale ranging from 1, not at all 
representative, to 9, very representative).They were also asked “What percentage of the 
long-term unemployed do you think would have similar attitudes to Dave? (0-100%)”.
To measure changes in stereotype content across conditions, participants were also 
asked to complete a Katz-Braly type checklist separately for the long-term unemployed
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and for Dave. The list of words was essentially the same as that originally used in Katz 
and Braly (1933). However, 12 words were removed from the list because they were 
thought to be irrelevant to the judgement at hand (treacherous, gluttonous, religious, 
superstitious, cowardly, pugnacious, sensual, cruel, musical, dirty, revengeful, artistic). 
These were replaced by 6 words thought to be particularly relevant to this category and 
which represented differing explanations for long-term unemployment (unmotivated, 
whingeing, dependent, unlucky, underprivileged, blameless). Participants were asked to 
read through the list of words and to underline those they thought to be most typical of 
the long-term unemployed. They were then asked to mark with the letter U the five 
words they thought were most typical of the long-term unemployed and to list these five 
words in the space provided. They then repeated the task for Dave, this time marking 
the words with the letter D. Participants always completed the task for the long-term 
unemployed before doing the task for Dave. A full list of the adjectives used appears in 
Appendix B.
Posttest measures and manipulation checks
All participants completed six questions designed as posttest measures and checks on 
the major manipulations in the study. All responses were on 9-point scales. The 
questions were as follows:
(1) How much effort do you think Dave put into finding a job? (1, ‘very little’ to 9,’a 
lot’)
(2) How much did you like Dave? (1, ‘very little’ to 9, ‘a lot’)
(3) Think back to the statement you were presented with at the beginning of this study. 
According to that statement, what are the important factors for success in our society? 
(1, ‘individual effort and ability’ to 9, ‘social and external factors’)
(4) How similar do you think you are to those people who would agree with that 
statement? (1, ‘not at all similar’ to 9, ‘very similar’)
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(5) How similar do you think you are to those people who would disagree with that 
statement? (1, ‘not at all similar’ to 9, ‘very similar’)
(6) How interested were you in this study? (1, ‘not at all interested’ to 9, ‘very 
interested’)
Questions 1 and 2 were designed to check that participants perceived a difference 
between the stimulus person in the two interviews. Question 3 was designed to check 
that there was a perceived difference in the content/message of the two statements. 
Questions 4 and 5 were designed to check the level to which participants self- 
categorised themselves as members of the appropriate social category. We expected 
them to see themselves as more similar to others who disagreed with the initial 
statement compared to those who agreed with it.
Finally, all participants were asked to indicate their age and sex.
Results
M anipulation checks
The mean scores for questions 1-6 across conditions appear in Table 11.1 below. We 
also looked at mean levels of disagreement with the stimulus statements (measured at 
pretest) across conditions.
A series of 2 (theory-type: A/B) x 2 (interview type: consistent/inconsistent) between 
subjects ANOVA’s were carried out for each of the first three measures. As we would 
expect, participants thought the stimulus person in the inconsistent interview put more 
effort into finding a job than stimulus person in the consistent condition (M’s=7-42 vs.
2.32), F(1,46)=279.8, pc.0001, and they also liked the inconsistent stimulus person 
more than the consistent stimulus person (M’s=6.81 vs. 3.19), F(l,46)=78.7, pc.0001.
As expected those participants presented with Theory A thought it attributed success 
more to ‘individual effort and ability’ (M=2.96) while those presented with Theory B 
thought it attributed success more to ‘social and external factors’ (M=5.51), 
F( 1,46)= 10.2, pc.005.
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Table 11.1
Mean scores for manipulation checks across interview and theory-type: 
Experiment 7
Interview Type: Consistent Inconsistent
Theory: A B A B
N: 13 14 12 11
Q l) Effort of stim. 
person
2.31 (.95) 2.33 (1.44) 7.57 (.94) 7.27 (.91)
Q2) Like stim. 
person
3.38(1.61) 3.00(1.91) 7.07(1.27) 6.54 (.52)
Q3) Original 
statement
3.00 (2.45) 4.83 (3.24) 2.93 (2.53) 6.18 (3.03)
Q4) Similar agree 4.46(1.94) 5.17(2.48) 3.21 (1.93) 4.09(1.92)
Q5) Similar disagree 6.54(1.27) 3.83 (1.95) 6.79(1.25) 6.27 (1.79)
Q6) Interested 7.00 (.71) 7.25 (1.06) 7.57 (.76) 6.73 (.79)
Disagreement at 
pretest
7.15 (.90) 7.42(1.08) 7.71 (.73) 7.46(1.04)
Note:All scores can range from 1 to 9; standard deviations in brackets.
Mean scores for questions 4 and 5 were analysed in a 2 (theory-type: A/B) x 2 
(interview type: consistent/inconsistent) x 2 (similarity: agree/disagree) ANOVA with a 
repeated measure on the last factor. Overall participants judged themselves to be more 
similar to those who disagreed with the statement (M=5.90) compared to those who 
agreed (M=4.20), F( 1,46)= 14.80, p<.001. However, this main effect was qualified by a 
significant interaction between theory-type, F(l,46)=8.08, pc.01, and interview type, 
F(l,46)=8.90, p<.005. This appears to be driven by the relatively high level of judged 
similarity to others who agreed with the initial statement and the relatively low level of 
judged similarity to those who disagreed with the statement in the inconsistent 
interview/Theory B condition. A possible reason for this was revealed by an inspection
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of participants’ responses in this condition. This suggested that a number may have 
misinterpreted these questions as meaning how similar are you to others who agree or 
disagree with the statement that they generated in response to the initial statement. 
Participants with low levels of similarity to others who disagreed and high levels of 
similarity to those who agreed also tended, in response to question 3, to misattribute the 
message of the initial statement to social and external factors suggesting that they were 
referring to their own position rather than the initial statement. It should be noted that 
participants in this condition showed overall high levels of disagreement with the initial 
statement at pretest, suggesting that they did indeed disagree with the statement.
Levels of disagreement with the statement presented at pretest were analysed in a 2 
(theory type: A/B) by 2 (interview type: consistent/inconsistent) between subjects 
ANOVA. Scores did not differ significantly across conditions, suggesting that across 
conditions levels of disagreement with the statement presented were equal. In addition, 
we wanted to ensure that those participants who chose to take part in the main 
experiment were not more extreme with respect to their levels of disagreement with the 
stimulus statement compared to those who participated in the pretest. For those 
presented with Theory A, there was no difference between mean levels of disagreement 
between all those who disagreed at pre-test (M=7.64) and those who chose to participate 
in the main experiment (M=7.44). Likewise, for those presented with Theory B, there 
was no difference between mean levels of disagreement between those at pretest 
(M=7.47) and those who participated in the main experiment (M=7.44).
Overall there was a high level of interest (question 6) in the main experiment (Grand 
M=7.16), which was slightly lower for those in the Theory B/inconsistent interview 
condition (as indicated by a significant theory by interview interaction, F(l,46)=5.36, 
P<.03).
Types of theories generated
All participants were asked to write about the reasons why they disagreed with the 
statement they were presented with and to outline their own, alternative position. For
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those participants initially presented with Theory A, the reasons most commonly stated 
for disagreement were: (1) that not everyone is born equal and not everyone has the 
same opportunities in life, and (2) that some people will not succeed no matter how hard 
they try because of circumstances beyond their control. There appeared to be a high 
degree of consistency in the theories produced in this condition. The following response 
was typical of those in this condition:
The concept we are ‘born equal’ is ridiculous — we are heavily influenced, for 
example, by the wealth, race, class etc. of our family and surroundings. We are not 
discrete individuals but a collective society. This (the statement) is an 
individualistic principle based on the free market etc. I believe many factors 
combine to decide whether or not an individual will ‘succeed’ — factors we are 
unable to control or change. Hard work helps, but background is more important.
For those participants initially presented with Theory B, the most common reasons for 
disagreement were: (1) people can succeed no matter what their
background/circumstances, (2) individuals are responsible for and in charge of their 
own destiny, and (3) hard work and effort count. Many participants in this condition 
also acknowledged that external factors can create some barriers to success but that 
generally these barriers can be overcome by hard work and effort. The following 
response typified many of those in this condition:
Many people born into low socio-economic groups later join high socio-economic 
groups — e.g., people who are born poor but die millionaires — through sheer 
hard work. If you want something badly enough you will go to any lengths to 
achieve it. Nothing is impossible — sometimes its just harder for some people. 
Life is what you make it and nothing is impossible — if you really want 
something, it won’t just be handed to you — you’ll have to put effort (sometimes 
lots!) into getting it, and you’ll be a better person for having that experience.
Thus, different types of theories reflecting different reasons for success in society were 
generated in the two conditions. To check that the theories generated within each 
condition were consistent (and different between conditions), participants’ responses 
were coded for the type of theory they represented. They were coded as either 
representing a theory which argued that external factors were important in determining 
success (external-type theory), a theory which argued that internal factors were 
important in determining success (internal-type theory), as containing elements of both
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types of theories (both) or as arguing for neither position (neither). We expected that 
those initially presented with Theory A would generate external-type theories whereas 
those presented with Theory B would generate internal-type theories.
The participants’ responses were coded by the experimenter and an independent coder, 
both blind to condition. Initial agreement between coders was 70%, which rose to 100% 
after discussion. The coding showed that of those initially presented with Theory A, 
96% generated an external-type theory. The remaining 4% generated a theory that 
contained elements of both theories. Of those initially presented with Theory B, 83% 
generated an internal-type theory, while the remaining 17% generated a theory that 
contained elements of both theories.
Thus, it appears that the theories produced were consistent within conditions and were 
different across conditions. The types of theories generated in response to Theory A 
were slightly more consistent than those generated in response to Theory B.
Prototypicalitv measures
The first three dependent measures (typicality, representativeness, and similar attitudes) 
were designed to assess the perceived prototypicality of the target person with the 
category long-term unemployed. The mean scores for these three measures across all 
conditions appear in Table 11.2 below.
It can be seen from that table that for participants presented with the consistent 
interview, across all measures judgements of prototypicality were higher with Theory B 
versus Theory A. However, for participants presented with the inconsistent interview, 
there was little difference in judgements of prototypicality across theory type. The 
correlations between dependent variables were all positive and highly significant as 
presented in Table 11.3 below.
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Table 11.2
Mean prototypicalitv scores across interview and theory-type: Experiment 7
Interview Type: Consistent Inconsistent
Theory: A B A B
N: 13 14 12 11
Typical 6.31 (1.25) 6.58 (.90) 5.14(1.70) 5.45 (2.30)
Representative 5.46 (.97) 6.67 (1.30) 4.79(1.72) 5.00(1.90)
Similar attitudes 48.8 (14.5) 67.5 (9.2) 50.7(18.9) 50.5 (22.7)
Note: A higher score indicates a judgement of greater prototypicality; scores for typical and 
representative can range from 1 to 9; scores on similar attitudes can range from 0 to 100; standard 
deviations in brackets.
Table 11.3
Correlations between dependent variables: Experiment 7
Representative Similar Attitudes
Typical .75* .66*
Representative .62*
Note: * indicates significant at pc.Ol, two-tailed.
All three dependent variables were combined into an overall measure of prototypicality. 
This was done by recoding scores on the similar attitudes measure to a 9-point scale and 
then averaging across all three measures. This new scale is referred to as prototypicalitv 
and had a very satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha of .80. A 2 (theory type: A/B) x 2 
(interview type: consistent/inconsistent) between subjects ANOVA was carried out for 
this ‘prototypicality’ measure revealing a significant main effect for interview type, 
F(l,46)=6.56, p<.015. The obtained pattern of means on this measure across conditions 
is presented below in Figure 11.1:
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Figure 11.1 Mean prototypicality scores across theory and interview type: 
Experiment 7
Overall, the consistent stimulus person was seen as more prototypical of the category 
‘long-term’ unemployed than the inconsistent stimulus person. A priori predictions were 
tested in terms of planned pair-wise contrasts applying Sidak’s multiplicative inequality 
to control the error rate2*. The assumption of homogeneity of variance may have been 
violated for the overall ANOVA, Cochran’s C(12,4)=.48, p<.05, and therefore contrasts 
were carried out using the separate variance estimate. For those participants presented 
with the consistent interview, there was a significant difference found across theory type 
such that participants given Theory B judged the target person to be more prototypical 
compared to those participants given Theory A (M’s=6.61 vs. 5.40), t(23)=2.83, p<.05. 
For those participants presented with the inconsistent interview there were no 
significant differences across theory-type (M’s=5.18 vs. 5.00), t( 18.5)=.26, p>.05. 
Although the overall main effect for interview-type was significant, neither of the 
planned contrasts across interview type reached significance, t(22.9)=l. 13, p>.05 
(consistent interview), and t(14.1)=2.28, p>.05 (inconsistent interview).
2* Note that with four contrasts, 23 degrees of freedom and oc=.05, one-tailed, the critical t-value based on 
Sidak’s multiplicative inequality is 2.37 (Rohlf & Sokal, 1981).
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Stereotype content
Stereotype content was assessed by means of a Katz-Braly type checklist. We predicted 
that there would be differences in stereotype content across theory-type with different 
theories reflected in different content and attributions for unemployment. The 
percentage of participants in each condition marking each adjective was calculated. We 
also looked at the percentage of participants from a pretest who marked each adjective. 
These participants judged the long-term unemployed without the context of a theory or 
a stimulus person. Table 11.4 below indicates the words most frequently chosen to 
characterise the category long-term unemployed across all conditions, and in the pretest.
Table 11.4
Percentage of participants choosing adjectives characterising long-term 
unemployed across interview type and theory-type, and in the pretest: Experiment
7
Interview: Consistent Inconsistent Pretest
Theory: A B A B
N: 13 12 14 11 16
unlucky 38 50 93 91 75
unmotivated 62 92 43 55 69
underprivileged 62 25 71 45 50
dependent 54 50 43 45 38
whingeing 23 32 14 - 13
ignorant 31 25 7 9 6
Note: Only traits marked by at least 30% of participants in at least one condition included, - = <30%
Turning our attention firstly to traits chosen in the pretest, when no theory or stimulus 
interview was present, we can see the four most frequently chosen traits were unlucky, 
unmotivated, underprivileged and dependent. It is interesting to note that this 
characterisation of the long-term unemployed contains elements of both types of 
explanations for unemployment. The traits unlucky and underprivileged seem to be 
connected to a more external (or social) attribution for the causes of unemployment
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whereas the traits unmotivated and dependent are linked to a more internal (or 
individualistic) explanation or attribution. It can be seen from above that there were 
some differences in stereotype content across experimental conditions. Overall, 
compared to participants presented with Theory B, participants presented with Theory A 
were less likely to characterise the unemployed as unmotivated, and more likely to 
characterise them as underprivileged. These differences were especially pronounced for 
those participants presented with the consistent stimulus interview. For example, in this 
condition 92% of participants presented with Theory B characterised the unemployed as 
unmotivated compared to only 62% of those given Theory A. Likewise, 62% of those 
given Theory A saw the unemployed as underprivileged compared to only 25% of those 
given Theory B. There were also some apparent differences in stereotype content across 
stimulus interview type, the most striking one being for the trait ‘unlucky’ with almost 
all participants (92%) presented with the inconsistent interview characterising the 
unemployed this way compared to only 44% of those presented with the consistent 
interview. Characterisations of the long-term unemployed in all conditions appeared to 
be somewhat different from those obtained at pretest.
We attempted a more systematic analysis of the traits chosen based on the method 
employed by Haslam et al. (1992) and that employed in Experiments 3, 4 and 5. We 
predicted that stereotype content should be consistent with the type of theory generated 
by participants. Those presented with Theory A tended to produce ‘external’ or ‘social’ 
theories for success; that is, they attributed success to factors beyond an individual’s 
control. Those presented with Theory B tended to produce more ‘internal’ or 
‘individualistic’ theories for success; that is, they attributed success to factors within the 
individual’s control. We predicted that those participants who generated a more 
‘external/social’ theory for success should stereotype the long-term unemployed in 
terms of content consistent with that theory (and likewise for those who produced a 
‘internal/individualistic’ theory). To test this prediction, we asked five independent 
participants to choose from the original checklist those words consistent with a person 
who is unemployed for reasons to do with them personally (internal words) and those
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words consistent with a person who is unemployed for reasons beyond their control 
(external words). Using the ten most commonly chosen internal and external words, an 
‘internal’ content and an ‘external’ content score was computed for each participant by 
scoring +1 for each internal trait chosen and +1 for each external trait chosen; all other 
traits chosen were scored as zero. For each participant we calculated an overall 
‘internal’ content score (values between 0 and +5), an overall ‘external’ content score 
(values between 0 and +5). A plot of the mean values for the internal content scores 
across conditions appears in Figure 11.2 below:
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Figure 11.2 Mean internal content scores for the long-term unemployed across 
conditions: Experiment 7
A 2 (theory type: A/B) x 2 (interview type: consistent/inconsistent) ANOVA of the 
mean internal content scores yielded a significant main effect for interview type, 
F(l,46)=6.73. pc.02, and a significant main effect for theory-type, F(l,46)=5.21, pc.03. 
Four pairwise contrasts were carried out applying Sidak’s multiplicative inequality to 
control for the error rate2'. As might be expected, use of internal content was higher in 
the consistent interview condition versus the inconsistent interview condition. However, 
this difference was only significant for those participants given Theory B, t(46)=2.52,
29 Note that with four contrasts, 46 degrees of freedom and oc=.05, one-tailed, the critical t-value based on 
Sidak’s multiplicative inequality is 2.30 (Rohlf & Sokal, 1981).
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£<.05. Those participants given Theory B tended to produce ‘internal/individualistic’ 
theories to explain success and thus there is good fit between their theory and ‘internal’ 
content. This fit appears to be accentuated in the consistent interview condition where 
there is also good fit between their theory and the stimulus person.
We predicted that stereotype content would vary with the type of theory made 
accessible. Therefore, we would predict that ‘internal’ content applied to the category 
long-term unemployed should be higher for those presented with Theory B versus 
Theory A. This was shown to be the case; however, the difference was only significant 
in the consistent interview condition, t(46)=2.42, p<.05
We also analysed mean ‘external’ content scores. A plot of these across conditions 
appears in Figure 11.3 below:
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Figure 11.3 Mean external content scores for the long-term unemployed across 
conditions: Experiment 7
A 2 (theory type: A/B) x 2 (interview type: consistent/inconsistent) ANOVA of the 
mean external content scores yielded a significant main effect for interview type only, 
F( 1,46)= 17.43. p<.001. Overall, participants presented with the inconsistent stimulus 
interview characterised the long-term unemployed more in terms of external content 
compared to those presented with the consistent interview.
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While it appears that those participants given Theory A used more external content than 
those given Theory B, these differences were not significant.
Content applied to stimulus person
We also looked at the frequency with which traits were chosen to characterise the 
stimulus person. Table 11.5 below indicates the words most frequently chosen to 
characterise the stimulus person, ‘Dave’, across all conditions.
Table 11.5
Percentage of participants choosing adjectives characterising stimulus person 
across interview type and theory-type: Experiment 7
Interview: Consistent Inconsistent
Theory: A B A B
N: 13 12 14 11
unmotivated 91 100 8 0
unemotional 64 17 - -
lazy 45 58 - -
ignorant 36 33 - 10
dependent 36 33 - 10
unreliable 36 25 - -
whingeing 27 50 - -
straightforward 9 33 21 20
persistent - - 64 70
practical 9 - 57 20
intelligent - - 43 70
methodical - - 43 30
unlucky 18 8 36 80
honest 9 - 36 40
sportsmanlike - - 21 30
educated - 8 14 30
Note: Only traits marked by at least 30% of participants in at least one condition included, - = 
<30%
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The most striking differences are across stimulus interview type as might be expected. 
Overall those presented with the consistent interview had a much more negative 
impression of Dave, characterising him as unmotivated, unemotional, lazy, ignorant, 
dependent, unreliable, whingeing and humourless. By comparison, those participants 
presented with the inconsistent interview characterised Dave as persistent, practical, 
intelligent, methodical, unlucky, honest, alert, sportsmanlike, and educated.
There were also some more subtle differences apparent across theory-type. Looking 
firstly at the consistent interview condition, it is apparent that those given Theory A 
were more inclined to characterise Dave as ‘unemotional’ (64% vs. 17%) whereas those 
given Theory B were more inclined to see him as ‘whingeing’ (50% vs. 27%). For those 
participants presented with the inconsistent stimulus interview, those with Theory A 
were more inclined to characterise Dave as practical (57% vs. 20%) whereas those given 
Theory B were more inclined to see him as unlucky (80% vs. 36%), intelligent (70% vs. 
43%) and educated (30% vs. 14%). Because in some cases there were either no internal 
or no external traits chosen for the stimulus person, rather than analysing internal and 
external scores separately, we calculated an overall ‘internal/external’ content score for 
each participant by subtracting external scores from internal scores (values between -5 
and +5, with a positive meaning a more ‘internal’ characterisation, and a negative score 
meaning a more ‘external’ characterisation). A plot of the mean scores on this new 
variable across conditions appears in Figure 11.4 below.
As might be expected, participants given the consistent interview made much more 
internal characterisations of the stimulus person than those given the inconsistent 
interview (reflecting the differing content of these two interviews). A 2 (interview type) 
x 2 (theory type) ANOVA of the mean ‘internal / external’ scores revealed a significant 
main effect for interview type, F(l,46)=223.74, p<.001, and a significant theory by 
interview type interaction, F(l,46)=4.57, p<.04. As can be seen from the above figure, 
for those participants given Theory B the differences across interview type were greater 
than for those given Theory A.
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Figure 11.4 Mean internal/external content scores for the stimulus person across 
conditions: Experiment 7
Discussion
Overall support was found for the major predictions of this experiment. The first 
prediction concerned differences in the perceived prototypicality of the target stimulus 
person of the category long-term unemployed across theory-type. For those participants 
presented with the consistent stimulus interview (which contained the more prototypical 
stimulus person based on results of a pretest), there were significant differences in 
prototypicality across theory type. Overall, participants presented with Theory B saw 
the stimulus person in this interview as more prototypical of the category long-term 
unemployed than those participants presented with Theory A. However, for participants 
presented with the inconsistent stimulus interview, no differences were found in 
perceived prototypicality across theory type.
The second major prediction of this study concerned differences in stereotype content 
across theory-type. Again, there was support for this prediction. Generally, participants 
in the Theory A condition were more inclined to characterise the unemployed as 
underprivileged and less likely to characterise them as unmotivated compared to those 
in the Theory B condition. Participants given Theory B were significantly more likely to 
characterise the long-term unemployed in terms of ‘internal’ content compared to
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participants given Theory A. However, characterisations in terms of ‘external’ content 
did not differ across theory-type. We also found large differences in stereotype content 
across interview-type. Across both theories, the most frequently chosen trait to 
characterise the unemployed for participants given the consistent interview was 
unmotivated, whereas for those given the inconsistent interview it was unlucky. Indeed, 
almost all the participants given the inconsistent interview characterised the 
unemployed as unlucky. It appears that the stimulus interview itself influenced 
participants’ subsequent stereotype of the unemployed. Those given the inconsistent 
interview tended to characterise the long-term unemployed in terms of more ‘external’ 
content and less ‘internal’ content compared to those given the consistent interview. 
Thus, it appears that the meaning of the category long-term unemployed may have 
changed in response to information presented in the stimulus interview.
In this experiment we aimed to demonstrate that there would be consistency in the types 
of theories generated within conditions and differences across conditions. In general, 
there appeared to be a considerable amount of consistency in the alternative types of 
theories generated by participants within conditions. There were clear differences in the 
types of theories generated between conditions. Measures of perceived similarity to 
others who disagreed with the initial theory (or agreed with it) indicated that 
participants saw themselves as more similar to those who disagreed compared to those 
agreed. This suggests that our manipulation was successful in getting participants to 
self-categorize as members of an ingroup in comparison to an outgroup.
Thus, the results of this experiment provide further support for the role of background 
theories in the stereotyping process. One of the most interesting results was the finding 
that the same stimulus person (who had previously been judged to be highly 
prototypical of the category long-term unemployed) could be judged to be differentially 
prototypical of the same social category, depending on the type of background theory 
which was made accessible. As discussed earlier, previous research has shown that 
judgements of prototypicality are context-dependent. The current research suggests that 
they are also theory-dependent. In the current experiment, context was not manipulated
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and differences in judged prototypicality were found across theory-type. The fact that 
these differences were found for the ‘consistent’ stimulus person lends further support 
to our position that the consistency between persons (or traits) and categories is theory- 
dependent.
The type of theory appeared to have no effect on judgements of prototypicality when the 
stimulus person was inconsistent. In this condition we expected that those given Theory 
B would not judge the stimulus person to be highly prototypical of the category long­
term unemployed (as was found). However, we expected that those participants given 
Theory A should see this stimulus person as prototypical of this category. This was not 
found. The reason for this may be to do with the fit between the stimulus person and the 
theory/category. The theories generated in this condition generally argued that not 
everyone has the same opportunities in life and that circumstances can stop some people 
from succeeding. Likewise, if we look at the content chosen to characterise the long­
term unemployed in this condition, the two traits chosen by more than 50% of 
participants were unlucky and underprivileged. In contrast, the two traits chosen to 
characterise the stimulus person by more than 50% of participants were persistent and 
practical. Similarly, the manipulation checks showed that the stimulus person in this 
condition was seen in very positive terms (participants liked the stimulus person). Thus, 
while the category ‘long-term unemployed’ was characterised as unfortunate, the 
stimulus person was seen very positively. Thus, there appears not to have been good fit 
between the category and the stimulus person in this condition. This may explain the 
lack of effects for theory-type in the inconsistent interview condition — neither theory 
provided good fit with the stimulus person.
The other interesting finding in this experiment was differences in stereotype content 
across theory type. This was especially apparent for ‘internal’ content. Participants 
tended to characterise the long-term unemployed in terms of content that was consistent 
with their theory. Thus, those given Theory B saw the unemployed in more ‘internal’ 
terms (consistent with their theory) compared with those given Theory A. Therefore, 
this experiment demonstrates that theories can influence not just the degree to which a
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specific content is applied to a category (as per previous experiments) but also the type 
of content applied to a category. Therefore, the current experiment lends further support 
to the notion that stereotype content is not only context-dependent but also theory- 
dependent.
There were also large differences in stereotype content across stimulus interview type. 
Specifically, those presented with the consistent interview tended to characterise the 
long-term unemployed in more ‘internal’ terms whereas those presented with the 
inconsistent interview tended to characterise the long-term unemployed in more 
‘external’ terms. While differences in content across interview type seemed to make 
sense, the results are interesting to consider in light of previous research on stereotype 
change. As discussed in Chapter 3, much of the research in this area has suggested that 
it is quite difficult to change stereotype content by presenting disconfirming 
information, and that usually this information will only be effective if it is dispersed 
across group members who are otherwise seen as typical of the category (e.g., Johnston 
& Hewstone, 1992; Johnston et al., 1994). In the current experiment, stereotype change 
appears to be occurring in response to a single disconfirming stimulus person. It appears 
that the presentation of the disconfirming stimulus person led participants to revise their 
stereotype of the long-term unemployed. This appears to be more consistent with the 
‘conversion’ model of stereotype change (Rothbart, 1981).
Likewise, the presentation of the inconsistent stimulus interview may have stimulated 
participants to think more about the reasons for unemployment and may subsequently 
have changed the meaning of this category. Thus, it is possible that a type of ‘theory- 
generation’ took place throughout the study, and not just in response to our intended 
manipulation. This could have impacted on the lack of effects for theory type in the 
inconsistent interview condition. The results of this experiment suggest that theory- 
generation may be a complex and highly variable phenomenon and that the theories 
people employ may change quite rapidly. This is consistent with the argument that 
people’s background knowledge contains contradictions and inconsistencies that may be
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resolved in response to any given judgement but does not contain any constant 
representation in an ongoing fashion.
Interestingly, there appeared to be some difference in the traits chosen to characterise 
the stimulus person across theory type. Most strikingly, for participants given the 
inconsistent interview, those with Theory B were more inclined to characterise Dave as 
unlucky, intelligent and educated. According to their theory, these participants believe 
that with hard work and ability anyone can succeed. Dave appears to fail despite his 
hard work and ability. Therefore he must be extremely unlucky. Also his intelligence 
and education are emphasised, indicating that his lack of unemployment cannot be 
attributed to his personal failings but rather externally. Characterisations of Dave tended 
to be more external for those given Theory B and the inconsistent interview compared 
to those given Theory A. It appears that even though these participants had generated 
theories tending to attribute success to internal factors they attributed Dave’s lack of 
success to external factors.
In conclusion, this experiment demonstrated that both perceived prototypicality and 
stereotype content can vary with different background theories, that are linked to salient 
self-categorizations. This lends further support to the argument that the meaning and 
content of categories are not only context-dependent, but also theory-dependent.
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Chapter 12
Implications and Conclusions
This thesis has sought to develop an analysis of the formation of stereotype content. It 
has done so by applying self-categorization theory’s account of category salience to the 
issue of category formation and content formation. Specifically, it has considered how 
stereotype content forms to reflect an interaction between comparative and normative 
fit. In doing this, we have elaborated upon the concept of normative fit and linked it to 
an understanding of how our broad background knowledge and theories influence social 
stereotyping. Likewise, the work of this thesis has developed the self-categorization 
theory analysis of social categorization and social stereotyping.
The aims of this thesis were threefold. Firstly, we aimed to demonstrate how 
comparative and normative fit operate together to produce stereotype content. 
Specifically, we have argued that stereotype content reflects comparative differences 
between groups that are also normative or meaningful. Importantly, content should not 
reflect comparative differences that are not normative, or normative expectations that 
are not accompanied by comparative differences. Experiments 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
addressed this aim of the thesis.
Our second aim was to demonstrate that while the normative direction and meaning of 
group differences is important, there is not a fixed consistency or fit between specific 
content and social categories. Specifically, we aimed to demonstrate that the 
consistency or fit between an attribute and a category can vary with background 
knowledge and theories. Thus, normative fit should not be conceptualised as a fixed set 
of expectations or content about a category; rather, normative fit is interpreted within 
the framework of broader knowledge and theories. Experiments 5, 6, and 7 all addressed 
this aim of the thesis.
The third aim of the thesis was to demonstrate that background knowledge and theories 
are broader than individual schemas or individual personality differences. It was argued
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that people have a broad range of theoretical knowledge to draw upon, and which part is 
used on any one occasion will depend upon which part of that knowledge is made 
accessible. The knowledge applied will be linked to salient self-categorizations. This 
knowledge will influence subsequent stereotype content and shape the meaning of 
social categories. Experiments 6 and 7 addressed this final aim of the thesis.
In this chapter we begin by reviewing the theoretical arguments made in this thesis and 
the empirical findings of the studies performed. Following this review, we will consider 
the theoretical implications of what this thesis has found in relation to the three aims 
outlined above. Finally, we will discuss some possible future directions for research in 
this field and conclude with some final comments.
Review of thesis
Chapters 2 to 5 of the thesis reviewed the stereotyping literature with respect to the 
issue of stereotype content formation. In Chapter 2, ‘early’ approaches to stereotyping 
and content were considered. In particular, this chapter considered the beginnings of the 
cognitive analysis of categorization and stereotyping which later approaches built upon. 
We began by reviewing early ‘checklist’ studies of stereotype content, the ‘kernel of 
truth’ debate, personality-based approaches to prejudice, and early psychological 
accounts of stereotyping that considered the importance of the group in stereotype 
formation and application. We also reviewed the beginnings of the cognitive analysis of 
stereotyping, with Allport’s work on the nature of prejudice. This analysis was 
expanded and concretised by Tajfel and colleagues via their work on accentuation 
effects resulting from categorization (e.g., Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963) and ingroup bias in 
the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel et al., 1971).
In terms of the concerns of this thesis, the work by Tajfel and colleagues is important 
for a number of reasons. Three points in particular are especially relevant to the 
arguments and analysis made in this thesis. Firstly, this work introduced the idea that 
the basic cognitive process involved in stereotyping is categorization — therefore, to 
understand stereotyping we must understand categorization. Secondly, it demonstrated
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that it is those dimensions that are correlated with a division into distinct categories that 
form stereotypes. Thus, stereotype content, seen as the accentuation of differences 
between groups and similarities within groups, should reflect those dimensions that are 
correlated with a division into groups. Thirdly, this work argued that accentuation will 
only occur in terms of relevant dimensions — thus only differences between groups that 
are somehow associated with the division into groups will be reflected in stereotype 
content. Thus, stereotype content is connected with both the degree of differentiation 
between groups and the nature of the dimensions on which differences between social 
groups are accentuated.
In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, three ‘contemporary’ approaches to stereotyping were reviewed 
with respect to how they explain stereotype content. Chapter 3 reviewed approaches to 
stereotype content from within the social cognition tradition. In this approach, 
stereotypes are conceptualised as relatively fixed cognitive structures, which have 
content associated with them. Thus, a distinction is made between the formation of 
stereotype content (how content comes to be initially associated with a cognitive 
stereotype) and the application of that content to any given social judgement (how and 
when the content associated with a stereotype is applied). Stereotype content is argued 
to form largely via bottom-up or data-driven processes. When it comes to stereotype 
application, however, top-down processes are argued to dominate. Stereotypes, once 
formed, tend to be quite resistant to change and tend to act in favour of their own 
confirmation. Thus, they tend to bias the encoding, recall and use of information in 
favour of their maintenance.
The activation and application of stereotype content starts with the categorization of a 
stimulus object. Initial categorization is argued to be determined by salient cues, 
priming (e.g., via category labels) and accessibility. If features of the stimulus fit the 
activated category then it will be stereotyped in terms of that category (i.e., the content 
associated with that category will be applied to it). Good fit occurs when the features of 
the stimulus are similar to the features of the stored category. Thus, the application of a 
stereotype is determined by category-attribute fit and the interpretation of fit is biased
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towards category confirmation. If activated stereotypes can possibly be confirmed, they 
will be. This implies that stereotype-inconsistent information will often be assimilated 
into the pre-existing stereotype. However, if inconsistent information does not fit the 
initial stereotype, and cannot be made to do so, then impressions formed will tend to be 
more individuated (and data-driven) and less categorical (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). 
Alternatively, when faced with inconsistent exemplars, perceivers may sub-type these 
exemplars and maintain their initial stereotype. Only if the inconsistent exemplars are 
seen as otherwise typical of the initial category (and are dispersed rather than 
concentrated) is change in the initial stereotype argued to occur to accommodate the 
inconsistent information.
Thus, in Chapter 3, the following important points emerged with respect to the 
formation of stereotype content: (a) stereotype content formation and application are 
conceptualised as separate and distinct processes; (b) while formation tends to be based 
on bottom-up processes, application tends to be based on top-down processes; (c) the 
application of stereotype content is determined by the fit between the stimulus and the 
category, and this in turn is determined by the perceived similarity between features of 
the stimulus and the category. Importantly, from this perspective fit appears to be seen 
as a fairly fixed property of the stimulus defined in relation to a category (Spears & 
Haslam, 1997). Since categories are seen as fixed, enduring cognitive structures, what is 
considered as consistent or inconsistent with them, typical or atypical, fitting or not 
fitting, is also considered to be fixed, and determined by the expectancies associated 
with the category.
Chapter 3 outlines an approach to stereotyping which is based largely around the 
operation of individual cognitive processes. The research reviewed in Chapter 4 takes a 
more collective approach to stereotyping and stereotype content. In particular, the 
approaches covered in Chapter 4 have been critical of the social cognitive approach and 
its emphasis on individual cognitive processes to the exclusion of content. Perspectives 
such as social representations theory have taken the content of cognitions as their focus 
and have emphasised that content is shared within groups and within society via
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processes of social communication. This approach views stereotyping largely as a ‘top- 
down’ process whereby data is interpreted in terms of social representations. In many 
respects these are similar to schemas; however, they have a social and consensual basis. 
Discursive social psychology has emphasised the variability of content both between 
and within groups, and within individuals. They argue against the notion of fixed 
cognitive structures which ‘contain’ category content; they suggest that content is 
variably constructed via discourse to serve strategic ends for individuals and groups. We 
have suggested that both these approaches, while taking content as their focus, fail to 
adequately predict content and provide a psychological analysis of content formation.
In Chapter 5 we turned our attention to the third major contemporary approach to 
stereotyping which we have termed interactionist. The research reviewed in this chapter 
was mainly conducted from the perspective of self-categorization theory. For self­
categorization theory, stereotyping is intimately tied up with the categorization process. 
Categorization is argued to be a comparative and context-dependent process. In 
accordance with the principle of comparative fit, categories form so as to maximise 
inter-class differences and minimise intra-class differences (meta-contrast). However, a 
full understanding of categorization also takes into account both the accessibility of 
categories and the normative content of categories. Self-categorization theory has 
applied an ‘accessibility x fit’ hypothesis to understanding category salience and argues 
that given appropriate accessibility or perceiver readiness, salience reflects an 
interaction between comparative and normative fit, where normative fit refers to the 
‘match’ between category specifications and the perceiver’s background knowledge and 
theories about that category.
The same principles that explain categorization can be applied to an explanation of the 
content of categories (or stereotypes). Thus, from the perspective of self-categorization 
theory, the formation of stereotype content can be explained in terms of the principles of 
perceiver readiness, comparative and normative fit. The principle of comparative fit 
implies that the content of stereotypes is flexible and context-dependent, and in Chapter 
5 we have reviewed evidence supportive of this position. Normative fit points us
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towards the role of expectations, theories and background knowledge in determining 
stereotype content. In Chapter 5 we expanded upon how theories and knowledge have 
been treated in cognitive psychology and examined emerging evidence from social 
psychology suggesting the importance of broad knowledge structures in influencing the 
interpretation and categorization of stimuli. Finally, in Chapter 5 the role of collective 
factors in determining stereotype content was discussed.
In Chapter 6 we attempted to draw together the research reviewed in the previous four 
chapters into a theoretical account of the formation of stereotype content. This was done 
in terms of two main issues. The first issue concerned the role of bottom-up versus top- 
down determinants of stereotype content. The second issue concerned the role of 
individual versus collective factors in the formation of stereotype content. In terms of 
the first issue, we contrasted the positions outlined by the social cognition approach and 
by self-categorization theory. The social cognition perspective makes a distinction 
between the formation and the application of stereotypes, with bottom-up processes 
dominating at formation and top-down processes dominating at application. Stereotypes 
are argued to form based on real or illusory correlations between social categories and 
observed behaviours. Once formed, these stereotypes (and their content) are stored as 
relatively fixed cognitive structures. These stereotypes influence the perception of 
subsequent stimuli and bias perception in favour of their confirmation. This perspective 
also makes a distinction between individuated and categorical impressions, with 
individuated impression argued to be data-driven and categorical impression theory- 
driven.
In contrast, self-categorization theory sees all impressions as being categorical. 
Likewise, it makes no distinction between the formation and application of stereotype 
content, with these two things being elements of the same process, namely the 
categorization process. Thus, stereotype content is applied as it is formed. This means 
that stereotypes and their content are not conceptualised as fixed, enduring cognitive 
representations of social groups. Rather they are actively constructed to reflect an 
interplay between theory and data. This interplay is conceptualised in terms of the
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interaction between comparative and normative fit. Stereotype content is the perceived 
similarities within groups and differences between groups on relevant dimensions. The 
perception of these similarities and differences is argued to be both context-dependent 
(reflecting comparative fit) and theory-dependent (reflecting normative fit).
The second issue discussed in Chapter 6 concerned the role of individual versus 
collective factors in determining stereotype content. Self-categorization theory argues 
that stereotyping is a function of individual cognitive and social, group-based factors 
operating in interaction with each other. Stereotype content is socially determined in 
two senses: firstly, content is derived from shared beliefs such as theories, and secondly, 
social processes influence the cognitive processes that in turn determine content. Shared 
beliefs, such as theories, arise within social groups. Our self-categorizations as members 
of a given social group will determine what shared knowledge is brought to bear upon a 
given social judgement, and these self-categorizations themselves are context- and 
theory-dependent just as categorizations of others are. Thus, from a self-categorization 
theory perspective, stereotype content is determined by knowledge and theories shared 
within social groups. However, as salient self-categorizations vary so will the 
knowledge and theories that are most relevant. Therefore, this perspective can account 
for the variability of stereotype content between groups, within groups and within 
individuals at different times.
At the conclusion of Chapter 6 we outlined our theoretical account of the formation of 
stereotype content, and the theoretical and empirical aims of the thesis. Specifically, we 
have argued that an account of stereotype content formation needs to incorporate both 
theory and data, and individual and collective factors. Stereotype content forms to 
reflect an interaction between stimulus data and background knowledge and theories. 
Content reflects the application of background knowledge and theories to the 
representation and interpretation of a stimulus reality within a specific comparative 
context. Background knowledge and theories derive from the ingroup. Our self­
categorization as ingroup members is in turn determined by the comparative context
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operating. The flexibility of the categorization process means that stereotype content is 
itself flexible and varies with context and with theories/knowledge.
Three theoretical and empirical aims of the thesis were outlined. The first aim was to 
elaborate upon the interaction between theory and data in determining stereotype 
content. Specifically we aimed to investigate the role of comparative and normative fit 
in determining stereotype content and to demonstrate that content reflects an interaction 
between comparative and normative fit. The second aim of the thesis was to elaborate 
on the concept of normative fit in terms of its link to background knowledge and 
theories. Specifically we aimed to demonstrate that normative fit is more than a fixed 
expectation about the content of a social category; rather the fit between content and 
category is both context- and theory-dependent. Thus, the content that is considered to 
be consistent with a given social category is not fixed but varies with background 
knowledge and theories. The third and final aim which the thesis addressed was to 
consider the variability of theoretical knowledge and its link to salient self­
categorizations. We aimed to demonstrate that different types of theoretical knowledge 
have different effects upon stereotype content, and that the accessibility of theoretical 
knowledge can vary.
Chapters 7 to 11 outlined a program of research which sought to address the above 
aims. Experiments 1 and 2 were outlined in Chapter 7. They addressed the first aim of 
the thesis. Experiment 1 manipulated the level of comparative fit (high or low) between 
attributes (intelligence and friendliness) and groups, and looked at the subsequent 
stereotyping of groups in terms of those attributes. In general, it was found that 
participants tended to differentiate between groups relatively more in terms of the 
attribute for which there was higher comparative fit. However, this effect was found to 
be much stronger for the friendliness dimension compared to the intelligence dimension. 
Interestingly, groups as described highly friendly and moderately unintelligent were 
judged in more positive terms than those described as highly intelligent and moderately 
unfriendly. This suggests that, while there was no explicit normative fit operating in this
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experiment, participants appeared to have implicit expectations about the nature of the 
groups, and their relative positivity.
Experiment 2 was largely a replication of Experiment 1 with the addition of a normative 
variable. Specifically, groups were given labels (chess players and tour guides) that 
were either consistent with attributes describing them (intelligence and friendliness) or 
inconsistent. Results showed that participants stereotyped significantly more in terms of 
differentiating attributes when labels were consistent with intergroup differences 
compared to inconsistent. Therefore, given comparative fit, more stereotyping occurred 
when there was good normative fit compared to counter-normative fit. However, a 
predicted interaction between comparative and normative fit was not found. Given good 
normative fit, there were no significant differences in stereotyping across degrees of 
comparative fit.
Chapter 8 outlined Experiments 3 and 4 which largely replicated Experiments 1 and 2 
with some changes to methodology and dependent variables. An important change to 
these experiments was that before completing dependent variables participants were 
asked to write a short ‘explanation’ for the behaviours of the people in the two groups. 
The results of Experiment 3 were very similar to Experiment 1 with participants 
differentiating between groups relatively more in terms of the dimension for which there 
was higher comparative fit and with this effect again being stronger for the friendliness 
versus intelligence dimension. In addition, the highly friendly and moderately 
unintelligent group was seen in highly positive terms and the highly 
unfriendly/moderately intelligent group seen in highly negative terms as might be 
expected. However, the highly intelligent/moderately unfriendly and highly 
unintelligent/moderately friendly groups were both seen in moderately positive terms. 
This suggests that the traits intelligence and friendliness may impact upon the 
interpretation of each other, with friendliness being the dominant dimension in terms of 
forming impressions.
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While Experiment 4 was designed to replicate Experiment 2, a quite different set of 
results was found. In this experiment no significant results involving the ‘label-type’ 
variable (an operationalisation of normative fit) were found. We have suggested, in 
Chapter 8, that asking participants to write an explanation for the behaviours observed 
may have activated theories or knowledge which reconciled any apparent 
inconsistencies between group labels and behaviours. This possibility was backed up by 
an examination of the types of explanations generated by participants in this study.
In light of the contradictory results found in Experiments 2 and 4, Experiment 5 (as 
discussed in Chapter 9) was designed to further explore the role of comparative and 
normative in determining stereotype content and to investigate the influence that theory- 
generation may have upon the operation of normative fit. The experiment manipulated 
the level of fit (high/no normative/no comparative) between groups and the attribute 
‘friendliness’, and whether participants generated a theory or not. The results showed 
clear differences in the level of stereotyping across comparative and normative fit. With 
no theory generation, participants stereotyped relatively more when both comparative 
and normative fit were operating together compared to when there was comparative fit 
but counter-normative fit, or normative labels but no comparative fit. We have argued 
that these results show that stereotype content reflects the effect of comparative and 
normative fit operating together. The influence of comparative fit depends on the level 
of normative fit and vice versa.
A different pattern of effects across the fit variable were found when a theory was 
generated— specifically no difference in the level of stereotyping between the high fit 
and no normative fit conditions. This appeared to be due to both a lower level of 
stereotyping in the high fit condition and a higher level of stereotyping in the no 
normative fit condition. An analysis of the types of theories generated in this experiment 
indicated that these fell mainly into two types — individualistic or personality-based 
versus social or group-based. Not surprisingly, different patterns of stereotyping were 
observed depending on the types of theories generated with ‘social’ theories tending to 
produce more stereotyping than ‘individualistic’ theories.
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Chapter 10 of the thesis discussed Experiment 6, which aimed to expand upon the role 
of normative fit and theories in determining stereotype content. Specifically, it tested 
how different types of theories influenced the interpretation of the fit between social 
categories and behaviours. Participants were ‘primed’ with theories similar to those 
spontaneously generated in Experiment 5 (i.e., either fixed-personality or social- 
variable) or were not primed with any explicit theory. In addition, the labels given to 
social categories were manipulated such that they were either consistent or inconsistent 
with the behaviours presented about those groups. Results showed that levels of 
stereotyping varied with the type of theory which was initially activated. Specifically, 
when category labels were inconsistent, one type of theory (the fixed-personality 
theory) produced very little stereotyping whereas the variable-social theory produced 
stereotyping at levels equivalent to those observed when category labels were 
consistent. As argued previously, stereotyping in terms of a trait is hypothesised to 
occur when there is good fit between the trait and the category. In this experiment it 
appeared that the fit between the categories tour guide and chess player, and the 
attribute friendliness, varied with the type of theory made accessible. This suggests that 
the normative fit between a category and a trait is not fixed but theory-dependent.
In Chapter 11 we outlined the final experiment of this thesis, Experiment 7. We aimed 
in this study to demonstrate the influence of different types of theories upon stereotype 
content both in terms of the perceived prototypicality of a stimulus person with a given 
social category, and in terms of the traits applied to describe that social category. 
Participants generated two different types of theories about success (in response to a 
statement which they initially expressed disagreement with). We attempted to link these 
theories to self-categorizations as persons who disagreed with an initial statement 
compared to those who agreed with it. Theories generated were consistent within groups 
and differed between groups. Participants were then presented with a stimulus person 
who was either consistent or inconsistent with the category long-term unemployed. 
Judgements of the prototypicality of the stimulus person with the category varied across 
theory-type (although this was only found for the consistent stimulus person). Thus, the
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same stimulus person was seen as more or less prototypical of the category ‘long-term 
unemployed’ depending on the type of theory being used. Variations in stereotype 
content were also found across theory-type with participants tending to characterise the 
category ‘long-term unemployed’ in terms of traits that fitted with their initial theory.
Overall, the empirical work of the thesis produced good evidence in support of our 
theoretical position. It appears that stereotype content reflects both the comparative and 
normative aspects of fit, and that stereotyping occurs when both of these variables are 
operating together. In addition, it appears that the normative fit between content and 
category is interpreted in light of a specific theoretical context and thus normative fit, 
and content, are variable and theory-dependent. Finally, the empirical work has 
demonstrated how different types of theories may be made accessible and the differing 
impact of these theories on normative fit, and the perceived prototype and content of 
categories.
Theoretical implications
The theoretical implications of the findings of this thesis are now discussed in terms of 
the three major aims of the thesis, namely: (a) to demonstrate how comparative and 
normative fit operate together to produce stereotype content, (b) to elaborate upon the 
concept of normative fit and demonstrate its relationship with background knowledge 
and theories and (c) to expand upon the nature of theories as diverse and socially- 
derived and shared pieces of knowledge. In this section we examine the implications of 
what this thesis has found in terms of those three aims. We begin, however, by 
considering how stereotype content and stereotype content formation have been 
conceptualised in this thesis.
One contribution of this thesis has been to clarify what is meant by stereotype content 
formation and to define what is meant by stereotype content from a self-categorization 
theory perspective. We have defined stereotype content as the nature in which, and the 
extent to which, a group of people are seen as similar to each other and different from 
some other relevant comparison group. Content is those attributes or dimensions on
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which we perceive group members to be alike, and different from other groups. Thus, 
there are two aspects to content — its nature and its degree. The nature of content tends 
to depend upon normative fit, which determines whether we see certain types of 
attributes as fitting a given social category. The degree to which we perceive this 
attribute to be shared within a social category depends upon comparative fit, which 
when operating tends to accentuate similarities within and differences between groups. 
Of course, in practice, the nature and degree of content are always linked, just as are 
normative and comparative fit.
Our definition of content implies that it is context-dependent. We have argued that 
content forms to reflect an interaction between comparative and normative fit within 
any given context. This, in turn implies that content is not fixed but varies from context 
to context. Thus, we do not consider stereotype content formation to be the formation of 
a permanent set of traits that come to be cognitively associated with a social group, 
waiting to be activated at some subsequent time. Instead we have argued that content 
forms as it is used in response to a specific and unique interaction between theory and 
data. Stereotype content formation is the product of the process of social categorization. 
Thus the way in which we have approached content formation, which derives from the 
theoretical perspective employed, is somewhat different from past accounts of content. 
Importantly, in our view content is not a fixed sets of traits permanently associated with 
a social category and stored, waiting to be applied whenever that category is cued. 
Rather, we view content as variable and context-specific product of the categorization 
process, formed and used on any given occasion, but not existing in any permanent, 
ongoing form.
Turning now to the first aim of the thesis, namely to demonstrate that stereotype content 
reflects an interaction between comparative and normative fit. A contribution of this 
thesis has been to clarify the nature of the interaction that is predicted to occur between 
comparative and normative fit. An interaction means that the influence of one variable 
should depend upon the level of another variable (and vice versa). Thus, the influence of 
comparative fit upon stereotype content should depend upon the level of normative fit,
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and the influence of normative fit upon stereotype content should depend upon the level 
of comparative fit. We have hypothesised that given high comparative fit, stereotyping 
will occur when there is also good normative fit but not when there is poor or counter- 
normative fit. This was demonstrated in Experiment 2 where it was shown that given 
the same level of comparative fit, participants stereotyped more when groups labels 
were consistent versus inconsistent. Likewise, Experiment 5 showed that with high 
comparative fit, more stereotyping occurred when labels were consistent versus 
inconsistent (given no theory-generation). The other prediction implied by an 
interaction is that given good normative fit, there should be more stereotyping when 
comparative fit is high compared to when there is no comparative fit. However, as has 
been discussed previously, normative fit is tied to comparative fit such that if there are 
no differences between groups (no comparative fit) there can be no normative fit. Thus, 
it makes no sense to talk of normative fit when there is no comparative fit, as normative 
fit concerns the nature of differences between groups (and similarities within groups). 
However, groups may have normative labels attached to them that imply some content 
for the groups, even if the groups do not differ from each other. In Experiment 5 we 
demonstrated that given the same normative labels for two groups, more stereotyping 
occurred when there was high comparative fit (consistent with those labels) compared to 
no comparative fit.
The experiments carried out in this thesis have demonstrated that stereotype content 
reflects an interaction between comparative and normative fit. That is, stereotype 
content reflects comparative differences between groups that are meaningful in terms of 
our expectations, background theories and knowledge about those groups. Comparative 
differences between groups, which are counter-normative, will contribute very little to 
stereotype content. Likewise, where no comparative differences exist between groups 
expectations about those groups will tend not be reflected in content if those 
expectations do not match ‘reality’ (i.e., real comparative differences). Thus, 
stereotyping should only occur when comparative and normative fit are operating 
together, and stereotype content reflects the operation of these two variables together.
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Theoretically we have argued that no (or little) stereotyping in terms of a given trait 
should occur when either comparative or normative fit are absent. This implies that 
comparative and normative fit are always linked and operating together. We have 
argued above that normative fit cannot operate in the absence of comparative fit. 
Normative fit always relates to the nature and direction of differences between groups; 
thus these differences must first exist. A related question concerns whether comparative 
fit can operate in the absence of normative fit. Do differences between groups always 
imply some meaning and expectations associated with those differences? In 
Experiments 1 and 3, comparative fit was manipulated independently of normative fit 
and stereotyping in terms of the differentiating dimensions was observed. However, we 
have suggested that while normative fit was not explicitly manipulated in these 
experiments, an implicit normative fit may have been operating. For example, it 
appeared that the presentation of behaviours about groups that were both, say, 
unfriendly and intelligent, led participants to form expectations about the types of 
people that would be in these groups. The explanations produced in Experiment 3 
suggested that participants formed quite distinctive impressions of the groups depending 
on which traits were used to describe them and how extreme these traits were. We 
would argue that comparative differences between groups always and necessarily imply 
some normative expectations about the nature of these groups. However, the same 
comparative differences may be interpreted differently depending upon the normative fit 
with these differences.
The second major aim of this thesis was to elaborate upon the concept of normative fit. 
Most importantly, it has been argued in this thesis that normative fit is not fixed but 
both context- and theory-dependent. Early definitions of normative fit may give the 
impression that it represents a rather fixed match with a stereotype about a social group 
and is similar to fit as outlined by models such as Fiske and Neuberg’s continuum 
model (1990). For example, Oakes et al. (1991) in discussing normative fit state that the 
dimensions seen as fitting a categorization will be those “which correlate with the social 
categorization in a way that is perceived to be consistent with its substantive meaning,
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its defining stereotypical and normative content” (p. 127). Likewise, in past research 
normative fit has been operationalised as the fit between content and expectations 
implied by category labels (e.g., Oakes et al., 1991). Research from the social cognitive 
perspective has argued that category labels can act to cue categories which have a 
stereotype cognitively associated with them. For example, if a group of people are 
described as ‘doctors’ this will cue a set of stereotypic expectations associated with that 
category label, and these in turn will bias the interpretation of subsequent information 
about that category (Fiske et al., 1987). However, normative fit should not be 
conceptualised as narrowly as a set of expectations about a social group. Indeed later 
definitions of normative fit make clear that it does not involve a simple matching 
process between, say, a category label and stored stereotype. Oakes et al. (1999) define 
normative fit as “the match between the content properties of stimuli and general 
‘background theories’, normative beliefs about the substantive meaning of the category” 
(p. 59). This second definition is closer to the treatment of normative fit in this thesis. 
Importantly this definition implies that normative fit is related to background theories 
and knowledge.
We have argued in this thesis that normative fit does not represent a fixed expectation to 
which stimulus data is matched, or a fixed relationship between data and theory. 
Normative fit is variable and is both context- and theory-dependent. By saying 
normative fit is variable, we mean that the fit between a certain attribute and a certain 
category will not always be the same. Firstly, it depends on the comparative context; 
attributes that are normatively fitting of Americans when compared to Australians may 
not be the same as those that are normatively fitting when Americans are compared to 
Iraqis. In this thesis, we have been concerned with demonstrating that the interpretation 
of normative fit also depends upon the background knowledge or theory which is 
applied. Thus, for example, interpreting friendliness as consistent or fitting with the 
category ‘tour guides’ and not the category ‘chess players’ depends upon the theoretical 
context within which that judgement is made (see Experiment 6). We would argue that 
normative fit is not the same thing as background knowledge and theories, but that
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normative fit is interpreted in light of knowledge/theories just as it is interpreted in light 
of context. Theories shape the meaning of categories by offering explanations of what 
traits do and do not make sense for that category.
While we have argued that normative fit should not simply be considered a match with 
a category label associated with a set of fixed expectations, we have used meaningful 
category labels as an operationalisation of normative fit. Like Wisniewski and Medin 
(1994) we believe that meaningful category labels can, at a simple level, activate 
theories and knowledge. The category label, tour guide, serves to activate beliefs, 
expectations and knowledge we have about tour guides. In this sense, category labels 
may act as low level theories. However, the set of beliefs/expectations/knowledge are 
quite broad and, importantly, the label tour guide could be associated with a different set 
of content given a different, broader theory (see Experiment 6). Thus, category labels do 
cue expectations/theories but may not always cue the same set of expectations/theories.
The above arguments concerning normative fit, and the previous arguments regarding 
the interaction between comparative and normative fit, suggest that the content of 
categories is not fixed. This has implications for category structure. It implies that social 
categories are not represented by a fixed prototype and that the ‘meaning’ of categories 
is also not fixed. Previous research has demonstrated that prototypicality is context- 
dependent. Likewise, it is also theory-dependent. The person seen as most 
representative or typical of a category should vary as the ‘meaning’ of that category 
varies. This meaning, in turn, varies with the theoretical context in which the category is 
interpreted. Thus, for example, the meaning of the category ‘long-term unemployed’ 
varies depending on whether we believe success has an individualistic or collective 
basis (see Experiment 7). In line with this variation, the person seen as being most 
prototypical of this category also varies. The same person can be considered more or 
less prototypical of the same category depending on the theory being employed. This 
suggests that categories are not cognitively stored with a fixed structure but that 
categories are actively constructed to represent reality as interpreted in light of relevant
theories.
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The third aim of this thesis was to expand upon the nature of theories. We wish to 
distinguish theoretical knowledge from schemas or stereotypes that may be associated 
with certain social groups. We have argued that, in contrast, theoretical knowledge is 
quite broad and diverse, and may even contain inconsistencies and contradictions. The 
knowledge that is brought to bear upon any given social judgement may represent only 
a sub-set of the total store of knowledge that could be drawn upon. This implies that the 
theories used on any given occasion may be quite variable. We have argued previously 
that such theories can vary both within and between persons. In Experiment 5 
participants generated a range of explanations to account for the same set of data, 
indicating variability in theories between persons. In Experiment 6, participants who 
had been randomly assigned to theory-type, were willingly to accept and make use of 
opposing types of theories. Presumably there was nothing ‘special’ about the people in 
these groups which made them more likely to endorse one type of theory versus the 
other, and, if selected for the other group, would have endorsed and applied the theory 
presented to that group. It would appear that most people have access to a fairly broad 
store of knowledge and will be aware of contradictory arguments. Which parts of that 
knowledge are applied will depend upon which parts of that knowledge is made 
accessible and is relevant. In Experiment 6 we attempted to make different types of 
theories accessible to participants by presenting them in a convincing fashion and 
making them personally relevant for participants. We do not see different types of 
theories as personality-type variables via which different types of people perceive and 
interpret the world in different types of ways.
The theories which individuals employ, however, are often tied to group memberships. 
An important distinction between theories and, say, schemas, is that the former are 
collectively produced. We are likely to employ those theories which are endorsed by our 
ingroup and thus the content of stereotypes produced by ingroup members should be 
consensual. In Experiment 7 we attempted to make participants’ self-categorizations 
salient as persons who disagreed with a certain ideological perspective compared to 
those who endorsed it. The subsequent theories produced by participants tended to be
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quite similar within groups and different between groups, and different stereotype 
content was produced depending on the initial type of theory generated.
Importantly, we do not conceptualise theories as either an individual difference variable 
or as a type of cognitive bias. We do not believe that some types of people hold one 
type of theory about the world while another type holds an opposing theory. Such ideas 
hark back to individualistic accounts of ideology such as the authoritarian personality. 
Instead we believe that the theories applied on any one occasion are drawn from a broad 
and diverse store of knowledge. The theories that are applied on any occasion will be 
determined by accessibility and this in turn may depend upon our salient self­
categorizations. Likewise, we do not believe that certain types of theories inevitably 
lead to stereotyping while others do not (e.g., entity theories or ‘essentialist’ theories). 
Instead, we would argue that many different types of theories may produce stereotyping 
provided they allow us to find a fit between data and a category.
Another interesting and fundamental question concerns the exact nature of background 
theories; that is, what exactly is a theory? The term, as we have used it, encompasses 
other terms such as explanations, beliefs, ideologies and knowledge. While there is as 
yet no definitive answer as to what may be considered a theory or not, we believe some 
possible defining characteristics have been outlined above — namely, that they are 
diverse knowledge structures which are broader than categories and which are 
collectively produced and transmitted. Another important feature is that theories may be 
concerned with both content and process. They may tell us something specifically about 
the content of a category (e.g., that tour guides are generally friendly because of the job 
they do). They may imply something more abstract about content (e.g., people’s 
personalities determine the jobs they find themselves in, thus we would be unlikely to 
find a group of unfriendly tour guides). Finally, they may tell us something about how 
we should perceive the world (e.g., that is inappropriate to stereotype others about 
whom we have only limited information, see social judgeability theory). In respect to 
this final point, theories may be likened to metacognitions (Jost, Kruglanski & Nelson,
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1998). Thus, we believe background theories should not simply be considered as 
reservoirs of specific knowledge but also as ways of thinking about social cognitions.
Future directions
The research outlined in this thesis and the theoretical implications discussed above 
point to some interesting areas for future research in this field. While we have argued 
for the importance of both individual-cognitive and collective factors in determining 
stereotype content, the work of this thesis has necessarily concentrated more on the 
individual determinants. The collective determinants of stereotype content remain to be 
explored more fully. Work by Haslam and colleagues has considered the consensuality 
of content and considered the processes via which content becomes consensual. Future 
research should expand this work by considering the consensuality of 
theorics/background knowledge and the processes via which these originate and become 
shared within groups. In particular, the link between identifying with a particular social 
group and endorsing and applying the theories associated with that group needs to be 
further articulated. Likewise, the variability of theories both within and between groups 
(and associated variations in stereotype content) which accompany variations in salient 
self-categorizations could be explored further.
The ideas outlined in the previous section concerning the nature of background theories 
remains largely speculative at this stage and offers an important avenue for further 
research. Of particular interest is the link between theories and metacognitions (Jost et 
al., 1998). Work in cognitive psychology, in particular concerning memory, has 
increasingly been interested in how our metacognitions can influence our cognitive 
processes. For social psychologists interested in social cognitions, such as stereotypes, it 
would appear that investigating how we think about categorization and stereotyping 
would be an obvious direction for further study.
Our approach to stereotype content has argued that content is variable and in any 
instance is determined by an interaction between context and theories. This implies that 
an understanding of stereotype content formation could be fruitfully be applied to
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changing the content of stereotypes. If content is context- and theory-dependent it 
follows that content can be changed by either varying context or varying theories. Work 
by self-categorization theorists has explored how the prototype of a category can be 
changed with variations in comparative context. It could be argued that work in this 
thesis has demonstrated changes in content with variation in the theoretical context 
(e.g., of stereotypes of tour guides or the long-term unemployed). As we have argued 
previously, we do not believe that content is associated with social categories in any 
fixed ongoing fashion. Thus, this perspective implies that stereotype content should 
always be changing. However, in practice the comparative context in which we view 
social groups is often quite constant and may be difficult to change. It may be more 
fruitful to bring about change by ‘attacking’ people’s theories. Thus, perhaps the 
emphasis in future research should not be upon changing stereotype content per se but 
on investigating how to change the theories and ideologies which produce that content.
We observed in both Experiments 5 and 6 that participants in high fit conditions, who 
also had theories, showed a tendency to stereotype less compared to those without 
theories. It has been suggested that this may be linked to the distinction between active 
and passive processing, with theories encouraging people to engage in more active 
processing of data and to employ less stereotyping. It would be interesting to explore 
further the distinction between active and passive processing, and the link to the use of 
theories.
Final comments
In the opening chapter of this thesis we suggested that stereotype content is returning to 
social psychologists’ research agenda as an important topic. It is hoped that the work of 
this thesis has advanced our understanding of that topic and in particular the processes 
by which stereotype content forms. In developing self-categorization theory’s analysis 
of social categorization and social stereotyping with respect to stereotype content, it is 
hoped that this work has offered an alternative way of conceptualising stereotype 
content and its formation that can be usefully employed in further research.
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This thesis has also explored the role of background theories in stereotyping and in 
producing stereotype content. In recent years social psychologists, especially 
stereotyping researchers, have increasingly acknowledged the importance of 
explanatory knowledge structures. We have argued that background theories need to be 
distinguished from schemas, social categories, personality variables and cognitive 
biases. We believe that the nature of these knowledge structures may be quite complex 
and that it is important that they are not reduced to constructs already widely used in 
stereotyping research for the sake of simplicity. Importantly, the collective nature of 
theories needs to be acknowledged and further explored.
Most researchers are ultimately interested in stereotype content because they want to 
change it. They believe certain stereotypes are unjust, harmful or just plain wrong. The 
research carried out in this thesis suggests that the content of stereotypes can be changed 
with changes in either context or theories, or both. In reality, context may often be 
difficult to change with long histories of inter-group relationships or structural barriers 
that maintain the status quo. In such situations focussing on people’s theories and 
ideologies may be the most useful approach. One need only consider the change in 
gender stereotypes over the past few decades which has accompanied the dissemination 
of feminist ideology to be convinced of this position.
In this thesis we have sought to illuminate the process that produces stereotype content. 
We have argued that content is not fixed and does not exist in any ongoing fashion but 
that it reflects the application of background theories to the representation and 
interpretation of stimulus reality within a specific context. Thus, attempting to define 
the specific content associated with any given social group may ultimately prove to be a 
fruitless exercise. Somewhat ironically, what matters with respect to content is the 
process. By understanding the process which produces content we should be able to 
predict the content which forms to represent any given group within any given context. 
Likewise, when attempting to change content it is also process that we should look
towards.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Stimulus Materials
Chapter 7 - Stimulus statements used in Experiments 1 and 2 (in order of 
presentation)
High comparative fit for friendliness condition
A member of Group A gets his hair cut regularly.
A member of Group B has two brothers.
A member of Group A attends foreign language films.
A member of Group B always introduces her friends to each other. 
A member of Group A eats three meals a day.
A member of Group A has her birthday in June.
A member of Group A avoids acquaintances in the street.
A member of Group B likes to spend time with friends.
A member of Group B goes shopping on Wednesdays.
A member of Group A invests her money wisely.
A member of Group B catches the bus to work.
A member of Group B is always laughing.
A member of Group A is interested in current affairs.
A member of Group B is a slow reader.
A member of Group A is often abrupt.
A member of Group B forgets to pay bills on time.
A member of Group B regularly hosts dinner parties.
A member of Group B made the same mistake three times.
A member of Group A hates team sports.
A member of Group B brushes her teeth in the morning.
A member of Group B seems to know everybody.
A member of Group A seldom goes to parties.
A member of Group A is an avid reader.
A member of Group A grew up in Canberra.
A member of Group A prefers to travel alone.
A member of Group B took a lift to the third floor.
A member of Group A was top of her class.
A member of Group B enjoys meeting people.
A member of Group B sometimes watches television.
A member of Group A failed his driver’s test for the fourth time.
A member of Group A suffers from hayfever.
A member of Group B attended the symphony concert.
A member of Group A has milk in her coffee.
A member of Group A never lends anything.
A member of Group B has difficulty following street maps.
A member of Group B went away and forgot to lock the house.
High comparative fit for intelligence
A member of Group B eats three meals a day.
A member of Group B grew up in Canberra.
A member of Group A gives directions to tourists.
A member of Group A brushes her teeth in the morning.
A member of Group A is interested in current affairs.
A member of Group A likes to do things by herself.
A member of Group B belongs to a number of social clubs.
A member of Group B has difficulty following street maps.
A member of Group B gets his hair cut regularly.
A member of Group A hates making small talk.
A member of Group B always introduces her friends to each other. 
A member of Group B went away and forgot to lock the house.
A member of Group A took a lift to the third floor.
A member of Group A is an avid reader.
A member of Group B forgot to renew her driver’s licence.
A member of Group A seldom goes to parties.
A member of Group B suffers from hayfever.
A member of Group B finds crossword puzzles difficult.
A member of Group B has milk in her coffee.
A member of Group A catches the bus to work.
A member of Group B never reads anything except magazines.
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A member of Group B has her birthday in June.
A member of Group B regularly hosts dinner parties.
A member of Group A can add up numbers in her head.
A member of Group B made the same mistake three times.
A member of Group B is always laughing.
A member of Group A finds it hard to chat to strangers.
A member of Group A was top of her class.
A member of Group B is always smiling.
A member of Group A prefers to travel alone.
A member of Group A has an extensive vocabulary.
A member of Group A has two brothers.
A member of Group A invests her money wisely.
A member of Group A sometimes watches television.
A member of Group B seldom initiates conversation with others.
A member of Group A goes shopping on Wednesdays.
Chapter 8 - Stimulus statements used in Experiments 3 and 4 (in order of 
presentation)
High comparative fit for friendliness condition
A member of Group B made the same mistake at work 2 times.
A member of Group B spent every Saturday doing volunteer work for the local school.
A member of Group B took the day’s garbage out before going to bed.
A member of Group A watched a documentary on the ABC.
A member of Group A beat his friend in a game of checkers.
A member of Group B went to the barber on Saturday morning and got a haircut.
A member of Group A listened to a complex debate between the politicians.
A member of Group B listened to a storm warning announcement on the radio.
A member of Group A remembered a list of telephone numbers.
A member of Group A avoids acquaintances in the street.
A member of Group B came out the back of a store and couldn’t figure out where he 
was.
A member of Group B went to visit his friend who was sick in hospital.
A member of Group B took a wrong turn and got lost on his way home from work.
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A member of Group A never has time for others.
A member of Group B brought some groceries on his way home from work.
A member of Group B spent Christmas and new year’s eve on the Gold Coast.
A member of Group a shouted and honked his horn at another driver on the road.
A member of Group A was insensitive to the department store salesperson.
A member of Group B smiled at people as he walked down the street.
A member of Group A went to buy a CD after work.
A member of Group A can add up numbers in his head.
A member of Group A bought a new pair of tennis shoes.
A member of Group B introduced himself to stranger on the bus.
A member of Group B finds crossword puzzles difficult.
A member of Group A has milk in his coffee.
A member of Group A catches a bus to work.
A member of Group B has difficulty following street maps.
A member of Group A never lends anything.
A member of Group B seems to know everyone.
A member of Group A suffers from hayfever.
High comparative fit for intelligence
A member of Group B failed his written driver’s test for the fourth time.
A member of Group A scolded the child for being disobedient.
A member of Group B pointed out the train station to the foreign tourist.
A member of Group A has milk in his coffee.
A member of Group A successfully completed his honour’s thesis with first class 
honours.
A member of Group B regularly hosts dinner parties.
A member of Group B said thank-you to the checkout person in the grocery store as he 
was leaving.
A member of Group B went to a party with his friends over the weekend.
A member of Group A received top prize for his senior essay from the chair of the 
English department.
A member of Group B painted his living room in 3 colours because he couldn’t figure 
out how to mix the paint correctly.
A member of Group A made an off-hand remark to his next-door neighbour.
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A member of Group B went to the movies with his friends one Friday night.
A member of Group B bought some groceries on his way home from work.
A member of Group A bought a new pair of tennis shoes.
A member of Group A earned a Ph.D in electrical engineering in 3 years.
A member of Group A had a quarrel with his roommate one evening.
A member of Group B spent Christmas and new year’s eve on the Gold Coast.
A member of Group B mailed his letters in the garbage bin on the street because he 
thought it was a mailbox.
A member of Group A invented and patented an automatic irrigation system to water his 
garden.
A member of Group B took out the day’s garbage before going to bed.
A member of Group A received a high distinction on his exam.
A member of Group A went to buy a CD after work.
A member of Group B went on holidays and forgot to lock the house.
A member of Group B couldn’t follow the simple instructions correctly.
A member of Group B went to the barber on Saturday morning and got a haircut.
A member of Group A tend to be a loner.
A member of Group A catches the bus to work.
A member of Group A suffers from hay fever.
A member of Group B listened to a storm warning announcement on the radio.
A member of Group A seldom goes to parties.
Chapter 9 - Stimulus statements used in Experiment 5 (both videos) and 
Experiment 6 (high fit video only) (in order of presentation)
High fit video
A member of Group A visited his grandmother every weekend.
A member of Group B hates making small talk.
A member of Group B went to buy a CD after work.
A member of Group A borrowed a book from the library.
A member of Group B never has time for others.
A member of Group A bought some groceries on the way home from work.
A member of Group A smoked a cigar in the non-smoking section of the restaurant.
A member of Group B watched some TV on the weekend.
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A member of Group B pushed rudely across people to get a theatre seat.
A member of Group A listened to a football game on the radio.
A member of Group A smiled at people while walking down the street.
A member of Group A has milk in coffee.
A member of Group A likes to spend time with friends.
A member of Group B helped a young boy repair his bike.
A member of Group B belongs to a number of social clubs.
A member of Group B bought a new pair of tennis shoes.
A member of Group a went to the barber and got a haircut.
A member of Group A introduced himself to strangers on the bus.
A member of Group A was inconsiderate to citizens of another country.
A member of Group B bought a new suit that was on sale.
A member of Group A regularly writes to friends overseas.
A member of Group B regularly hosts dinner parties.
A member of Group A looked after his neighbour’s pets while there were on holidays. 
A member of Group B never lends anything.
A member of Group A scolded and bullied his assistant at work.
A member of Group B listened to a storm warning announcement on the radio.
A member of Group B seldom goes to parties.
A member of Group A eats three meals a day.
A member of Group B refused to give the thirsty paper boy a drink of water.
A member of Group A always introduces friends to each other.
A member of Group B is often abrupt.
A member of Group B seldom initiates conversation with others.
A member of Group B avoids acquaintances in the street.
A member of Group A seems to know everyone.
A member of Group B bought a newspaper on the way home from work.
A member of group A enjoys meeting people.
No fit video
A member of Group B avoids acquaintances in the street.
A member of Group B is often abrupt.
A member of Group B helped a young boy repair his bike.
A member of Group A likes to spend time with friends.
A member of Group A never lends anything.
A member of Group B hates making small talk.
A member of Group A regularly writes to friends overseas.
A member of Group A introduced himself to strangers on the bus.
A member of Group A seldom initiates conversation with others.
A member of Group A always introduces friends to each other.
A member of Group A was inconsiderate to citizens of another country.
A member of Group B bought a new pair of tennis shoes.
A member of Group A bought some groceries on the way home from work.
A member of Group B pushed rudely across people to get a theatre seat.
A member of Group A smiled at people walking down the street.
A member of Group B went to buy a CD after work.
A member of Group A scolded and bullied his assistant at work.
A member of Group A smoked a cigar in the non-smoking section of the restaurant.
A member of Group A listened to a football game on the radio.
A member of Group A went to the barber and got a haircut.
A member of Group a visited his grandmother every weekend.
A member of Group B watched some TV on the weekend.
A member of Group B refused to give the thirsty paper boy a drink.
A member of Group A has milk in coffee.
A member of Group B seems to know everybody.
A member of Group B enjoys meeting people.
A member of Group B regularly hosts dinner parties.
A member of Group B belongs to a number of social clubs.
A member of Group a borrowed a book from the library.
A member of Group B looked after his neighbour’s pets while they were away 
holidays.
A member of Group B bought a newspaper on the way home from work.
A member of Group B seldom goes to parties.
A member of Group B listened to a storm warning announcement on the radio.
A member of Group A eats three meals a day.
A member of Group A never has time for others.
A member of Group B bought a new suit that was on sale.
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Chanter 11 - Transcripts of stimulus interviews used in Experiment 7
Transcript of interview with ‘consistent’ stimulus person (Dave)
Interviewer: Can you tell me your name please?
Dave: Dave.
I: And what’s your nationality?
D: Umm, Australian.
I: And how old are you Dave?
D: Ah, twenty-seven.
I: And what is your occupation?
D: Ah, well, I ’m actually unemployed, have been for, oh, about a year and a half now.
I: Are you married Dave? Do you have any children?
D: No I ’m not married and no I don't have any children.
I: OK, ... where did you spend you childhood Dave?
D: Ah, in Sydney.
I: And did you go to school there?
D: Yep.
I: OK ... I want to talk a little bit about your school days. Can you try to tell me a little 
about your school and about your experiences there?
D: Ah, yeah, the school I went to was, umm, not a bad school I guess. Umm, but I never 
liked school very much. I didn’t try very hard, ah, missed a lot of classes. It just seemed 
too much like hard work you know. And I just wasn ’t interested. And, uh, the teachers 
never liked me.
I: And have you had any further education or training since leaving school?
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D: Ah, yeah, I started a TAFE course when I left school hut 1 dropped out after a year 
‘cause I ended up failing most things. I guess 1 just partied too much. Umm, since I ’ve 
been unemployed the CES is always trying to send me on those, you know, trainin’ 
courses. But I don’t go to any o f them. Can’t see the point really. They usually sound 
like they’d be dead boring. Uh, can’t see what I ’d get out o f them.
I: Could you describe your living arrangements to me? That is, what sort of dwelling do 
you live in and who do you share it with?
D: Umm, yeah, I live in a two-bedroom flat. Ah, I share it with one o f my mates and we 
rent it together.
I: I’ve been asking people to describe their typical day to me. Can you try to describe a 
typical day to me Dave?
D: Umm, ... yeah, well, you know ‘cause I ’m not working and that, I usually get out o f 
bed, oh, about lunchtime and been up watching late so I ’m pretty tired and that. Ah, 
most afternoons 1 just head down to the pub to meet my mates. We play a bit o f pool and 
vids, things like that. Umm ...on racedays I spend a bit o f time at the TAB. You know, I 
like to have a bit o f a flutter, oh, that’s if I ’ve got any dole money left. Stuff like that.
I: OK, and how do you see you future Dave? Where do you think you’ll be, for 
example, this time next year?
D: Oh, jeez, oh, I dunno. Probably be in the same situation I ’m in now. Like, I just don’t 
hold out much hope o f finding a job. D on’t really see the point o f looking fo r  work. The 
only jobs I ever get offered are, like, boring ones or unskilled ones. Its just not fa ir - 
might as well give up.
I: Now I’d like to ask you some questions concerning you attitudes to Australian society 
and ... (fade away).
Transcript of interview with ‘inconsistent’ stimulus person (Dave)
Interviewer: Can you tell me your name please?
Dave: Yeah, Dave.
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I: And what’s your nationality?
D: I ’m Australian.
I: How old are you Dave?
D: I ’m twenty-seven.
I: And what’s your occupation?
D: Ah, well, actually I ’m unemployed. Have been fo r  about a year and a half now.
I: Are you married Dave? Do you have any children?
D: Ah, no I ’m not married and no I don’t have any children.
I: Where did you spend you childhood Dave?
D: In Sydney.
I: Did you go to school there?
D: Ah, yeah.
I: OK ... I want to talk a little bit about your school days. Can you try and tell me a little 
about your school and about your experiences there?
D: Umm, sure, umm, yeah, I quite liked school really and I thought I was o f average 
intelligence and I tried very hard because I found it, ah, pretty interesting. Umm, I 
guess I did alright at school. You know, like, the school that I went to might not have 
been really good because it was in a working-class suburb, but I, I, think I still got a 
pretty education.
I: And what about since school, have you had any further education or training?
D: Ah, yeah, actually I have. Umm, I did a TAFE course when I left school. It got pretty 
hard going at times because I had to support myself but I still managed to finish it. And 
since I ’ve been unemployed the CES has encouraged me to go to training courses and 
I ’ve been along to a few  now and they’re, oh, pretty interesting. I figure it, you know, I 
figure it can't hurt to be better trained. At least I feel like I ’m, you know, doing 
something.
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I: Could you describe your living arrangements to me? That is, what sort of dwelling do 
you live in and who do you share it with?
D: Umm, yeah, I live in a two-bedroom ßat. Ah, I share it with one of my mates and we 
rent it together.
I: OK ... I’ve been asking people to try and describe their typical day to me. Can you try 
to describe a typical day to me Dave?
D: Ah, sure. OK now. Well, I like to have a routine, so I try to get up early as if I'm 
going to work each day. Ah, then, umm, most days I look through the paper to see if 
there ’s any jobs and the, umm, oh yes, I go down to the CES a couple of times a week 
and, oh, if there are any jobs there that I think I ’ve got the slightest chance at, I apply 
for them. You know I ’m not fussy. Sometimes, umm, I do some volunteer work. I like 
staying fit also so, you know, afternoons 1 meet up with a couple of my mates and, I 
dunno, we play soccer or cricket. Things like that.
I: OK ... How do you see you future Dave? Where do you think you’ll be, for example, 
this time next year?
D: Oh, this time next year, well, oh, I don’t like my chances of finding a job. I don’t 
really see what else I can personally do towards getting one. Oh, its frustrating 
because I think I ’m just as good as many people who are employed. I guess my plans 
are to keep trying.
I: Now I’d like to ask you some questions concerning you attitudes to Australian society 
and ... (fade away).
Transcript of interview with ‘neutral’ stimulus person (Cathy)
Interviewer: Can you tell me your first name please?
Cathy: Cathy.
I: And what’s your nationality?
C: I ’m Australian.
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I: OK, and how old are you Cathy?
C: I ’m twenty-eight years old.
I: And what’s your occupation?
C: Ah, I work as a secretary for a law firm.
I: Are you married Cathy? Do you have any children?
C: Yes, I ’ve been married for seven years and I ’ve got two children. There’s Joshua, 
he’s five and he’s at school now, and, and, Amy’s three.
I: Where did you spend you childhood Cathy?
C: I grew up in Perth.
I: And did you go to school there?
C: Yeah, until grade 7 and then my family moved to Melbourne.
I: OK ... I want to talk a little bit about your school days. I’m wondering, can you tell 
me a little about your school and about your experiences there?
C: Oh, oh (laughs) its hard to remember that long ago. But school was a pretty good 
time I guess. Ah, I had a lot of fun there and, umm, I made some good friends.
I: And have you had any further education or training since leaving school?
C: umm, yes, I did a TAFE course when I left school and umm, that was in secretarial 
studies.
I: Ok ... Could you describe your living arrangements to me? That is, what sort of 
dwelling do you live in and who do you share it with?
C: I live in a three-bedroom house with my husband and two children.
I: I’ve been asking people to describe their typical day to me. Can you try to describe 
your typical day to me Cathy?
C: Oh, pretty normal I guess. I ’m either at work or, umm, on weekends I try to spend 
time with my family. I ’m a pretty keen netball player but, but its hard to find the time 
with the little ones, you know.
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I: And how do you see you future Cathy? Where do you think you’ll be, for example, 
this time next year?
C: Umm, well I imagine nothing will be too different to how it is now. Umm, my 
children are getting older so that might mean a few changes. But, but /  think life will be 
pretty much the same for a while... yeah.
I: Now I’d like to ask you some questions concerning you attitudes to Australian society 
and ... (fade away).
347
Appendix B: Checklists
Chapter 8 - Checklist Adjectives Used In Experiments 3 And 4
intelligent argumentative brilliant courteous scientifically-minded
conventional straightforward alert sophisticated shrewd
ignorant sly reserved impulsive quiet
imaginative industrious stupid quick-tempered passionate
stubborn unreliable deceitful naive happy-go-lucky
jovial honest methodical faithful pleasure-loving
friendly vague evasive kind sensitive
neat practical cruel generous absent-minded
persistent frivolous aggressive gregarious unfriendly
tradition-loving conservative conceited ambitious individualistic
efficient talkative rude loud arrogant
preoccupied radical
Chapter 9 - Checklist Adjectives Used In Experiment 5
intelligent courteous argumentative shrewd sly
reserved quiet quick-tempered deceitful happy-go-lucky
jovial pleasure-loving friendly faithful evasive
kind sensitive neat kind sensitive
neat cruel generous absent-minded aggressive
gregarious unfriendly conceited arrogant radical
talkative rude loud
Chanter 11 - Checklist Adjectives Used In Experiment 7
in te llig e n t b r illia n t s o p h is tic a te d w itty s c ie n tif ic a lly -m in d e d
a le r t sh re w d sly m e d ita tiv e im a g in a tiv e
s tu p id ig n o ran t p ra c tic a l n a iv e in d u s tr io u s
lazy h o n es t d e c e itfu l u n re lia b le e v a s iv e
u n m o tiv a te d p ro g re s s iv e ra d ic a l c o n se rv a tiv e k in d
g e n e ro u s d e p e n d e n t m e rc e n a ry m a te r ia lis t ic e f f ic ie n t
q u a r re ls o m e n a tio n a lis tic s p o r ts m a n lik e a g g re ss iv e c o n c e ite d
b o a s tfu l a m b itio u s o s te n ta tio u s b la m e le ss in d iv id u a lis t ic
u n lu c k y lo u d fu ssy w h in g e in g u n d e rp r iv ile g e d
ru d e ta lk a tiv e su av e c o u r te o u s c o n v e n tio n a l
a rg u m e n ta tiv e loyal su sp ic io u s re se rv e d s tra ig h tfo rw a rd
q u ie t u n e m o tio n a l p o n d e ro u s s tu b b o rn im p u ls iv e
su g g e s tib le p a s s io n a te a rro g a n t jo v ia l q u ic k - te m p e re d
h u m o u rle s s se n s itiv e m e th o d ic a l n ea t p le a su re - lo v in g
p e rs is te n t im ita tiv e fr iv o lo u s g re g a rio u s h a p p y -g o - lu c k y
s lo v e n ly e d u c a te d fa ith fu l g ra sp in g tra d it io n - lo v in g
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Appendix C: Statistical Appendices
Chapter 7
Table Cl
Comparative Fit (high for friendliness/high for intelligence) x Dimension 
(friendliness/intelligence) ANOVA of trait rating difference scores: Experiment 1
S o u rces  o f  varia tion d f M S F E
B etw een  sub jec ts
W ith in  cells 62 10.47
C o m p . F it 1 3.32 .32 .576
W ith in  su b jec ts
W ith in  cells 62 2.47
D im en sio n 1 31.44 12.75 .001
C o m p . F it x D im ension 1 41 .44 16.81 .000
Table C2
Comparative Fit (high for friendliness/high for intelligence) x Dimension 
(friendliness/intelligence) ANOVA of number of thoughts generated: Experiment 1
S o u rces  o f  varia tion d f M S F E
B etw een  su b jec ts
W ith in  cells 62 1.11
C o m p . F it 1 .00 .00 .962
W ith in  su b jec ts
W ith in  ce lls 62 1.31
D im en sio n 1 28.53 21 .70 .000
C o m p . F it x D im ension 1 4.78 3.64 .061
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Table C3
Comparative Fit (high for friendliness/high for intelligence) x group (AVB) 
ANOVA of relative positivity of thoughts generated: Experiment 1
S o u rces  o f  varia tion d f M S F E
B etw een  subjects
W ith in  cells 62 .97
C om p. F it 1 .01 .01 .924
W ith in  subjects
W ith in  cells 62 1.64
group 1 20.35 12.41 .001
C om p. F it x group 1 9 .10 5.55 .022
Table C4
Comparative Fit (high for friendliness/high for intelligence) x Dimension 
(friendliness/intelligence) ANOVA of number of recalled behaviours: Experiment 
1
S o u rces  o f varia tion d f M S F E
B e tw een  sub jects
W ith in  cells 62 4.35
C om p. F it 1 18.78 4 .32 .042
W ith in  sub jects
W ith in  cells 62 2.06
D im en sio n 1 7.15 3.47 .067
C om p. F it x D im ension 1 14.46 7.03 .010
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Table C5
Comparative Fit (high for friendliness/high for intelligence) x Label 
(consistent/inconsistent) x Dimension (friendliness/intelligence) ANOVA of trait 
rating difference scores: Experiment 2 - Full Sample
S ources o f  varia tion d f M S F E
B etw een  sub jec ts
W ith in  cells 78 6.57
C om p. F it 1 .00 .00 .998
L abel 1 98 .62 15.00 .000
C om p. F it x Label 1 .01 .01 .936
W ith in  sub jec ts
W ith in  ce lls 78 2 .48
D im ension 1 18.91 7.63 .007
C om p. F it x D im . 1 11.03 4.45 .038
L abel x D im 1 1.21 .49 .487
C om p. F it x Lab. x D im 1 1.07 .43 .513
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Table C6
Comparative Fit (high for friendliness/high for intelligence) x Label 
(consistent/inconsistent) x Dimension (friendliness/intelligence) ANOVA of trait 
rating difference scores: Experiment 2 - Reduced Sample
S ources o f  varia tion d f M S F E
B etw een  sub jects
W ith in  cells 65 6.39
C om p. F it 1 .27 .04 .837
L abel 1 80.58 12.62 .001
C om p. F it x Label 1 .25 .04 .843
W ith in  sub jects
W ith in  cells 65 2.22
D im ension 1 17.96 8.07 .006
C om p. F it x D im . 1 8.61 3.87 .053
L abel x D im 1 .03 .02 .903
C om p. F it x Lab. x D im 1 3.28 1.48 .229
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Table C7
Comparative Fit (high for friendliness/high for intelligence) x Label 
(consistent/inconsistent) x Dimension (friendliness/intelligence) ANQVA of number 
of thoughts generated: Experiment 2 - Full Sample
S o urces o f  variation d f M S F E
B etw een  sub jects
W ith in  cells 78 .99
C om p. F it 1 .19 .19 .661
L abel 1 18.60 18.80 .000
C om p. F it x Label 1 .40 .41 .526
W ith in  sub jects
W ith in  cells 78 1.88
D im en sio n 1 32.74 17.38 .000
C om p. F it x D im . 1 .01 .01 .939
L abel x D im 1 10.81 5.74 .019
C om p. F it x Lab. x D im 1 .01 .01 .934
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Table C8
Comparative Fit (high for friendliness/high for intelligence) x Label 
(consistent/inconsistent) x Dimension (friendliness/intelligence) ANOVA of number 
of thoughts generated: Experiment 2 - Reduced Sample
S o u rces  o f  variation d f M S F E
B etw een  sub jects
W ith in  cells 65 1.00
C o m p . Fit 1 .39 .39 .535
L abel 1 18.03 18.08 .000
C o m p . F it x Label 1 .65 .65 .423
W ith in  sub jects
W ith in  cells 65 1.84
D im en sio n 1 28.25 15.35 .000
C o m p . Fit x D im . 1 .00 .00 .963
L abel x D im 1 6.19 3.36 .071
C o m p . Fit x Lab. x D im 1 .48 .26 .610
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Table C9
Comparative Fit (high for friendliness/high for intelligence) x Label 
(consistent/inconsistent) x Group (A/B) ANOVA of relative positivity of thoughts 
generated: Experiment 2 - Full Sample
S ources o f  varia tion d f M S F E
B etw een  sub jects
W ith in  cells 78 .95
C om p. F it 1 1.12 1.18 .282
L abel 1 .44 .47 .497
C om p. F it x Label 1 .11 .11 .740
W ith in  sub jec ts
W ith in  cells 78 2.55
G roup 1 14.52 5.69 .020
C om p. F it x G roup 1 .89 .35 .558
L abel x G roup 1 31.74 12.43 .001
C om p. F it x Lab. x G rp. 1 .35 .14 .711
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Table CIO
Comparative Fit (high for friendliness/high for intelligence) x Label 
(consistent/inconsistent) x Group (A/B) ANOVA of relative positivity of thoughts 
generated: Experiment 2 - Reduced Sample
S o urces o f variation d f M S F E
B etw een  subjects
W ith in  cells 65 1.04
C om p. Fit 1 1.16 1.11 .296
L abel 1 .50 .48 .490
C om p. F it x Label 1 .05 .05 .830
W ith in  subjects
W ith in  cells 65 2.51
G roup 1 10.76 4 .30 .042
C om p. F it x G roup 1 1.35 .54 .465
L abel x G roup 1 2 2 .90 9 .14 .004
C om p. F it x Lab. x G rp. 1 1.08 .43 .514
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Table C ll
Comparative Fit (high for friendliness/high for intelligence) x Label 
(consistent/inconsistent) x Dimension (friendliness/intelligence) ANOVA of number 
of recalled behaviours: Experiment 2 - Total Sample
S o u rces  o f variation d f M S F E
B etw een  sub jects
W ith in  cells 77 3 .50
C om p. F it 1 19.33 5.52 .021
L abel 1 .11 .03 .861
C om p. F it x Label 1 6.79 1.94 .168
W ith in  subjects
W ith in  cells 77 1.37
D im ension 1 3.23 2.36 .129
C om p. F it x D im . 1 1.44 1.05 .308
L abel x D im 1 .60 .44 .508
C om p. F it x Lab. x D im 1 .30 .22 .642
358
Table C12
Comparative Fit (high for friendliness/high for intelligence) x Label 
(consistent/inconsistent) x Dimension (friendliness/intelligence) ANOVA of number 
of behaviours recalled: Experiment 2 - Reduced Sample
S o urces o f  varia tion d f M S F E
B etw een  su b jec ts
W ith in  cells 64 3.58
C o m p . F it 1 13.33 3.72 .058
L abel 1 .76 .21 .646
C o m p . F it x L abel 1 9.03 2.52 .117
W ith in  su b jec ts
W ith in  ce lls 64 1.15
D im en sio n 1 .86 .75 .391
C om p. F it x D im . 1 .13 .12 .733
L abel x D im 1 1.16 1.01 .318
C om p. F it x Lab. x D im 1 .74 .65 .425
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Table C13
Comparative Fit (high for friendliness/high for intelligence) x Dimension 
(friendliness/intelligence) ANOVA of trait rating difference scores: Experiment 3
S o u rces  o f  v a ria tion d f M S F E
B etw een  su b jec ts
W ith in  ce lls 18 3.11
C o m p . F it 1 2 .50 .81 .381
W ith in  su b jec ts
W ith in  ce lls 18 2.68
D im en sio n 1 12.10 4.51 .048
C o m p . F it x D im ension 1 19.60 7.30 .015
Table C14
Comparative Fit (high for friendliness/high for intelligence) x Dimension 
(friendliness/intelligence) ANOVA of positivity scores; Experiment 3
S o u rces  o f  v a ria tion d f M S F E
B etw een  su b jec ts
W ith in  ce lls 18 2 .00
C o m p . F it 1 4 .90 2.45 .135
W ith in  su b jec ts
W ith in  cells 18 2.71
G ro u p 1 36 .10 13.32 .002
C o m p . F it x G ro u p 1 4 4 .1 0 16.27 .001
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Table C15
Comparative Fit (high for friendliness/high for intelligence) x Label 
(consistent/inconsistent) x Dimension (friendliness/intelligence) ANOVA of trait 
rating difference scores: Experiment 4
S ources o f  variation d f M S F E
B etw een  sub jects
W ith in  cells 40 8.05
C om p. F it 1 7.28 .90 .347
L abel 1 6.72 .83 .366
C om p. F it x Label 1 .07 .01 .927
W ith in  sub jects
W ith in  cells 40 2.82
D im ension 1 17.75 6.31 .016
C om p. F it x D im . 1 7.92 2.81 .101
L abel x D im 1 .25 .09 .766
C om p. F it x Lab. x D im 1 2.06 .73 .397
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Table C16
Comparative Fit (high for friendliness/high for intelligence) x Label 
(consistent/inconsistent) x Dimension (friendliness/intelligence) ANOVA of
positivity scores: Experiment 4
S o u rces  o f  variation d f M S F E
B etw een  subjects
W ith in  cells 40 2.21
C om p. F it 1 9.71 4 .40 .042
L abel 1 4 .77 2.16 .149
C om p. F it x Label 1 2.39 1.08 .304
W ith in  sub jects
W ith in  cells 40 3.08
group 1 31.48 10.22 .003
C om p. F it x G roup 1 21.89 7.11 .011
L abel x G roup l .17 .05 .817
C om p. F it x Lab. x G rp. 1 .27 .09 .767
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Table C17
Fit (high/no normative/no comparative) x Theory Generation (no theorv/theorv) 
ANOVA of trait rating difference scores: Experiment 5
S o u rces  o f  varia tion d f M S F E
M ain  E ffects
F it 2 25.11 3.54 .035
T h eory  G eneration 1 .23 .03 .859
2 -w ay  In terac tion
F it x T h eory  Gen. 2 2 .42 .34 .713
R esidual 58 7 .10
Table C18
Fit (high/no normative/no comparative) x Theory Generation (no theorv/theorv) 
ANOVA of similarity scores; Experiment 5
S o u rces  o f  varia tion d f M S F E
M ain  E ffec ts
F it 2 4 .38 1.36 .264
T h eo ry  G eneration 1 .06 .02 .893
2-w ay  In terac tion
F it x T h eory  G en. 2 8.34 2.59 .084
R esidual 57 3.22
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Table C19
Fit (high/no normative/no comparative) x Theory Generation (no theory/theorv) x 
Group (A/B) ANQVA of composite friendliness scores: Experiment 5
S o u rces  o f  variation d f M S F E
B etw een  sub jects
W ith in  cells 54 .89
F it 2 1.55 1.75 .184
T h eory  G eneration 1 2 .36 2.66 .109
F it x T heory  G en. 2 1.27 1.43 .247
W ith in  sub jects
W ith in  cells 54 4 .84
G roup 1 104.11 21.53 .000
F it x G roup 2 5.67 1.17 .317
T h eory  G en. x G roup 1 .13 .03 .871
F it x T heory  G en. x G rp 2 10.36 2.14 .127
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Table C20
Fit (high/no normative/no comparative) x Theory Generation (no theorv/theorv) x 
Group (tour guides/chess players) ANOVA of friendliness ratings: Experiment 5
S o u rces  o f  variation d f M S F E
B etw een  sub jects
W ith in  cells 58 1.98
F it 2 3.71 1.87 .164
T h eo ry  G eneration 1 1.86 .94 .338
F it x T heory  G en. 2 .26 .13 .880
W ith in  subjects
W ith in  cells 58 3.25
G roup 1 201 .54 62.07 .000
F it x G roup 2 1.56 .48 .620
T h eo ry  G en. x G roup 1 15.33 4 .72 .034
F it x T heory  G en. x G rp 2 4.23 1.30 .280
Table C21
Fit (high/no normative/no comparative) x Theory Generation (no theorv/theorv) 
ANOVA of interest scores: Experiment 5
S o u rces  o f  variation d f M S F E
M ain  E ffec ts
F it 2 8.47 3.24 .046
T h eo ry  G eneration 1 .25 .10 .757
2-w ay  In teraction
F it x T heory  Gen. 2 4 .1 0 1.57 .217
R esidual 58 2.61
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Table C22
Theory (individual/social) x Label (consistent/inconsistent) ANOVA of levels of 
agreement with theory: Experiment 6
S ou rces  o f  varia tion d f M S F E
M ain  E ffec ts
T heory 1 1.07 .36 .551
L abel 1 3 .39 1.14 .290
2-w ay  In terac tion
T h eo ry  x L abel 1 4 .46 1.50 .226
R esidual 53 2 .96
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Table C23
Mean scores for trait rating and percentage estimate measures for group A and B 
(and standard deviations): Experiment 6
Theory: No Fixed Variable
Label: Cons Incons Cons Incons Cons Incons
T R A IT  R A T IN G S
G ro u p  A 7.62
(-77)
5.65
(1.69)
6.71
(1.49)
5.79
(1.12)
6.86
(1.23)
6.67
(1.63)
G ro u p  B 3.69
(1-70)
4.12
(1.36)
4.29
(1.44)
5.14
(1.61)
4.07
(1.49)
4.20
(1.57)
P E R C E N T A G E
E S T IM A T E
G ro u p  A 81.62
(7.6)
63.24
(18.7)
74.64
(15.5)
58.00
(17.5)
72.29
(12.68)
68.00
(16.56)
G ro u p  B 39.46
(21.3)
38.82
(18.8)
40.71
(19.5)
50.14
(19.1)
38.36
(17.7)
38.00
(23.1)
Table C24
Theory (no/individual/social) x Label (consistent/inconsistent) ANOVA of 
‘friendliness stereotyping’ scores: Experiment 6
S o u rces  o f  varia tion d f M S F E
M ain  E ffec ts
T h eo ry 2 12.76 1.77 .177
L abel 1 49 .33 6.85 .011
2-w ay  In terac tion
T h eo ry  x L abel 2 8.42 1.17 .316
R esid u al 81 7 .20
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Table C25
Theory (no/individual/social) x Label (consistent/inconsistent) ANOVA of 
‘stereotyping’ scores; Experiment 6
S o u r c e s  o f  v a r ia t io n d f M S F E
M a in  E f f e c ts
T h e o r y 2 1 0 .7 9 5 .2 7 .0 0 7
L a b e l 1 9 .0 3 4 .4 1 .0 3 9
2 -w a y  In te r a c t io n
T h e o r y  x L a b e l 2 4 .1 9 2 .0 5 .1 3 6
R e s id u a l 81 2 .0 5
Table C26
Theory Type (no/individual/social) x Label (consistent/inconsistent) x Attribution 
Type (individual/group) ANOVA of attribution ratings: Experiment 6
S o u r c e s  o f  v a r ia t io n d f M S F E
B e tw e e n  s u b je c ts
W ith in  c e l ls 7 9 3 .1 1
T h e o r y 2 4 .3 5 1 .4 0 .2 5 3
L a b e l 1 2 5 .4 1 8 .1 7 .0 0 5
T h e o r y  x L a b e l 2 .9 2 .3 0 .7 4 4
W ith in  s u b je c ts
W ith in  c e l ls 7 9 4 .5 6
A t t r ib u t io n 1 2 4 5 .6 9 5 3 .8 5 .0 0 0
T h e o r y  x A t t r ib u t io n 2 1 9 .1 0 4 .1 9 .0 1 9
L a b e l  x A t t r ib u t io n 1 9 .7 9 2 .1 5 .1 4 7
T h e o r y  x L a b . x A ttr ib . 2 5 .1 2 1.12 .331
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Table C27
Theory (no/individual/social) x Label (consistent/inconsistent) ANOVA of interest 
scores: Experiment 6
S ources o f  variation d f M S F E
M ain  E ffects
T heory 2 39.33 12.41 .000
L abel 1 8.57 2.70 .104
2-w ay  In terac tion
T h eo ry  x Label 2 .44 .14 .870
R esidual 81 3.17
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Table C28
Theory Type (A/B) x Interview Type (consistent/inconsistent) ANOVA of ‘effort* 
scores (Ol): Experiment 7
S ources o f  varia tion d f M S F E
M ain  E ffects
T h eory 1 .23 .20 .656
In terv iew 1 322.71 279 .84 .000
2-w ay  In terac tion
T h eory  x In terv iew 1 .33 .28 .597
R esidual 46 1.15
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Table C29
Theory Type (A/B) x Interview Type (consistent/inconsistent) ANQVA of ‘like* 
scores (02): Experiment 7
S o u rces  o f  variation d f M S F E
M ain  E ffec ts
T heory 1 2.57 1.25 .270
In terv iew 1 162.14 78.73 .000
2-w ay  In teraction
T h eory  x In terv iew 1 .06 .03 .863
R esidua! 46 2.06
Table C30
Theory Type (A/B) x Interview Type (consistent/inconsistent) ANQVA of 
‘statement’ scores (03): Experiment 7
S o urces o f  varia tion d f M S F E
M ain  E ffec ts
T heory 1 80.20 10.19 .003
In terv iew 1 5.06 .64 .427
2-w ay  In terac tion
T h eory  x In terv iew 1 6.25 .79 .378
R esidual 46 7.87
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Table C31
Theory Type (A/B) x Interview Type (consistent/inconsistent) ANQVA of ‘similar 
agree’ scores (04): Experiment 7
S o u rces  o f  varia tion d f M S F E
M ain  E ffects
T heory 1 7.76 1.80 .186
In terv iew 1 16.73 3.88 .055
2-w ay  In teraction
T heory  x In terv iew 1 .09 .02 .885
R esidual 46 4.31
Table C32
Theory Type (A/B) x Interview Type (consistent/inconsistent) ANQVA of ‘similar 
disagree’ scores (05): Experiment 7
S o u rces  o f  varia tion d f M S F E
M ain  E ffects
T heory 1 32.10 13.02 .001
In terv iew 1 22.38 9.07 .004
2-w ay  In teraction
T h eory  x In terv iew 1 14.90 6.04 .018
R esidual 46 2.47
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Table C33
Theory Type (A/B) x Interview Type (consistent/inconsistent) ANOVA of ‘interest* 
scores (06): Experiment 7
S ources o f  varia tion d f M S F E
M ain  E ffects
T heory 1 1.09 1.58 .215
In terv iew 1 .01 .01 .918
2-w ay  In terac tion
T h eory  x In terv iew 1 3.71 5.36 .025
R esidual 46 .69
Table C34
Theory Type (A/B) x Interview Type (consistent/inconsistent) ANOVA of 
disagreement with pretest scores: Experiment 7
S ources o f  varia tion d f M S F E
M ain  E ffects
T h eory 1 .00 .00 .995
In terv iew 1 1.11 1.27 .266
2-w ay In te rac tio n
T h eo ry  x In terv iew 1 .85 .97 .330
R esidual 46 .87
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Table C35
Theory Type (A/B) x Interview Type (consistent/inconsistent) ANOVA of 
prototypicalitv scores: Experiment 7
S ources o f  varia tion d f M S F E
M ain  E ffec ts
T heory 1 4.88 2.67 .109
In terv iew 1 12.00 6.56 .014
2-w ay In terac tion
T h eory  x In terv iew 1 2.46 1.34 .252
R esidual 46 1.83
Table C36
Theory Type (A/B) x Interview Type (consistent/inconsistent) ANOVA of mean
internal content scores for long-term unemployed: Experiment 7
Sources o f  varia tion d f M S F E
M ain E ffec ts
T h eory 1 3.93 5.21 .027
In terv iew 1 5.07 6.73 .013
2-w ay In te rac tion
T h eory  x In terv iew 1 .95 1.26 .267
R esidual 46 .75
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Table C37
Theory Type (A/B) x Interview Type (consistent/inconsistent) ANOVA of mean 
external scores for the long-term unemployed: Experiment 7
S ources o f  variation d f M S F E
M ain  E ffects
T heory 1 .64 .80 .376
In terv iew 1 13.90 17.43 .000
2-w ay  In teraction
T h eory  x In terv iew 1 .28 .35 .558
R esidual 46 .80
Table C38
Theory Type (A/B) x Interview Type (consistent/inconsistent) ANOVA of mean 
internal/external content scores for stimulus person; Experiment 7
S ources o f variation d f M S F E
M ain  E ffects
T heory 1 .11 .10 .751
In terv iew 1 249.69 223 .74 .000
2-w ay In teraction
T h eory  x In terv iew 1 5.10 4.57 .038
R esidual 46 1.12
